The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DARRELL L. BRIGHT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19CV504
)
ANDREW SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff brought this action to obtain review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security1 denying his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits.
The Court has before it the certified administrative record (Docket Entry 8) and cross-motions
for judgment on the pleadings (Docket Entries 12, 16).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits
on September 29, 2017, alleging a disability onset date of September 1, 2017. (Tr. 194-197.)
The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 10, 93-96, 102-108.) Plaintiff
1 Andrew Saul was confirmed as the Commissioner of Social Security on June 4, 2019 and was
sworn in on June 17, 2019. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew
Saul should be substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill as Defendant. No further action need be taken to
continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 405(g) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which he attended on
October 24, 2018 with his attorney and a vocational expert. (Tr. 110-111, 32-69.) In his
December 4, 2018 decision, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 10-22.)
On March 8, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s
decision the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of review. (Tr. 1-6.)
II. STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is specific and
narrow. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). Review is limited to determining
if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990). In reviewing for substantial evidence, the Court does not re-weigh conflicting
evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). The issue before the Court is
not whether Plaintiff is disabled but whether the finding that he is not disabled is supported
by substantial evidence and based upon a correct application of the relevant law. Id.
III. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ followed the well-established five-step sequential analysis to ascertain whether
Plaintiff is disabled, which is set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See Albright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).2 The ALJ initially determined that Plaintiff met
2 “The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock v. Astrue,
667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this
process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to [his] past relevant work; and (5) if not, could
the insured status requirements through December 31, 2022. (Tr. 12.) The ALJ then
determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
alleged onset date of September 1, 2017. (Id.) The ALJ next found the following severe
impairments at step two: sleep apnea, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and alcohol use
disorder. (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listing. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ next
set forth Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) and determined that he could
perform medium work with the following limitations:
his work is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks, but not
at a production rate; simple work-related decisions; and
occasional interaction with the public, co-workers and
supervisors. He would be off-task no more than 10 percent of
the time in an eight-hour workday, in addition to normal breaks
(with normal breaks defined as a 10-15 minute morning and
afternoon break and a 30-minute lunch break).
(Tr. 14.)
At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past
relevant work. (Tr. 20.) Last, at step five, the ALJ determined that there were jobs in the
national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 21.) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 22.)
perform any other work in the national economy.” Id. A finding adverse to the claimant at any of
several points in this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. Id.
IV. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in (1) failing to adequately assess the medical
evaluations of Dr. Lekisha Alesii and Dr. Julia Messer and (2) failing to explain the reasons for
not giving significant weight to Plaintiff’s Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability rating. (Docket
Entry 14 at 4-10.) For the following reasons, neither of these contentions has merit, and the
Commissioner’s final decision should be upheld.
A. Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ failed to properly assess the medical evaluations of
Drs. Alesii and Messer. (Docket Entry 14 at 4-8.) This argument is without merit.
As a threshold issue, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed his application on September
29, 2017. (Tr. 194-197.) For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, the SSA has
fundamentally changed how adjudicators assess opinion evidence. See Revisions to Rules Regarding
the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01, 2017 WL 168819 (Jan. 18, 2017).3
The longstanding requirements calling for adjudicators to weigh medical opinions and
give special deference to treating source opinions have changed. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)
(effective March 27, 2017). Now, adjudicators “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s] medical sources.”4 Id. Nevertheless, an ALJ must
3 To the extent Plaintiff suggests that case law requires the ALJ to provide additional
explanation about the VA disability decision or the medical opinions, or that the ALJ had to “weigh”
the opinions in a manner that deviates from the current regulations, he is incorrect to rely upon it.
4 The new regulations define a medical opinion as “a statement from a medical source about
what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one or more impairment-
related limitations or restrictions” in the ability to perform the physical, mental, or other demands of
consider and articulate in the administrative decision how persuasive he or she finds each
medical opinion or prior medical finding in a claimant’s case record. See id. § 404.1520c(b)
(“We will articulate in our determination or decision how persuasive we find all of the medical
opinions and all of the prior administrative medical findings in your case record.”). When a
medical source provides more than one opinion or finding, the ALJ will evaluate the
persuasiveness of such opinions or findings as a class. See id. § 404.1520c(b)(1). In doing so,
the ALJ is “not required to articulate how [he] considered each medical opinion or prior
administrative medical finding from one medical source individually.” Id.
In evaluating persuasiveness, the ALJ must articulate two factors: supportability and
consistency. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability is an internal check that references objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations that come from the source itself. Id. §
404.1520c(c)(1); see also Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853 (defining supportability as “[t]he
extent to which a medical source’s opinion is supported by relevant objective medical evidence
and the source’s supporting explanation”). Consistency is an external check that references
evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources. Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2); see also Revisions to
Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853 (defining consistency as “the extent to which the opinion is
consistent with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim”). The ALJ must only address the three other persuasiveness factors—relationship with
the claimant, specialization, and the catchall “other factors”—when two or more medical
work activity or adapt to environmental conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (2017). The new
regulations also define a “finding . . . about a medical issue made by . . . Federal and State agency
medical and psychological consultants at a prior level of review” as “[p]rior administrative medical
finding.” Id. § 404.1513(a)(5).
opinions, or prior administrative medical findings about the same issue, are equally persuasive
in terms of supportability and consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 404.1520c(c)(3)-(5).
i. Dr. Lekisha Alesii
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr. Alesii’s medical opinion.
(Docket Entry 14 at 4-8.) This argument is without merit.
On September 6, 2017, soon after Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of September 1, 2017,
Dr. Alesii conducted a one-time Compensation and Pension Examination of Plaintiff as part
of his application for disability benefits to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. (Tr. 375-
381.) The ALJ cited to the new regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, and performed a lengthy
analysis of Dr. Alesii’s examination as follows:
Lekisha Alesii, Ph.D., indicated during a Compensation and
Pension Examination in September 2017 that the claimant
appeared to have limitations in job-related duties as it pertained
to his PTSD diagnosis. His symptoms included intrusive
thoughts, distressing dreams/nightmares, flashbacks,
psychological and physiological distress to triggers of trauma,
avoidance of thoughts and external reminders of trauma,
emotional numbness, detachment from others, persistent and
exaggerated negative beliefs, distorted cognitions surrounding
the trauma, persistent negative emotional state, irritability/anger,
hypervigilance, and exaggerated startle response. He also
reported having a depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness and
hopelessness, fatigue, difficulty concentrating, anhedonia, guilt,
and a sleep disturbance. (Ex. 2F).
He appeared to be moderately limited in his ability to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed instructions due to distractions
from PTSD symptoms (such as flashbacks, intrusive thoughts,
hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating). The claimant also
appeared to be markedly impaired in his ability to complete a
normal workday and workweek without interruption from
psychologically based symptoms (due to problems with re-
experiencing trauma, avoidance reactions, and hyperarousal). He
appeared to have a marked impairment in responding
appropriately to changes and stressors in a work setting (due to
irritability/anger, excessive worry, exaggerated startle response,
hyperarousal, and unprovoked irritability with periods of
violence). The claimant appeared to have marked limitations in
his ability to relate to others, including supervisors and coworkers
(due to suspiciousness, irritability/anger, avoidance of crowds,
and difficulty in social interactions as evidenced by problems in
his interactions with his ex-wife and people in public with whom
he became angry). Based upon the examination, the claimant
needed to seek follow up treatment. He required individual
psychotherapy and medication management. (Ex. 2F).
This opinion is not persuasive because the marked limitations
given to the claimant by Dr. Alesii are not supported by her own
interview notes, which indicate the claimant arrived early for his
appointment; was dressed casually with adequate hygiene; was
very personable and talkative; had behavior within normal limits;
had mildly anxious affect at times, but was mostly euthymic; had
speech within normal limits; was jovial and cooperative; had good
insight; had adequate judgment; was very forthcoming with
information; had good concentration; was attentive; was alert and
oriented x 3; had no overt signs of psychotic symptoms; had
adequate memory; and had no thoughts of suicide or homicide.
Her marked limitations are also not consistent with the overall
evidence of record. While the claimant stated that he avoided
public interactions and large crowds, he was able to live with his
fiancée and stepson without significant difficulties. He also
indicated that he did not have a problem getting along with co-
workers and was able to go to church if he sat in the back or to
restaurants as long as he faced the door. He stated that he was
able to go to the grocery store in the early mornings, as well as go
to places where Help Wanted signs were posted. Claimant’s
mental status exams were mostly normal, with limited mental
health treatment during the period at issue and many missed
appointments. (Ex. lF, 2F, 3F, and 4F).
(Tr. 14, 18-19, 375-381.)
The ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Alesii’s medical opinion as unpersuasive is both legally
correct and supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Alesii’s
conclusion that Plaintiff was markedly impaired in his ability to complete a normal workday
and workweek due to the severity of his psychological symptoms. The ALJ correctly pointed
out that this determination was not supported by Dr. Alesii’s own interview notes. (Tr. 19.)
For example, Dr. Alesii noted that Plaintiff arrived early for his appointment. (Tr. 18, 380.)
He showed both good insight and adequate judgment. (Id.) He had good concentration and
adequate memory, was attentive, and had both speech and behavior within normal limits. (Id.)
Further, he showed no signs of psychotic symptoms. (Id.) Each of these characteristics affirm
rather than undermine his ability to complete a normal workweek.
Also, as the ALJ accurately noted, Dr. Alesii’s determination is not consistent with the
overall evidence of record. Dr. Alesii based her conclusion on Plaintiff’s problems with re-
experiencing trauma, avoidance reactions, and hyperarousal, but as the ALJ also accurately
pointed out, Plaintiff had mostly normal mental status exams, sought out limited treatment,5
and missed many appointments. (See, e.g., Tr. 19, 319, 320, 321, 328, 336, 354, 380.) By making
certain adjustments, Plaintiff was able to attend church, go to restaurants, and shop at the
grocery store.6 (Tr. 19, 58, 61, 348.) He was also able to drive himself around town looking for
work. (Tr. 19, 343.) Therefore, the record contradicts Dr. Alesii’s conclusion that Plaintiff had
a marked limitation in his ability to complete a normal workweek. The ALJ properly found
this determination unpersuasive.
5 For instance, during the seventeen-month period between February 2016 and July 2017,
Plaintiff was “lost to mental health follow up.” (Tr. 848.)
6 At his hearing, Plaintiff also said that he attended his stepson’s middle school track meets
because he could “deal with” smaller crowds. (Tr. 58.) This admission is not consistent with the
severity of Dr. Alesii’s conclusion as to Plaintiff’s social limitations. (Tr. 381.)
Second, the ALJ correctly discounted Dr. Alesii’s conclusion that Plaintiff was
markedly impaired in his ability to respond appropriately to changes and stressors at work.
Again, the ALJ pointed to portions of Dr. Alesii’s interview notes that contradict rather than
support this finding. (Tr. 18-19.) While Plaintiff was mildly anxious at times during the
interview, he was “mostly euthymic” rather than excessively worried. (Tr. 18, 380.) Rather than
exhibiting irritability or anger, Plaintiff was “jovial and cooperative.” (Id.) Again, Dr. Alesii
found Plaintiff’s speech and behavior to be within normal limits. (Id.) These observations do
not support her conclusion that Plaintiff would be unable to respond appropriately to
stressors. Further, as the ALJ points out, this conclusion is inconsistent with the overall record.
As noted above, Plaintiff’s mental status exams were mostly normal, he sought out limited
mental health treatment, and he also missed many scheduled appointments. (See, e.g., Tr. 19,
319, 320, 321, 328, 336, 354, 380.)
Third, the ALJ appropriately discounted Dr. Alesii’s determination that Plaintiff was
markedly impaired in his ability to relate to others, including his supervisors and coworkers.
Again, this finding is not supported by Dr. Alesii’s own interview notes. (Tr. 19.) For example,
Dr. Alesii found Plaintiff “very personable and talkative.” (Tr. 18, 380.) She also found him
“jovial and cooperative” and “very forthcoming with information.” (Id.) The ALJ also
accurately observed that Dr. Alesii’s conclusion that Plaintiff had marked limitations in his
ability to relate to others was inconsistent with the overall record. Specifically, the ALJ
accurately observed that Plaintiff was able to live with his fiancé (now wife) and his stepson
without significant difficulties, that he did not have a problem getting along with his
coworkers, and that he could go to the grocery store in the morning, seek out Help Wanted
signs, sit in the back at church, and go to restaurants if he could face the exit. (Tr. 19, 40, 50,
52-53, 58, 60-61, 348, 849, 853.) The ALJ’s conclusion as to Dr. Alesii’s opinion was legally
correct and supported by substantial evidence. He articulated his analysis of both relevant
factors (supportability and consistency) in his persuasiveness analysis. Plaintiff’s arguments to
the contrary are unpersuasive, and this argument fails.
ii. Dr. Julia Messer
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr. Messer’s medical
evaluation. (Docket Entry 14 at 4, 7-8.) Through the Durham VA Medical Center, Dr. Messer
performed a psychiatry consultation on Plaintiff on August 16, 2017, a few weeks before
Plaintiff saw Dr. Alesii and a few weeks before his alleged onset of disability. (Tr. 847-864.) In
her report, Dr. Messer stated that Plaintiff’s “psychiatric symptoms appear to be moderately
to severely impacting his level of functioning at this time.” (Tr. 849.) Dr. Messer then
summarized Plaintiff’s social functioning, describing the details of his “conflictual relationship
with his ex-wife,” his avoidance of public gatherings, and “altercation[s]” related to sporting
events he attended or participated in. (Id.) However, Dr. Messer also noted his “current
romantic relationship [w]as stable and supportive,” that he got “along well with his fiancé’s
son,” that he had “a close relationship with his mother,” and that “he spends time with her
and several uncles.” (Id.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s occupational functioning, Dr. Messer noted that Plaintiff was not
working, that he was terminated in 2016 from an IT help desk company, and that he had been
terminated from multiple IT jobs previously due to his irritability, attitude, short temper, and
lack of patience. (Id.) Dr. Messer also pointed out that Plaintiff noted problems related to
having a criminal record, which prevented him from obtaining new employment. (Id.) Dr.
Messer then concluded that regarding his current mental health symptoms, “it is possible that
symptoms of alcohol use disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder could moderately to
severely impact his ability to complete work-related tasks and maintain effective interpersonal
relationships.” (Id.) However, Dr. Messer concluded that “[a] job involving independence and
limited interactions with others would likely minimize the impact of his symptoms on his
occupational functioning.” (Id.)
Although the ALJ never mentioned Dr. Messer’s name, he did specifically point to her
evaluation, along with other opinions from VA mental health providers. The ALJ concluded
that Dr. Messer’s opinion was “persuasive” because it was “supported by personal
examination and a review of the claimant’s medical history, [and was] consistent with the
overall medical and other evidence of record,” which the ALJ had described earlier in his
decision (and much of which the undersigned has summarized above). (Tr. 20 referencing Tr.
337-353, 847-864.) In assessing Dr. Messer’s evaluation, the ALJ therefore considered both its
supportability and consistency.
The ALJ accordingly accommodated Plaintiff’s symptoms by “limiting him to medium,
unskilled, non-production rate pace work, with social interaction restrictions and an allowance
for time off task.” (Tr. 19; see also Tr. 14.) Beyond this, at Plaintiff’s administrative hearing, a
vocational expert testified (and in reliance on this, the ALJ concluded) that an individual with
these limitations could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a technical support
specialist, but could perform other jobs in the national economy, such as laundry worker,
cleaner, and hand packager. (Tr. 20-21, 65-67.)
Plaintiff now contends that “Dr. Messer’s conclusion regarding the severity of Mr.
Bright’s mental impairments is essentially the same [as] Dr. Alesii’s, therefore, if the ALJ found
Dr. Messer’s evaluation and opinion persuasive, it follows that he should have found Dr.
Alesii’s persuasive as well. Therefore, the ALJ’s explanations are incomplete, and his findings
are contradictory.” (Docket Entry 14 at 7-8.) But Dr. Messer’s findings were “essentially
the same” as Dr. Alesii’s. As explained, Dr. Messer concluded that while it was “possible” that
Plaintiff’s symptoms of alcohol use disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder could impact
his ability to complete work-related tasks and maintain effective interpersonal relationships,
“[a] job involving independence and limited interactions with others would likely minimize the
impact of his symptoms on his occupational functioning.” (Tr. 849.) The ALJ then
incorporated Dr. Messer’s proposed limitations into his RFC finding. (Tr. 19; see also Tr. 14.)
Dr. Alesii, on the other hand, concluded that Plaintiff had marked (and potentially
work preclusive) limitations in his ability to function, but unlike Dr. Messer did not address
whether these limitations could be accommodated. (Tr. 381.) However, as demonstrated
above, the ALJ provided good reasons in explaining why Plaintiff’s limitations were not as
severe as Dr. Alesii found them to be.
Finally, state agency psychologists reviewing Plaintiff’s claim for benefits in October
of 2017 and November of 2017 (including both Drs. Messer’s and Alesii’s findings), opined
that Plaintiff retained the mental RFC to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks in a stable,
low-stress setting with limited social demands. (Tr. 72-74, 84-86.) The ALJ’s assessment of
Drs. Alesii and Messer is also supported by these prior administrative medical findings,
rendered by highly qualified experts in Social Security disability evaluation. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1513a(b)(1) (2017). The ALJ, consistent with the regulations, found these prior
administrative medical findings persuasive, citing the psychologists’ “thorough review of the
available evidence” with “detailed explanations” (i.e., supportability) and the fact that the
findings were “consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence of record,
as described above” (i.e., consistency). (Tr. 19-20.) Plaintiff has not disputed the ALJ’s analysis
of these two doctors, and their prior administrative medical findings lend further support to
the ALJ’s analysis of Drs. Alesii and Messer.
B. VA Disability Determination
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ “erred in failing to explain the reasons for not
giving significant weight to [Plaintiff’s] disability rating from the VA.” (Docket Entry 14 at 8.)
However, Plaintiff relies upon case law and regulations that no longer apply in cases such as
this one. Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument has no merit.
Effective March 27, 2017, the most recent version of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 modified
the duties of the ALJ with respect to disability determinations by other agencies. The
regulation now states:
Other governmental agencies and non-governmental entities—
such as the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Labor, the Office of Personnel
Management, State agencies, and private insurers—make
disability, blindness, employ-ability, Medicaid, workers’
compensation, and other benefits decisions for their own
programs using their own rules. Because a decision by any other
governmental agency or a non-governmental entity about
whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or entitled to any
benefits is based on its rules, it is not binding on us and is not our
decision about whether you are disabled or blind under our rules.
Therefore, in claims filed (see § 404.614) on or after March 27,
2017, we will not provide any analysis in our determination or decision about
a decision made by any other governmental agency or a nongovernmental entity
about whether you are disabled, blind, employable, or entitled to any
benefits. However, we will consider all of the supporting
evidence underlying the other governmental agency or
nongovernmental entity’s decision that we receive as evidence in
your claim in accordance with § 404.1513(a)(1) through (4).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (emphasis added). Under these regulations, the ALJ is expressly no longer
required to provide “any analysis” in his decision about a disability decision made by any other
governmental agency, including the Department of Veterans Affairs. However, the ALJ retains
a duty to consider the record underlying a VA disability rating. Id.
Here, the ALJ expressly discussed the VA’s disability determination in his decision:
Documents from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
indicated that the claimant’s PTSD resulted in a 70 percent
service-connected disability; he was being paid at the 100 percent
rate because he was unemployable due to his disabilities; and he
was considered to be totally and permanently disabled (Ex. 9E,
12E, 13E, 15E, and l7E).
(Tr. 19.)
The ALJ also clearly considered the record underlying the VA’s disability rating. The
VA included a list of the evidence it relied upon as part of its decision. (Tr. 292-293.) One of
the listed pieces of evidence was a “VA contract examination, dated September 6, 2017.” (Tr.
293.) This referenced examination was that of Dr. Alesii, who produced her opinion as part
of Plaintiff’s application for VA disability benefits. (Tr. 375.) As discussed above, the ALJ
included an extensive analysis of Dr. Alesii’s opinion in his decision, thus meeting his burden
to consider the record underlying the VA’s disability rating. The ALJ also considered the
remainder of the administrative record, including Dr. Messer’s opinion. (Tr. 23-26.) Thus, the
ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s VA disability rating is legally correct and supported by
substantial evidence. Plaintiffs argument to the contrary is without merit and should be
rejected.
V. CONCLUSION
After a careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Court finds that the
Commissioner’s decision 1s legally correct and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on _ the
Pleadings (Docket Entry 12) be DENIED, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Docket Entry 16) be GRANTED, and the final decision of the Commissioner be
upheld. Y ; | .
Joe L. Webster
United States Magistrate Judge
August 4, 2020
Durham, North Carolina
15