Giarratano v. Johnson

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH M. GIARRATANO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GENE JOHNSON, Director of the  No. 06-7890

Virginia Department of Corrections;

TRACEY S. RAY, Warden of Red

Onion State Prison,

Defendants-Appellees.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap.

James P. Jones, Chief District Judge.

(2:06-cv-00004-jpj)

Argued: December 6, 2007

Decided: March 25, 2008

Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge,

and John Preston BAILEY, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Bailey wrote the opinion, in

which Chief Judge Williams and Judge Duncan joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Steven David Rosenfield, Charlottesville, Virginia, for

Appellant. William Eugene Thro, State Solicitor General, OFFICE

2 GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON

OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appel-

lees. ON BRIEF: Rebecca K. Glenberg, AMERICAN CIVIL LIB-

ERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA FOUNDATION, INC., Richmond,

Virginia; R. Frazier Solsberry, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appel-

lant. Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, Stephen R. McCul-

lough, Deputy State Solicitor General, William C. Mims, Chief

Deputy Attorney General, Marla Graff Decker, Deputy Attorney Gen-

eral, Mark R. Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

OPINION

BAILEY, District Judge:

Joseph M. Giarratano (Giarratano) is a Virginia state prisoner

infected by Hepatitis C. Giarratano twice requested, at his own

expense, that the Red Onion State Prison, of the Virginia Department

of Corrections (VDOC), provide him copies of the prison treatment

protocols for inmates with Hepatitis C so that he could make

informed decisions about his health and to aid in any litigation arising

from VDOC’s treatment of his condition. Both times, VDOC denied

Giarratano’s requests. Additionally, Giarratano attempted to obtain

the requested protocols through the Virginia Freedom of Information

Act (VFOIA);1 however, he was denied access because prisoners are

specifically excluded from obtaining information under the Act. Giar-

ratano alleges that he has never filed a frivolous request for informa-

1

The prisoner exclusion provision to the VFOIA reads as follows:

No provision of this chapter or Chapter 21 (§ 30-178 et seq.) of

Title 30 shall be construed to afford any rights to any person

incarcerated in a state, local or federal correctional facility,

whether or not such facility is (i) located in the Commonwealth

or (ii) operated pursuant to the Corrections Private Management

Act (§ 53.1-261 et seq.). However, this subsection shall not be

construed to prevent an incarcerated person from exercising his

constitutionally protected rights, including, but not limited to, his

rights to call for evidence in his favor in a criminal prosecution.

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3703(C).

GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON 3

tion, and he is willing to pay the costs associated with obtaining the

protocols.

Giarratano brought his § 1983 action against the director of the Vir-

ginia Department of Corrections, Gene Johnson, challenging the con-

stitutionality of the statutory exclusion of prisoners from making

requests for public records under VFOIA. In his complaint, Giarran-

tano raised three claims before the district court, both facial and as-

applied challenges to the VFOIA under the Equal Protection and Due

Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as an as-

applied challenge under the First Amendment.

In dismissing the complaint, the district court ruled that the statu-

tory exclusion of prisoners from making requests for public records

under VFOIA was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and

that Giarratano’s right of access to the courts was not violated. On

appeal, Giarratano argues that the VFOIA prisoner exclusion violates

the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection, and that the

court must determine whether prisoners are prone to filing frivolous

VFOIA requests at a higher rate than members of the general public.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I.

VFOIA provides citizens the right of ready access to all public

records held by the State and its officers and employees. See Va.

Code Ann. §§ 2.2-3700 - 3704 (2005). The State may deny access to

a public record only by invoking one of the narrowly drawn exemp-

tions enumerated by the statute. To this end, Section 2.2-3703(C)

excludes all persons incarcerated in any state, local, or federal correc-

tional facility from enjoying any of the rights afforded under VFOIA

to make requests for public records.

Giarratano alleges that the VFOIA prisoner exclusion violates the

Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law,

claiming that the court must make a determination in fact whether

prisoners are prone to filing frivolous VFOIA requests at a higher rate

than members of the general public. Giarratano additionally alleges

that, as applied to him, VFOIA’s prisoner exclusion violates his right

4 GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON

of access to the courts under the First Amendment and the Due Pro-

cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this argu-

ment, Giarrantano represents that he has a clean history of never filing

frivolous requests.

Giarratano brought suit in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Virginia, challenging VFOIA’s prisoner exclusion

under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment and under the First Amendment. As in Fisher v. King,

232 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2000), the district court analyzed the claim as

both a facial challenge attacking the constitutionality of the statute2 in

all situations and as an as-applied challenge, which consists of a chal-

lenge to the statute’s application only to the party before the court.

The district court granted VDOC’s motion to dismiss the Giarra-

tano’s 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claim, which sought to determine whether

Virginia’s statutory exclusion of prisoners from making FOIA

requests is constitutional. See Giarratano v. Johnson, 456 F.Supp. 2d

747 (W.D. Va. 2006). The court held that, on its face and as applied

to Giarratano’s individual request, the prisoner exclusion provision of

VFOIA was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

II.

On appeal, Giarratano seeks reversal of the district court’s Rule

12(b)(6) ruling in favor of the VDOC based upon Giarratano’s failure

to allege any facts that would indicate his rights had been violated.

Specifically, Giarratano argues that although the VFOIA prisoner

exclusion had been in place for nearly ten years at the time of final

disposition, the VDOC failed to show that prisoners are more prone

to filing frivolous VFOIA requests and that he should have been pro-

vided an opportunity to prove that prisoners do not make frivolous

requests at a higher rate than members of the general public. Accord-

ing to Giarratano, the only evidence relating to Virginia prisoners’

VFOIA filings is wholly in the possession of the VDOC and its

2

We do not find it necessary at this time to determine the validity of

VFOIA’s prisoner exclusion. Because we are reviewing a 12(b)(6) dis-

missal, we must only evaluate whether Giarratano has stated a plausible

claim.

GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON 5

employees; accordingly, Giarratano claims the only way to disprove

the exclusion’s rationale would derive from the district court’s pro-

viding him with the opportunity to conduct discovery.

On appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss filed under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we review de novo and

focus only on the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In conducting

this review, we "take the facts in the light most favorable to the plain-

tiff," but "we need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the

facts," and "we need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unrea-

sonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D.

Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Bass

v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).

Additionally, the complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege

"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (emphasis

added).

III.

Our careful review of the record in this case reveals no reversible

error. Giarratano’s facial challenge to the VFOIA prisoner exclusion

rests on its violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection

clause, which states, in relevant part, that "[n]o State shall . . . deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause requires that similarly-

situated individuals be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne City

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

Under an Equal Protection analysis, courts generally hold that "leg-

islation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classifica-

tion drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state

interest." Id. at 440. Indeed, upon rational basis review, a classifica-

tion in a statute such as VFOIA comes before the Court bearing a

strong presumption of validity. See Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485

U.S. 360, 370 (1988). In fact, "[l]aws are presumed to be constitu-

tional under the equal protection clause for the simple reason that

classification is the very essence of the art of legislation." Moss v.

Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 689 (4th Cir. 1989)(citing City of Cleburne, 473

at 440). As such, the challenged classification need only be rationally

6 GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON

related to a legitimate state interest unless it violates a fundamental

right or is drawn upon a suspect classification such as race, religion,

or gender. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

However, we do not recognize prisoners as "a suspect class." Roller

v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we will

review the VFOIA prisoner exclusion under the rational basis stan-

dard.

Under this deferential standard, the plaintiff bears the burden "to

negate every conceivable basis which might support" the legislation.

Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973);

see Mitchell v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 182 F.3d 272, 274

(4th Cir. 1999). Further, the State has no obligation to produce evi-

dence to support the rationality of the statute, which "may be based

on rational speculation unsupported by any evidence or empirical

data." FCC v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). Rather,

"a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because

the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification

has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution sim-

ply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety

or because in practice it results in some inequality.’" Dandridge v.

Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Indeed, "a legislative choice is

not subject to courtroom fact-finding," and "equal protection [analy-

sis] is not a license for the courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or

logic of the legislative choices." FCC v. Beach Comms., Inc., 508

U.S. at 313.

A.

In Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1992),

the Seventh Circuit, realizing the dilemma created when "the rational

basis standard meets the standard applied to a dismissal under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)," id. at 459, noted:

The rational basis standard requires the government to win

if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify its

classification; the Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires the plain-

tiff to prevail if "relief could be granted under any set of

facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81 L. Ed. 2d

GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON 7

59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). The rational basis standard, of

course, cannot defeat the plaintiff’s benefit of the broad

Rule 12(b)(6) standard. The latter standard is procedural,

and simply allows the plaintiff to progress beyond the plead-

ings and obtain discovery, while the rational basis standard

is the substantive burden that the plaintiff will ultimately

have to meet to prevail on an equal protection claim.

Id. at 459-60. The Seventh Circuit resolved the dilemma as follows:

While we therefore must take as true all of the complaint’s

allegations and reasonable inferences that follow, we apply

the resulting ‘facts’ in the light of the deferential rational

basis standard. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to over-

come the presumption of rationality that applies to govern-

ment classifications.

Id. at 460 (emphasis added).3 In Wroblewski, because the complaint’s

conclusory assertion that the challenged policy was "without rational

basis" was "insufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality

coupled with the readily apparent justification for the policy," the

Seventh Circuit upheld the 12(b)(6) dismissal. Id.; see also Shanks v.

Forsyth County Park Authority, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D.N.C.

1994) (applying Wroblewski framework to dismiss equal protection

challenge).

We find the Seventh Circuit’s analysis persuasive and apply it here.

Giarratano’s complaint alleges that "[t]he exclusion of inmates from

the protections of the Freedom of Information Act is not rationally

related to any legitimate government interest." This conclusory asser-

tion is insufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that

3

The "plausibility" standard for assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) is somewhat

different than the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69 (1984), that the Seventh Circuit considered in Wroblewski

v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1992), but the Wroblewski

analysis is still relevant because the Twombly standard is even more

favorable to dismissal of a complaint.

8 GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON

applies to the VFOIA prisoner exclusion.4 Thus, the district court’s

dismissal of the facial challenge was appropriate.

The conclusion that dismissal is appropriate comports with Twom-

bly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), which requires pleading "enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. In

Twombly, the Supreme Court, noting that "a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do," id. at 1964-65, upheld the dismissal of

a complaint where the plaintiffs did not "nudge[ ] their claims across

the line from conceivable to plausible."5 Id. at 1974. Here, Giarra-

tano’s conclusory allegation about the lack of a rational relationship

between VFOIA’s prisoner exclusion and any legitimate state interest

is insufficient6 to plausibly state a claim for relief in light of the strong

presumption in favor of the legislation’s rationality and the readily

apparent justification for the legislation.

In holding that Giarratano could not meet his burden, the district

court cited a variety of rational reasons for the VFOIA prisoner exclu-

sion.7 For one, inmates could abuse VFOIA and unduly burden state

4

Giarratano also fails to explain why his attorney could not have

retrieved the desired statistics about frivolous VFOIA requests and

included the information in his complaint to support his claim.

5

In Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), a case involving

a pro se prisoner litigant, the Supreme Court, citing Twombly, reiterated

that "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defen-

dant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests." We do not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s requirement

that a pleading contain "more than labels and conclusions," Twombly,

127 S. Ct. at 1965, and need not consider Erickson further here.

6

Although Giarratano’s conclusory allegations fail to state a plausible

claim, we do not go so far as to foreclose the possibility that another

inmate might be able to survive a motion to dismiss a VFOIA challenge.

7

See "Senate Passes Bill to Limit Inmates’ FOI Use," Rich. Times Dis-

patch, Jan. 21 1997 at A-10; see also "Bill to Ban Handguns in City Park

Advances," Rich. Times Dispatch, Feb. 18, 1997 at A-6.

GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON 9

resources. Additionally, excluding prisoners could conserve state

resources and prevent frivolous requests. See Leija v. Koselka, 2007

WL 2950787 (E.D. Mich. October 10, 2007) (upholding the Michigan

FOIA prisoner exclusion as rationally related to a legitimate state

interest in preventing scarce governmental resources from being

squandered by prisoners’ frivolous requests for information). Finally,

inmates have less need to access public records, due to their exclusion

from society and state agencies.

Giarratano, on the other hand, failed to allege any set of facts that

would indicate the classification at issue violated any fundamental

rights, was irrational, or otherwise failed to serve a legitimate state

interest. Simply put, Giarratano has alleged no facts to support a

claim - much less a "plausible" claim.

B.

Next, Giarratano claims that the VFOIA prisoner exclusion violates

Equal Protection as applied to his specific VFOIA request. He bases

this contention on allegations that he has never filed a frivolous

request for information or used a request to harass a government offi-

cial. Thus, he claims there is no rational basis for denying his request

for the protocols.

Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Giarratano, these

conclusory assertions are not enough to state a plausible claim that the

exclusion denied Giarratano equal protection because, where some

reasonable basis exists, "(such a classification) does not offend the

Constitution simply because (it) ‘is not made with mathematical

nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’" Dan-

dridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v.

Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). We also recog-

nize that the penal system in general dictates most facets of everyday

life for prisoners, and greatly limits certain freedoms. See Johnson v.

California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Sha-

bazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)) ("‘Lawful incarceration brings about

the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,

a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal sys-

tem.’") (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).

10 GIARRATANO v. JOHNSON

Accordingly, Giarratano’s conclusory assertions are insufficient to

plausibly overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to the

VFOIA prisoner exclusion. See Wroblewski, 965 F.2d at 460. Thus,

we find that Giarratano fails to maintain a "plausible" as-applied

equal protection claim; rather, the situation in which he finds himself

is simply a result of the inequality inherent to such "imperfect" laws.

See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.

C.

The question of whether Giarratano’s rights were violated with

respect to his access-to-the-courts claim under the First Amendment

and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been

answered by the Supreme Court. In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355

(1996), the Court cited the specific tools required to provide access

to courts: "those that the inmates need in order to attack their sen-

tences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the condi-

tions of their confinement." Further, "[i]mpairment of any other

litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly con-

stitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Id. In fact,

the Supreme Court specifically disclaimed the notion that the right of

access to the courts requires "that the State must enable the prisoner

to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court." Id.

at 354. Rather, the right of access affords only "the capability of

bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of con-

finement." Id. at 356. In this case, we find that the prison officials

have in no way obstructed the Giarratano’s capability to file a suit

alleging the inadequate treatment of his hepatitis C.

Finding no facts sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED