WATSON v. MOORE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TRAVIS L. WATSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:19cv931

)

SGT. MOORE, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the “Motion by Defendant

Sergeant Moore to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice”

(Docket Entry 9) (the “Motion”).1 For the reasons that follow, the

Court should grant the Motion.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Travis L. Watson (the

“Plaintiff”), an inmate with the North Carolina Department of

Public Safety (the “NCDPS”), commenced this action against Sergeant

Moore (the “Defendant”) for his alleged violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights during Plaintiff’s pretrial detention at the

1 For legibility reasons, this Opinion uses standardized

capitalization in all quotations from the parties’ materials.

Guilford County Jail (the “GCJ”). (See Docket Entry 2 (the

“Complaint”) at 1-13.)2 According to the Complaint:

“Plaintiff ha[d] been clinically diagnosed with anxiety,

depression, and personality disorder prior to th[e] event” at

issue. (Id. at 5.) At 5:30 p.m. on January 2, 2017,

Plaintiff asked to see a nurse about anxiety and

depression. While waiting, [Defendant] approached

Plaintiff and accused him of an earlier improper act and

stated [that Defendant] ha[d] to put [Plaintiff] on

suicide watch because [Defendant wa]s about to go home

for the day and if anything happened to Plaintiff it

would be on [Defendant]. At no time did Plaintiff say

anything to any officer or nurse about harming himself or

others. Plaintiff complied reluctantly with

[Defendant’s] orders. Plaintiff was immediately taken to

a suicide cell and stripped naked at [Defendant’s]

command.

(Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff was “watched for 7 days until he demanded to know

why he was being treated as such. A psychologist was sent to talk

to Plaintiff in order to determine if Plaintiff needed further

watch[ing].” (Id. at 12.) The psychologist indicated “that she

did not see in the records why Plaintiff was on a suicide watch.

After leaving, she returned and notified Plaintiff that he had been

put in the cell by [Defendant] because of an alleged rule

violation.” (Id.) The psychologist “then ordered that Plaintiff

be released from the suicide watch and his clothes were returned on

[January 9, 2017].” (Id.)

2 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF

footer’s pagination.

2

Although the Complaint indicates that Plaintiff did not file

a grievance “concerning the facts relating to th[e C]omplaint” (id.

at 7), it also states that Plaintiff did file “Grievance No:

2017/2,” which “claim[ed],” in relevant part, “unlawful suicide

watch for 7 days as a pretrial [detainee]” (id.). The Complaint

elaborates:

For reasons unknown, as a pretrial detainee

Plaintiff was transferred to prison after this event.

When he was returned he filed request for grievance to

address this issue but request was ignored. However in

July of 2017 Plaintiff did file grievance and referred to

this event in the complaint (Grievance No: 2017/2).

(Id. at 8.)

Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the

grounds, inter alia, that “Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

Administrative Remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.”

(Docket Entry 9 at 1.) In support of this assertion, Defendant

provided Grievance No: 2017/2, which describes the nature of

Plaintiff’s “grievance/problem” as:

I was intentionally, deliberately, and maliciously

denied my rights of Due Process by [Sheriff] B.J. Barnes

and staff at [the GCJ]. I was unlawfully held in

segregation for 90 days without a hearing (2/22/17 to

5/22/17) after completing a 20-day segregation stint for

(1) one guilty infraction. Again I was denied Due

Process, being sent to [sic] process into the custody and

control of the [NCDPS] for 26 days without judgement and

commitment (5/22/17 to 5/30/17 and 6/22/17 to 7/10/17).

(Docket Entry 11-1 at 1.)

3

In response, Plaintiff concedes that Grievance 2017/2 does not

cover the events at issue in the Complaint. (See Docket Entry 15

at 1.) More specifically, Plaintiff states:

After review, there has in fact been an error.

Plaintiff did not focus on the issue in this civil

complaint when he filed Grievance No: 2017/2 on July 25,

2017 at the [GCJ]. This assertion by [] Plaintiff was

not intended to mislead the Court. In the matter of

exhaustion, Plaintiff was subjected to [Defendant’s]

actions on or about 1-2-17 to 1-9-17. Before []

Plaintiff could file any grievance on this matter, he was

unlawfully transferred, by GCJ officials, to a state

prison. The record will support that on 5-22-17[,

]Plaintiff was abruptly transferred from the GCJ to

Craven Correctional Institution (CCI) . . . . And so

. . . Plaintiff was precluded from exhausting

administrative remedies because he had no access to the

rendered grievance procedure. As admitted by Officer

Diehl in his/her affidavit,[3 ]Plaintiff was transferred

back to the GCJ on 5-30-17, until June 22, 2017. During

the month of June of 2017, [] Plaintiff did in fact file

a complaint with [a GCJ official, Captain J.L. Rollins].

This complaint was filed by way of Guilford County

Sheriff’s Detention Bureau Form. In the Complaint,

Plaintiff notified Cpt. J.L. Rollins of 3 issues:

1) That on 5-22-17 he had been illegally sent to prison,

2) That from 2-22-17 to 5-22-17 he had been illegally

imprisoned in segregation, and 3) That he had been

illegally imprisoned as a suicide [risk] for 7 days.

Plaintiff requested a formal grievance to address these

issues. [Cpt.] J.L. Rollins and any other official

failed to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint and request

and instead, on June 22, 2017[, ]Plaintiff was again

illegally transferred from the GCJ to the prison (CCI),

where administrative remedies were again

3 In support of the Motion, Defendant submitted an affidavit

from Officer M. Diehl detailing the dates of Plaintiff’s detention

at the GCJ and providing all of Plaintiff’s “Grievance Forms at the

[GCJ]” (Docket Entry 11, ¶ 4) for the duration of his detention

there. (See id., ¶¶ 2-4; see also Docket Entry 11-1.) Defendant

also submitted an affidavit from Captain Z. Sellars detailing and

attaching the GCJ’s grievance procedures. (See Docket Entries 12,

12-1.)

4

unavailable. . .. Officer Diehl and Cpt. 4 Sellars, who

both offer affidavits addressing the grievance procedure

and two filed grievances by [] Plaintiff, have neglected

to address the fact that [] Plaintiff did file a

complaint by way of request form to Cpt. J.L. Rollins,

the request being contained in the request form records

mentioned by Officer Diehl in the affidavit. []

Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to allow the

complaint filed to [Cpt. Rollins], who also reviews

grievance complaints, to serve as proof of exhaustion

since [Cpt. Rollins] did not respond to the complaint and

request. In the alternative, [] Plaintiff respectfully

asks that this matter be excused from exhaustion because

of the actions by GCJ officials to illegally send him to

prison (as the record will support) on 5-22-17 and 6-22-

17, thereby rendering administrative remedies unavailable

to [] Plaintiff. . . . It is only by GCJ officials[’]

action and inaction that has caused this matter not to be

properly channeled through the grievance procedure.

(Id. at 1-3.)

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standards

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the

“Rules”). (See Docket Entry 9 at 1.) To avoid such dismissal, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft □□

Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To qualify as plausible, a

claim needs sufficient factual content to support a reasonable

inference of the defendant’s liability for the alleged misconduct.

Id. Facts that remain “‘merely consistent with’” liability fail to

establish a plausible claim for relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 557). However, the complaint need not contain detailed

factual recitations, as long as it provides “the defendant fair

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis

omitted).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept the

facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of

App., 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Coleman v.

Court of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). The Court must also

“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I.

du_Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a

pro se complaint must “be liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court “will not accept legal conclusions

couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable

conclusions, or arguments.” United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda

Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d

298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to

undermine Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than

labels and conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “At

bottom, determining whether a complaint states . . . a plausible

claim for relief . . . will ‘be a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.’” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.

2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Furthermore, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “tests the sufficiency of

a complaint,” but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts,

the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”

Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.

1992) (emphasis added). Thus, “claims lacking merit may be dealt

with through summary judgment under Rule 56” rather than through a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506,

514 (2002). Nevertheless, dismissal remains “appropriate when the

face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a

meritorious affirmative defense.” Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,

85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996).

Further, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court

evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents

attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont, 637

F.3d at 448. The Court may also consider documents “attached to

the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the

complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp., 572

7

F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). Generally, a “court cannot go

beyond these documents” without “convert[ing] the motion into one

for summary judgment.” E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 448.

As such, if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to

and not excluded by the [C]ourt, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be

treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(d). In turn, under Rule 56, “[t]he [C]ourt shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The

movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of such

dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Moreover,

[w]here, as here, the movant seeks summary judgment

on an affirmative defense, [he] must conclusively

establish all essential elements of that defense. When

the defendant has produced sufficient evidence in support

of [hi]s affirmative defense, the burden of production

shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Ray Commc’ns, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 673 F.3d 294,

299 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

8

Additionally, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. Moreover, “the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs,

conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a

motion for summary judgment.” Lewis v. Eagleton, No. 4:08cv2800,

2010 WL 755636, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing Baber v.

Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992)),

aff’d, 404 F. App’x 740 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Pronin v.

Johnson, 628 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that

“[m]ere conclusory allegations and bare denials” or the nonmoving

party’s “self-serving allegations unsupported by any corroborating

evidence” cannot defeat summary judgment). Finally, factual

allegations in a complaint or court filing constitute evidence for

summary judgment purposes only if sworn or otherwise made under

penalty of perjury. See Reeves v. Hubbard, No. 1:08cv721, 2011 WL

4499099, at *5 n.14 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2011), recommendation

adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2011).

II. Exhaustion Requirement

As relevant here, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as

amended (the “PLRA”), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

This “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

The defendant bears the burden of establishing that a prisoner

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549

U.S. 199, 216 (2007) (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not

required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their

complaints.”).

Nevertheless, the “exhaustion of administrative remedies under

the PLRA is a question of law to be determined by the judge.”

Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2010); see also

Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[A]ll . . . of

the circuits that have considered the issue agree that judges may

resolve factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without

the participation of a jury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A prisoner satisfies the PLRA exhaustion requirement when he “ha[s]

utilized all available remedies ‘in accordance with the applicable

procedural rules,’ so that prison officials have been given an

opportunity to address the claims administratively.” Moore v.

Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Woodford v.

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Thus, the relevant jail’s grievance

10

procedures determine the steps that a prisoner must take to meet

his exhaustion obligations. See id. at 726.

Per Grievance 2017/2, an individual “must file the grievance

within three days from the date [he] discovered or reasonably

should have discovered the incident giving rise to the complaint

and was able to file the grievance.” (Docket Entry 11-1 at 1.)

That requirement accords with the GCJ grievance procedures that

Captain Sellars provided. (See Docket Entry 12-1 at 1 (“The inmate

must file the grievance within three (3) days from the date of the

incident, the discovery of the incident, when they reasonably

should have discovered the incident, giving rise to the complaint,

or within three (3) days of receipt of a response to an inmate

request form [detailing the inmate’s compliance with the GCJ’s

informal resolution process, specifying the relevant grievance, and

requesting a grievance form].”).)

III. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, Defendant relies on materials outside

the Complaint in support of his Motion. (See, e.g., Docket Entry

10 at 6-7.) Accordingly, the Motion more properly constitutes a

request for summary judgment than for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The distinction between Rule 12(b)(6) and

Rule 56 motions has little bearing on the outcome of this case,

however, because (i) the Court can properly consider Grievance

2017/2 in resolving the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6), see Philips,

11

572 F.3d at 180, and, in any event, (ii) the parties agree on the

relevant facts (see, e.g., Docket Entry 10 at 6-7; Docket Entry 11,

¶ 2; Docket Entry 15 at 1-3.) In this regard, the record reflects

the following:4

No later than January 9, 2017, GCJ officials released

Plaintiff from suicide watch. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at 12-13

(alleging that Plaintiff remained on suicide watch from January 2,

2017, to January 9, 2017); Docket Entry 11, ¶ 2 (averring that

“Plaintiff was on Suicide Watch from December 31, 2016 until

January 5, 2017”).) Plaintiff alleges that, on January 9, 2017, a

psychologist informed Plaintiff that Defendant had placed him on

suicide watch “because of an alleged rule violation.” (Docket

Entry 2 at 12.) According to Plaintiff, the psychologist “then

ordered that Plaintiff be released from the suicide watch and his

clothes were returned on [January 9, 2017].” (Id.) On May 22,

2017, NCDPS officials transferred Plaintiff from the GCJ to another

NCDPS facility, where he remained until May 30, 2017, at which

point he transferred back to the GCJ, where he remained until June

22, 2017. (See Docket Entry 11, ¶ 2; Docket Entry 15 at 1-2.)

In July 2017, Plaintiff filed Grievance 2017/2, which does not

address the suicide watch incident. (See Docket Entry 11-1 at 1.)

4 It bears noting that neither Plaintiff’s Complaint nor his

response to the Motion constitutes evidence for summary judgment

purposes, as he did not submit them under penalty of perjury (see

Docket Entries 2, 15). See Reeves, 2011 WL 4499099, at *5 n.14.

12

Plaintiff maintains, however, that during June 2017, he filed a

complaint with a GCJ official, Captain J.L. Rollins, reporting the

suicide watch incident and requesting a grievance form. (See

Docket Entry 15 at 2.)5 Per Plaintiff, neither Captain Rollins nor

any other GCJ official responded to that June 2017 complaint.

(See id.) Plaintiff asks the Court to either allow that alleged

June 2017 complaint “to serve as proof of exhaustion” or,

alternatively, to “excuse[]” this matter “from exhaustion because

of the actions by GCJ officials to illegally send him to prison

. . . on [May 22, 2017,] and [June 22, 2017], thereby rendering

administrative remedies unavailable to [him].” (Id. at 2-3.)

In sum, the record reflects that Plaintiff failed to file a

grievance, as required, regarding the suicide watch incident. The

record further shows that, although Plaintiff knew by at least

January 9, 2017, of “the incident giving rise to the complaint”

(Docket Entry 11-1 at 1), he did not attempt to pursue a grievance

5 As Plaintiff suggests, the GCJ grievance process begins

with an informal resolution process in which an inmate alerts GCJ

officials to a complaint, which GCJ officials “shall attempt [to]

remedy for the inmate.” (Docket Entry 12-1 at 1.) If the GCJ

official “is unable to provide a satisfactory remedy for the

complaint, the officer or employee shall issue a request form to

the inmate. Only if the inmate has satisfied the above

requirements and is unsatisfied with the resolution of that request

or complaint, then the inmate can request a grievance form” by

“submit[ting] an Inmate Request Form requesting a grievance form,

stating the matter to be grieved, and detailing how the inmate has

complied with the foregoing requirements.” (Id.) “If proper, the

inmate will then be issued a Grievance Form,” which he “must fully

complete” within three days. (Id.)

13

regarding the suicide watch until, at the earliest, June 2017, even

though he remained at the GCJ until May 22, 2017 (see Docket Entry

15 at 1-3). Thus, the record establishes that Plaintiff neither

initiated the informal resolution process nor “file[d a] grievance

within three days from the date [he] discovered or reasonably

should have discovered the incident giving rise to the

[C]omplaint,” as the GCJ’s grievance policy requires. (Docket

Entry 11-1 at 1.) Plaintiff therefore failed to exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit, necessitating dismissal

of his Complaint. See, e.g., Germain v. Shearin, 653 F. App’x 231,

234 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Given that [the plaintiff] failed to his

[sic] exhaust his claims, dismissal is mandatory.”).6

6 In addition, as Plaintiff concedes, his official-capacity

claim against Defendant lacks merit. (See Docket Entry 15 at 7.)

Under Section 1983, official-capacity liability occurs only if

“execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Collins v. City

of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Relevant here, “an official’s discretionary acts,

exercised in carrying out official duties, do not necessarily

represent official policy.” Perdue v. Harrison, No. 1:17cv403,

2017 WL 4804363, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2017). “Rather, the

official must have ‘final authority’ over government policy with

respect to the action in question to trigger official capacity

liability.” Id. (certain internal quotation marks omitted). The

Complaint contains no allegations that Defendant either acted

pursuant to any GCJ policy or possessed “final authority” over any

such custom or policy. (See generally Docket Entry 2.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claim against Defendant

fails as a matter of law.

Finally, Defendant moves to dismiss “Plaintiff’s State Law

claims . . ., if any.” (Docket Entry 9 at 2.) The Complaint does

(continued...)

14

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before

filing suit.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 9)

be granted and this action be dismissed without prejudice for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

This 4th day of February, 2021.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

6(...continued)

not raise any such claims (see generally Docket Entry 2), mooting

such request.

15