Opinion

Staudner v. Robinson Aviation, Inc.

Court
District Court, E.D. North Carolina
Filed
Feb 17, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.6%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 4:15-CV-98-BO

PATRICK P. STAUDNER, )

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

ROBINSON AVIATION, INC.,

PROFESSIONAL AIR TRAFFIC )

CONTROLLERS ORGANIZATION, )

Defendants.

This cause comes before the Court on plaintiff's motion for attorney fees [DE 204] and

motion to amend motion for attorney fees file by plaintiff pro se [DE 239]. The appropriate

responses and replies have been filed, or the time for doing so has expired, and the matters are ripe

for ruling. For the reasons that follow, the Court awards attorney fees of $53,009.38 to plaintiff's

former counsel as against defendant Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO).

BACKGROUND

On August 15, 2019, a jury rendered its verdict in favor of plaintiff, Staudner. [DE 159,

160]. Defendants filed renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial, which

the Court denied on March 12, 2020. On October 14, 2019, Staudner filed a motion for attorney

fees pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking attorney fees as against

defendant PATCO.

PATCO and defendant Robinson Aviation (RVA) appealed the jury’s verdict and the Court

denied the motion for attorney fees without prejudice to re-filing. By opinion filed March 23, 2021,

the court of appeals affirmed the Court’s judgment in part as to liability but vacated the judgment

as to damages and remanded for a new trial on damages. [DE 201]. The matter was returned to

this Court and plaintiff filed a renewed motion for attorney fees, seeking $106,018.75 in reasonable

attorney fees. Three days later, counsel for plaintiff moved to withdraw. Counsel was permitted

withdraw and the Court held the motion for attorney fees in abeyance until after the damages trial.

The damages trial took place on November 1, 2021, and the jury awarded plaintiff

$550,000 in damages, which were apportioned in the amounts of 60% against PATCO and 40%

against RVA consistent with the first jury’s liability verdict. [DE 235]. Plaintiff then filed the pro

se motion to amend the motion for attorney fees filed by counsel. Defendants have since deposited

their respective damages into the Court’s registry. [DE 241 & 248].

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the Court denies plaintiff's pro se motion to amend the motion for attorney

fees. Staudner seeks to amend the fee request to $129,033.31 to represent the true amount of

attorney fees in this case based on counsel’s billing records. However, counsel submitted the

amount she believed to be appropriate based upon her own time and billing records in her renewed

motion for attorney fees. The Court will not permit Staudner’s request to add to the fee request

based upon his assessment of the total.! The motion to amend is denied.

Attorney fees are available in hybrid Section 301 actions such as this pursuant to the Court’s

equitable powers. United Food & Com. Workers, Loc. 400 v. Marval Poultry Co., 876 F.2d 346,

350 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Wilson v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &

Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 83 F.3d 747, 754 (6th Cir. 1996). “[I]n Section 301 cases the damages

arising from a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation include the attorneys’ fees

The Court would further note, to the extent it is unclear as to whether Staudner seeks any

additional fees for himself or his prior counsel, that a pro se party is generally not entitled to

recovery attorney fees. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991).

reasonably incurred in pursuing a claim against the employer for breach of the collective

bargaining agreement.” Wilson, 83 F.3d at 753; see also Self v. Drivers, Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen & Helpers Loc. Union No. 61, 620 F.2d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 1980). Whether attorney

fees should be assessed against the union in hybrid Section 301 cases is a matter for the court.

Brown & Pipkins, LLC y. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 846 F.3d 716, 729 (4th Cir. 2017); Sparks v.

Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 99 F.3d 1140 (6th

Cir. 1996) (unpublished). The Court further has discretion to determine the amount of a fee award.

See id., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 30 F. Supp. 2d 454, 466 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Tex. States Teachers Assoc.

v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S 782 (1989)). To calculate an award of attorneys’ fees, the

court “must first determine a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours

expended times a reasonable rate.” Robinson v. Equifax Info Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th

Cir. 2009).* Other facts may lead the court “to adjust the fee upward or downward.” Hensley, 461

USS. at 434.

PATCO? does not challenge counsel’s proposed rates of $175 per hour for her own time,

$225 and $120 per hour for her partners’ time, and $85 per hour for paralegal time, and the Court

finds the rates to be reasonable. PATCO does request that the Court reduce the amount of the fees

? Factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the hours and rate include: (1) the time

and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform

the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of

the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9)

the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11)

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar

cases. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d

714, 717-19 (Sth Cir. 1974)).

3 Because the attorney fees are assessed against PATCO alone, the Court focuses on PATCO’s

arguments in opposition to the attorney fee request rather than RVA’s.

because the litigation was not complicated and it involved the unusual circumstance of having the

Court’s initial decision to dismiss the case reversed by the court of appeals. PATCO also argues

that because the first jury awarded approximately half of what plaintiff requested in damages, the

attorney fee award should also be reduced by half.

The Court disagrees that any unique circumstance based on the reversal of a motion to

dismiss justifies a reduction in fees, and while the litigation was straightforward the Court declines

to apply a reduction on that ground. The Court does agree, however, that a reduction is appropriate

based upon the jury’s allocation of the damage award. The jury in this case held PATCO liable for

60% of plaintiff's damages, and the Court finds that PATCO should be liable for 60% of plaintiff's

requested attorney fees.

“The attorney fees are not awarded as a penalty, but as consequential damages for the

union’s failure to provide representation. . . Courts limit attorney fees awarded as damages in

hybrid claims to the expenses the employee incurred in pursuing the claim against the employer

only, and not the claim against the union.” Vattiat v. U.S. W. Communs., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d

1091, 1099 (D. Or. 2001). Here, plaintiff has failed to submit a sum which represents the total

amount of “expenses [he] incurred in pursing the claim against [RVA] only”. Jd. The Court will

not comb the record to make the adjustments, and accordingly will reduce the amount of the total

fee request required to be paid by PATCO by 10%.

In sum, as the jury found PATCO 60% liable for plaintiffs damages, the Court determines,

in its discretion and under its equitable authority, that PATCO is liable for 60% of plaintiff's

requested attorney fee amount. With the additional 10% reduction applied for plaintiff's failure to

show which expenses were incurred in prosecuting his claim against RVA only, PATCO is

assessed attorney fees in the amount of $53,009.38, or 50% of the requested amount.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for attorney fees [DE 204] is

GRANTED, except that the amount awarded is REDUCED to $53,009.38. Plaintiff's motion to

amend the motion for attorney fees [DE 239] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this b day of February, 2022.

TERRENCE W. BOYLE j

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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