RICHARDSON v. CITY OF DURHAM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DONALD RAY RICHARDSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

N.C. STATE BUREAU OF )

INVESTIGATION, SBI DIRECTOR )

ROBERT SHURMEIER IN HIS )

OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL )

CAPACITY, FORMER SBI DEPUTY )

DIRECTOR GREGORY TART IN HIS )

OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL ) 1:20cv141

CAPACITY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR )

KANAWHA PERRY IN HIS OFFICIAL )

AND PERSONAL CAPACITY, SBI )

AGENT DANNIE SCOTT FAIRCLOTH IN )

HIS OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL )

CAPACITY, CITY OF DURHAM, )

OFFICER JESUS SANDOVAL IN HIS )

OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL )

CAPACITY, and SAMANTHA ALEX )

BUCK, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

Upon removal from state court, this case came before this

court on the motions to dismiss of Defendants Jesus Sandoval and City

of Durham. (Docs. 7, 11.) After reviewing those motions, the court

directed the parties to brief whether subject matter jurisdiction

exists. (Doc. 28.) Plaintiff Donald Richardson filed a brief

arguing the lack of such jurisdiction and urging remand. (Doc.

32.) Defendants City of Durham and Sandoval filed a brief

supporting a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 31.)

For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that it lacks

subject matter jurisdiction and that remand to state court is

required.

I. BACKGROUND

Richardson brings claims against three groups: N.C. State

Bureau of Investigation (“SBI”), Robert Shurmeier, Gregory Tart,

Kanawha Perry, and Dannie Scott Faircloth (“SBI Defendants”); City

of Durham and Jesus Sandoval (“Durham Defendants”), and Samantha

Alex Buck. (Doc. 2 ¶¶ 2-8.) According to the complaint,

Richardson, worked as an agent for the North Carolina Alcohol Law

Enforcement (“ALE”) branch of the SBI. (Id. ¶ 23.) Buck falsely

accused him of rape after he and other ALE officers spoke with

Buck and searched her car in a gas station parking lot in January

2017. (Id. ¶¶ 27-51.)

Sandoval was a Durham Police Department (“DPD”) Officer

assigned to investigate Buck’s claims against Richardson and the

other ALE officers. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) DPD and SBI initiated a joint

criminal investigation into Plaintiff’s actions. (Id. ¶ 55.)

Pursuant to this investigation, Sandoval authored a search warrant

and in the application for it, falsely stated that security camera

footage from the gas station supported Buck’s claims. (Id. ¶ 59.)

Surveillance footage from the gas station clearly demonstrated

otherwise. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 61.) Nevertheless, because Sandoval

falsely misrepresented the contents of the video, a North Carolina

superior court judge issued the warrant (id. ¶ 59), which

Richardson claims was vague and overly broad (id. ¶ 73). SBI

Defendant Faircloth executed the warrant on Richardson at SBI

Headquarters. (Id. ¶ 60.) Richardson also claims that, subject

to the vague search warrant, his DNA and fingerprints were

collected, his state-owned work vehicle was searched, and his

personal property, including his personal phone, was seized. (Id.

¶¶ 65, 73, 76, 81-85, 89.)

After the search, SBI initiated an internal investigation of

Richardson’s conduct. (Id. ¶ 62.) Richardson alleges that all of

the officers who investigated him had viewed the security camera

footage that exonerated him, yet the officers intentionally

continued their investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 69.) In conducting

the SBI internal investigation, Richardson claims, Defendants did

not follow ALE policy. (Id. ¶¶ 101-11.) The internal

investigation ultimately concluded that Richardson had improperly

refused to turn over his cell phone pursuant to the search warrant

and that he had failed to document the seizure of evidence during

the search of Buck’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 116.) As a result,

Richardson received a 10-day unpaid suspension, was required to

partake in search and seizure training, and was prohibited from

working in Durham County. (Id. ¶¶ 130, 146).

On January 9, 2020, Richardson filed the instant complaint in

Durham County Superior Court. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5; Doc. 2.) On February

13, the City of Durham timely removed the case to this court.1

(Doc. 1.) The City argued that Richardson had alleged that

Defendants had violated his federal constitutional rights

sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction. (Id.

¶¶ 10-13, 17-18.) The City and Sandoval filed separate motions to

dismiss (Docs. 7, 11.) Richardson filed a consolidated response

brief (Doc. 22), and Sandoval filed a reply (Doc. 23). On June

30, this court directed the parties to file briefs addressing the

issue of whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction over

the case. (Doc. 28.) While this issue was being briefed, SBI

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 29.)

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that subject

matter exists, as they removed this action from state court. Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998)

(“[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing its existence.”).

A defendant may remove a case from state court only if “the

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction”

over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A federal court will have

subject matter jurisdiction in a removed action if: (1) there is

1 Removal was timely because the City of Durham was served with the

complaint on January 14. (Doc. 2 ¶ 19.)

diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332; (2) the face of the

“well-pleaded” complaint raises a federal question, see 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331, 1338; or (3) the state law claims are completely preempted

by federal law. Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 439-40 (4th Cir.

2005). If none of these is present, remand is proper. “Because

the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be noticed by the

district court sua sponte . . . the court may enter a remand order

sua sponte.” Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d

192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

Defendants do not argue, nor is it the case, that diversity

jurisdiction is present here. Thus, the court may exercise

jurisdiction only if the face of Richardson’s complaint raises a

federal question, or if his state law claims are completely

preempted by federal law.

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of

the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. The rule makes the

plaintiff the master of the claim; he . . . may avoid federal

jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar,

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal citation

omitted).2 The most direct and clear example of a case arising

2 The “artful pleading” exception allows removal of a case when “federal

law completely preempts a plaintiff’s state-law claim” despite the fact

that “no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s

complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998)

(emphasis added). Although Defendants invoke Rivet here, federal law

under federal law occurs “when federal law creates the cause of

action asserted.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). As

the City noted, Richardson’s complaint seeks claims for relief

arising under state law. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16.)3

Defendants argue that Richardson’s complaint falls under the

“special and small category” of cases in which federal question

jurisdiction may still exist even when claims find their origins

in state law. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (quoting Empire Healthchoice

Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)). In this

narrow category of cases, “federal jurisdiction over a state law

claim will lie if a federal issue is (1) necessarily raised, (2)

actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution

in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance

approved by Congress.” Id. A failure to satisfy any of these

four elements requires remand. Burrell v. Bayer Corp., 918 F.3d

372, 386 (4th Cir. 2019).

Defendants argue that Richardson’s complaint meets the first

element because Richardson alleges that Defendants violated his

federal constitutional rights. To be sure, Richardson does claim

does not completely preempt Richardson’s state claims, so the artful

pleading exception does not apply.

3 Specifically, Richardson brings claims for civil conspiracy (Doc. 2

¶¶ 149-60); malicious prosecution (Id. ¶¶ 161-73); punitive damages

(Id. ¶¶ 174-80.); violations of N.C. Const. Art. I § 1 (Id. ¶¶ 181-

86); violations of N.C. Const. Art. I § 19 (Id. ¶¶ 187-200.); and

defamation (Id. ¶¶ 201-20).

that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 2 ¶¶ 21, 153.) Defendants further argue that

the second element is satisfied because they dispute Richardson’s

constitutional rights were actually violated.

Assuming Defendants satisfy these first two elements, they

have not satisfied the third. The Supreme Court has stated that

the “substantial” element refers to “the importance of the issue

to the federal system as a whole.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 260. A

substantial question “generally will involve a pure issue of law,

rather than being fact bound and situation-specific because the

crux of what makes a question substantial . . . is that it is

importan[t] to the federal system as a whole and not just to the

particular parties in the immediate suit.” Burrell, 918 F.3d at

385. (alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). This element is a “high bar” for Defendants to

meet. Id. Defendants argue that the federal right at issue here

-– the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure –

qualifies in this case. It does not.

Although the Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures is indeed significant, it is

not fundamentally important to the federal system as a whole. The

Supreme Court has found that a quintessential “substantial” issue

concerns the “constitutionality or construction of a federal

statute.” Id. Resolution of the federal question here does not

address a federal statute, nor have Defendants shown how resolution

of the federal issue here “would be controlling in numerous other

cases.” Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.

677, 700 (2006). Other district courts addressing similar

arguments have found that when a plaintiff brings state law tort

claims that encompass violations of federal constitutional rights,

a substantial federal question is not invoked. Rather, such claims

are the types of fact-bound and situation-specific issues that the

Supreme Court has found insufficient to establish federal “arising

under” jurisdiction. See, e.g., Torres v. City of Trenton, Civil

Action No. 19-18368 (MAS) (ZNQ), 2020 WL 2767316, at *2 (D.N.J.

May 27, 2020); Fitzgerald v. New Mexico, No. 17-CV-00365-MCA-LF,

2018 WL 671183, at *3-4 (D.N.M. Jan. 31, 2018).

Defendants also note that a companion case, arising out of

the same set of facts, is before this court. The plaintiff in

that case, Jack Cates, was one of the other ALE officers who, along

with Richardson, interacted with Buck that night. Cates brings

claims arising out of an illegal search and seizure by Defendant

Sandoval. Defendants argue that a remand of Richardson’s case

here would “jeopardize the uniformity of decisions.” (Doc. 31 at

10.) However, a critical fact distinguishes Cates’s case from

Richardson’s: Cates has brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. (1:20cv00200, Doc. 3 ¶¶ 25-29.) Cates’s

complaint presents a federal question on its face such that the

court may exercise jurisdiction. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc.

v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (“[The] provision

for federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by

plaintiff[] pleading a cause of action created by federal law

(e.g., claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).”). Richardson, on the other

hand, has not alleged any federal causes of action; such is his

right as the master of his claims. He confirms that in his briefing

to this court. Defendants’ argument that a remand here would

create disparate results is therefore unpersuasive, as “even a

strong interest in uniformity of results is not enough to make a

federal question ‘substantial’ so that it may be heard in federal

courts.” Burrell, 918 F.3d at 386. State courts are fully capable

of deciding federal issues that accompany state claims. Id.; see

also Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986)

(“Petitioner’s concern about the uniformity of interpretation,

moreover, is considerably mitigated by the fact that, even if there

is no original district court jurisdiction for these kinds of

actions, [the Supreme Court] retains power to review the decision

of a federal issue in a state cause of action.”).

Thus, Defendants have failed to show that any federal issue

underlying Richardson’s state claims is so substantial as to

establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. This renders

consideration of the remaining final factor unnecessary. Burrell,

918 F.3d at 386.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the court finds subject matter

jurisdiction wanting.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the

General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, of Durham

County, North Carolina, for further proceedings. Defendants’

various motions to dismiss (Docs. 7, 11, 29) are DENIED as moot.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

July 30, 2020