LINK v. SAUL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TINA OLIVER LINK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:19CV662

)

ANDREW M. SAUL, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Tina Oliver Link, brought this action pursuant to

the Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security,

denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”). (Docket Entry 1.) Defendant has filed the certified

administrative record (Docket Entry 6 (cited herein as “Tr. __”)),

and both parties have moved for judgment (Docket Entries 9, 11, 12;

1 The United States Senate confirmed Andrew M. Saul as the Commissioner of

Social Security on June 4, 2019, and he took the oath of office on June 17, 2019.

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul

substitutes for Nancy A. Berryhill as the Defendant in this suit. Neither the

Court nor the parties need take any further action to continue this suit by

reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

see also Docket Entry 13 (Defendant’s Memorandum)).2 For the

reasons that follow, the Court should enter judgment for Defendant.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of

August 8, 2014. (Tr. 33, 206-10, 236.) Upon denial of that

application initially (Tr. 73-103, 122-30) and on reconsideration

(Tr. 104-20, 132-39), Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 140-41). Plaintiff, her

attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) attended the hearing.

(Tr. 27-72.) The ALJ subsequently ruled that Plaintiff did not

qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 7-19.) The Appeals

Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for review (Tr. 1-6,

201-05), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s final

decision for purposes of judicial review.

In rendering that decision, the ALJ made the following

findings:

1. [Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of

the . . . Act through December 31, 2021.

2. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since August 8, 2014, the alleged onset date.

2 Plaintiff originally filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket

Entry 9) and a Memorandum of Law in Support (Docket Entry 10) and then re-filed

a combined Motion for Summary Judgment (see Docket Entry 11 at 2-3) and

Memorandum of Law in Support (see Docket Entry 11 at 1, 4-27).

2

3. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease, status post total left knee

arthroplasty, carpal tunnel syndrome of the right hand,

connective tissue disease with features of Lupus,

headaches post herpetic neuralgia, and left eye light

sensitivity with pain.

. . .

4. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals

the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

. . .

5. . . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional

capacity to perform light work . . . except she can

occasionally push and pull with the upper and lower

extremities; and she can occasionally handle and finger

with the right upper extremity, but no tasks should

involve small objects or that require visual precision –

defined as tasks that require use of fine motor skills to

finger objects that are smaller than one inch that need

to be placed in exact locations, such as electronic

circuit boards or other small electronic items that

require exact placement of parts. She can occasionally

climb ramps and stairs, but should never climb ladders,

ropes or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch and occasionally crawl. She can have no

exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts,

or hazardous work settings; and should avoid concentrated

exposure to bright lights, flashing lights, or outdoor

sunlight but should be allowed to wear sunglasses for

frequent exposure to work task [sic] indoors or under

indoor lighting. [Plaintiff] would be off task 10% of

the workday in addition to normal breaks due to pain and

side effects from medication.

. . .

6. [Plaintiff] is capable of performing past relevant

work as a Management Trainee and Health Club Membership

Salesperson. This work does not require the performance

of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff]’s

residual functional capacity.

3

. . .

7. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as

defined in the . . . Act, from August 8, 2014, through

the date of this decision.

(Tr. 12-18 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations

omitted).)

II. DISCUSSION

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security

Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.

Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope

of . . . review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely limited.”

Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has

not established entitlement to relief under the extremely limited

review standard.

A. Standard of Review

“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”

Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a

reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ

[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by

substantial evidence and were reached through application of the

correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets

and quotation marks omitted).

“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

4

Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of

more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less

than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th

Cir. 2001) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “If

there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the

case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter,

993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not

undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility

determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as

adopted by the Social Security Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at

176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where

conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to

whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that

decision falls on the [Social Security Commissioner] (or the ALJ).”

Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The issue before

[the Court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled,

but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled

is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a

correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d

585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that

“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving

5

a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),

and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).3 “To regularize the

adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]

has . . . promulgated . . . detailed regulations incorporating

longstanding medical-vocational evaluation policies that take into

account a claimant’s age, education, and work experience in

addition to [the claimant’s] medical condition.” Id. “These

regulations establish a ‘sequential evaluation process’ to

determine whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. (internal citations

omitted).

This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five

steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial

gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a

‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of

specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent

3 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. [DIB] . . .

provides benefits to disabled persons who have contributed to the program while

employed. The Supplemental Security Income Program . . . provides benefits to

indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . .

for determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects

relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal

citations omitted).

6

that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity

to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any other work.”

Albright v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2

(4th Cir. 1999).4 A finding adverse to the claimant at any of

several points in the SEP forecloses an award and ends the inquiry.

For example, “[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is

engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is

working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the

claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not, benefits are denied.”

Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at

each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,

270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and

two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment

is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,

the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.5 Step four

4 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the

claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the

[government] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).

5 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the

claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative

regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and

continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an

equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The

RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses

the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy

work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin

impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only

after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and

any related symptoms (e.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.

7

then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the

claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant

does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the

claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the

analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering

both [the RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age,

education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job.”

Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the government cannot

carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant]

remains able to work other jobs available in the community,” the

claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.6

B. Assignments of Error

Plaintiff asserts that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s

finding of no disability on these grounds:

1) “[t]he ALJ failed to identify herpes zoster eye pain as a

symptom and as a severe impairment which ultimately developed into

post-herpetic and trigeminal neuralgia” (Docket Entry 11 at 17);

6 A claimant thus can qualify as disabled via two paths through the SEP.

The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three

in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail

at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations

of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a

claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, e.g., Hunter, 993

F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the

process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).

8

2) “[t]he ALJ set forth an RFC finding that was vague and

failed to account for Plaintiff’s severe impairments” (id. at 18);

3) “[t]he ALJ failed to present a logical connection between

the evidence of record and his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s RFC”

(id. at 20); and

4) “[t]he ALJ has failed to state the weight he has given to

Plaintiff’s various treating providers whose findings and opinions

appear in the record” (id. at 21).

Defendant contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of the ALJ’s

decision. (See Docket Entry 13 at 10-25.)

1. Herpes Zoster Eye Pain

In Plaintiff’s first assignment of error, she maintains that

“[t]he ALJ failed to identify herpes zoster eye pain as a symptom

and as a severe impairment which ultimately developed into post-

herpetic and trigeminal neuralgia.” (Docket Entry 11 at 17.)

According to Plaintiff, “[t]he zoster virus was the trigger for

Plaintiff’s post-herpetic neuralgia; the neuralgia affected the

trigeminal nerve and became the etiology for Plaintiff’s []

symptoms” of “severe pain, severe light sensitivity, nausea,

vomiting, headaches and [] decreased corrected vision.” (Id.)

Plaintiff additionally faults the ALJ for “fail[ing] to discuss any

of the procedures [Plaintiff underwent] in an attempt to diminish

or relieve her symptoms; he merely stated that ‘the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms [we]re

9

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record’ without specifically citing such evidence,

as well as ignoring the evidence favorable to Plaintiff.” (Id.

(quoting Tr. 16).) Plaintiff’s contentions miss the mark.

As an initial matter, the ALJ found both “headaches post

herpetic neuralgia” and “left eye light sensitivity with pain” as

severe impairments at step two of the SEP (Tr. 12), thus

acknowledging both the headache component and the eye pain/light

sensitivity components of Plaintiff’s post-herpetic neuralgia. In

light of this, Plaintiff’s argument that “[t]he ALJ failed to

identify herpes zoster eye pain as a symptom and as a severe

impairment” (Docket Entry 11 at 17 (emphasis added)) essentially

amounts to a complaint over the ALJ’s word choice rather than an

assertion of error in failing to identify any severe impairments.

Moreover, the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s herpes zoster

(shingles) a non-severe impairment (see Tr. 12-13), because her

active outbreak of shingles in August 2014 cleared within a few

months (see Tr. 476-85) and thus did not last for 12 months as

required for a severe impairment under the regulations, see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1509.

Plaintiff additionally faults the ALJ for “fail[ing] to

discuss any of the procedures [Plaintiff underwent] in an attempt

to diminish or relieve her [post-herpetic neuralgia] symptoms,”

including “various ganglion nerve blocks, of both a chemical and an

10

operative nature,” and “an ablation procedure (in effect, burning

the nerve tissue to prevent it from sending pain impulses), all of

which did not effectively diminish the pain.” (Docket Entry 11 at

17.) The ALJ’s discussion of the record evidence relating to

Plaintiff’s post-herpetic neuralgia included the following:

[Plaintiff] has alleged that she is unable to work due

to[, inter alia,] . . . vision problems[ and] headaches.

In her Function Report, [Plaintiff] . . . reported having

pain due to shingles and sensitivity to light. . . . Due

to shingles, [Plaintiff] stated that she has vision

problems and needs to constantly wear sunglasses because

of pain and light sensitivity in her eyes. She rated the

pain in her eyes an 8 out of 10 despite pain medication.

. . . She testified that her pain level also affects her

ability to concentrate and focus.

. . .

Progress notes from November 2015 show that [Plaintiff]

was treated for reported head pain due to herpetic

neuralgia of the right upper forehead. However, physical

exam findings note that [Plaintiff] was in no acute

distress with normal musculoskeletal and neurological

findings. . . . Opthalmology findings indicated no

diminished or blurred vision.

At the internal medicine consultative examination in

February 2016 with Dr. Everett Bolz, [Plaintiff]

presented with sunglasses and appeared uncomfortable

sitting for the examination due to the lights. Eye

examination was normal and vision testing showed 20/50 in

the right eye and 20/30 in the left.

(Tr. 16 (internal citations omitted).)

Although that discussion did not specifically include the

ganglion blocks and ablation procedure Plaintiff underwent (see

id.; see also Tr. 426-45, 464-75), “‘there is no rigid requirement

that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his

11

decision,’” Reid v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865

(4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211

(llth Cir. 2005)). Moreover, the ALJ indicated that he

“careful[ly] consider[ed ] the entire record” (see Tr. 15 (bold

font omitted)), and “[t]he Court is entitled to rely on th[at]

representation[] absent a compelling reason to the contrary,”

Hunter v. Colvin, No. 1:10CV401, 2013 WL 2122575, at *4 (M.D.N.C.

May 15, 2013) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (citing Grubby v.

Astrue, No. 1:09CV364, 2010 WL 5553677, *6 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2010)

(unpublished) (in turn citing Rappaport v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1320,

1323 (8th Cir. 1991))), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.

June 18, 2013) (Eagles, J.). Plaintiff has provided no such

compelling reason. (See Docket Entry 11 at 17.)

Furthermore, as the above-quoted discussion makes clear, the

ALJ expressly acknowledged Plaintiff’s complaints of eye pain,

headaches, and light sensitivity, as well as her alleged need to

take pain medication and wear sunglasses indoors (see Tr. 16), and

the ALJ accommodated those complaints in the RFC by including

restrictions to no tasks involving visual precision, no

concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing lights, and

outdoor sunlight, and an allowance to wear sunglasses indoors

(see Tr. 15). As such, Plaintiff has not shown how remand for an

express discussion of the ganglion blocks and ablation procedure

would lead to a different outcome in her case. See generally

12

Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing

that “[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense requires

[a court] to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion [by an

ALJ] unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead

to a different result”).

Simply put, Plaintiff’s first assignment of error fails as a

matter of law.

2. RFC7

Plaintiff next asserts that “[t]he ALJ set forth an RFC

finding that was vague and failed to account for Plaintiff’s severe

impairments” (Docket Entry 11 at 18), as well as that “[t]he ALJ

failed to present a logical connection between the evidence of

record and his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s RFC” (id. at 20).

Plaintiff’s arguments fall short.

RFC measures the most a claimant can do despite any physical

and mental limitations. Hines, 453 F.3d at 562; 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a). An ALJ must determine a claimant’s exertional and

non-exertional capacity only after considering all of a claimant’s

impairments, as well as any related symptoms, including pain. See

Hines, 453 F.3d at 562–63; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(b). The ALJ then

must match the claimant’s exertional abilities to an appropriate

7 As Plaintiff’s second and third assignments of error both challenge the

ALJ’s RFC (see Docket Entry 11 at 18, 20), this Recommendation will discuss them

together.

13

level of work (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very

heavy). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Any non-exertional limitations

may further restrict a claimant’s ability to perform jobs within an

exertional level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c). An ALJ need not

discuss every piece of evidence in making an RFC determination.

See Reid, 769 F.3d at 865 (citing Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211).

However, “the ALJ must both identify evidence that supports his [or

her] conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge from that

evidence to [that] conclusion.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686,

694 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal emphasis, quotation marks, and

brackets omitted).

a. Vagueness/Inadequacy of RFC

Plaintiff first attacks the ALJ’s inclusion of restrictions to

frequent kneeling and crouching in the RFC, arguing that such

restrictions “fail[] to consider” the opinion of Plaintiff’s

treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. James Melvin, that, “[d]ue to the

knee replacement, [Plaintiff] will have discomfort sitting for long

periods of time with the knee flexed, running, kneeling, crawling

and squatting.” (Docket Entry 11 at 18 (referencing Tr. 15, and

quoting Tr. 907).) Plaintiff’s argument glosses over the fact that

Dr. Melvin offered that opinion on July 3, 2013 (see Tr. 906-07),

over a year prior to Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date and

prior to her left knee arthroscopy and debridement of scar tissue

and adhesions in April 2014 (see Tr. 965-66). Moreover, even prior

14

to Plaintiff’s 2014 arthroscopy, Dr. Melvin did not restrict

Plaintiff to occasional (or less than frequent) kneeling and

squatting; rather, he opined only that Plaintiff would experience

“discomfort” with such activities. (Tr. 907.) Plaintiff has not

shown how the ALJ’s restriction to frequent (as opposed to

constant) kneeling and crouching conflicts with Dr. Melvin’s

opinion.

Next, Plaintiff contends that, although the ALJ restricted

Plaintiff from “concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing

lights, or outdoor sunlight” (Tr. 15), “[t]he ALJ made no effort to

define what constitutes ‘bright lights’ at the hearing or in his

decision.” (Docket Entry 11 at 18.) According to Plaintiff, “a

‘bright’ light may be a 60 watt bulb, a 40 watt bulb, or even

less,” and “[i]t is unknown whether the past relevant jobs that the

ALJ found Plaintiff could perform involved ‘bright’ lighting or

some other level of lighting.” (Id. at 19.) Those contentions

falter for two reasons.

First, despite representation by counsel at the hearing,

Plaintiff objected neither to the purported vagueness of the ALJ’s

bright lights restriction in the dispositive hypothetical question

(see Tr. 54-57), nor to the VE’s testimony that an individual

restricted from concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing

lights, or outdoor sunlight could nonetheless perform Plaintiff’s

past relevant work as a Management Trainee and Health Club

15

Membership Salesperson (see Tr. 57-67). As a result, Plaintiff has

waived, in this Court, any challenge to the ALJ’s bright lights

restriction and to the ALJ’s adoption of the VE’s testimony that

Plaintiff’s former work as a Management Trainee and a Health Club

Membership Salesperson could accommodate the ALJ’s bright lights

restriction. See Stepinski v. Astrue, No. CA 11–183, 2012 WL

3866678, at *9–10 (D.R.I. Aug. 6, 2012) (unpublished) (“The [c]ourt

views unfavorably the silence of [the p]laintiff’s counsel at the

hearing regarding the omission about which he now complains.

Reversal and remand . . . would encourage other counsel to remain

silent in similar circumstances. This [c]ourt is disinclined to

provide such an incentive[ ] . . . [and] finds that [the p]laintiff

waived this issue by failing to raise it before the ALJ.” (internal

citations omitted)), recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3863812

(D.R.I. Sept. 5, 2012) (unpublished).

Second, even if Plaintiff had not waived this argument,

consideration of the entire exchange between the ALJ and the VE at

the hearing makes clear what the ALJ meant by his bright lights

restriction. During the ALJ’s questioning of the VE, the ALJ

elaborated on his bright lights restriction by explaining that

“[w]ork tasks indoors or under indoor lighting c[ould] be

accommodated with sunglasses” (Tr. 55). Thus, as the Commissioner

argues, “[t]he context [] made clear that ordinary ‘indoor

lighting’ was acceptable (with sunglasses).” (Docket Entry 13 at

16

13.) Moreover, the VE expressed no confusion over the meaning of

the ALJ’s bright lights restriction. (See Tr. 54-67.)

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s preclusion in the

RFC of “tasks [that] involve small objects or that require visual

precision,” which the ALJ further defined as “‘tasks that require

use of fine motor skills to finger objects that are smaller than

one inch that need to be placed in exact locations, such as

electronic circuit boards or other smaller electronic items that

require exact placement of parts.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 19

(quoting Tr. 15).) According to Plaintiff, “the ALJ failed to take

into account the necessity of being able to read normal print,

which is considerably smaller than one inch.” (Id.) More

specifically, Plaintiff points out that the job descriptions in the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) for Plaintiff’s prior

work as a Management Trainee and Health Club Membership Salesperson

reflect that both jobs require reading of job-related materials.

(Id. at 19-20 (referencing DOT, No. 189.167-018 (Management

Trainee), 1991 WL 671497 (G.P.O. 4th ed. rev. 1991), DOT, No.

293.357-022 (Membership Solicitor), 1991 WL 672580).) Plaintiff

emphasizes that the VE defined visual precision as “something like

small lines or thin lines, small wording” (Tr. 63), and that the

ALJ’s preclusion of tasks involving visual precision “would not

allow for ‘small lines or thin lines, small wording’ as such things

17

are smaller than the one inch definition.” (Docket Entry 11 at

20.)

Despite Plaintiff’s acknowledgment that the ALJ’s small

objects/visual precision restriction “seem[ed] to relate more to

the use of fine motor skills than [the] ability to see the objects”

(id. at 19), Plaintiff nonetheless attempts to convert the ALJ’s

restriction into one precluding the reading of normal-sized print

(id. at 19-20). That attempt fails for two reasons.

First, and most critically, the ALJ did not find that

Plaintiff had a medically determinable vision impairment at step

two of the SEP (see Tr. 12-13), and found at step three that

Plaintiff “d[id] not meet Listing 2.02 for Impairment of Visual

Acuity because her remaining vision in the better eye after best

correction [wa]s not 20/200 or less” (Tr. 14). The ALJ further

noted during his discussion of the RFC that, in February 2016,

Plaintiff’s vision had tested at 20/50 in the right eye and 20/30

in the left eye (Tr. 16; see also Tr. 407). Thus, the ALJ’s

decision as a whole provides no support for Plaintiff’s contention

that the ALJ intended the small objects/visual precision

restriction to preclude Plaintiff from reading normal-sized print.

Second, the following exchange between Plaintiff’s counsel,

the VE, and the ALJ makes clear that the ALJ intended the small

objects/visual precision restriction as a limitation on Plaintiff’s

ability to engage in the precise placement of small objects:

18

[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Visual precision, how do you

define visual precision in answering the [ALJ]’s

question?

[VE:] The ability to see precise objects, such as

like thin lines or smaller wording.

[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Well, you’re kind of defining

the term by using its own term itself. What is precise?

[VE:] Such as something like small lines or thin

lines, small wording.

[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Wouldn’t you agree that

different people can have different interpretations of

what constitutes visual precision?

[VE:] That’s possible.

[Plaintiff’s counsel:] Wouldn’t you agree that

different people would have different definitions of what

constitutes a small object?

[VE:] Yes, that’s possible as well.

[ALJ:] All right, point well taken. So let me provide

a little definition then if will help then [sic].

Because I agree that my wording was probably not precise

in terms of size or details and that was vague wording.

. . .

So when I say no tasks involving small objects or that

require visual precision, I specifically mean tasks that

require fine motor skills to finger objects that are

smaller than one inch, that would need to be placed onto

– or into exact locations, such as electronic circuit

boards or other small electronic items, that require

exact placement of parts. So what I envision here is –

when I talk about small objects and visual precision is

being able to see and manipulate small things that have

to be placed exactly in a particular location in order

for the object to work or for the task to be properly

completed.

19

(Tr. 63-64 (emphasis added).) Thus, even though the VE initially

defined visual precision to mean the ability to see “precise

objects, such as like thin lines or smaller wording” (Tr. 63

(emphasis added)), the ALJ then refined his definition to make

clear that he intended to convey a restriction on Plaintiff’s

ability to engage in fine finger movements to place objects smaller

than one inch in exact locations (see Tr. 63-64) and the VE

indicated that Plaintiff’s prior work as a Management Trainee and

Health Club Membership Salesperson remained available (see Tr. 64).

b. Logical Bridge Between Evidence and RFC

Plaintiff’s second attack on the RFC concerns the ALJ’s

alleged “fail[ure] to present a logical connection between the

evidence of record and his conclusions as to Plaintiff’s RFC.”

(Docket Entry 11 at 20.) In that regard, Plaintiff observes that

“the ALJ listed a multitude of limitations in his RFC, yet he

failed to identify evidence in the record supporting the small

objects/visual precision requirement, the frequent balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch and occasionally crawl requirements, the avoidance of

concentrated exposure to bright lights requirements, the allowance

for sunglasses requirements [sic] for indoor work tasks or under

indoor lighting, or the off-task requirement.” (Id. at 20-21

(internal citation omitted).) Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments,

the ALJ sufficiently identified evidence in the record supporting

20

the limitations in the RFC to permit meaningful judicial review by

this Court.

Regarding the small objects/visual precision restriction, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe carpal tunnel

syndrome of the right hand at step two of the SEP (see Tr. 12), and

then, in support of the RFC, discussed that “Dr. Bolz noted a

fracture deformity of the right wrist” and “4/5 grip strength,” as

well as that “an ultrasound of the bilateral hands” showed a

“moderate probability of median entrapment on the right hand” (Tr.

16). Those findings also explain why the ALJ included limitations

to occasional handling and fingering with the right upper extremity

in the RFC. (See Tr. 15.)

Concerning the ALJ’s postural limitations, the ALJ

acknowledged Plaintiff’s indication on a Function Report that she

had “problems with [] squatting, bending, . . . [and] kneeling”

(Tr. 16; see also Tr. 263), found that Plaintiff’s degenerative

disc disease and status post total left knee arthroplasty

constituted severe impairments at step two (see Tr. 12), and

pointed out in support of the RFC that “[f]indings from an

examination in April 2015 show[ed] that [Plaintiff] had mild

degenerative changes in the spine” (Tr. 16 (citing Tr. 391)), but

that, although Plaintiff had “reduced range of motion in the spine

and knee[s], [] all other findings were within normal limits” (id.

(citing Tr. 406-11)). Moreover, the ALJ afforded “little probative

21

weight” to the state agency medical consultants (Tr. 18) who found

Plaintiff capable of medium work without any postural limitations

(see Tr. 83-84, 114-15), noting that the consultants “neither

examined [Plaintiff] nor based their opinions on the most recent

evidence of record, which support[ed] further limitations” (Tr.

18). In further support of the postural limitations, the ALJ

accorded “only partial weight” to the opinion of Dr. Bolz that

Plaintiff “[wa]s moderately severely impaired in performing certain

postural activities,” finding that such an opinion “d[id] not give

specific functional limitations.” (Tr. 17; see also Tr. 410.)

The ALJ also supplied a logical bridge between the record

evidence and his preclusion of concentrated exposure to bright

lights, flashing lights, and outdoor sunlight and his allowance to

wear sunglasses for work under indoor lighting (see Tr. 15). The

ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s statements that she had “pain due to

shingles and sensitivity to light,” that she “needs to constantly

wear sunglasses because of pain and light sensitivity in her eyes,”

and that “[s]he rated the pain in her eyes an 8 out of 10 despite

pain medication.” (Tr. 16; see also Tr. 43-44, 46, 49, 262.)

However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements about her symptoms

“not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record” (Tr. 16) and further noted that “the

evidence suggest[ed] that [Plaintiff]’s symptoms m[ight] not be

accurately reported and m[ight] not exist at the level of severity

22

assumed by her testimony” (Tr. 17). Nevertheless, “[t]o account

for [Plaintiff’s] allegations of pain and other symptoms,” the ALJ

precluded Plaintiff from “concentrated exposure to bright lights,

flashing lights, or outdoor sunlight” and “allowed [Plaintiff] to

wear sunglasses for frequent exposure to work task[s] indoors or

under indoor lighting.” (Id.)

The ALJ also adequately explained the RFC’s allowance for

Plaintiff to remain off-task for up to 10 percent of the workday in

addition to normal breaks (see Tr. 15). Consistent with that

allowance, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s non-severe mental

impairments resulted in only mild limitation of Plaintiff’s ability

to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace at step two of the

SEP. (See Tr. 13.) Moreover, the ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s

testimony that she suffered “fatigue from her medications” and

“that her pain level also affect[ed] her ability to concentrate and

focus” (Tr. 16), but found Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms []

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record” (id.). However, the ALJ stated that he

“view[ed] the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff]”

(Tr. 18), and included the off-task allowance to accommodate

Plaintiff’s alleged “pain and side effects from medication” (Tr.

17).

23

In sum, Plaintiff’s second and third issues on review do not

warrant reversal or remand.

3. Opinion Evidence

In Plaintiff’s final assignment of error, she asserts that

“[t]he ALJ has failed to state the weight he has given to

Plaintiff’s various treating providers whose findings and opinions

appear in the record.” (Docket Entry 11 at 21.) In that regard,

Plaintiff faults the ALJ for according great weight to consultative

psychological examiner Dr. Patrick C. Quinn (id. (citing Tr. 17)),

and for failing to discuss and/or weigh the opinions and findings

of Dr. Melvin, Dr. Gary T. Raflo, Dr. Landirs Shaun Williams, Dr.

Jason A. Ravanbahkt, Dr. Robert B. Wilson II, Dr. Joshua A.

Rheinbolt, Dr. Brian K. Cain, and Dr. Bolz (id. at 21-22 (citing

Tr. 410, 906-07, 1784)). Plaintiff’s arguments do not establish an

entitlement to relief.

The treating source rule generally requires an ALJ to give

controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source regarding

the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(2) (“[T]reating sources . . . provide a detailed,

longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and

may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot

be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from

reports of individual examinations, such as consultative

examinations or brief hospitalizations.”). The rule also

24

recognizes, however, that not all treating sources or treating

source opinions merit the same deference. The nature and extent of

each treatment relationship appreciably tempers the weight an ALJ

affords an opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii). Moreover,

as subsections (2) through (4) of the rule detail, a treating

source’s opinion, like all medical opinions, deserves deference

only if well-supported by medical signs and laboratory findings and

consistent with the other substantial evidence of record. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(4). “[I]f a physician’s opinion is not

supported by clinical evidence or if it is inconsistent with other

substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less

weight.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 590 (emphasis added). Finally,

statements from medical sources (and even treating sources) that a

claimant qualifies as disabled or cannot work do not constitute

“medical opinions as described in [§ 404.1527(a)(1)], but are,

instead, opinions on issues reserved for the Commissioner” and do

not warrant controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).8

Consultative examiners (such as Drs. Quinn and Bolz) do not

constitute treating sources under the regulations, see 20 C.F.R.

8 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Commissioner has

significantly amended the regulations governing opinion evidence. The new

regulations provide that ALJs “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary

weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s), including those from your medical sources.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. As Plaintiff filed her claims prior to March 27, 2017

(see Tr. 10), this Recommendation has analyzed Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the

treating physician rule set out above.

25

§ 404.1527(c)(2), and thus their opinions, as a general

proposition, do not warrant controlling weight, Turberville v.

Colvin, No. 1:11CV262, 2014 WL 1671582, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 23,

2014) (unpublished) (Auld, M.J.), recommendation adopted, slip op.

(M.D.N.C. May 15, 2014) (Eagles, J.). However, the ALJ must

nevertheless evaluate consultative opinions using the factors

outlined in the regulations, and expressly indicate and explain the

weight he or she affords to such opinions. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c) (“Regardless of its source, [the ALJ] will evaluate

every medical opinion [he or she] receive[s]” and where an opinion

does not warrant controlling weight, the ALJ must “consider all of

the . . . factors [in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6)] in deciding

the weight [to] give to any medical opinion.”).

a. Dr. Quinn

Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s decision to afford “great

weight” to the opinions of consultative psychological examiner Dr.

Quinn (Tr. 17) “when so many of [Plaintiff]’s limitations are

physical in nature.” (Docket Entry 11 at 21 (emphasis added).) In

that regard, Plaintiff points out that Dr. Quinn lacked the

qualifications “to give an opinion as to [Plaintiff]’s exertional

capacity, her postural abilities, her manipulation abilities, her

visual perception, her nerve-related pain issues, her environmental

issues, or her need for sunglasses in the workplace.” (Id.)

According to Plaintiff, Dr. Quinn “gave an opinion as to

26

Plaintiff’s mental state (without performing any formal mental

status testing), and her [sic] opinion has virtually no bearing on

[] Plaintiff’s overall functional abilities.” (Id.)

The ALJ did not err in his consideration of Dr. Quinn’s

opinions, because the ALJ did not rely upon Dr. Quinn’s opinions to

formulate Plaintiff’s physical RFC; rather, the ALJ credited Dr.

Quinn’s opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would not

“prevent her from tolerating the stress and pressure associated

with day-to-day [work] or similar activity” (Tr. 17; see also Tr.

401) and accordingly found that Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety

constituted non-severe impairments that “d[id] not cause more than

minimal limitation in [her] ability to perform basic mental work

activities” (Tr. 13). Moreover, Dr. Quinn’s report directly

contradicts Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Quinn “gave an opinion as

to Plaintiff’s mental state (without performing any formal mental

status testing)” (Docket Entry 11 at 21), as the report contains

both a “Narrative Mental Status” (Tr. 397) and individual findings

for orientation (see Tr. 398), immediate retention and recall (see

id.), recent memory (see id.), remote memory (see Tr. 399), fund of

information (see id.), calculations (see id.), abstract reasoning

(see Tr. 399-400), and insight (see Tr. 400).

b. Dr. Melvin

With regard to Dr. Melvin, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s

failure to “discuss what weight he gave to the opinions of Dr.

27

Melvin . . . and the limitations and prognosis he set forth” ina

letter to Plaintiff’s counsel dated July 3, 2013. (Docket Entry 11

at 21 (citing Tr. 906-07).) In the letter, Dr. Melvin estimated

that, as of July 2013, Plaintiff “ha[d] a 40[ percent] disability

to the left lower extremity,” noted that her left knee showed signs

of “developing early patellar clunk syndrome,” indicated that she

“very well m[ight] need arthroscopic debridement of scar tissue,”

and opined that she would have “discomfort sitting for long periods

of time with [her left] knee flexed, running, kneeling, crawling,

and squatting.” (Tr. 907 (emphasis added).) Dr. Melvin noted that

Plaintiff had a “slight gait impairment,” and that he could not

predict whether her mild to moderate knee pain would improve with

time. (Id. (emphasis added).) Dr. Melvin further recommended that

Plaintiff pursue “an active, healthy lifestyle.” (Id.)

The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Melvin’s July 2013 letter in his

decision. (See Tr. 12-18.) However, the ALJ’s omission, if error

at all, amounts to at most harmless error, see generally Fisher,

869 F.2d at 1057, because Dr. Melvin offered that opinion over a

year prior to Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date and during

a time period subsequent to Plaintiff’s total knee replacement in

October 2012 but prior to her left knee arthroscopy in April 2014

which, as Dr. Melvin predicted (see Tr. 907), involved debridement

of scar tissue and adhesions from the total knee replacement

(see Tr. 965-66). As the Commissioner points out (see Docket Entry

28

13 at 22), Dr. Melvin released Plaintiff to return to work without

restrictions on May 19, 2014, less than one month after her

debridement procedure (see Tr. 984). Under such circumstances,

Plaintiff has not shown that remand for an express discussion by

the ALJ of Dr. Melvin’s July 2013 letter would have resulted in

additional, material restrictions in the RFC or an otherwise more

favorable outcome in her case. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d

650, 655 (4th Cir. 2005) (declining to “determine whether

substantial evidence support[ed] the ALJ’s rejection of the

[treating physician’s] assessment [issued after Plaintiff’s insured

status for benefits expired,] because the [] assessment [wa]s not

relevant”); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235-36 (4th Cir.

1984) (requiring ALJs to “explain[] the weight . . . given to

obviously probative exhibits” (emphasis added)); Rivera v. Colvin,

No. 5:11CV569, 2013 WL 2433515, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 4, 2013)

(unpublished) (deeming treating physician’s opinion not probative

to determining whether plaintiff qualified as disabled under her

current application for benefits, because opinion pre-dated the

plaintiff’s disability onset date and addressed injuries that had

improved); Ambrose v. Astrue, 2:11CV683, 2013 WL 1308981 *12 (E.D.

Va. Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished) (holding that ALJ’s failure to

explain weight given to treating physician’s opinion qualified as

harmless error where opinion (issued two years after the

29

plaintiff’s date last insured) remained “[in]consistent with the

record during the relevant period”).

c. Drs. Raflo and Rheinbolt

Dr. Raflo, an opthalmologist, treated Plaintiff immediately

after her alleged disability onset date for the approximately two-

and-a-half-month-period Plaintiff had an active herpes zoster

(shingles) infection in her right eye. (See Tr. 476-85.) By the

end of that period, Dr. Raflo noted that Plaintiff’s right eye

“look[ed] good” and recommended that Plaintiff see her primary care

physician for headaches and/or post-herpetic pain. (Tr. 485.) Dr.

Raflo did not offer an opinion regarding the impact of Plaintiff’s

zoster infection on her functional abilities (see Tr. 476-85), and

the record does not reflect any subsequent treatment by Dr. Raflo.

The ALJ’s decision does not specifically reference Dr. Raflo’s

treatment (see Tr. 12-18); however, that omission constitutes, at

most, harmless error, see generally Fisher, 869 F.2d at 1057. As

discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s first issue on

review, her active zoster infection did not meet the 12-month

durational requirement for a severe impairment, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1509, and thus the ALJ properly focused his discussion on

Plaintiff’s treatment for the post-herpetic neuralgia symptoms

caused by the zoster infection. As with Dr. Melvin, Plaintiff has

30

thus not shown that an express discussion by the ALJ of Dr. Raflo’s

treatment would result in a more favorable outcome for Plaintiff.

So far as the record reflects, Dr. Rheinbolt, also an

opthalmologist, treated Plaintiff two times on March 15, 2017 (see

Tr. 1679-81), and September 18, 2017 (see Tr. 642-44). On March

15, 2017, Plaintiff complained of blurry vision, sticky eyes, and

light sensitivity, but denied eye pain. (See Tr. 1679.) Dr.

Rheinbolt tested Plaintiff’s vision in the right eye at 20/80 and

in the left eye at 20/100 (see Tr. 1680), and prescribed Valtrex as

well as the use of artificial tears (see Tr. 1681). Approximately

six months later, Dr. Rheinbolt noted Plaintiff’s vision had

improved to 20/30 on the right and 20/40 on the left (see Tr. 643)

and continued to prescribe Valtrex (see Tr. 642). In neither

record did Dr. Rheinbolt note that Plaintiff wore sunglasses or

recommend that Plaintiff wear them. (See Tr. 642-44, 1679-81.)

As an initial matter, doubt exists as to whether Dr.

Rheinbolt, having treated Plaintiff on only two occasions,

qualifies as a treating physician. see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527 (c) (2) (1) (“Generally, the longer a treating source has

treated [a claimant] and the more times [a claimant] have been seen

by a treating source, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to the

source’s medical opinion. When the treating source has seen [a

claimant] a number of times and long enough to have obtained a

longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] impairment, [the ALJ] will

31

give the source’s opinion more weight than [the ALJ] would give it

if it were from a nontreating source.” (emphasis added)). Whether

properly considered as a treating physician nor not, Dr. Rheinbolt

did not offer any opinions as to the effect of Plaintiff’s eye

impairments on her physical functioning and thus Plaintiff merely

challenges the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Rheinbolt’s two

treatment records. Given the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s

“headaches post herpetic neuralgia” and “left eye light sensitivity

with pain” qualified as severe impairments (Tr. 12), and his

preclusion of concentrated exposure to bright lights, flashing

lights, or outdoor sunlight, as well as an allowance to wear

sunglasses indoors on the job in the RFC (see Tr. 15), Plaintiff

has not established that remand to require the ALJ to discuss Dr.

Rheinbolt’s treatment records would have a material impact on

Plaintiff’s case.

d. Drs. Williams, Ravanbahkt, and Wilson

Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s failure to “reference any of

the pain management doctors . . . who saw Plaintiff” and the

omission of any “discussion in the record as to any of the

findings, treatment, procedures performed, or course of care of any

of these physicians.” (Docket Entry 11 at 21.) According to

Plaintiff, “[i]n a case where the primary medical impairment taking

Plaintiff out of, and keeping Plaintiff from performing, her last

32

job, is post-herpetic neuralgia and trigeminal neuralgia caused by

the zoster virus, with resulting photosensitivity, severe eye pain,

nausea, vomiting, and headaches, it is difficult to understand why

no reference is made to these physicians or any of their findings

and opinions.” (Id. at 21-22.)

As discussed in connection with Plaintiff’s first assignment

of error, “‘there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically

refer to every piece of evidence in his decision,’” Reid, 769 F.3d

at 865 (quoting Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211), and, as the ALJ indicated

that he “careful[ly] consider[ed ] the entire record” (see Tr. 15

(bold font omitted)}), “[t]he Court is entitled to rely on th[at]

representation[] absent a compelling reason to the contrary,”

Hunter, 2013 WL 2122575, at *4. Again, Plaintiff has not presented

any such compelling reason. (See Docket Entry 11 at 21-22.)

Furthermore, the ALJ expressly acknowledged Plaintiff’s complaints

of eye pain, headaches, and light sensitivity, as well as her

alleged need to take pain medication and wear sunglasses indoors

(see Tr. 16), and accommodated those complaints in the RFC (see Tr.

15). Plaintiff has simply not shown that remanding this matter for

an express discussion by the ALJ of Plaintiff’s pain management

procedures would lead to a different result in her DIB claim. See

generally Fisher, 869 F.2d at 1057.

33

e. Dr. Cain

Plaintiff additionally challenges the ALJ’s “fail[ure] to

signify what weight, if any, he gave to the opinion of [Plaintiff’s

primary care physician,] Dr. [] Cain, who, after filling out

[Plaintiff]’s disability paperwork, gave an assessment; ‘Currently

she is severely limited in her ability to do much of anything

beyond her [activities of daily living] as exertion does exacerbate

her post-herpetic neuralgia.’” (Docket Entry 11 at 22 (quoting Tr.

1784).) The ALJ’s failure to mention or weigh Dr. Cain’s above-

quoted statement (see Tr. 12-18) does not constitute reversible

error. As the Commissioner argues:

If one looks more closely at Dr. Cain’s statements, [] he

is simply reporting what Plaintiff subjectively stated to

him. Dr. Cain explains that Plaintiff “states” she

cannot perform activities: Plaintiff “states that she has

very limited ability to do much throughout the day. She

states that even attempting light housework results in

severe headaches” (Tr. 1785, emphasis supplied).

Otherwise, Dr. Cain largely notes Plaintiff’s diagnoses,

and then concludes by again noting that Plaintiff

“states” she is “limited in her ability to do day-to-day

activities,” which has resulted in significant sadness

[(Id.)]. These notations from Dr. Cain, therefore, are

not true medical opinions; rather, they are a recitation

of what Dr. Cain has been told by Plaintiff. As the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has

aptly explained, the mere memorialization of a patient’s

subjective complaints by a physician does not

“transform[] his observations into ‘clinical evidence.’

If this were true, it would completely vitiate any notion

of objective clinical medical evidence.” Craig, 76 F.3d

34

at 590 n.2. “There is nothing objective” about a doctor

saying, without more, “I observed my patient telling me

she was in pain.” Id.

(Docket Entry 13 at 24 (underscoring added).)

f. Dr. Bolz

Lastly, Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ for “fail[ing] to state

what weight he gives to Dr. Bolz’[s] opinion that ‘[Plaintiff]’s

ability to perform work-related activities such as bending,

stooping, lifting, walking, crawling, squatting, carrying,

traveling, and pushing and pulling heavy objects appears to be at

least moderately severely impaired due to the sum of [Dr. Bolz’s]

findings described [in his report].’” (Docket Entry 11 at 22

(quoting Tr. 410).) Plaintiff’s argument inexplicably overlooks

the fact that the ALJ expressly accorded “partial weight” to Dr.

Bolz’s opinion in question, finding the opinion “vague[]” and

noting that the opinion lacked “specific functional limitations.”

(Tr. 17.)

In short, as Plaintiff has not shown reversible error in the

ALJ’s consideration of the opinion evidence of record, Plaintiff’s

fourth and final assignment of error misses the mark.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not established grounds for relief.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision

finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s Motion for

35

Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 9; Docket Entry 11 at 2-3) be

denied, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

(Docket Entry 12) be granted, and that judgment be entered

dismissing this action.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

August 26, 2020

36