“Like those of many other states, North Carolina’s long-arm statute is construed to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.”
How later courts described this case
- “Like those of many other states, North Carolina’s long-arm statute is construed to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BENJAMIN VIENT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19cv2
)
THE SANFORD HERALD, RACHAEL )
RANEY, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff Benjamin Vient (“Vient”) brings this action against
The Sanford Herald (the “Herald”) and Rachael Raney (“Raney”)
alleging violations of the Copyright Act of 1976. (Doc. 59.)
Before the court is Vient’s motion to transfer (Doc. 56), motion
to amend his second amended complaint (Doc. 66), and motion for
court mediation (Doc. 70), as well as Defendant Raney’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. 61). The motions have been fully briefed and are
ready for decision. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant
Raney’s motion to dismiss will be granted, and Plaintiff’s motions
will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case has an already extensive procedural history. Vient
initiated this action on January 3, 2019, with the filing of a pro
se complaint alleging that “Defendant[s] ha[ve] infringed upon
[his] exclusive copyright and intellectual property rights,” in
violation of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
(Doc. 1 at 1.) The alleged copyright infringement involved the
December 23, 2015 publication by the Herald, a Sanford, North
Carolina newspaper, of an article, “On the Rails: Gliding into the
Holidays,” authored by Vient. On March 18, 2019, Defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint (Docs. 12, 15), and in lieu of responding
to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Vient filed an amended complaint
on March 21, 2019 (Doc. 18). Additionally, Vient filed a Motion
to Compel Expedited Disclosure and/or Discovery (Doc. 19), a Motion
to Schedule Conference and Order (Doc. 20), and a Motion for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. 21). Defendants opposed
Vient’s motions to compel discovery and for a preliminary
injunction (Docs. 26, 31) and subsequently filed motions to dismiss
the amended complaint (Docs. 22, 24), which were later amended
(Doc. 48).
On April 9, 2019, Vient filed a Motion for More Definitive
Answer/Statement (Doc. 29), as well as a Motion for Court’s Leave
to Amend Complaint (Doc. 30), which Defendants opposed (Doc. 37).
On April 22, 2019, Vient filed a Motion for a More Definite
Statement (Doc. 34), which Defendants opposed (Doc. 40). Vient
then filed a Motion to Delineate Complaint’s Relief (Doc. 41) and
an additional Motion to Amend (Doc. 47), both of which Defendants
opposed (Docs. 46, 51). On June 10, 2019, Vient filed a Letter
Motion “[i]n support of [his second] Motion to Amend” and included
a proposed second amended complaint. (Doc. 50.) Defendants
opposed this motion as well. (Doc. 52.) Vient then filed a Motion
for Settlement Proposal (Doc. 54), which was struck by the court.
In a February 10, 2020 Opinion, Order, and Recommendation,
Magistrate Judge Auld allowed Vient to amend his pleadings, thereby
rendering the motions to dismiss moot, but denied all of Vient’s
other motions. (Doc. 57.) This court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Recommendations. (Doc. 64.) Thus, as allowed by the
court, Vient’s second amended complaint was filed February 10,
2020. (Doc. 59.)
On February 24, 2020, Raney moved to dismiss Vient’s second
amended complaint (Doc. 61), and the Herald filed an answer (Doc.
63). On March 6, 2020, Vient moved yet again to amend his second
amended complaint (Doc. 66), a motion opposed by Defendants (Doc.
68). Vient has also filed a motion to transfer this case to the
United States District Court in the Western District of Kentucky
(Doc. 56), a motion which Defendants oppose (Doc. 60). Vient
thereafter filed a Motion for Court Mediation (Doc. 70), which is
opposed by Defendants (Doc. 71).
Because Vient seeks to amend his complaint, the court
summarizes the facts of his grievance as set out in the proposed
third amended complaint, which is viewed in the light most
favorable to him. Vient alleges he is the owner of copyrights
registered with the United States Copyright Office, which he
identifies as TX0008587743, TX0008587772, and TX0008589705. (Doc.
59 at 1.) He contends that Defendants have engaged in “multiple
violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.: including multiple
reproduction violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), multiple
distribution violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), and multiple
display violations of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(5)” as it relates to
TX0008589705, an article entitled “On the Rails: Gliding into the
Holidays.” (Id.) In November 2018, after discovering the
unauthorized use of his work, Vient contacted Defendant Raney, who
was then the publisher of the Herald, and informed her that his
works were copyrighted. (Doc. 65.) Vient argues that he never
transferred his right to authorize electronic distribution to
Defendants and that, therefore, the third-party use and sale of
his work violates 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). (Doc. 66.)
II. ANALYSIS
This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 because this claim involves violations of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
When properly raised, personal jurisdiction is a threshold
question that precedes consideration of the merits of a claim.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted) (“Personal
jurisdiction . . . is an essential element of the jurisdiction of
a district . . . court, without which the court is powerless to
proceed to an adjudication.”); accord Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v.
Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
dismissal of a case on an issue relating to the merits of the
dispute, such as failure to state a claim, is improper without
resolving threshold issues of jurisdiction, including personal
jurisdiction.”).
A. Motion to Dismiss
1. Standard of Review
“[W]hen the court addresses the personal jurisdiction
question by reviewing only the parties’ motion papers, affidavits
attached to the motion, supporting legal memoranda, and the
allegations in the complaint, a plaintiff need only make a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction to survive the
jurisdictional challenge.” Grayson v. Anderson, 816 F.3d 262, 268
(4th Cir. 2016) (citing Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th
Cir. 1989)). The court “must construe all relevant pleading
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, assume
credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the
existence of jurisdiction.” Combs, 886 F.2d at 676.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Defendant Raney moves to dismiss Vient’s second amended
complaint, arguing that she resides in Carrollton, Georgia, and is
not involved with the December 2015 publication of Vient’s article
that forms the basis of his copyright infringement claims. (Doc.
62 at 3.) She supports these arguments with sworn affidavits.
(Docs. 16-1, 62-1.) Raney further contends that she “is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court, under either a
theory of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.” (Doc.
62 at 5.) In his proposed amendment to his amended complaint,
Vient argues that he reached out to Raney to resolve the copyright
issues, but nothing came of his efforts. (Doc. 65 at 1.) He
argues that Raney is “at least partially responsible for [his]
damages.” (Id.)
Analysis of personal jurisdiction consists of a two-part
inquiry: first, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized
under the state’s long-arm statute; and second, whether the
exercise of jurisdiction comports with the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carefirst of Md., Inc.
v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir.
2003). See also Pan-Am. Prods. & Holdings, LLC v. R.T.G. Furniture
Corp., 825 F. Supp. 2d 664, 677 (M.D.N.C. 2011). Under North
Carolina’s long-arm statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4, North
Carolina courts are permitted to exercise “personal jurisdiction
over a defendant to the outer limits allowable under federal due
process.” Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553,
558-59 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2014); accord Christian Sci. Bd. of Dirs.
of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215
(4th Cir. 2001) (“Like those of many other states, North Carolina’s
long-arm statute is construed to extend jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the Due
Process Clause.”); Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d
629, 630–31 (N.C. 1977) (same). Thus, the two-part inquiry merges
into a single question: whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with due process. Universal Leather, 773 F.3d at 559.
Under the Due Process Clause, a court can have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in either of two ways:
First, a court may find specific jurisdiction based on
conduct connected to the suit. If the defendant’s
contacts with the State are also the basis for the suit,
those contacts may establish specific jurisdiction.
Second, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction under
the theory of general jurisdiction, which requires a
more demanding showing of continuous and systematic
activities in the forum state.
Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co.,
682 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Construing the proposed complaint and
affidavits in the light most favorable to Vient, the court finds
no contention or evidence that Raney had any contact with North
Carolina. Therefore, personal jurisdiction cannot be based on
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction stemming from
Raney’s contacts, and the inquiry will proceed solely as to the
conduct connected with the lawsuit.
To resolve an objection to personal jurisdiction, the court
must determine “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum state; (2) whether the plaintiff's claims arise out of those
activities; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
is constitutionally reasonable.” Id. at 301-02 (citation
omitted). Each prong must be satisfied for the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction. See Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v.
Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278–79 (4th Cir. 2009). “The
allegations of the complaint are taken as true only if they are
not controverted by evidence from the defendant. Once a defendant
presents evidence indicating that the requisite minimum contacts
do not exist, the plaintiff must come forward with affidavits or
other evidence in support of its position.” Vision Motor Cars,
Inc. v. Valor Motor Co., 981 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (M.D.N.C. 2013)
(internal citations omitted).
Raney has filed sworn affidavits detaching her from any
involvement with the publication of Vient’s articles. The alleged
copyright infringement in this case involved the Herald’s
December 23, 2015 publication of an article, “On the Rails: Gliding
into the Holidays,” and its upload onto a third-party site,
Newsbank. (Doc. 1.) While Vient alleges that Raney has some
involvement in the alleged infringement, Raney has controverted
these allegations with sworn affidavits averring that she was not
employed with the Herald when these articles were published (Doc.
16-1 at 1-2), and she had no role in deciding what material would
be available through Newsbank. (Doc. 62-1 at 2.) Even viewed in
the light most favorable to Vient, the facts do not demonstrate
that Raney purposefully availed herself of the privilege of
conducting activities in North Carolina or is connected to Vient’s
copyright infringement claim.
Even considering Vient’s proposed third amended complaint,
the court has no specific or general personal jurisdiction over
Raney; therefore, Raney’s motion to dismiss will be granted, and
Vient’s motion to amend will be denied as futile. See Katyle v.
Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525
F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)) (“[A] district court may deny leave
if amending the complaint would be futile — that is, if the
proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of
the federal rules.”). See also Skinner v. Womack Army Med. Ctr.,
No. 1:19CV572, 2019 WL 6350628, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 27, 2019)
(denying leave to file an amended complaint where the proposed
amendment would not save plaintiff’s claim from dismissal).
B. Motion to Transfer
Vient moves to transfer this case “to the jurisdiction of the
owner of Defendant Sanford Herald, Paxton Media Group, to KY Case
5:19-CV000141,” basing the motion on “the revelation of the
Affidavit in the NC Case 1:19CV2 (Doc. 32) that Paxton Media Group
of Kentucky is responsible for infringing actions of this case.”
(Doc. 56.) Defendants oppose this motion, noting that Vient chose
to file his suit here in North Carolina. (Doc. 60 at 1.) They
further argue that the “referenced affidavit [(Doc. 32)] was filed
on April 18, 2019 – more than nine [months] before plaintiff’s
Motion to Transfer” and that they have already “expended
significant time, energy and financial resources to defend against
plaintiff’s varied and sometimes inscrutable filings” here in
North Carolina. (Id at 2.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which
all parties have consented.” The court undertakes a two-step
analysis in determining whether to grant a motion to transfer.
First, section 1404(a) requires that the lawsuit could have been
brought in the district or division to which transfer is sought.
Second, the court determines whether transfer is warranted. In
considering a motion to transfer, a court should weigh the
following discretionary factors:
(1) the plaintiff’s initial choice of forum; (2)
relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3)
availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing and unwilling witnesses; (4)
possibility of a view of the premises, if appropriate;
(5) enforceability of a judgment, if one is obtained;
(6) relative advantage and obstacles to a fair trial;
(7) other practical problems that make a trial easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive; (8) administrative
difficulties of court congestion; (9) local interest in
having localized controversies settled at home; (10)
appropriateness in having a trial of a diversity case in
a forum that is at home with the state law that must
govern the action; and (11) avoidance of unnecessary
problems with conflicts of law.
Speed Trac Techs., Inc. v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 567 F. Supp.
2d 799, 802 (M.D.N.C. 2008). The party moving to transfer bears
the burden of proving that the balance favors transfer. Id. at
803. Further, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is given considerable
weight and, “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.” Collins v. Straight, Inc., 748 F.2d 916, 921 (4th
Cir. 1984) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1946)).
Vient bears the burden of demonstrating that transfer is
warranted, but his only support for transfer is that “Paxton Media
Group of Kentucky is responsible for infringing actions of this
case.” (Doc. 56.) Nowhere does he allege that the lawsuit could
have been brought in Kentucky, as is his burden, and he fails to
articulate how any of the factors identified above weigh in favor
of transfer. Because Vient has failed to meet his burden, his
motion to transfer will be denied.
C. Motion for Court Mediation
Vient moves for court mediation, suggesting that the parties
“should be able to professionally resolve the matters without
necessitating Court resources and costs.” (Doc. 70.) Defendants
oppose this motion, arguing that it is both improper and
unnecessary. (Doc. 71 at 2.) Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
As Defendants note, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules here in the Middle District provide the order in which
civil litigation shall proceed. The court directs Vient to this
court’s Local Rules 16.1 and 16.4 regarding the proper timing of
mediation in civil cases before the court, noting that this
district has mandatory mediation at the appropriate time.
Mediation and voluntary settlement are indeed encouraged. Vient
is free to engage in informal discussions with the Defendant in an
effort to resolve his dispute. However, his request for court-
ordered mediation outside the parameters of this court’s local
rules is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Rachael Raney’s motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. 61) is GRANTED
and Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 66), motion to transfer (Doc.
56), and motion for court mediation (Doc. 70) are DENIED.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
August 7, 2020