The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA □
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:22-CV-381-D
WILLIAM R. HARRIS, individually )
and as administrator of the estate of )
Christine Alease Harris, ) □
Plaintiff, ) ORDER
)
V. )
)
JONATHAN RAMON FAMBRO, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
On September 22, 2022, William R. Harris (“Harris” or “plaintiff’), individually and as
administrator of the estate of Christine Alease Harris (“Christine”), filed a complaint against the
City of Fayetteville (“the City”), the Fayetteville Police Department (“FPD”), two of its law
enforcement officers, Jonathan Ramon Fambro (“Fambro”), in his official and individual capacity,
and Christopher Biggerstaff (“Biggerstaff’), in his official and individual capacity, and NC Special
Police LLC (“NCSP”). See [D.E. 1]. On October 6, 2022, Harris amended his complaint. See
Am. Compl. [D.E. 8]. Harris asserts substantive and procedural due process claims under 42
USC. § 1983 against Biggerstaff, the City, and the FPD and state law tort claims against all
defendants, all arising out of Christine’s death on July 1, 2022. See id. at 7 1, 72-105. Harris
seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. See id. at 27.
On November 7, 2023, the City, Biggerstaff, and the FPD (“the moving defendants”)
moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims. See [D.E. 44]. On November 28, 2023, Harris responded in
opposition [D.E. 47].! On December 11, 2023, the moving defendants replied [D.E. 49]. On
December 15, 2023, the court stayed discovery pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss [D.E.
53]. As explained below, the court grants the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I.
“At approximately 6:20 p.m. on September 22, 2020, .. . Christine . . . was traveling to the
Church of Christ,” in Fayetteville, North Carolina, “to assist a family friend in preparing a eulogy
for a deceased fellow church member” when Fambro “suddenly appeared, and collided into the
passenger side” of Christine’s vehicle “at an estimated speed of [75] miles nn hour.” Am. Compl.
29-31. Christine’s seatbelt snapped, she was ejected from her vehicle, and she “died in transport
to a local hospital.” Id. at FJ 33-34.
At the time of the collision, Fambro was a sworn law enforcement officer with NCSP, “a
law enforcement agency, acting under the color of State law, pursuant to the powers and authority
granted to it pursuant to the North Carolina General Statutes.” Id. at JJ 6, 9. Biggerstaff also was
a sworn law enforcement officer with the FPD and “responded to the scene of the collision . . . to
‘investigate’ the collision pursuant to his role as a fatal accident investigator.” Id, at FJ 10, 38.
Harris alleges that “Biggerstaff either knew or was informed that [Fambro] was a fellow law
enforcement officer and immediately set in motion a scheme, design, and plan to ignore and
conceal evidence related to [Fambro’s] criminal conduct in connection with the fatal collision and
to shield and protect [Fambro] from prosecution.” Id. at { 39; see id. at FJ 40-41, 50, 55, 59, 69,
71.
| «Plaintiff does not oppose the . .. Motion to Dismiss Defendant “The Fayetteville Police
Department’ from this action.” [D.E. 47]2 n.1. Accordingly, the court dismisses the FPD. □
Following Christine’s death, Harris’s legal counsel repeatedly contacted Biggerstaff about
the investigation. See id. at f] 42-44, 47-49. Harris alleges that Biggerstaff and other defendants
“persistently failed to provide any reasonable and relevant information to [Harris] in connection
with the prosecution of [Fambro]” in violation of Article 37 of the North Carolina Constitution
and North Carolina’s Crime Victims’ Rights Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 152-830 et seg. (“CVRA”)
which “prevented him from seeking other administrative remedies.” Id. at [J] 51, 56. Instead,
Harris “learned through court records that [Fambro’s] speeding ticket and reckless driving/wanton
disregard charges in connection with the September 22, 2020 fatal collision were consolidated
with” two other speeding tickets “and that all such charges were dismissed during a February 4,
2021 session of the Cumberland County traffic court,” even though “the September 22, 2020 fatal
collision met all elements of the crime of misdemeanor death by motor vehicle and should have
resulted in the prosecution of [Fambro] in connection with the killing of Christine.” Id. at □□ 54,
58.
Count one of the amended complaint contends that the moving defendants’ inadequate
criminal investigation into Christine’s death violated Harris’s “rights under the North Carolina
Constitution, the [CVRA], and the substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed to
[Harris] by the United States Constitution.” Am. Compl. { 74. Counts three through five assert
state law claims for obstruction of justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress,” and civil
conspiracy. Id. at ff] 89-105.
2? The court construes plaintiff's claim for “Reckless/Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress,” Am. Compl. 26, as one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Bumpass v.
Birkhead, No. 1:21CV394, 2022 WL 943727, at *15 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2022) (unpublished),
report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 939845 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (unpublished).
3.
TL.
A.
The moving defendants argue that Harris lacks standing “because (i) the two statutes which
generally allow [Harris] to bring claims as the administrator of [Christine]’s estate do not apply
here; and (ii) private citizens do not have standing to challenge the criminal investigation or
prosecution of another.” [D.E. 45] 7. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) tests subject-matter
jurisdiction, which is the court’s “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis omitted); see Holloway v.
Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 453 (4th Cir. 2012); Constantine v. Rectors &
Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479-80 (4th Cir. 2005). A federal court “must
determine that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the case before it can pass on the merits of
that case.” Constantine, 411 F.3d at 479-80. In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment. See, e.g., White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451,
479 (4th Cir. 2005); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765,
768 (4th Cir. 1991). “[T]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its
existence.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104; see Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir.
1999). “[W]hen a defendant asserts that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support
subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must apply a standard patterned on Rule 12(b)(6) and
assume the truthfulness of the facts alleged [in the complaint and any additional materials].” Kerns
v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
A court considers the law of the state where the individual is domiciled or where the district
court is located in order to determine capacity to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b); Brown v. Town
of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
576 U.S. 155 (2015); cf. Howard v. City of Durham, 68 F.4th 934, 947 (4th Cir. 2023). North
Carolina law recognizes two types of claims which survive a person’s death: survival claims,
which “are brought after death for injuries sustained before death and inure to the benefit of the
estate,” and wrongful death claims, which “provide[] relief where a defendant’s actions cause
injury proximately resulting in the decedent’s death, with all recovery inuring to the benefit of
_ decedent’s heirs as provided for by North Carolina’s Intestate Succession Act.” Sparks v. Oxy-
Health, LLC, 134 F. Supp. 3d 961, 969 n.3 (E.DN.C. 2015) (citations omitted).
The moving defendants did not cause Christine’s death, and “[a]ll of the alleged
investigative [and other] conduct identified in the [c]Jomplaint as the impetus for the claims against
the [moving dJefendants . . . occurred after [Christine]’s death.” Wattley v. City of Charlotte, No.
3:20-CV-426, 2021 WL 1226552, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2021) (unpublished). Additionally,
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see Smith v. McCarthy, 349 F.
App’x 851, 859 n.12 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished); Wattley, 2021 WL 1226552, at
Thus, Harris’s eter against the moving defendants fail.
B.
Alternatively, to the extent Harris has standing to assert any claims on his own behalf
against the moving defendants, they argue that Harris fails to state a claim. A motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554— 63 (2007); Coleman v.
Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v.
Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano,
521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable
inferences “in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d
343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d
549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155
(2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint’s legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, a plaintiff's factual allegations must “nudge[ ] [his] claims,”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into “plausibility.” Igbal, 556
US. at 678-79,
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials
_ “attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d
263, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A court also may consider a document submitted by a moving party if it
is "integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity" without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd. 822
F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016). Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of public records
when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201;
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts, Ltd., 551 US. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’]
Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
1. .
Count one asserts violations of Harris’s “substantive and procedural due process rights
guaranteed to [Harris] by the United States Constitution” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Am. Compl. □
74. “To state a claim under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
see Philips v. Pitt Caty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). Additionally, a section
1983 plaintiff must plausibly allege the personal involvement of a defendant. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Wrigh t v. Collins, 766
F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985).
Harris has failed to plausibly allege a due process violation. See Smith, 349 F. App’x at
859; Bumpass, 2022 WL 943727, at *10-11; Johnson v. Raleigh Police Dep’t, No. 5:19-CV-31,
2019 WL 4691619, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2019) (unpublished), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 4687112 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2019) (unpublished); Hoffman v. Tanner, No. CV
9:18-1146, 2018 WL 6933405, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 2018) (unpublished), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 6787442 (D.S.C. Dec. 26, 2018) (unpublished), aff'd, 770 F.
App’x 54 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished). Harris has also failed to plausibly allege that
any municipal policy or custom attributable to the City caused the violation of his constitutional
rights. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 25 (1991); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S, 112, 124-25 (1988); Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94; Howard, 68 F.4th at 952; King v.
Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 223 (4th Cir. 2016); Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d
451, 469-70 (4th Cir. 2013); Wright Hertford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:23-CV-30, 2024 □□
85926, at *3-4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2024) (unpublished); Kennedy v. Rowe, No. 5:23-CV-264, 2023
WL 6612437, at *2-3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2023) (unpublished); Fogg v. U.S.A. Transp. Sec.
7 .
Admin., No. 5:22-CV-124, 2023 WL 3635622, at *3-4 (E.D.N.C. May. 24, 2023) (unpublished);
Bumpass, 2022 WL 943727, at *12; Hoffman, 2018 WL 6933405, at *6 n.8. To the extent Harris
asserts violations of either the CVRA or Article 1, Section 37 of the North Carolina Constitution,
see Am. Compl. 74-75, 78, they do not “create a claim for damages against the State, any
county or municipality, or any State or county agencies, instrumentalities, officers, or employees,”
and the CVRA is not judicially enforceable in federal court. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-830.5(c),
15A-839; see N.C. Const. art. I, § 37(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-834.5; Corum v. Univ. of N.C.,
330 N.C. 761, 782, 789, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289, 293 (1992); cf. May v. Univ. Health Sys. of E.
Carolina, Inc., No. 4:21-CV-00014, 2021 WL 5868135, at *10 n.6 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 9, 2021)
(unpublished). Accordingly, the court grants the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss count one
of the amended complaint.
2.
The City and Biggerstaff in his official capacity argue that governmental immunity bars
counts three through five of the amended complaint against them and Harris’s official-capacity
claims against Biggerstaff duplicate his claims against the City. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss
21-27. Under North Carolina law, “[g]overnmental immunity is that portion of the [s]tate’s
sovereign immunity which extends to local governments.” Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C.
41, 47, 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017). “Generally, governmental immunity protects a municipality
and its officers or employees sued in their official capacity for torts committed while performing
a governmental function.” Sellers v. Rodriguez, 149 N.C, App. 619, 623, 561 S.E.2d 336, 339
(2002); see Galligan v. Town of Chapel Hill, 276 N.C. 172, 175, 171 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1970).
Generally, governmental immunity bars tort lawsuits against the governmental entity
absent waiver. See Wray, 370 N.C. at 47, 802 S.E.2d at 898; Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 104,
489 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1997). A county or town may waive governmental immunity by purchasing
insurance, but any waiver is limited to the extent of the insurance coverage. See, e.g., N.C. Gen.
Stat. §153A-435(a); Evans v. Hous. Auth., 359 N.C. 50, 57, 602 S.E.2d 668, 673 (2004); Satorre
v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 165 N.C. App. 173, 176, 598 S.E.2d 142, 144 (2004). If
“the insurance policy does not indemnify [the] defendant against the negligent acts alleged in [the]
plaintiff's complaint, [the] defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity.” Doe v. Jenkins, 144
N.C. App. 131, 135, 547 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2001); see Dawes v. Nash Cnty., 357 N.C. 442, 445-
46, 449, 584 S.E.2d 760, 763, 765 (2003); Est. of Earley ex rel, Earley v. Haywood Cnty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 204 N.C. App. 338, 341, 694 S.E.2d 405, 408 (2010).
The City has not waived governmental immunity. See Hewett Decl. [D.E. 44-1] 47. “The
City does not participate in a local government risk pool, or any other form of risk pool.” Id. at {
15, The City has a retained limit policy which provides “no coverage unless and until the City has
paid the full amount of its . . . Retained Limit.” Id. at | 10; see Cox v. Lamm, No. 4:20-CV-52,
2020 WL 5097832, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2020) (unpublished) (collecting cases) (“[E]xcess
liability insurance coverage over a municipality’s self-insured retention amount does not waive
governmental immunity.”). Moreover, Harris’s claims against Biggerstaff in his official capacity
are functionally brought against the City and are duplicative. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66;
Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004); Howard v. City of Durham, No. 1:17-
CV. 477, 2018 WL 1621823, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2018) (unpublished); Hill v. Robeson
Caty., 733 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (E.D.N.C. 2010). Thus, the court grants the motion to dismiss,
and dismisses counts three through five of the amended complaint against the City and Biggerstaff
in his official capacity.
3.
“North Carolina is one of a small minority of jurisdictions that . . . recognizes a civil cause
of action for obstruction of justice.” Braswell v. Medina, 255 N.C. App. 217, 229, 805 S.E.2d
498, 507 (2017) (emphasis omitted). The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly held that North Carolina
would not “recogniz[e] a common-law obstruction of justice claim against a police officer for his
actions relating to a criminal proceeding.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 658 (4th Cir. 2012);
see Massey v. Ojanitit, 759 F.3d 343, 358 (4th Cir. 2014); cf. Jones v. City of Durham, 183 N.C.
App. 57, 59, 643 S.E.2d 631, 633 (2007). Accordingly, the court dismisses Harris’s obstruction
of justice claims against the defendants. See Massey, 759 F.3d at 358; Evans, 703 F.3d at 658;
Houck v. Howell, No. 5:14-CV-00187, 2016 WL 1599806, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 21, 2016)
(unpublished); Haynes v. City of Durham, No. 1:12CV1090, 2014 WL 2864470, at *10 (M.D.N.C.
June 24, 2014) (unpublished); Braswell, 255 N.C. App. at 234, 805 S.E.2d at 510; see also. Calliste
City of Charlotte, ___ F. Supp. 3d __, 2023 WL 6367672, at *15 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2023).
Harris’s citation to Jones v. City of Durham, 168 N.C. App. 433, 608 S.E.2d 387, aff'd, 360 N.C.
81, 622 S.E.2d 596 (2005), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g and decision rescinded in
part based upon dissenting opinion, 361 N.C. 144, 638 S.E.2d 202 (2006) (per curiam), see [D.E.
47] 22-23, does not alter this conclusion. See Howard, 2018 WL 1621823, at *6; Braswell, 255
N.C. App. at 233-34, 805 S.E.2d at 509-10. Accordingly, the court dismisses count three of the
amended complaint. .
4,
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege
“(1) that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) that the conduct was
intended to cause severe emotional distress; and (3) that the conduct in fact caused severe
10
emotional distress.” Sasser v. City of Whiteville, No. 7:10-CV-95, 2010 WL 4809039, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2010) (unpublished); see Tumer v. Thomas, 369 N.C. 419, 427, 794 S.E.2d
439, 446 (2016); Waddle v. Sparks, 331 N.C. 73, 82, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1992); Dickens v. Puryear,
302 N.C. 437, 452-53, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981). /
To be considered “extreme and outrageous,” the conduct must be “so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Hogan v. Forsyth Country
Club Co. 79 N.C. App. 483, 493, 340 S.E.2d 116, 123 (1986) (quotation omitted); see Turner, 369
N.C. at 427, 794 S.B.2d at 446; West v. King’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 321 N.C. 698, 704, 365 S.E.2d
621, 625 (1988). “The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, [and] threats.”
Wagoner v. Elkin Cnty. Schs.’ Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 579, 586, 440 S.E.2d 1 19, 123 (1994).
North Carolina “has set a high threshold to satisfy this element.” Tumer, 369 N.C. at 427, 794
S.E.2d at 446 (quotation omitted). Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous is a question of law
the court. See Lenins v. K-Mart Corp., 98 N.C. App. 590, 599, 391 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990).
Harris has failed to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
moving defendants based on the criminal enioaion of Fambro. Compare Hensley v. Suttles,
167 F. Supp. 3d 753, 768-69 (W.D.N.C. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Hensley ex, rel, North Carolina v.
Price, 876 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2017), and Needham v. Price, 368 N.C. 563, 566-67, 780 S.E.2d
549, 551 (2015), with Kifer v. Crow, No. 3:21-CV-039, 2023 WL 5192113, at*11(WDNC.
Aug. 11, 2023) (unpublished), and Turner, 369 N.C. at 428-29, 794 S.E.2d at 446-47.
Accordingly, the court dismisses count four of the amended complaint. SO
5,
“As a matter of North Carolina law, a municipality [cannot] be a party to a conspiracy.”
no
Shinaberry v. Town of Murfreesboro, No. 2:17-CV-7, 2018 WL 1801417, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Apr.
16, 2018) (unpublished); see White v. City of Greensboro, 532 F. Supp. 3d 277, 332 (M.D.N.C.
2021), on recons. in part, 586 F. Supp. 3d 466 (M.D.N.C. 2022). And “without sufficiently alleged
wrongful acts [by the moving defendants], the conspiracy claim cannot survive.” Massey, 759
F.3d at 358; see White, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 332; cf. Grant v. High Point Reg’! Health Sys., 184
N.C. App. 250, 255, 645 S.E.2d 851, 855 (2007). Accordingly, the court dismisses count five of
the amended complaint against the moving defendants. _
6.
In light of the dismissal of Harris’s federal claim, the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims against NCSP and Fambro and dismisses
without prejudice his remaining state-law claims against NCSP and Fambro. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376,
394 (4th Cir. 2012); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). .
I.
In sum, the court GRANTS the motion to dismiss [D.E. 44] and DISMISSES the action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the Fayetteville Police
Department. .
SO ORDERED, This 21 day of February, 2024.
United States District Judge