Opinion

M.B. v. CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION

Court
District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Filed
Sep 27, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.7%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

M.B., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:20-CV-796

)

CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY )

SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed by Defendants Nancy Kueffer1, Cheryl Carnahan, Elizabeth Clary,

and Ronnie Jackson (“Individual Defendants”). (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff’s grandmother

and legal guardian, Jamie Little, initially filed this suit individually and on Plaintiff’s behalf

on August 31, 2020, alleging violations of federal and state law. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has

since turned 18 and, on April 14, 2021, by Order of the Court, was substituted as Plaintiff

in this lawsuit. (ECF No. 38.) The Complaint alleges that the Chapel Hill-Carrboro City

Schools Board of Education (“Defendant School Board”) and Individual Defendants

(collectively, “Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent toward student-on-student sexual

abuse that Plaintiff suffered while he was a minor student attending Defendants’ school.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) Individual Defendants now move to dismiss the claims against them.

1 A Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Without Prejudice, as to Defendant Kueffer Only, (ECF No. 33),

(ECF No. 18.) For the reasons that follow, Individual Defendants’ motion is granted in

part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff attended Estes Hills Elementary School (“Estes Hills”); a primary school

governed by Defendant School Board. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4, 6–7.) Defendant Nancy Kueffer

worked for Defendant School Board as the school system’s “Coordinator of Exceptional

Children Behavior Support and Positive Behavior Intervention and Support Services,” and

directed “system level programs” at Estes Hills. (Id. ¶ 8.) The remaining Defendants each

worked at Estes Hills: Defendant Cheryl Carnahan served as Principal, Defendant Elizabeth

Clary as Assistant Principal, and Ronnie Jackson as Guidance Counselor. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12, 14.)

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff, a classmate named R.W., and one other

student were sexually abused by older students from around 2009 to 2011. (Id. ¶ 23.)

Primarily while Plaintiff was in first grade, he was subjected to repeated sexual touching and

manipulation of his genitalia and anus by two older students. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) This abuse

occurred all over the school: “in the school cafeteria, bathrooms and hallways, at recess on

the playground, as well as on the school bus.” (Id. ¶ 23.)

Individual Defendants first became aware of the abuse when Plaintiff’s classmate

R.W. reported it to their first grade teacher during the spring of 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 33–35, 37.)

Plaintiff’s teacher brought R.W. to speak with Assistant Principal Clary, but Clary never

contacted R.W.’s parents. (Id. ¶ 29, 35.) The next morning, Plaintiff’s teacher met with

Principal Carnahan and Guidance Counselor Jackson. (Id. ¶ 37.) Defendants Carnahan

and Jackson rebuffed suggestions that notice be sent to parents and the Department of

Social Services (“DSS”) and instead insisted that the situation was “being handled” and the

teacher should “stay out of it.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s teacher “believed the administration ‘was

trying to sweep what was occurring under the rug.’” (Id.) Plaintiff and R.W. continued to

be sexually abused after Plaintiff’s teacher became aware of the abuse and notified

Defendants. (Id. ¶ 39.)

Two years later, in the spring of 2013, the new Mental Health Clinician (“Clinician”)

hired by Estes Hills, became concerned that Plaintiff and R.W. were displaying symptoms

of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. (Id. ¶ 23.) She interviewed the two boys separately, and

each reported consistent accounts of the abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 24–25.) The Clinician investigated

the reports and spoke with (now former) Principal Kueffer, who admitted to knowing of

the allegations of abuse but did not believe them because, she said, Plaintiff and R.W. were

“manipulative.” (Id. ¶ 28.) The Clinician also spoke with two representatives from

Defendant School Board’s District Office, who were aware of “the incidents” and told the

Clinician to drop her investigation because “the situation had been resolved.” (Id. ¶ 27.)

The representatives claimed that a local rape crisis center provided counseling to Plaintiff

and R.W. and that the boys’ guardians had been notified. (Id.) The local center had no

record of counseling either child, however, and the representatives could produce no

evidence that either boy’s guardian was notified of their allegations. (Id.) Instead, the center

was asked to stage a puppet show on unsafe touching for Plaintiff’s class, and the boys’

guardians were mailed a general announcement describing the puppet show. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 30.)

Defendants removed one student who was believed to be Plaintiff’s primary abuser

from his school bus and temporarily installed “monitors” on the bus, but otherwise did not

evaluate, treat, confront, or discipline Plaintiff’s abusers. (Id. ¶ 38.) Defendants did not

notify Plaintiff’s guardian when they became aware of the abuse or in the two years

thereafter, until the Clinician finally notified Plaintiff’s guardian and R.W.’s mother on May

8, 2013. (Id. ¶ 29.) As a consequence of the continued and repeated abuse, Plaintiff has

suffered physical and psychological injuries, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional distress,

and a decline in classroom performance and ability to learn. (Id. ¶ 39.)

Count I of the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile educational

environment in violation of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §

1682 et seq. (“Title IX”) against Defendant School Board. (Id. ¶¶ 40–54.) Count II is

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment (“§ 1983 claim”) against Individual Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 55–

65.) Counts III through V allege violations of state common law by Individual Defendants,

including claims for negligence and gross negligence (Count III); negligent infliction of

emotional distress (“NIED”) (Count IV); and intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) (Count V). (Id. ¶¶ 66–88.) Finally, Counts VI and VII assert claims for medical

and counseling expenses, and for loss of services and companionship, respectively. (Id.

¶¶ 89–94.)

Individual Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss on November 2, 2020,

(ECF No. 18), requesting that all claims against them be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, Individual Defendants challenge Count V,

arguing that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for IIED. (ECF

No. 19 at 7–9.) They additionally challenge all state law claims, outlined in Counts III

through V, against Defendants Kueffer, Carnahan, and Clary, arguing that these Defendants

are protected by state public official immunity. (Id. at 10–17.) Lastly, Individual Defendants

move to dismiss Count II, arguing that: (1) Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to sustain

his § 1983 equal protection claim, and (2) alternatively, Defendants Kueffer, Carnahan, and

Clary are protected by qualified immunity. (Id. at 17–24.)

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is meant to “test[ ] the sufficiency of a

complaint” and not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the

applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.

1992). To survive such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and all

reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor, Ibarra v. United States,

120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997).

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) (Count V)

Individual Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for IIED

because their conduct was not “extreme and outrageous.” (ECF No. 19 at 8–9.)

North Carolina defines the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) as: “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly

causes severe emotional distress to another.” Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 332 (N.C.

1981). To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show three elements: (1)

“extreme and outrageous conduct,” (2) “which is intended to cause and does cause” or with

“reckless indifference to the likelihood that they will cause,” does cause (3) “severe

emotional distress to another.” Id. at 335.

Conduct is extreme and outrageous if it is “so outrageous in character, and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Smith-Price v. Charter Behavioral

Health Sys., 595 S.E.2d 778, 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). “Such conduct differs from behavior

universally regarded as inappropriate and abhorrent.” Griffin v. Mortier, 1:18CV98, 2019 WL

8641158, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2019) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d, 837 F. App’x

166 (4th Cir. 2020). It is for the court to decide in the first instance as a matter of law

“whether the conduct complained of may reasonably be found to be sufficiently outrageous

as to permit recovery”; the jury must then determine “whether the conduct complained of

is, in fact, sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” Hogan v. Forsyth Country

Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 121 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).

Courts in this District have found some school officials’ responses to allegations of

sexual assault to be extreme and outrageous conduct. See, e.g., McClean v. Duke Univ., 376 F.

Supp. 3d 585, 614 (M.D.N.C. 2019); Rouse v. Duke Univ., 869 F. Supp. 2d 674, 681–82

(M.D.N.C. 2012); Mandsager v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, 269 F. Supp. 2d 662, 683

(M.D.N.C. 2003). In McClean, a Gender Violence Coordinator “engaged in a campaign to

impugn [a rape victim’s] reputation” by: (1) making false stalking reports to police, (2)

“disclosing [p]laintiff’s confidential sexual assault report widely within the university,” (3)

causing a police officer to make false statements about [p]laintiff, and (4) “compiling and

disseminating negative information about [p]laintiff to destroy her reputation.” McClean,

376 F. Supp. 3d at 595–96. The District Court found that these allegations were

“exacerbated by the fact that [the Coordinator] was supposed to provide [p]laintiff with

counselling and other sensitive medical and social services,” but instead “abused her

position of power within the university to take advantage of [plaintiff’s] vulnerability.” Id.

at 614. In Rouse, defendant university “wrongfully and publicly suggested that [plaintiff]

was to blame for being raped” and “purposefully ‘duped’ her into withdrawing from

school.” Rouse, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 681. In Mandsager, defendant university refused to

discipline a faculty member accused of sexual harassment, stating of the harasser, “William

will be William,” and effectively told plaintiff that she would need to endure the harassment

to finish her graduate program. Mandsager, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 670. In each case, the conduct

was found to be extreme and outrageous.

In contrast, failures to investigate allegations of sexual assault or harassment, though

they may be inappropriate and abhorrent, typically do not constitute extreme and

outrageous conduct under North Carolina law. See, e.g., Marshall v. Frederick, No. 5:19-CV-

69-BO, 2019 WL 3822321, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2019); Biggs v. Edgecombe Cty. Pub. Sch.

Bd. of Educ., No. 4:16-CV-271-D, 2018 WL 4471742, at *11 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2018); Cash

v. Lees-McRae Coll., Inc., No. 1:18CV52, 2018 WL 7297876, at *16 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2018),

aff’d, 811 F. App’x 190 (4th Cir. 2020); J.W. v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:11-CV-707-D,

2014 WL 4771613, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2014).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew about sexual abuse, failed to adequately

respond, and discouraged school employees from investigating the abuse further. These

allegations, while they may be inappropriate and abhorrent, are more analogous to the

failure to sufficiently investigate or prevent abuse, rather than to those cases where a school

official independently harmed an abuse victim. Unlike in McClean or Rouse, Plaintiff has not

alleged that Individual Defendants attempted to publicly discredit or otherwise affirmatively

harm him. Unlike in Mandsager, Individual Defendants did not take the side of Plaintiff’s

abusers or tell Plaintiff that he would need to endure the abuse to finish his schooling.

Instead, they made some attempt to separate Plaintiff from at least one abuser and educate

his classmates on unsafe touching, though these attempts were minimal. While this alleged

conduct may establish liability under another legal standard, it does not constitute extreme

and outrageous conduct under North Carolina law.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for IIED must be dismissed.2

B. Public Official Immunity (Counts III through V)

Individual Defendants next argue that Defendants Carnahan and Clary are entitled

to public official immunity from Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.3 (ECF No. 19 at 10–

15.)

Under North Carolina law, “a public official, engaged in the performance of

governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, may not be held

personally liable for mere negligence in respect thereto.” Meyer v. Walls, 489 S.E.2d 880,

888 (N.C. 1997). A public official may nevertheless be liable where his conduct was “(1)

corrupt; (2) malicious; (3) outside of and beyond the scope of his duties; (4) in bad faith; or

(5) willful and deliberate.” Smith v. Jackson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 608 S.E.2d 399, 411 (N.C. Ct.

App. 2005).

2 Plaintiff cites to Smith v. Jackson County Board of Education to argue that failure to adequately respond to

allegations of sexual misconduct may constitute IIED. (ECF No. 27 at 7 (citing Smith v. Jackson Cty. Bd. of

Educ., 608 S.E.2d 399, 406–07 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)).) The court in Smith addressed whether that plaintiff’s

IIED claim was barred by the public duty doctrine, not whether plaintiff alleged extreme and outrageous

conduct. Smith, 608 S.E.2d at 406–07. Thus, the Court does not find that case to be persuasive here.

3 Individual Defendants initially argued that Defendant Kueffer is also entitled to public official immunity.

(ECF No. 19 at 10.) Jamie Little voluntarily dismissed all claims against Kueffer, rendering this argument

North Carolina courts have allowed public official immunity to be pierced where

the public official (1) actually knew of a risk of harm and (2) failed to act to prevent that

risk. In Martin v. Moreau, for example, public official immunity was pierced where a

highway-patrol training officer (1) knew that a cadet had suffered a severe injury but (2)

failed to provide aid within a reasonable timeframe. 770 S.E.2d 390, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App.

2015) (unpublished). Similarly, public official immunity was pierced where a sheriff (1)

knew that one of his deputies had previously assaulted a minor but (2) nevertheless assigned

him to work as a school resource officer. Smith, 608 S.E.2d at 411.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Individual Defendants (1) knew of severe injury—sexual

abuse—but (2) failed to take reasonable remedial action. Further, he alleges they (1) knew

that older students were abusing him and others but (2) nevertheless allowed them to

interact with him on a regular basis. As in Martin and Smith, here Individual Defendants

allegedly failed to act to address a known harm. Thus, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts

from which one could conclude that public official immunity should be pierced under the

circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court declines to find that Plaintiff’s claims

should be dismissed based on public official immunity.

C. Equal Protection Claim § 1983 Claim(Count II)

Individual Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims.

(ECF No. 19 at 17–21.)

“[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures a student’s

‘right to be free from sexual harassment in an educational setting.’” Feminist Majority Found.

v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 702 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686,

701 (4th Cir. 2007)). To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for peer sexual

harassment, a student must allege: (1) he “was subjected to discriminatory peer

harassment”; (2) “the school administrator responded to the discriminatory peer

harassment with deliberate indifference, i.e., in a manner clearly unreasonable in light of

known circumstances”; and (3) that deliberate indifference “was motivated by a

discriminatory intent.” Id. at 702–03 (internal quotations omitted). A response to alleged

peer-harassment constitutes deliberate indifference where the action was not “reasonably

calculated to end [the] harassment.” Id. at 689. Discriminatory intent can be inferred where

a defendant knows of sexual harassment but takes little or no action to remedy the abuse.

See T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2010).

Here, the first element is satisfied because Plaintiff alleges that he was regularly

abused by his classmates. The second element is also met because the Individual

Defendants knew that R.W. and Plaintiff were being abused but made no effort to interview

victims, notify parents, or discipline perpetrators. Defendants’ minimal efforts to remove

a single student from Plaintiff’s bus and install monitors was not “reasonably calculated to

end the harassment,” since multiple students were abusing Plaintiff and the abuse occurred

in more locations than the school bus. Finally, the third element is also adequately pleaded,

since the Individual Defendants were either openly skeptical of, or inclined to minimize,

Plaintiff’s disclosure and did little to stop the alleged harassment—a sufficient basis from

which to infer discriminatory intent. Individual Defendants may argue at trial that their

responses to the alleged abuse were reasonable or were not motivated by Plaintiff’s sex, but

at this stage “such suggestions do not mean that [Defendants] are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Grindle, 599 F.3d at 589. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded an Equal

Protection § 1983 claim.

D. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against

Defendants Carnahan and Clary are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.4 (ECF

No. 19 at 21–24.)

“Qualified immunity protects officials who commit constitutional violations but

who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably believe that their actions were

lawful.” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 537–38 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal

quotations omitted). To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must allege (1) defendant

infringed on her constitutional right, and (2) the violated right was “clearly established at

the time of the official’s conduct.” Id. at 538 (internal quotation omitted). A right is “clearly

established” only when it is “settled law, which means it is dictated by controlling authority

or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Feminist Majority, 911 F.3d at 704

(quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018)).

In Feminist Majority, plaintiff argued that she had a clearly established right under the

Equal Protection Clause to be free from student-on-student sexual harassment. Id. She

pointed first to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, which

held that victims of peer sexual harassment can pursue an equal protection claim against an

individual school employee. Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257–

58 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit, however, reasoned that Fitzgerald “did not define the

applicable standard for an equal protection claim premised on deliberate indifference.” Id.

Plaintiff then argued that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jennings clearly established the

4 Again, Individual Defendants’ argument that Defendant Kueffer is also entitled to qualified immunity is

right. Id. (citing Jennings, 482 F.3d at 701–02). The Fourth Circuit disagreed once again.

Jennings involved harassing conduct by an administrator, not by a peer, and the Fourth

Circuit concluded that “similarities between those two types of claims did not provide fair

warning, i.e., ‘obvious clarity,’ that an insufficient response to student-on-student

harassment violates established law.” Id. at 705 (quoting E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884

F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018)). Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that only three sister

circuits had recognized an equal protection claim for student-on-student harassment in

2014, and these circuits “adopted and applied different intent standards for such a claim.”

Id. at 705–06. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that, while a student has a fundamental

right under the Equal Protection Clause “to be free from a university administrator’s

deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment,” that right was not clearly

established in the Circuit when defendants’ conduct occurred. Id. at 706.

The conduct assessed in Feminist Majority occurred in 2014–2015. Id. at 680–84.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Individual Defendants were deliberately indifferent to student-

on-student sexual abuse even earlier, from 2011–2013. Thus, Feminist Majority governs this

issue, and this Court is bound by its determination. No clearly established right prohibited

Individual Defendants’ behavior in the years they were allegedly deliberately indifferent. In

arguing that such a right was clearly established, Plaintiff cites to Fitzgerald, Jenkins, and

several sister circuit cases, all of which were considered and rejected by the Fourth Circuit

in Feminist Majority.

Thus, Plaintiff’s equal protection claims against Defendants Carnahan and Clary are

barred by qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for IIED, and while Plaintiff

has alleged facts sufficient to support his equal protection claims arising under § 1983, those

claims against Defendants Carnahan and Clary are barred by qualified immunity. In

addition, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts from which public official immunity may be

pierced as it relates to his other state law claims. Thus, Individual Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following:

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (ECF No. 18), is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim arising under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Carnahan and Clary, (Count II) and Plaintiff’s IIED

claims against all Defendants, (Count V of the Complaint), (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55–65, 84–88).

It is DENIED as to all other claims against Individual Defendants.

This, the 27th day of September 2021.

/s/ Loretta C. Biggs

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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