Opinion

ANDREWS v. KECK-THOMAS

Court
District Court, M.D. North Carolina
Filed
May 11, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.7%

holding that “[j]udges are absolutely immune from suit” for money damages arising from their judicial acts, even if such acts took “place ex parte and without notice or a hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “[j]udges are absolutely immune from suit” for money damages arising from their judicial acts, even if such acts took “place ex parte and without notice or a hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)
  • discussing eleventh- amendment immunity of states and state officials
  • ruling that judicial immunity precludes liability even for malicious or corrupt actions
  • noting that, even where “damages are theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy” (internal quotation marks omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TYRONE ANDREWS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:19cv1173

)

BRANDI KECK THOMAS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1), filed in

conjunction with his pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2), Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 3), and Supplement (Docket

Entry 4). The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application for the

limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking relief from immune

defendants. As a result, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s Motion

as moot.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems . . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt

shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines . . .

the action . . .(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This

ground for dismissal generally applies to situations in which

doctrines established by the United States Constitution or at

common law immunize government entities and/or government personnel

from liability for damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing eleventh-

amendment immunity of states and state officials); Pierson v. Ray,

386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and common-law immunity doctrines, such as judicial,

legislative, and prosecutorial immunity); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690

F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where “damages are

theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some

cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to

public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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INTRODUCTION

Asserting claims under “42 U.S.C. § 1983,” Plaintiff initiated

this action against “Brandi Keck Thomas” (“Magistrate Thomas”) and

“James T. Bryan, III” (“Judge Bryan”). (Docket Entry 2 at 1.) The

Complaint alleges in relevant part that

[t]his deprivation of constitutional rights occurred on

or about November 21 and November 27. . .[,] 2019

. . . . On the 21st, [Magistrate] Thomas was given

[Plaintiff’s] . . . rental receipts which showed rent

paid up until December 2019. [Magistrate Thomas] ruled

that [Plaintiff] did not owe rent and said [he] had to

pay court costs which [Plaintiff] objected to since [he]

was not there by evidence for non[-]payment, lateness,

nor destruction of property. After obtaining the Order

a few days later and reading [Magistrate Thomas’s] side

notes, [Plaintiff] believe[s] that [Magistrate Thomas]

talked with [an attorney for Plaintiff’s landlord] before

the hearing was held. . . . [Plaintiff] appealed to stop

the court costs[s] and [to] get monies owed to [him] from

[the landlord] for advance payments.

Next, on appeal with [Judge] Bryan[,] during preliminary

hearing and after reviewing the magistrate order and

mentioning [Plaintiff’s] poverty and seeing [that

Plaintiff was] a black male[, Judge Bryan] decided to

rule that [Plaintiff] must pay [rent for] the month[s] of

November and December[,] which was paid[. F]inally[,]

Judge Bryan mentioned several times [that] if [Plaintiff

did] not pay the monies by December 2, 2019, [Plaintiff]

w[ould] be removed from the property.

. . . Magistrate Thomas [] rule[d] in another black male

case on Plaintiff’s hearing date . . . that [the

defendant] had sixty days to remove [h]is trailer from

[the plaintiff’s] property. . . . This is normal with

all rulings with black males in Chatham County courts.

Finally, there are only two blacks employed with the

Chatham County [c]ourts[,] not counting maintenance

contractors that clean the building.

(Id. at 3.) Further, the Complaint indicates that, “Plaintiff

prays for temporary injunction and court cost[s] against the

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defendants and for such other relief as the Court may deem just and

proper under the circumstances.” (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff also provides allegations regarding this matter in

his Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 3), to include

that he “was discriminated [against] because of his race[,] black[,

and his] gender by the Defendants. Plaintiff and no other [b]lack

male should have a decision made with bias and/or prejudice.” (Id.

at 4; see also id. (referring to “discrimination based on

[r]ace”).)

Additionally, Plaintiff included a “Supplement” (Docket Entry

4 at 1-6), in which he “[e]nclosed . . . [his] receipts that

Chatham County, NC [Small Claims] and District Court had at the

time any discussions were made” (id. at 1), which were “submitted

to solidify [his] claim against the Defendants and future

supplement of Chatham County Sheriff’s Office” (id.). Along with

the referenced “receipts,” (id. at 2-4), the Supplement also

includes a “Writ of Possession Real Property” concerning

Plaintiff’s summary ejectment matter (id. at 5), and a Notice of

Eviction (id. at 6), issued from the Chatham County Sheriff’s

Office to Plaintiff.

The Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims and

should further deny the request for preliminary injunctive relief

as moot.

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DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Complaint alleges that Magistrate

Thomas and Judge Bryan presided, as judges, over Plaintiff’s

summary ejectment matter. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-4; see also

Docket Entry 3 at 2-4.) “Judges performing judicial acts within

their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil

liability claims,” In re Mills, 287 F. App’x. 273, 279 (4th Cir.

2008) (emphasis added), “even if such acts were allegedly done

either maliciously or corruptly,” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356

(Ath Cir. 1992) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).

See also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (stating that

“judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate

assessment of damages”). To determine whether an action

constitutes a “judicial act” protected by judicial immunity, the

Court must consider “whether the function is one normally performed

by a judge, and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or

her judicial capacity.” King, 973 F.2d at 357. Thus, a plaintiff

can overcome the judicial immunity bar only if the judge’s “actions

were non-judicial or the actions were judicial but were taken

without jurisdiction.” Evans v. Downey, No. 1:15-CV-117, 2016 WL

3562102, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 24, 2016) (unpublished) (citing

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13).

Here, the Complaint does not allege that either Magistrate

Thomas or Judge Bryan acted in a non-judicial capacity or lacked

Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-4.)

To the contrary, the Complaint specifically asserts that, “at all

times mentioned herein, the Defendants were acting within the

course and scope of their office, employment, service, and

authority as a member of the North Carolina Judicial Department.”

(Id. at 2.) Further, the actions Plaintiff challenges - conducting

hearings, issuing orders, and the like - all qualify as judicial.

See King, 973 F.2d at 357. In addition, even though Plaintiff

alleges that Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan deprived Plaintiff

of his constitutional rights, judicial immunity still applies. See

id. at 356 (ruling that judicial immunity precludes liability even

for malicious or corrupt actions); see also Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F.

Supp. 2d 596, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that “[j]udges are

absolutely immune from suit” for money damages arising from their

judicial acts, even if such acts took “place ex parte and without

notice or a hearing” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan enjoy absolute

judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s damages claims.

Moreover, this immunity extends to Plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief (whether brought in connection with individual

capacity or official capacity claims). See Clay v. Osteen, No.

1:10CV399, 2010 WL 4116882, at *3-4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 19, 2010)

(unpublished) (analyzing judicial immunity doctrine in monetary

damages and injunctive relief contexts), recommendation adopted,

slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2010); see also, e.g., Pearson v.

District Att’y Billy W., No. 5:16-CT-3182, 2017 WL 5163368, at *5

(E.D.N.C. June 26, 2017) (unpublished) (“[J]udges have absolute

immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial

actions. Not only are judge[s] immune from claims for monetary

damages, they are immune from requests for injunctive relief.”

(citations omitted)), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Pearson v. West, No. 5:16-CT-3182, 2017 WL 5163235 (E.D.N.C. Nov.

7, 2017) (unpublished).

Finally, any official capacity claim for damages against

Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan would fail as a matter of law

because the State of North Carolina employs them, see N.C. Gen.

Stat. §§ 7A-3 (bringing all court operations under control of

state), 7A-130 (establishing district courts), 7A-132 (providing

for district court judges and magistrates), 7A-170 (establishing a

magistrate as an officer of the district court). “[A] suit against

a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit

against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s

office.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70

(1989). “Because a state is not a ‘person’ under [Section] 1983,

it follows that state officials acting in their official capacities

cannot be sued for damages under the statute.” Wells v. Northam,

No. 3:18CV00040, 2018 WL 2978026, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 13, 2018)

(unpublished) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71).

7

In sum, the Court should dismiss the Complaint’s Section 1983

claims against Magistrate Thomas and Judge Bryan.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has demonstrated eligibility for proceeding in forma

pauperis; however, the Court should dismiss his Complaint under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) for seeking monetary relief from immune

defendants.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE

LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION

OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry 3) be denied as moot.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

May 11, 2020

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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