The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:19-CV-86-D
MICHAEL SHEPPARD,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
ERNIE COLEMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
On June 25, 2019, Michael Sheppard “Sheppard” or “plaintif?), proceeding pro se and
in forma pauperis, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County Sheriff's Office (“BCSO”)
alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. [D.E. 5, 6].
On July 25, 2019, Sheppard filed a corrected complaint that added Ernie Coleman (“Coleman”),
Charlie Rose (“Rose”), Kelly Cox (“Cox”), and William Ragland (“Ragland”; collectively,
“defendants”) as defendants [D.E. 15]. On August 2, 2019, Sheppard through counsel amended
his corrected complaint and added claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 [D.E. 18].
On August 12, 2019, BCSO moved to dismiss the corrected complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. 19] and filed a Arenoeanetur fa ear [D.E. 20].
On August 22, 2019, Cox, Ragland, and Rose also moved to dismiss the corrected complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. a7] and filed a memorandum in
support [D.E. 28]. On the same date, Coleman answered the corrected complaint [D.E. 29].
Sheppard did not respond to the motions to dismiss. As explained below, the court grants
Sheppard leave to amend his corrected complaint, grants Cox, Ragland, and Rose’s motion to
dismiss, dismisses Ragland and BCSO from this action, and denies as moot BCSO’s motion to
dismiss. :
I.
In March 2007, Sheppard completed basic law enforcement training at Beaufort County
Community College. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 18] 7. On May 1, 2007, Sheppard joined BCSO
as aroad deputy. See id. | 8. In that role, Sheppard primarily served court documents, executed
warrants, responded to calls, and conducted traffic enforcement. See id. Coleman is the current
sheriff of Beaufort County. See id. 4. BCSO employs Rose, Ragland, and Cox. Cf. id. ff 5,
9-10.
In November 2016, Sheppard saw Ragland point a loaded firearm at the head of a former
deputy sheriff, Dominic Franks (“Franks”), for approximately fifteen seconds and use a racial slur
to refer to Franks. See id. ff] 1,9. Franks is biracial. See id. 91. Franks feared that Ragland
would shoot him. See id. 9. Several other deputies witnessed this episode. See id. Sheppard
also alleges that he witnessed Ragland refer to Franks as “monkey boy” and “boy,” and that
Ragland would refer to Franks’s hair as “rhino lining” because of its texture and color. See id. J
10. Coleman also referred to Franks as “deeply psychotic.” Id. . .
Sheppard alleges that he notified Ragland’s supervisor, Cox, on numerous occasions about
Ragland’s behavior. See id. { 11. Although Cox assured Sheppard that he would inform his
supervisor Rose about Ragland’s behavior, Ragland’s behavior continued, See id. For example,
Ragland told Sheppard that Franks’s uncle had sued him for allegedly creating a hostile work
environment, and Ragland continued to use racial slurs to refer to Franks and his uncle. See id. Tf
12-13. : oe
On February 8, 2017, Coleman informed Sheppard that he would terminate Franks because
he believed Franks to be “psychotic” as a consequence of too much “trigger time” during the war.
Id. { 14. During this conversation, Sheppard told Coleman that he believed Franks had been
subjected to a hostile and racist work environment. See id. Coleman terminated Franks soon after
this conversation. Cf. id. J 15. .
On February 10,2017, Sheppard arrived at BCSO around 6 pi. Seeid. He noticed that
Coleman and Rose’s vehicles were in the parking lot, which he found abnormal given the time and
day. See id. Sheppard began to record video on his cell phone. See id. When Sheppard entered
the building, Coleman and Rose escorted him into Rose’s office. See id. § 16. Coleman told |
Sheppard that he was aware of the complaints concerning Franks and Ragland and that Sheppard’s
statements on February 8, 2017, had “stuck with him.” Id. Coleman also asked Sheppard why he
continued to work at BCSO if he thought that the BCSO command staff were racists. See id.
Sheppard responded that he did not think that BCSO command staff were racists. See id.
Coleman then wished Sheppard good luck and left. See id. ‘Sheppard resigned in lieu of
termination. See id. Sheppard video recorded the entire encounter on his cell phone. See id.
In count one, Sheppard alleges that BCSO and Coleman in his official capacity retaliated
against him under Title VII because Sheppard reported Ragland’s behavior towards Franks. See
id. 18-19. In count two, Shepard alleges that Coleman, Cox, and Rose retaliated pean him
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See id. 20-21.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s legal and factual sufficiency.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
554— 63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566
;
U.S. 30 (2012); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d.250, 255 (4th Cir.
2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the
facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party].” Massey
v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of
Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). A court need not accept as tues complaint’s legal conclusions,
“unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or Renin Giarratatio, 521 F.3d at 302
(quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, plaintifiy’ allegations must “nudge[]
their claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into
“plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
As for Sheppard’s Title VII claim against BCSO, Sheppard voluntarily dismissed his claim
against BCSO in the amended complaint! Thus, the court denies as moot BCSO’s motion to
dismiss. Alternatively, Sheppard’s Title VII claim against BCSO fails because BCSO is nota legal
entity capable of being sued. See, e.g., Williams v. Melochick, No. 5:18-CV-254-H, 2018 WL
8130558, at *2 (EDN.C. Dec. 5, 2018) (unpublished), memorandum peitrecommenciatic □□
adopted, 2019 WL 1867930 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2019) (unpublished); Jilani v.Hatrison, No. 5:15-
CT-3271-FL, 2018 WL 1545584, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2018) (unpublished), aff'd, 732 F.
App’x 208 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished); Sullivan v. N. C., No. 7 :11-CV-238-D,
1 The court grants Sheppard leave to amend his corrected complaint one Rule 15(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 =
2012 WL 3762445, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2012) (unpublished); Cooper V. Brunswick Cty.
Sheriff's Dep’t, No. 7:10-CV-14-D, 2011 WL 738610, at *4-5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2011)
(unpublished), memorandum and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 736670 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23,
2011) (unpublished); Hill v. Robeson Cty., NC., 733 F. Supp. ‘2d 676, 690 (E.D.N.C. 2010);
. Parker v. Bladen Cty., 583 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008). Thus, the court dismisses
BCSO from this action.
As for Sheppard’s Title VI claims against Cox, Rose, and Ragland in their individual
capacities, Sheppard appears to have abandoned the claims in his amended complaint. See Am.
Compl. FJ 18-19 (naming BCSO and Coleman as the only defendants to Sheppard’s Title Vil
claims). Alternatively, “supervisors are not liable in their individual aries for Title VI
violations.” Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir, 1998); a Abeles v. Metro.
Wash. Airports Auth., 676 F. App’x 170, 176-77 (4th Cir. 2017) ae curiam) (unpublished); Scott □
v. Md. State Dep’t of Labor, 673 F. App’x 299, 307-08 (4th Cir. 2016) Ce curiam} (unpublished);
Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir. 1999); Amos v. Welles, No. 4:18-CV-28-
D, 2018 WL 5305537, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2018) (unpublished) (collecting cases); Brown v.
Wake Cty. Gov’t, No. 5:16-CV-806-D, 2017. WL 2982971, at 3 EDN. July 12, 2017)
(unpublished); Huckelba v. Deering, No. 5:16-CV-247-D, 2016 WL 6082032, at *4(E.D.N.C. Oct.
17, 2016) (unpublished). Thus, the court grants Cox, Rose, and:Ragland’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
As for Sheppard’s section 1981 and 1983 claims in Sheppard’s amended complaint,
defendants did not move to dismiss those claims under Rule 12(b)(6). ‘See [D.E. 19]; [D.E. 27].
Because the court grants leave to Sheppard to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a)(2), the
amended complaint is the operative complaint in this action. Thus, the court permits defendants
5
to plead in response to the amended complaint, including Sheppard’s section 1981 and 1983
claims. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 18] ff 20-21; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3)2 The response is due
not later than October 21, 2019. ote
I.
In sum, the court GRANTS Sheppard leave to file an amended complaint under Rule
15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [D.E. 18], GRANTS Cox, Ragland, and Rose’s
motion to dismiss Sheppard’s Title VII claims for failure to state a claim [D.E. 27], DISMISSES
Ragland and BCSO from this action, and DENIES AS MOOT BCSO’s motion to dismiss [D.E.
19]. Coleman, Cox, and Rose may plead in response to the amended complaint not later than
October 21, 2019. The clerk shall continue management of the case.
SO ORDERED. This _7_ day of October 2019. a
United States District Judge
2 Sheppard does not name Ragland as a defendant to any claim in his amended complaint.
See Am. Compl. ff 18-21. Thus, the court dismisses Ragland from this action. .
6 .