The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MAJOR BOYD WHITLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:19CV358
)
SHERIFF VAN SHAW, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Major Boyd Whitley’s motion for summary
judgment. (Docket Entry 23.) Defendants Sheriff Van Shaw, Captain M. Nesbitt, and
Lieutenant W. Wallace have filed a response. (Docket Entries 25, 27.) For the reasons stated
herein, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner and self-proclaimed Hebrew Israelite, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a First Amendment violation of his religious rights. (See
generally Complaint, Docket Entry 2.)1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that staff at Cabarrus
County Detention Center (“CCDC”), under the direction of Defendants, did not adequately
accommodate Plaintiff in providing him a bible consistent with his faith even though the jail
staff has provided Christian bibles to Christian inmates. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also alleges that
the staff at CCDC effectively forced him to listen to Christian preaching by visitors from
1 All citations in this recommendation to documents filed with the Court refer to the page numbers
located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear on CM/ECF.
Gideon International when staff denied his request to be removed from his pod during the
preaching. (Id. at 3, 7.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants refused to accommodate
Plaintiff’s request for kosher meals during Passover. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that he filed
grievances regarding these requests and was denied in all instances. (Id.)
Attached to his Complaint is an exhibit that contains excerpts of his communication
with prison staff at CCDC regarding his grievances. (Id. at 7-18.) The exhibit provides that
on December 8, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a grievance regarding his concerns with being forced
to listen to Christianity preaching. (Id. at 7.) Several days later, Defendant Nesbitt responded
reminding Plaintiff that he previously indicated closing his food tray slot would resolve the
issue. (Id. at 9.)
On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a request for a kosher meal in observance
of Passover that would take place between April 1, 2019 and April 7, 2019. (Id. at 13, 15.)
Defendant Wallace responded, explaining that the prison would accommodate Plaintiff’s
request by providing a vegan meal that “meets the same requirements as the kosher diet.” (Id.
at 15.) Plaintiff responded that “the [kosher] diet is not the vegan diet for the [Passover]
Israelite and Jewish people have to eat special diet and bread with no yeast.” (Id. at 16.)
Defendant Wallace ultimately responded, explaining that,
[CCDC] recognizes the vegan diet (which we offer for religious
reasons) to be applicable for the requested religious kosher diet
as well. At this point I will not schedule you to receive the diet as
you have stated that you do not want the diet we use for kosher,
the vegan diet. Should you change your mind please let me know
and I will be happy to accommodate your request for a special
diet during your religious observance of New Moon.
(Id. at 17.)
In support of Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
Defendants filed the affidavit of Defendant Wallace. (See W. Joel Wallace Affidavit, Docket
Entry 26.) According to the affidavit, the Gideons were permitted to enter the jail pods once
per week on Sundays. (Id. ¶ 9.) If inmates did not desire to hear the Gideons’ teachings, they
remained in the cells and their food trays were closed by jail staff to prevent noise transmission.
(Id.) Defendant Wallace indicates that “a[t] one time, [Plaintiff] told staff that this worked for
him.” (Id.) In any event, beginning May 2019, the Gideons no longer held service in the pods.
(Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Wallace also indicated that the Gideons, not CCDC, supplied bibles for
inmates who wanted them. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff requested a copy of the Book of Yahweh,
however CCDC has never had one. (Id.)
Defendant Wallace’s affidavit also addressed CCDC’s food services. The food service
used by CCDC provides a vegan meal for inmates who request it. (Id. ¶ 12.) The vegan meal
that CCDC provides “satisfies the requirements for a kosher meal, in that it contains none of
the foods that would not be part of the kosher diet.” (Id.) Defendant Wallace states that at
no point did he nor any other jail staff try to influence Plaintiff regarding his religious beliefs.
(Id. ¶ 13.)
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Zahodnick
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir.
1991) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its
burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine
issue of material fact which requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the non-moving party for a fact finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817
(4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the moving party can bear his burden either by presenting affirmative
evidence or by demonstrating that the non-moving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish
his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, dissenting). When making the summary judgment
determination, the Court must view the evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the
evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913;
Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997). However, the party opposing
summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, and the court need not
consider “unsupported assertions” or “self-serving opinions without objective
corroboration.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 1996);
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
“To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the alleged
constitutional deprivation at issue occurred because of action taken by the defendant under
color of . . . state law.” Davidson v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2019) (quotations
omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment guarantees inmates a “reasonable opportunity” to practice their religion. Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A prisoner, however does not enjoy the same full range of
freedoms as those not incarcerated; rather, state action violates a prisoner’s constitutional
rights if it burdens a prisoner’s religious rights and is not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In determining whether a
reasonable relationship exists, the Supreme Court usually considers four factors: (1) whether
there is a “valid, rational connection” between the restriction and a legitimate governmental
interest; (2) whether alternatives for exercising the right remain to the prisoner; (3) what effect
accommodation of the right will have on prison administration; and (4) whether there are
other ways that prison officials can achieve the same goals without encroaching on the
right. Id. at 89-91. In a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a prisoner must
demonstrate both a sincere religious belief and a substantial burden in the exercise of that
belief. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
Applying a more stringent protection, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Person Act (“RLUIPA”)2 provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person” serves to further a compelling government interest
and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. In order to determine whether there has been a violation under RLUIPA,
Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case, showing (1) that he seeks to
2 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not explicitly state a RLUIPA claim. However, the Court will consider it
given Plaintiff’s pro se status.
engage in an exercise of religion, and (2) that the challenged conduct substantially burdens that
exercise.” Krieger v. Brown, 496 Fed.Appx. 322, 324 (4th Cir. 2012).
Following the Supreme Court’s guidance, the Fourth Circuit has held that “a substantial
burden on religious exercise occurs when a state or local government, through act or omission,
put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). In contrast, “[n]o substantial burden occurs if the government action merely makes
the religious exercise more expensive or difficult, but fails to pressure the adherent to violate
his or her religious beliefs or abandon one of the precepts of his religion.” Dellinger v.
Clarke, 172 F. Supp. 3d 898, 902-03 (W.D.Va. 2016) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Upon Plaintiff establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government
to show “that the limitation on the plaintiff’s religious exercise is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest.” Krieger, 496 Fed.Appx. at 324. “In assessing
[whether there is a substantial] burden, courts must not judge the significance of the particular
belief or practice in question.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 n.2.
Based upon the evidence presented here considered in the light most favorable to
Defendants, there is at minimum a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any CCDC
regulation impinges upon Plaintiff’s rights, and if so, whether the burden is reasonably related
to legitimate prison interests. Likewise, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
Defendants have imposed a substantial burden to Plaintiff pursuant to RLUIPA, and if so,
whether such limitations are the least restrictive means to further the prison’s interests.
Defendants deny any allegations of wrong-doing, but rather contend that they tried to
accommodate Plaintiff regarding his religious beliefs. More specifically, Defendant Wallace’s
affidavit suggests that (1) by Plaintiff's own admissions, the prison’s protocol of closing the
food tray was sufficient to resolve his noise concerns, (2) the CCDC does not own a Book of
Yahweh, nor hands out Bibles to prisoners, and (3) the CCDC’s vegan diet satisfies the
requirements of a kosher meal. (Wallace Affidavit, Docket Entry 26.) Plaintiffs responsive
affidavit refutes Defendant’s claims, but does not resolve the genuine issues of material fact
in this matter. (See Docket Entry 29.) As such, Plaintiff's motion seeking summary judgment
should be denied.?
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry 23) be DENIED.
Joe L. Webster
United States Magistrate Judge
July 6, 2020
Durham, North Carolina
his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff also contends that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies as to the claims asserted in his Complaint. (See Docket Entry 23 at 2.) Defendants do not
directly address this issue in their response, other than what appears to be a concession that it 1s not
an issue here. (See Docket Entry 27 at 2 (“. .. except on the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedy, which is not present in our case’”’)). ‘The Court need not address this issue any further. Even
if Plaintiff did exhaust his administrative remedies, the issues noted herein still precludes summary
judgment in his favor.