finding DPS to be an agency of the state and entitled to sovereign immunity
How later courts described this case
- finding DPS to be an agency of the state and entitled to sovereign immunity
- dismissing on the basis of qualified immunity
- applying North Carolina’s sovereign immunity to a subdivision of a state agency
- noting that dismissal with prejudice would be improper where amendment would not be futile or otherwise improper
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ERIC DARDEN, et. al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv1050
)
GOVERNOR ROY A. COOPER, III, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This lawsuit arises out of the murder of three North Carolina
prison employees at the hands of four inmates during a failed
attempt to escape Pasquotank Correctional Institution (“PCI”) in
October 2017. Plaintiffs represent the decedents’ estates and
claim multiple violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by seventeen named Defendants across two
state agencies and the state’s executive branch: North Carolina
Governor Roy A. Cooper, III; The North Carolina Department of
Public Safety (“DPS”) and employees Erik A. Hooks, Frank L. Perry,
Kenneth Lassiter, George Solomon, W. David Guice, Felix Taylor,
Colbert Respass, Fay D. Lassiter, Nicole E. Sullivan, Annie Harvey,
Joseph Harrell, and Marquis Betz, all in their individual and
official capacities; and Correction Enterprises (“CE”) and
employees Karen Brown and Robert Leon, in their individual and
official capacities.
Before the court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), and (6). (Doc.
17.) Plaintiffs responded in opposition and suggested that
granting leave to file a second amended complaint would be more
appropriate than granting dismissal. (See Doc. 20 at 4.)
However, Plaintiffs have not filed for leave to amend. For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The allegations, taken in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs, show the following:
Decedents Veronica Darden, Wendy Shannon, and Justin Smith
were employed at PCI. (Doc. 10 ¶ 3.) On October 12, 2017, at
least twelve close-custody prisoners and eighteen medium-custody
prisoners were working in a sewing plant operated by CE, located
within the perimeter fence of PCI. (Id. ¶ 4.) The prisoners who
worked in the plant were violent and had previously engaged in
serious misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 39(lvii–lix).) In contravention
of DPS and CE policy, and due to underlying staffing shortages,
correctional supervisors charged Smith with guarding all thirty of
the inmates in the plant alone. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.) On that day, four
violent inmates gained unfettered access to deadly tools and
closed, unguarded hallways within the plant and attempted to
escape. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) The four inmates attacked Darden, Shannon,
Smith, and others with claw hammers and scissors. (Id. ¶ 5.) Due
to ineffective security policies, monitoring, training, and
equipment, the attack was allowed to continue for over twenty
minutes before help arrived. (Id. ¶ 6.) Darden, Shannon, and
Smith ultimately died of the injuries inflicted upon them. (Id.)
At the time of the attack, the three guards were locked inside the
plant. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Plaintiffs charge that institutional failures contributed to
the danger for the inmates’ violent escape attempt. (Id. ¶ 8.)
These failures include poor hiring and retention practices; severe
understaffing; improper training; lack of safety equipment; lax,
unenforced, and ineffective safety and security procedures; and
inadequate supervision of staff and inmates. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 8, 39.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
(8)(a)(2). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).1 A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam), and all reasonable inferences must be drawn
in the plaintiff’s favor. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472,
474 (4th Cir. 1997). “Rule 12(b)(6) protects against meritless
litigation by requiring sufficient factual allegation ‘to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level’ so as to ‘nudge[]
the[] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”
Sauers v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 3d
544, 550 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]he complaint must ‘state[] a
plausible claim for relief’ that permit[s] the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct based upon ‘its judicial
experience and common sense.’” Coleman v. Md. Ct. App., 626 F.3d
187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679). Thus, mere legal conclusion are not accepted as
1 To the extent Defendants move to dismiss based on sovereign immunity,
that raises an issue of personal jurisdiction, such that Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) is the proper vehicle. Simmons v. Corizon
Health, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 255, 268 (M.D.N.C. 2015). Thus, any motion
to dismiss based on sovereign immunity will be considered under Rule
12(b)(2).
true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to sovereign immunity for
the claims against DPS, CE, and named Defendants in their official
capacities. (Doc. 18 at 7–9.) Plaintiffs respond that it is
inappropriate to consider sovereign immunity in a motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 20 at 6.) Plaintiffs further argue that Defendants
are not eligible to plead sovereign immunity because the State of
North Carolina is not a party to this case. (Id.) Both of
Plaintiffs’ arguments fail.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has
held that “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of
another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). A
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is
a suit against the official’s office and is therefore a suit
against the state itself. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Agencies, instrumentalities, and arms of the state receive
the same protection as the state itself. Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). The touchstone for considering
an entity as an agency of the state is whether judgments rendered
against that entity would be paid from the state’s treasury. Hess
v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48–50 (1994).
“Given the State’s unique dignitary interest in avoiding suit, .
. . Eleventh Amendment immunity questions [should be resolved] as
soon as possible after the State asserts immunity.” Constantine
v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 482
(4th Cir. 2005) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))
(resolving questions of sovereign immunity on motion to dismiss).
In the present cause of action, Plaintiffs name two North
Carolina agencies as parties to the litigation: NC DPS and CE.
Both are entitled to sovereign immunity. DPS is an agency of the
State of North Carolina that is funded by the North Carolina
treasury. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-601 (2020); see also Biggs
v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 953 F.3d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 2020)
(finding DPS to be an agency of the state and entitled to sovereign
immunity). CE, a subdivision of DPS, is also an agency of the
State of North Carolina whose funds are held by the state treasury.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 148-128, 130 (2020) (establishing CE as a
subdivision of DPS and explaining “[a]ll revenues . . . produced
by Correction Enterprises shall be deposited with the State
Treasurer”); see also Candillo v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 199 F. Supp.
2d 342, 349 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (applying North Carolina’s sovereign
immunity to a subdivision of a state agency). Any judgment against
either DPS or CE would be paid from the state treasury, such that
classification as state agencies is appropriate. As agencies of
North Carolina, both DPS and CE are entitled to sovereign immunity.
See Biggs, 953 F.3d at 241.
Plaintiffs also name fifteen state employees in their
official capacities as parties to this litigation. Thirteen of
these employees worked at DPS during or leading up to October 2017.
(Doc. 10 ¶¶ 13–26.) The other two named employees worked at CE in
October 2017. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.) Each of these Defendants was named
in his or her official capacity as an employee of DPS or CE. As
a suit against an individual in his official capacity is a suit
against the state itself, these employees are entitled to sovereign
immunity to the extent the claims against them are made in their
official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Fauconier v. Clarke,
966 F.3d 265, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2020).
There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity:
congressional abrogation, waiver, and Ex parte Young. Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 59 (1996); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). None of these exceptions applies here.
First, it is well-established that Congress did not abrogate
sovereign immunity through the enactment of § 1983. Will, 491
U.S. at 66. Second, Defendants have not taken — nor do Plaintiffs
allege — any actions that could constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity. In fact, Defendants have asserted their sovereign
immunity at their first opportunity. (See Doc. 17.) Lastly, Ex
parte Young, which holds that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
a suit against a state official for prospective injunctive relief,
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60, Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582,
587–88 (4th Cir. 1998), does not apply here because Plaintiffs are
seeking only compensatory damages (Doc. 10 at 23, 24).
Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against
DPS, CE, and the individual Defendants in their official capacities
on the grounds of sovereign immunity will be granted.
C. Failure to State a Claim under § 1983
As to the remaining claims, the court will consider whether
Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim under § 1983. To state
a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,
and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person2 acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
2 Although already addressed on the grounds of sovereign immunity, it is
worth noting that the claims against DPS, CE, and Defendants in their
official capacities would fail here as well. Contrary to Plaintiffs’
assertions, the Monell standard does not apply to the present case
because Defendants are not local government agencies, but rather state
agencies. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). Here, Plaintiffs bring two § 1983 claims, the first
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment generally and the second
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment specifically in relation to
negligent training, retention, and supervision. (Doc. 10 at 13,
21.)
Both of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims are based on
a deliberate indifference theory. First, Plaintiffs claim their
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment generally were violated
because “Defendants acted with deliberate indifference and/or
reckless disregard to Plaintiff’s safety and well being in
violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, more
specifically, their rights to life, liberty, and property.” (Id.
¶ 40.) Second, Plaintiffs claim their rights were violated through
negligent training, retention, and supervision under the
Fourteenth Amendment because, “Defendants’ failure to hire,
retain, and/or supervise officers and employees at [PCI] amounted
to a deliberate indifference and/or a reckless disregard to
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Id. ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs base
their claim on Defendants’ inaction as having “placed [the
decedents] in dangerous conditions.”3 (See id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs
658 (1978). States and state officials are not “persons” for the
purposes of § 1983. 491 U.S. Will, 491 U.S. 70-71.
3 The only possible exception is Plaintiffs’ claim that the decedents
were “locked in” at the time of the attack. (See id. ¶¶ 5, 40, 48.)
However, Plaintiffs’ complaint is bereft of any facts that would indicate
do not allege any affirmative actions by Defendants that resulted
in a constitutional deprivation nor do they allege that Defendants
had an intent to harm. (See id. ¶ 39.)
While “the Due Process Clause in particular limits the
government’s power to interfere with individual life, liberty or
property[,] it does not act as a ‘guarantee of certain minimal
levels of safety and security.’” Rutherford v. City of Newport
News, VA., 919 F. Supp. 885, 891 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing DeShaney
v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)).
Due Process generally “does not require the state to protect
individuals from harm caused by third parties.” Rutherford, 919
F. Supp. at 890.
Deliberate indifference may amount to a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process violation where the government is required
“to take care of those who have already been deprived of their
liberty” — such as pretrial detainees, persons in mental
institutions, convicted felons, and persons under arrest. Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 127 (collecting
cases). However, this does not apply in a voluntary employment
context. See, e.g., id. at 127–28 (1992); Slaughter v. Mayor &
City Council of Balt., 682 F.3d 317, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2012);
Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1482 (D.C.
that the situation was due to Defendants’ affirmative actions or that
the situation amounted to a deprivation of the decedents’ liberty.
Cir. 1986) (“Prison guards, unlike the prisoners . . . are not
held in state custody. Their decision to work as guards is
voluntary. If they deem the terms of their employment
unsatisfactory, e.g., if salary, promotion prospects, or safety
are inadequate, they may seek employment elsewhere. The state did
not force appellant to become a guard, and the state has no
constitutional obligation to protect him from the hazards inherent
in that occupation.”) To support a due process violation in the
context of voluntary employment with the government, it must be
alleged that the government acted with an intent to harm.
Slaughter, 682 F.3d at 322.
As Plaintiffs’ decedents were voluntarily employed with DPS,
the state did not have a constitutional obligation to provide its
employees with certain minimal levels of safety. Further,
Plaintiffs have not made any claims or alleged any facts that would
suggest that Defendants acted with an intent to harm. Taken
together, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a plausible violation
of their decedents’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.4
4 For these same reasons, Defendants’ defense of qualified immunity
succeeds. In order to overcome a defense of qualified immunity, it must
be shown that (1) the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff made out
a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right was “clearly
established” at the time of the defendant’s misconduct. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Without alleging a cognizable
constitutional violation, Plaintiffs cannot overcome this defense. See
also Katz, 533 U.S. at 201 (questions of qualified immunity should be
resolved as soon as possible); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232–33
(1991) (dismissing on the basis of qualified immunity).
Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that
would establish a prima facie case for personal or supervisory
liability for any of the named Defendants. To establish personal
liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must “affirmatively show[]
that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of
the plaintiff’s rights.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850
(4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere knowledge
of such a deprivation will not suffice. Id. Rather, the
official’s “own individual actions” must have “violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
To establish supervisory liability, it must be alleged that
(1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his
subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and
unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the
plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so
inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices,”; and (3) there
was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction
and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support either
liability. As noted by Defendants, beyond listing the individual
Defendants’ job titles, Plaintiffs tie none of their allegations
to specific individual Defendants. For each of the individual
Defendants, Plaintiffs simply report that “[a]t all times material
hereto, [named Defendant] had authority over the control,
supervision, and/or ownership of [PCI] and specific and/or
distinct knowledge and involvement during all relevant time
periods referenced herein.” (See Doc. 10 ¶¶ 13–34.) These
conclusory statements do not sufficiently connect Defendants to
the alleged deprivations. And although Plaintiffs list over fifty
failures within PCI as contributing to the guards’ murders, at no
point do Plaintiffs connect any of these failures to any particular
Defendant. (See id. ¶ 39.) As Plaintiffs have failed to allege
any facts that would tend to show any Defendant acted personally
in the deprivation of their decedents’ rights, Plaintiffs’
complaint does not establish grounds for finding these Defendants
could be personally liable.
Plaintiffs have also failed to allege facts that would support
a finding of supervisory liability. Even accepting Plaintiffs’
conclusory statements that Defendants had “knowledge and
involvement” of the relevant facts (id. ¶¶ 13–34), Plaintiffs have
alleged no facts that would tend to show inadequacy in a given
supervisor’s response. Further, Plaintiffs’ barebones report of
the facts shows no “affirmative causal link” between any
supervisor’s inaction and the murder of the guards. As such,
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded facts that would
establish grounds for supervisor liability.
In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a constitutional
violation under § 1983. They have also failed to allege facts
that would subject the Defendants to either personal or supervisory
liability under § 1983. As such, Plaintiffs have not stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted, and Defendant’s motion to
dismiss will be granted.
D. Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs have not explicitly sought leave to amend their
complaint. However, their response suggests that leave to amend
would be more appropriate in this case than dismissal. (See Doc.
20 at 4.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), once 21 days
elapses from service of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff may amend
a pleading only with the opposing party’s consent or leave of
court. Leave should be freely given “when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend will be denied only if
(1) the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, (2) there is
bad faith on the part of the moving party, or (3) the amendment
would be futile. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir.
2006) (en banc).
While leave may be freely granted, a “request for a court
order must be made by a motion,” which must state the grounds for
seeking the order and the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).
This district’s local rules require that a separate motion for
leave be filed and a proposed amended pleading be attached to the
motion. L.R. 15.1. The purpose is to avoid having cases thrust
into limbo on such generalized requests that may later prove
unsupported. Robinson v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., No. 1:13CV729, 2014
WL 2048127, at *4 (M.D.N.C. May 19, 2014). Therefore, the
suggestion that leave to amend would be appropriate made in a
plaintiff’s brief opposing a motion to dismiss is not a proper
motion and can be denied on that ground alone. See Cozzarelli v.
Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630–31 (4th Cir. 2008);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Bank of Am., Corp., No. 3:13–CV–
358–RJC–DSC, 2014 WL 868713, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2014). It is
also within the court’s discretion to deny a motion for leave to
amend where the moving party fails to comply with Local Rule 15.1.
See United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., 745 F.3d
694, 703 (4th Cir. 2014).
Here, Plaintiffs have not filed a motion to amend, nor have
they attached a proposed amended complaint. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs will not be granted leave to amend, but their claims
for which they seek the potential to re-plead will be dismissed
without prejudice. Cf. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue
Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 920 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that
dismissal with prejudice would be improper where amendment would
not be futile or otherwise improper).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss
(Doc. 17) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against DPS,
CE, and named Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against named
Defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
September 14, 2020