The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
KADIATOU TOURE )
o/b/o C.B.S., Jr., a minor, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:18CV590
)
ANDREW M. SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social )
Security,1 )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Kadiatou Toure, brought this action on behalf of
her minor child, C.B.S., Jr., pursuant to the Social Security Act
(the “Act”), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of
Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, denying Plaintiff’s
claim for Child Supplemental Security Income (“CSSI”). (Docket
Entry 2.) Defendant has filed the certified administrative record
(Docket Entry 8 (cited herein as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have
moved for judgment (Docket Entries 10, 11; see also Docket Entry 12
(Defendant’s Memorandum)). For the reasons that follow, the Court
should enter judgment for Defendant.
1 The United States Senate confirmed Andrew M. Saul as the Commissioner of
Social Security on June 4, 2019, and he took the oath of office on June 17, 2019.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Andrew M. Saul
is substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill as the Defendant in this suit. Neither the
Court nor the parties need take any further action to continue this suit by
reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for CSSI on behalf of her child C.B.S., Jr.
(Tr. 156-64.) Following denial of that application initially (Tr.
74-85, 99-102) and on reconsideration (Tr. 86-98, 106-12),
Plaintiff requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 113-15). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se,
testified at the hearing. (Tr. 32-64.) The ALJ subsequently ruled
that C.B.S., Jr. did not qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr.
7-27.) The Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request
for review (Tr. 1-6, 153-55, 266), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling
the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering this disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1. [C.B.S., Jr.] . . . was a school-age child on . . .
the date the application was filed, and is currently an
adolescent.
2. [C.B.S., Jr.] has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since . . . the application date.
. . .
3. [C.B.S., Jr.] has the following severe impairments:
seizure disorder, under control; attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder [(“ADHD”)], and oppositional
defiant disorder.
. . .
4. [C.B.S., Jr.] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
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5. [C.B.S., Jr.] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that functionally equals the
severity of the listings.
. . .
6. [C.B.S., Jr.] has not been disabled, as defined in
the . . . Act, since . . . the date the application was
filed.
(Tr. 13-26 (bold font and internal citations omitted).)
II. DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope
of . . . review of [such an administrative] decision . . . is
extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir.
1981). Plaintiff has not shown entitlement to relief under the
extremely limited review standard.
A. Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a
reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ
[underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by
substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of
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more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less
than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If
there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the
case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter,
993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not
undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the
[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether
[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the
claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and
was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and a child under the age of 18 qualifies as disabled if he or she
has “a medically determinable physical or mental impairment or
combination of impairments that causes marked and severe functional
limitations, and that can be expected to cause death or that has
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lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.906. In resolving such a
claim, the ALJ must follow a three-step sequential evaluation
process to consider whether a claimant (1) has engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; and (3)
has an impairment that meets or either medically or functionally
equals a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.
B. Assignment of Error
In Plaintiff’s motion for judgment, she generally seeks
reversal of the ALJ’s decision finding C.B.S., Jr. not disabled but
fails to specifically assign error to any of the ALJ’s findings.
(See Docket Entry 10 at 1-2.) Plaintiff does note, however, that
C.B.S., Jr. “struggles in all area[s] with his classes in school[,]
. . . doesn’t complete assignments because he struggles to
understand[, ] doesn’t engage in reading in his classes [or]
immerse himself outside of school[ , ] struggles with calculation
and computations[, ] take[s ] a very long time to solve simple
basic math calculations[, and] gets distracted very easily and
suddenly [] will just st[are] off into another zone and hav[e a]
seizure.” (Id. at 1.) Although Plaintiff’s statements reflect her
observations of C.B.S., Jr. as an eighth grade student during the
2018 to 2019 school year (i.e., well after the ALJ’s decision and
relevant period in this case) (id. at 1-2), Plaintiff’s pro se
filing warrants a liberal construction by the Court, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Accordingly, the Court should
interpret Plaintiff’s statements as an argument that ALJ erred in
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his evaluation of whether C.B.S., Jr. had impairments that
functionally equaled a listing.
In order to determine whether a child’s impairment(s)
functionally equal(s) a listing, the ALJ must consider how the
child functions in six different broad areas of functioning (or
“domains”) “intended to capture all of what a child can or cannot
do . . . (I) Acquiring and [U]sing [I]nformation; (ii) Attending
and [C]ompleting [T]asks; (iii) Interacting and [R]elating with
[O]thers; (iv) Moving about and [M]anipulating [O]bjects; (v)
Caring for [One]self; and (vi) Health and [P]hysical [W]ell-
[B]eing.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). A child’s impairments
functionally equal a listing if the child has “‘marked’ limitations
in two domains of functioning or an ‘extreme’ limitation in one
domain.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). A “marked” limitation
“interferes seriously with [a child’s] ability to independently
initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.926a(e)(2)(i) (emphasis added). An “extreme” limitation
“interferes very seriously with [a child’s] ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities,” but “does
not necessarily mean a total lack or loss of ability to function.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
Here, the ALJ found that C.B.S., Jr. had a “less than marked”
limitation in Attending and Completing Tasks, Interacting and
Relating with Others, and Health and Physical Well-Being, and “no
limitation” in Acquiring and Using Information, Moving about and
Manipulating Objects, and Caring for Oneself. (See Tr. 20-26.)
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The Court should construe Plaintiff’s statements that C.B.S., Jr.
struggles to understand reading and math, gets distracted easily,
and suffers from seizures (see Docket Entry 10 at 1) as an argument
that the ALJ erred with respect to his findings in the domains of
Acquiring and Using Information, Attending and Completing Tasks,
and Health and Physical Well-Being. A careful review of the
record, however, confirms that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s findings with respect to those domains.
1. Acquiring and Using Information
The ALJ began his evaluation of this domain by reciting
relevant portions of the regulatory criteria for Acquiring and
Using Information:
This domain involves how well children perceive, think
about, remember, and use information in all settings,
which include daily activities at home, at school, and in
the community.
. . .
Some examples of difficulties children could have in
acquiring and using information are: (i) does not
understand words about space, size, or time . . .; (ii)
cannot rhyme words or the sounds in words; (iii) has
difficulty recalling important things learned in school
yesterday; (iv) does not use language appropriate for
age; (v) is not developing “readiness skills” the same as
peers (e.g., learning to count, reciting ABCs,
scribbling); (vi) has difficulty comprehending written or
oral directions; (vii) struggles with following simple
instructions; (viii) has difficulty solving mathematic
questions or computing arithmetic answers; or (ix) talks
only in short, simple sentences, and has difficulty
explaining what he means.
(Tr. 19 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g) and Social Security Ruling
09-3p, Title XVI: Determining Childhood Disability – The Functional
Equivalence Domain of “Acquiring and Using Information,” 2009 WL
-7-
396025 (Feb. 17, 2009) (“SSR 09-3p”)) (internal citation omitted).)
In turn, SSR 09-3p emphasizes the importance of school records in
analyzing a child’s functioning in this domain:
Because much of a . . . school-age child’s learning takes
place in a school setting, . . . school records are often
a significant source of information about limitations in
th[is] domain . . . . Poor grades or inconsistent
academic performance are among the more obvious
indicators of a limitation in this domain . . . . Other
indications in school records that a mental or physical
impairment(s) may be interfering with a child’s ability
to acquire and use information include, but are not
limited to[ s]pecial education services, such as
assignment of a personal aide who helps the child with
classroom activities in a regular classroom, remedial or
compensatory teaching methods for academic subjects, or
placement in a self-contained classroom.
SSR 09-3p, 2009 WL 396025, at *3. The ALJ ultimately found that
C.B.S., Jr. “ha[d] no limitation” in this domain. (Tr. 20
(underscoring omitted).)
The ALJ complied with the above-described regulation and
policy in finding “no limitation” in this domain. (Id.) Despite
Plaintiff’s assertion that C.B.S., Jr. struggled to understand
reading and math (see Docket Entry 10 at 1), the ALJ primarily
relied on C.B.S., Jr.’s at or above grade level academic
performance and lack of special education classes to find no
limitation in this domain:
In a questionnaire dated November 19, 2014, [C.B.S.,
Jr.’s fourth grade] teacher[ Kelly Grant] indicated
[C.B.S., Jr. wa]s above or on grade level, receive[d] no
special education services, d[id] not have an
Individualized Education Program (IEP) plan, and [wa]s in
regular education with no special instructions.
(Tr. 20 (internal citation omitted).) The ALJ also credited the
opinions of consultative psychological examiner Dr. Jake Ricketson:
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. . . Dr. Ricketson reported [C.B.S., Jr.]’s estimated
full-scale IQ score equal[ed] 90, falling in the average
range of intelligence and [that] he appear[ed] capable of
performing simple calculations.
(Id. (internal citation omitted).)2 Plaintiff has pointed to no
evidence that would compel a finding that C.B.S., Jr. suffered a
“marked” limitation in Acquiring and Using Information and thus
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding of “no limitation”
in this domain.
2. Attending and Completing Tasks
With regard to this domain, the ALJ first recited the
regulatory considerations as follows:
This domain considers how well a child is able to focus
and maintain attention, and how well he is able to begin,
carry through, and finish activities, including the
mental pace at which he performs activities and the ease
of changing activities. Attending and completing tasks
also refers to a child’s ability to avoid impulsive
thinking and his ability to prioritize competing tasks
and manage his time.
. . .
Some examples of difficulty children could have in
attending and completing tasks are: (i) is easily
startled, distracted, or over-reactive to sounds, sights,
movements, or touch; (ii) is slow to focus on, or fails
to complete, activities of interest (e.g., games or art
projects); (iii) repeatedly becomes side-tracked from
2 Although not specifically relied on by the ALJ with regard to this domain
(see Tr. 20), Plaintiff admitted in a Function Report dated August 25, 2014, that
C.B.S., Jr. did not have any limitation in his “ability to progress in learning”
(Tr. 171). Moreover, the ALJ properly accorded “significant weight” to the
opinions of the state agency psychological consultants (Tr. 18), who each found
that C.B.S., Jr. had no limitation in this domain (see Tr. 79, 92). See, e.g.,
Adams v. Barnhart, Civ. No. 05–134–B–W, 2005 WL 3832408, at *3 n.4 (D. Me. Mar.
6, 2005) (unpublished) (“[T]wo state-agency psychologists found no limitation or
less than marked limitations in these domains . . . . The [ALJ] was entitled to
rely on the medical evidence provided by the state-agency psychologists.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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activities or frequently interrupts others; (iv) is
easily frustrated and gives up on tasks, including ones
he is capable of completing; (v) requires extra
supervision to remain engaged in an activity; or (vi)
cannot plan, manage time, or organize self in order to
complete assignments or chores.
(Tr. 20-21 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(h) and Social Security
Ruling 09-4p, Title XVI: Determining Childhood Disability – The
Functional Equivalence Domain of “Attending and Completing Tasks,”
2009 WL 396033 (Feb. 17, 2009)) (internal citation omitted).)
The ALJ then provided the following rationale for finding a
“less than marked” limitation (Tr. 21 (underscoring omitted)) in
the domain at issue:
In a questionnaire dated November 19, 2014, [Ms. Grant]
reported [C.B.S., Jr.] ha[d] slight problems in paying
attention when spoken to directly, sustaining attention
during play/sports activities, carrying out single-step
instructions, carrying out multi-step instructions,
organizing his own things/school materials, completing
class/homework assignments, completing work accurately
without careless mistakes and working at a reasonable
pace/finishing on time. He ha[d] obvious problems in
focusing long enough to finish assigned activity/task,
refocusing to task when necessary, waiting to take turns,
changing from one activity to another without being
disruptive, and working without distracting himself or
others. [Ms. Grant] commented he c[ould] work very well
independently when he [wa]s on task and focused. If he
[wa]s uninterested in the task or confused, he remain[ed]
very unfocused throughout. He d[id] react well to a very
structured classroom environment. He enjoy[ed] having
his own “island” or area in the class where he ha[d]
extra room and c[ould] stay focused.
. . . Dr. Ricketson noted that without [C.B.S., Jr.’s]
ADHD medications, [Plaintiff] report[ed] that [C.B.S.,
Jr.] ha[d] combined type symptoms, which include[d]
hyperactivity. According to [Plaintiff], [C.B.S., Jr.]
[wa]s constantly out of his seat in school, constantly
moving and disruptive to the class. [Plaintiff] also
reported [C.B.S., Jr.] was without medication at the time
of the evaluation. On mental status examination, [he]
appear[ed] mildly hyperactive, predominantly becoming
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fidgety while seated. He d[id] not appear impulsive or
inattentive the day of his evaluation while on no
medications. His focused attention/concentration
appear[ed] average. Dr. Ricketson observed [C.B.S., Jr.]
was fidgety, but did not leave his chair and put forth
good effort on testing despite being unmedicated.
(Id. (internal citation omitted).)
As noted above, Plaintiff did not expressly challenge the
ALJ’s above-quoted analysis (see Docket Entry 10 at 1-2), but did
contend that C.B.S., Jr. continues to get distracted easily (see
id. at 1). However, as the ALJ observed, the opinions of Ms. Grant
and Dr. Ricketson show that, although C.B.S., Jr. continued to
experience some ADHD symptoms, those symptoms remained under
reasonable control (even when not on his medication) during the
relevant period in this case. (See Tr. 21, 192, 361-62; see also
Tr. 16 (ALJ’s discussion of visit with pediatrician Dr. Dale Gertz
on January 16, 2014, noting that C.B.S., Jr. “was doing very well
on the higher dose of [his ADHD medication], [his] teacher reported
improvements and [Plaintiff] agreed, [C.B.S., Jr. ] had no side
effects, his grades [we]re very good, and he [wa]s at or above
grade level” (citing Tr. 318)). Moreover, the ALJ properly
assigned “significant weight” to the opinions of the state agency
psychological consultants (Tr. 18), who also found “less than
marked” limitation in this domain (Tr. 79, 93). See, e.g.,
Williams ex rel. R.M. v. Astrue, No. 1:11CV2135, 2012 WL 3283427,
at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2012) (unpublished) (describing state
agency psychologist’s “opinion that the claimant was less than
markedly limited in attending and completing tasks . . . [a]s
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medical expert opinion evidence upon which the ALJ was permitted to
rely”). Those consistent opinions certainly amount to substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that C.B.S., Jr. experienced
“less than marked” limitation in Attending and Completing Tasks.
3. Health and Physical Well-Being
In regard to the final domain at issue, the ALJ first
described the proper criteria for evaluating limitations:
This domain considers the cumulative physical effects of
physical and mental impairments and any associated
treatments or therapies on a child’s health and
functioning that were not considered in the evaluation of
the child’s ability to move about and manipulate objects.
Unlike the other five domains of functional equivalence,
which address a child’s abilities, this domain does not
address typical development and functioning. The “Health
and Physical Well-Being” domain addresses how recurrent
illness, the side effects of medication, and the need for
ongoing treatment affect the child’s health and sense of
physical well-being. . . .
Some examples of difficulty children could have involving
their health and physical well-being are: (i) generalized
symptoms, such as weakness, dizziness, agitation (e.g.,
excitability), lethargy (e.g., fatigue or loss of energy
or stamina), or psychomotor retardation because of any
impairment(s); (ii) somatic complaints related to an
impairment (e.g., seizure or convulsive activity,
headaches, incontinence, recurrent infections, allergies,
changes in weight or eating habits, stomach discomfort,
nausea, headaches [sic] or insomnia); (iii) limitations
in physical functioning because of need for frequent
treatment or therapy (e.g., chemotherapy, multiple
surgeries, chelation, pulmonary cleansing, or nebulizer
treatments); (iv) periodic exacerbations from an
impairment(s) that interfere with physical functioning
(e.g., pain crises from sickle cell anemia); or (v)
medical fragility requiring intensive medical care to
maintain level of health and physical well-being.
(Tr. 25 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(l) and Social Security Ruling
09-8p, Title XVI: Determining Childhood Disability – The Functional
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Equivalence Domain of “Health and Physical Well-Being,” 2009 WL
396030 (Feb. 17, 2009)) (internal citation omitted) □□
The ALJ then provided a lengthy explanation for finding “less
than marked” limitation (Tr. 25 (underscoring omitted)) in this
domain:
School records show [C.B.S., Jr. was ] in a regular
education class and d[id] not have an IEP. He d[id] take
medications for ADHD and a seizure disorder. When
medicated, [Ms. Grant] noted there [we]re no physical
effects and he remain[ed] focused/on task, and stayl[ed]
in his seat.
Treatment notes from [child neurologist Dr. William H.
Hickling] show [C.B.S., Jr.] djfid] have a seizure
disorder, which [wa]s under control, as well as ADHD and
oppositional defiant disorder, but he clearly d[id] well
when he [wa]ls compliant with medications.
At a visit with Dr. Gertz in January 2014, [C.B.S., JUr.]
was taking [his ADHD medication] and receiving no
therapy. He was doing very well on the higher dose of
[his ADHD medication], [his] teacher reported improvement
and [Plaintiff] agreed, [C.B.S., Jr. ] had no side
effects, his grades [we]re very good, and he [wa]s at or
above grade level. Dr. Gertz continued [C.B.S., Jr.] on
[his ADHD medication].
On April 25, 2015, [Plaintiff] ... stated [C.B.S., Jr.]
s[aw] his neurologist once a year .... She said that
his seizures [we]re controlled with medication. He had
a seizure [two to three] months ago, but she stated it
[wa]s because she missed a dose ... . She also said
that as long as she g[ave] him his medication, he d[id]
not have seizures.
On July 9, 2015, [C.B.S., Jxr.], accompanied by
[Plaintiff], followed up with Dr. Hickling, at which time
[Dr. Hickling] noted [C.B.S., Jr.] ha[d] occasional
absence seizures. [Plaintiff] indicated she could not
remember the last time [C.B.S., Jr.] had one. Dr.
Hickling indicated [C.B.S., Jr.] hal[d] not had any
seizures in quite some time, his overall health [wals
good, he playled] basketball and football for a team, no
other concerns were raised at that visit, he [wals
growing well, sle[pt] well, and his overall health ha[d]
been good. At a February 2016 visit with Dr. Hickling,
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[Plaintiff] reported that school [wa]s going okay, [and]
her son [wa]s making A’s, B’s and one C. He complain[ed]
of occasional headache, but otherwise ha[d] been doing
well with no recent illnesses and sleeping well. Dr.
Hickling indicated that he was pleased that [C.B.S., Jr.]
ha[d] well-controlled seizures and made no plans to
change his treatment. [Dr. Hickling] noted, “[C.B.S.,
Jr.] truly has been seizure-free for a _ year” and [Dr.
Hickling] was considering tapering and discontinuing
[C.B.S., Jr.’s] medications [in January 2017], but most
likely wlould] not do so until [C.B.S., Jr. wa]s out of
school for the summer of 2017.
[Plaintiff] acknowledged at the hearing that [C.B.S.,
Jr.] d[id] not have seizures as long as _ he tlook] his
medications, but she d[id] not ensure that he t[ook] them
by observing him when taking them.
(Tr. 25-26 (emphasis added) (internal citations and parenthetical
omitted) .)
As the above-emphasized language makes clear, the ALJ
considered the proper criteria in determining that C.B.S., Jr. had
“less than marked” limitation in this domain. (Tr. 25
(underscoring omitted).}) In spite of Plaintiff’s contention that
C.B.S., Jr. continues to “suddenly . . . just st[are] off into
another zone and hav[e a] seizure” (Docket Entry 10 at 1), the ALJ
appropriately noted (1) Ms. Grant’s observation that, when on
seizure medication, C.B.S., Jr. suffered no physical effects of his
seizures (see Tr. 25, 196); (2) Dr. Gertz’s opinion that C.B.S.,
Jr. did very well on his ADHD medication without side effects (see
Tr. 26, 318); (3) Dr. Hickling’s opinion that C.B.S., Jr. had well-
controlled seizures and overall good health (see Tr. 26, 370, 380);
and (4) Plaintiff’s concession that [C.B.S., Jr.] did not have
seizures when he took his seizure medication (see Tr. 26, 52-54).
In addition, the ALJ afforded “significant weight” to the opinions
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of the state agency psychological consultants (Tr. 18), who both
felt that C.B.S., Jr. had “less than marked” limitations in this
domain (Tr. 81, 94). See, e.g., Adams, 2005 WL 3832408, at *3 n.4
(“[T]wo state-agency psychologists found no limitation or less than
marked limitations in these domains . . . . The [ALJ] was entitled
to rely on the medical evidence provided by the state-agency
psychologists.” (internal citations omitted)).
In short, the ALJ supplied substantial evidence to support his
finding of “less than marked” limitation in the domain of Health
and Physical Well-Being.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision
finding no disability be affirmed, that Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment (Docket Entry 10) be denied, that Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Docket Entry 11) be granted, and that
this action be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 6, 2020
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