ALLEN v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DERRICK ALLEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

) 1:19cv786

v. )

)

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE )

HEARINGS, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (the “Application”)(Docket Entry 1) filed

in conjunction with his pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2). For the

reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s instant

Application for the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of

this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to

state a claim.

LEGAL STANDARD

“The federal in forma pauperis [‘IFP’] statute, first enacted

in 1892 [and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to

guarantee that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts

‘solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or

secure the costs.’” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d

951, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont

de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). “Dispensing with

filing fees, however, [is] not without its problems. Parties

proceeding under the statute d[o] not face the same financial

constraints as ordinary litigants. In particular, litigants suing

[IFP] d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully

obtaining relief against the administrative costs of bringing

suit.” Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th

Cir. 2004).

To address this concern, the IFP statute provides, in relevant

part, that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the

court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint falls short when it does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

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statements, do not suffice.” Id.’ The Court may also anticipate

affirmative defenses that clearly appear on the face of the

complaint. Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955.

BACKGROUND

Asserting claims under “42 U.S.C. § 1983” for “[v]Jioclation[]

of [his] constitutional [r]ights [under] the 8 [Amendment] Cruel

[and] Unusual Punishment, [and] 14% [A]mendment of [the] US

Constitution section one” (Docket Entry 2 at 3 (internal brackets

omitted)), Plaintiff initiated this action against six defendants:

(1) “Mr. Lamont Goins” (“Defendant Goins”) (id. at 2); (2) “Elouise

Williams” (“Defendant Williams”) (id.); (3) “Richard Bou[l]den”

(“Defendant Boulden”) (id. at 3); (4) “Gene Troy” (“Defendant

Troy”) (id.); (5) “State of North [Carolina] Office of

Administrative Hearings” (the “OAH”) (id. at 1); and (6) “Civil

Rights Division Human Relations Commission” (the “NCHRC”) (id.).

t Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine

Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and

conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se

complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint

- . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must

plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than

the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551

U.S. at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

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The Complaint states the following as its basis for asserting

claims under Section 1983:

Human relations refuse[d] to [i]nvestigate [Plaintiff’s]

Fair Housing complaint . . . . The refusal is based on

either inaccurate information derived from [Plaintiff’s]

criminal record in which some offenses [were] dismissed,

expunged by the courts . . . [or] are listed mult[i]ple

times in a feeble attempt to exasperate or make wors[e

Plaintiff’s] criminal record . . . .

(Id. at 4.) The Complaint’s “Statement of Claim” states the

following in its entirety: “[h]uman relations refused to

investigate [Plaintiff’s] claim of housing discrimination based

upon in[ac]curate reports derived from third party reporting

agencies associated with [E]quifax, [T]rans[]union, and

[E]xperian.” (Id. at 5.) The Complaint also alleges that

Plaintiff has “been subjected to housing discriminati[on] and

employment discrimination” (id.), and further requests

“compensat[ion] for [] mental anguish and punitive damages in

accordance with federal law” (id. at 6).

DISCUSSION

I. The OAH and the NCHRC

As an initial matter, neither the OAH nor the NCHRC qualify as

a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that regard,

to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must

assert “that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged

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deprivation was committed under color of state law.” American

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).2

Pursuant to North Carolina law, “[t]he [OAH] is an

independent, quasi-judicial agency under Article III, Sec. 11 of

the Constitution and, in accordance with Article IV, Sec. 3 of the

Constitution, has such judicial powers as may be reasonably

necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the purposes for

which it was created.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-750. North Carolina

law similarly places the NCHRC under the Civil Rights Division of

the OAH. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-761.3

“[A] State is not a person within the meaning of [Section]

1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64

2 Specifically, Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part,

that

[e]very person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States

or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

3 The NCHRC previously existed as an agency within the North

Carolina Department of Administration. See Hershner v. Emp’t Sec.

Comm’n of North Carolina, No. COA 11-1425, 220 N.C. App. 415, 725

S.E.2d 474 (table), 2012 WL 1514839, at *1 (May 1, 2012)

(unpublished) (referring to the NCHRC as “an agency within the

Department of Administration”); Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 191

N.C. App. 386, 387-88, 663 S.E.2d 320, 321 (2008) (referring to the

North Carolina Department of Administration as a state agency).

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(1989). As such, states and state agencies do not constitute

“persons” subject to suit under Section 1983. Id. at 67-71.

Therefore, the Court should dismiss all claims against the OAH and

the NCHRC.

II. Official Capacity Claims

Next, the Complaint indicates that it asserts official

capacity claims against Defendant Goins, Defendant Williams,

Defendant Boulden, and Defendant Troy. (See Docket Entry 2 at 2-

3.) Those claims fail for the same reasons that claims fail

against the OAH and the NCHRC. Although “state officials literally

are persons[, ] a suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is

a suit against the official’s office.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

“Because a state is not a ‘person’ under [Section] 1983, it follows

that state officials acting in their official capacities cannot be

sued for damages under the statute.” Wells v. Northam, No.

3:18CV00040, 2018 WL 2978026, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 13, 2018)

(unpublished) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71). The Complaint states

that (i) Defendant Goins serves as “Executive Director,” (ii)

Defendant Williams serves as “Administrative Specialist,” (iii)

Defendant Boulden serves as “General Counsel,” and (iv) Defendant

Troy serves as “Programs Manager.” (Docket Entry 2 at 2-3.) The

Complaint lists each Defendant’s email address as ending in

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“oah.nc.gov.” (Id. at 2-3.)* As state officials, no claim lies

against these Defendants under Section 1983 for damages in their

official capacities.

Because the Complaint seeks only damages, the Court should

dismiss all official capacity claims against Defendant Goins,

Defendant Williams, Defendant Boulden, and Defendant Troy.

III. Individual Capacity Claims

As a final matter, beyond naming them as Defendants, the

Complaint does not even so much as mention Defendant Goins,

Defendant Williams, Defendant Boulden, and/or Defendant Troy. (See

id. at 4-7.) Thus, the Complaint fails to establish a Section 1983

claim against Defendant Goins, Defendant Williams, Defendant

Boulden, and Defendant Troy due to the lack of factual matter

suggesting that any of those defendants violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. see American Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 49

(requiring allegations of a “depriv[ation] of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States” to state a Section

1983 claim); see also Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th

Cir. 2016) (“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

“ In addition, at least one state court decision confirms that

Defendant Boulden worked as “Agency Counsel” for NCHRC. See The

North Carolina Human Relations Comm’n, ex rel. Block v. Carriages

At Allyn’s Landing Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. COA 13-823, 233 N.C.

App. 786, 759 S.E.2d 713 (table), 2014 WL 1795161, at *1 (May 6,

2014) (unpublished).

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rights, but rather provides a method for vindicating federal

constitutional and statutory rights.”).

Put another way, nothing in the record indicates in any way

that Defendant Goins, Defendant Williams, Defendant Boulden, and/or

Defendant Troy engaged in any violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights as remains necessary to state a plausible

Section 1983 claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations”). The Court should therefore

dismiss all individual capacity claims alleged against Defendant

Goins, Defendant Williams, Defendant Boulden, and Defendant Troy,

for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

In sum, neither the OAH nor the NCHRC qualify as a “person”

subject to suit under Section 1983, Plaintiff’s claims for damages

against Defendant Goins, Defendant Williams, Defendant Boulden, and

Defendant Troy in their official capacities constitute claims

against the State, not a “person” as required under Section 1983,

and Plaintiff has otherwise failed to allege a plausible claim for

relief against Defendant Goins, Defendant Williams, Defendant

Boulden, and Defendant Troy in their individual capacities.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Leave

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE

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LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION

OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

December 6, 2019

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