WATSON v. ENGLAND

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TRAVIS L. WATSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:19cv945

)

OFFICER ENGLAND,1 et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the “Motion by Defendants

England, M. Johnson and Coleman to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

and Amended Complaint (Doc. Nos. 2 and 4) in Part with Prejudice”

(Docket Entry 16) (the “Motion”). For the reasons that follow, the

Court should grant in part and deny in part the Motion.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Travis L. Watson (the

“Plaintiff”), an inmate with the North Carolina Department of

Public Safety, commenced this action against Officer England,

1 Plaintiff originally identified “Officer England” as

“Officer English” (see, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at 1), but

subsequently filed a “Notice of Correction” (Docket Entry 4 at 1),

docketed as an “Amended Complaint” (see Docket Entry dated Jan. 23,

2020), clarifying that Plaintiff “is suing Officer England” rather

than “Officer English” (Docket Entry 4 at 1). [For legibility

reasons, this Opinion uses standardized capitalization and spelling

in all quotations from the parties’ materials. In addition,

citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.]

Officer M. Johnson, and Officer Coleman (collectively, the

“Defendants”) for their alleged violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights during Plaintiff’s pretrial detention at the

Guilford County Detention Center. (See Docket Entry 2 (the

“Complaint”) at 1-12.) According to the Complaint:

Plaintiff was intentionally, deliberately, and

maliciously denied the right to due process by [Officer]

Engl[and] and [Officer] Johnson, who were at the time

classification officers at the Guilford County Detention

Center. Plaintiff was unlawfully imprisoned, as a

pretrial detainee, in Administrative Segregation for 90

days by the mentioned officials without notice for or

reason or any written findings presented, immediately

after he had completed a 20-day segregation stint for a

rule violation. It was Plaintiff’s first rule violation

and no one had been caused any harm. After the

completion of the 20-day segregation stint, these

officials named above did arbitrarily abuse their

authority by placing Plaintiff on permanent

Administrative Segregation, not to protect inmates or

employees from danger but to overpunish Plaintiff with an

extensive segregation without due process which

constitutes false imprisonment. This was an unnecessary

infliction of pain and punishment which was not used to

maintain order and was disproportionate to the infraction

committed. Under the Due Process Clause, pretrial

detainees cannot be punished. Plaintiff completed [the]

20-day segregation on 2-22-17 and was immediately

transferred to another segregation unit (5E) for an

additional 90 days until he was transferred to prison on

5-22-17 for unknown reasons. Officer Coleman was

responsible for transferring Plaintiff to Administrative

Segregation.

(Id. at 12.)

The Complaint’s only other allegation regarding Defendants

states that Officer Johnson and Officer England “did act in their

official capacities being employees of the Guilford County

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Detention Center and thereby acted under the color of state law.

Officer Coleman is/was also an employee of the same.” (Id. at 4.)

Defendants move to entirely dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

Officer Coleman, as well as to dismiss Plaintiff’s official-

capacity claims against Officer England and Officer Johnson. (See

Docket Entry 16.) In particular, Defendants maintain that

“Plaintiff’s claims against [Officer] Coleman should be dismissed

because they are not plausible on their face in view of the facts

alleged in the Complaint.” (Id. at 1.) Defendants further assert

that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims “should be dismissed

because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants acted

pursuant to any official policy or custom which inflicted injury.”

(Id. at 2.)2

In response, Plaintiff filed a “Reply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss” (Docket Entry 22 (the “Response”) at 1), which solely

addresses Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claim against Officer

Coleman. (See id. at 1-4.) In relevant part, the Response

asserts:

In this case, [] Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee being

detained in the Guilford County Jail (GCJ) pending trial.

[Officer] Coleman is a classification officer at the GCJ

as admitted[3] by [] Defendants and so he would know that

2 The Motion also argues that “Plaintiff’s State Law claims

against Defendants, if any, should be dismissed.” (Id.) The

Complaint contains no state-law claims (see generally Docket Entry

2), mooting this aspect of the Motion.

3 The Complaint identifies Officer England and Officer

(continued...)

3

[] Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and he would know

that [] Plaintiff had just finished a 20-day segregation

stint for a rule infraction which was [] Plaintiff’s

first rule infraction. [Officer] Coleman would have

access to and a knowledge of Plaintiff’s rule infraction

to know that [] Plaintiff posed no danger to staff or

other inmates to warrant [Officer] Coleman placing []

Plaintiff in a segregation unit “permanently,” as he did

tell [] Plaintiff. . . . As stated, [Officer] Coleman is

a classification officer at the GCJ who has access to the

same information, as to inmates at the GCJ, that

[Officer] England and [Officer] Johnson have access to.

And so, before [Officer] Coleman was designated to

transport [] Plaintiff to further lockup, he had the same

knowledge as to Plaintiff’s segregation infraction and

status that the other Defendants had. [Officer] Coleman

knew that no legitimate justification had been

established to warrant Plaintiff being placed in

segregation permanently and yet he carried out the

act. . . . The fact that [] Defendants (including

[Officer] Coleman) acted outside of proper due process to

continue to imprison [] Plaintiff after his 20-day

segregation stint, implies that their actions were

arbitrary.

[Officer] Coleman is not entitled to qualified

immunity because, as discussed, he acted outside of the

procedural protections of due process. . . . [Officer]

Coleman is a classification officer, versed in these

type[s] of matters and daily situations dealing with

inmates, and he should know that these rights are

established.

For the foregoing reasons, [] Plaintiff asks the

Court to consider [Officer] Coleman’s knowledge as a GCJ

classification officer. [Officer] Coleman has

contributed to the violation of [] Plaintiff’s rights, by

being the actual and direct hand that placed [] Plaintiff

under the illegal restriction. [Officer] Coleman has a

3(...continued)

Johnson by “Job or Title” as “Classification” officers (Docket

Entry 2 at 2), but neither provides a description of Officer

Coleman’s job/title (see id. at 3) nor elsewhere identifies him as

a classification officer (see generally Docket Entry 2). However,

Defendants filed an answer admitting “that [Officer] Coleman was a

Detention Classification Officer” (Docket Entry 18 at 2).

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duty to be in tune with these things and should have

known that his actions were prejudicing []

Plaintiff... .

(Id. at 2-3.)

Defendants reply that the Response improperly attempts to

alter the Complaint’s allegations against Officer Coleman. (See

Docket Entry 23 at 2-4.) Accordingly, Defendants assert that such

allegations “should be disregarded by thle] Court.” (Id. at 4.)

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standards

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the

“Rules”). (See Docket Entry 16 at 1.) In reviewing a Rule

12 (b) (6) motion, the Court must “accept the facts alleged in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App., 626 F.3d 187, 189

(4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Coleman v. Court of App. of Md.,

566 U.S. 30 (2012). The Court must also “draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours &

Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a pro se complaint

must “be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court “will not accept legal conclusions couched

as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or

arguments.” United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am.,

Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5

(4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Frickson to undermine [the]

requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and

conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court can

also “put aside any naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d

412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), as _ amended _on reh’g in part (Oct. 29,

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To avoid Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). To qualify as plausible, a claim needs sufficient factual

content to support a reasonable inference of the defendant’s

liability for the alleged misconduct. Id. “Where a complaint

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). This standard “demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. In other

words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id. Moreover, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint” cannot “survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Francis v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009). “At bottom,

determining whether a complaint states . . . a plausible claim for

relief . . . will ‘be a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

II. Analysis

A. Officer Coleman

Defendants first move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

Officer Coleman on the ground that “they are not plausible on their

face in view of the facts alleged in the Complaint.” (Docket Entry

16 at 1.) In regards to Officer Coleman, the Complaint asserts

simply that “[he] was responsible for transferring Plaintiff to

Administrative Segregation.” (Docket Entry 2 at 12.) This lone

assertion fails to support a reasonable inference that Officer

Coleman violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. As such, the

Complaint fails to state a viable claim against Officer Coleman.

See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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Plaintiff attempts to overcome this deficiency by adding

various allegations regarding Officer Coleman in his Response.

(See Docket Entry 22 at 1-3.) However, “[a plaintiff] is bound by

the allegations contained in [hi]s complaint and cannot, through

the use of motion briefs, amend the complaint,” Zachair, Ltd. v.

Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d

1162 (4th Cir. 1998). See, e.g., Morgan Distrib. Co., Inc. v.

Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is

axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in

opposition to a motion to dismiss. To hold otherwise would mean

that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will, even

without filing an amendment, and simply by raising a point in a

brief.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see

also Days v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 318cv440, 2019 WL 8619628,

at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 4, 2019) (“In order to amend their complaint,

[the p]laintiffs may not simply add allegations to their already

existing complaint as they have done here. Rather, they must

submit a proposed amended complaint that contains all claims they

intend to bring in this action against all [the d]efendants they

intend to sue. That is, [the p]laintiffs may not amend their

complaint in piecemeal fashion.” (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly,

Plaintiff cannot stave off dismissal through the Response’s new

allegations against Officer Coleman.

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Moreover, Plaintiff’s new allegations fail to state a viable

claim. The Response alleges that “[Officer] Coleman is a

classification officer .. .andso he would know that [] Plaintiff

was a pretrial detainee and he would know that [] Plaintiff had

just finished a 20-day segregation stint” for his first rule

infraction. (Docket Entry 22 at 2 (emphasis added).) The Response

further maintains that “[Officer] Coleman would have access to and

a_knowledge of Plaintiff’s rule infraction to know that []

Plaintiff posed no danger to staff or other inmates to warrant

[Officer] Coleman placing [] Plaintiff in a segregation unit

‘permanently,’ as he did tell [] Plaintiff.” (Id. (emphasis

added) .) The Response further alleges that, as a classification

officer, Officer Coleman “has access to the same information...

that [Officer] England and [Officer] Johnson have access to. And

so, before [Officer] Coleman was designated to transport []

Plaintiff to further lockup, he had the same knowledge as to

Plaintiff’s segregation infraction and status that the other

Defendants had.” (Id. (emphasis added) .) Thus, the Response

asserts, “[Officer] Coleman knew that no legitimate justification

had been established to warrant Plaintiff being placed in

segregation permanently and yet he carried out the act.” (Id.)

In sum, the Response maintains that, through his position,

Officer Coleman could obtain information regarding Plaintiff’s

disciplinary history and status. (See id. at 2-3.) Because

Officer Coleman allegedly “has access to the same information” (id.

at 2) as the officers who “plac[ed] Plaintiff on permanent

Administrative Segregation” (Docket Entry 2 at 12), Plaintiff

contends that “[Officer] Coleman knew that no legitimate

justification had been established to warrant Plaintiff being

placed in segregation permanently and yet he carried out the act”

(Docket Entry 22 at 2). At best, however, Plaintiff’s allegations

raise “the mere possibility of misconduct,” and thus cannot

“survive [Defendants’] Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” Francis, 588 F.3d at

193.

In other words, on the facts (improperly) alleged in the

Response, the Court could conclude that Officer Coleman possibly

utilized his “access to . . . information[] as to inmates at the

[Greensboro Detention Center]” to learn about Plaintiff’s

disciplinary history and status “before [Officer] Coleman was

designated to transport [] Plaintiff to further lockup.” (Docket

Entry 22 at 2.) However, the Court also must conclude that it

remains equally possible that Officer Coleman did not avail himself

of this information before his “designat[ion] to transport []

Plaintiff to further lockup.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails

to “nudge[ his] claims [against Officer Coleman] across the line

from conceivable to plausible,” necessitating their dismissal.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining

that if a “complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with

10

a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

B. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants further move to dismiss Plaintiff’s official-

capacity claims against Officer England and Officer Johnson. (See

Docket Entry 16 at 2.) Under Section 1983, official-capacity

liability occurs only if “execution of a government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or

acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121

(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant here, “an

official’s discretionary acts, exercised in carrying out official

duties, do not necessarily represent official policy.” Perdue v.

Harrison, No. 1:17cv403, 2017 WL 4804363, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 24,

2017). “Rather, the official must have ‘final authority’ over

government policy with respect to the action in question to trigger

official capacity liability.” Id. (certain internal quotation

marks omitted). The Complaint contains no allegations that Officer

England and Officer Johnson either acted pursuant to any Greensboro

Detention Center policy or possessed “final authority” over any

such custom or policy. (See generally Docket Entry 2.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims against Officer

England and Officer Johnson fail as a matter of law.

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Officer

Coleman and further fails to allege that Defendants acted pursuant

to any official policy.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 16)

be granted in part and denied in part as follows: Plaintiff’s

claims against Officer Coleman and his official-capacity claims

against Officer England and Officer Johnson should be dismissed

without prejudice.4

This 5th day of February, 2021.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

4 Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the relevant claims

with prejudice. (See id. at 1-2.) However, as a general matter,

“where a defect in the complaint is curable, the court should grant

the dismissal without prejudice.” Misel v. Green Tree Servicing,

LLC, 782 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178 (E.D.N.C. 2011). Because Plaintiff

could potentially cure his pleading deficiencies, dismissal without

prejudice remains appropriate here.

12