“There is little question that disclosing the identity of targets of law-enforcement investigations can subject those identified to embarrassment and potentially more serious reputational harm.”
How later courts described this case
- “There is little question that disclosing the identity of targets of law-enforcement investigations can subject those identified to embarrassment and potentially more serious reputational harm.”
- “[T]he process of reviewing voter registration applications is a ‘program’ and ‘activity.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
No. 5:19-CV-248-BO
PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL )
FOUNDATION, INC., )
Plaintiff, )
v. ) ORDER
)
KAREN BRINSON BELL, in her official _)
capacity as Executive Director of the North )
Carolina State Board of Elections, and )
NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD )
OF ELECTIONS, )
Defendants. )
This cause comes before the Court on defendants’ motions to dismiss! the amended
complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff has responded, defendants have replied, and the matter is ripe
ruling. For the reasons that follow, the motions to dismiss are granted.
BACKGROUND
‘Plaintiff filed this action against the North Carolina State Board of Elections (NCSBOE)
seeking disclosure of public voting records pursuant to Section 8 of the National Voter Registration
Act of 1993 (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i). NCSBOE moved to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff
thereafter filed an amended complaint, adding Bell as a defendant. Defendants Bell and NCSBOE
filed the instant motions to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1 The State Board of Elections filed a motion to dismiss, which defendant Bell joined. [DE 20 &
22].
The amended complaint alleges as follows. Plaintiff is a non-partisan, public interest
organization that seeks to promote the integrity of elections nationwide through research,
education, remedial programs, and litigation. Plaintiff regularly utilizes the NVRA’s public
disclosure provision as well as state and federal open records laws to gain access to records and
data which plaintiff compiles and disseminates in accordance with its organizational mission.
Plaintiff alleges that more than nine months ago it requested access to public records
maintained by the NCSBOE and that the NCSBOE has denied its request. Specifically, plaintiff
requested records following the NCSBOE’s issuance of a post-election audit report in April 2017
which stated that in the 2016 general election:
41 non-citizens with legal status (green card, etc.) cast ballots. The State
Constitution only permits U.S. citizens to register and vote. The audit pairing state
and federal databases identified an additional 34 voters who provided documents
showing they are U.S. citizens. Investigators continue to review 61 additional
records. .
[DE'8 29] (emphasis in original removed).
On September 10, 2018, Plaintift sent letters to the county boards of elections for the
counties of Durham, Guilford, and Forsyth seeking to inspect three broad categories of records:
(1) documents regarding all registrants who were identified as potentially not satisfying the
citizenship requirements for registration from any official information source, including the United
"States Department of Homeland Security and the North Carolina Department of Motor vehicles;
(2) all documents and records of communication received by the boards of elections from
registered voters, legal counsel, claimed relatives or other agents since January 1, 2006, requesting
removal or cancellation from the roe role for any reason related to non-United States Citizenship:
and (3) all documents and records of communication received by the boards of elections since □
January 1, 2006, from state and federal jury selection officials referencing individuals who claimed
2.
be non-US. citizens when responding to a jury summons. Plaintiff's request for records was
later amended to include the same records from Buncombe and Mecklenberg counties.
The relevant county boards of elections were not responsive to plaintiff's requests, and thus
. plaintiff contacted the NCSBOE. After several months of communication between plaintiff and
the NCSBOE, on May 3, 2019, plaintiff received a letter from then-counsel for the NCSBOE
describing programs and activities conducted by the NCSBOE to perform registration list
maintenance in regard to actual or suspected noncitizen registrants; the letter further explained that
the NCSBOE would not allow plaintiff to inspect those records related to the programs and
activities described in the letter. Despite continued efforts, plaintiff has not been permitted to
inspect the records which it has sought to inspect. This suit followed.
DISCUSSION ee
Defendants have moved to dismiss the first amended complaint ee to Rules 12(b)(1)
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of civil Procedure.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 1) authorizes dismissal of a claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving jurisdiction to survive the motion. Evans v. BF. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647-50 (4th
Cir. 1999). “In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the district court is to regard the pleadings’
allegations as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without
converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, Eyedericke eure & Potomac
RR. Co. v. United States, 945 F 2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To this end, “the nonmoving party
must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact
exists.” Id. (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1558-59 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 283 (1986). When acting on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court should
accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir.1993). A complaint
must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Facial plausibility means that the facts pled “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” and mere
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory statements do not suffice.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
I, The NCSBOE is immune from suit.
“The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against non-consenting states by private individuals
in federal court.” Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). This
guarantee applies not only to suits against the state itself but also to suits where “one of [the state’s]
agencies or departments is named as the defendant.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. y, Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The Court concludes that the NCSBOE is within the purview of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Cooper v. N. Carolina State Bd. of Elections, No. 5:08-CV-423-
D, 2009 WL 9081691, at *9 (E.D.N.C. June 12, 2009). The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in
federal court regardless of the nature of the relief that is sought, Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, unless
one of the limited exceptions, such as waiver or abrogation, applies. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Plaintiff's argument that Congress abrogated state immunity for suits under the NVRA is
unpersuasive. Two questions must be answered in the affirmative in order for Congress to have
properly abrogated state sovereign immunity: (1) Congress must have unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, and (2) and in so doing Congress must have acted “pursuant
to a valid exercise of power.” Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that Congress, in enacting the NVRA, has unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate sovereign immunity. Indeed, the general authorization to bring suit in federal court
provided in 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b)(2) “is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient □
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56 (internal quotation and
citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the NCSBOE is immune from suit. See
also Krieger v. Loudon Cty., No. 5:13CV073, 2014 WL 4923904, at *3 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2014),
aff'd sub nom. Krieger v. Virginia, 599 F. App’x 112 (4th Cir. 2015).
II. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Bell. □
The NVRA reflects the view of Congress that the right to vote “is a fundamental □
. right,” that government has a duty to “promote the exercise of that right,” and that
discriminatory and unfair registration laws can have a “damaging effect on voter
_., Participation” and “disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups,
‘ including racial minorities.” Congress enacted the NVRA in order to “increase the □
number of eligible citizens who register to vote” in federal elections, “enhance[]
the participation of eligible citizens as voters,” “protect the integrity of the electoral —
process,” and “ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are
maintained.”
Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§
1973gg(a) & (b), as amended 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(i)(1)(a) & (b)). In furtherance of these goals,
the NVRA requires states to establish methods of voter registration and a system for removal of
improperly registered voters. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20503-20507.
To ensure compliance, the NVRA includes a public disclosure provision, which requires
that election administration officials must “make available for public inspection .. . all records
concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring
the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.” Jd. § 20507(i)(1). Expressly
exempted from the NVRA’s public disclosure provision are “records relate[d] to a declination to
5
register to vote or the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is
registered.” Jd. At bottom, the NVRA puts in place a uniform code for the registration of voters
and the removal of voters from registered voter lists. True the Vote v. Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d
693, 722 (S.D. Miss. 2014). Finally, the NVRA establishes a private ren of action, subject to
certain prerequisites. Id. § 20510(b).?
Voter registration applications are within the scope of the NVRA’s public disclosure
provisions. Long, 682 F.3d at 335-36 (“[T]he process of reviewing voter registration applications
is a ‘program’ and ‘activity.’”). However, as the district court in Long recognized, nothing in the
NVRA requires that information contained in voter application records which is “uniquely
sensitive and vulnerable to abuse” must be disclosed. Project Vote/Voting For Am., Inc. v. Long,
752 F. Supp. 2d 697, 712 (E.D. Va. 2010). On this ground, the Eastern District of Virginia court
required that applicant social security numbers be redacted, and this limitation on public disclosure
was upheld. Other courts have upheld similar redactions of sensitive information subject to abuse,
such as telephone numbers, birth dates, and email addresses. See generally Project Vote, Inc. v.
Kemp, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
In response to plaintiff’s request, the NCSBOE has disclosed to plaintiff documents which
demonstrate the manner in which it has identified and investigated potential noncitizens who are
registered to vote as well as documents which show that it has removed individuals who have been
demonstrated to be noncitizens. See [DE 17-8] Amd, Compl. Ex. G. Indeed, records of individuals
who have been removed from the voter roll, including the oon for removal, are publicly
pemilaclel Id. But the documents at issue here are records of individual voters who the NCSBOE,
for one reason or another, has identified as potential noncitizens. The Court concludes that the
2 Defendants have not challenged plaintiffs compliance with the prerequisites to bringing this suit.
Lo 6
information plaintiff requests concerning individuals on the voter rolls is uniquely sensitive and
vulnerable to abuse, and thus that the NCSBOE is not required to disclose it by the NVRA.
In so holding, the Court is guided by the following. First, and importantly, being identified
as an individual who is registered to vote but who may not be a United States citizen raises the
specter of immigration violations and criminal activity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 611. This is plainly
the type of information that is both sensitive and vulnerable to abuse. See e.g., Senate of the Com.
of Puerto Rico on Behalf of Judiciary Comm. y. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 588 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (“There is little question that disclosing the identity of targets of law-enforcement
investigations can subject those identified to embarrassment and potentially more serious
reputational harm.”). Moreover, plaintiff's broad request seeks not only individual voter
registration records, but also documents relating to immigration or citizen status. Such documents
would include copies of birth certificates or passports, both of which may be utilized, like social
security numbers, in identity theft. See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1354 (4th'Cir. 1993).
Second, the NVRA expressly prevents the disclosure of a potential voter’s declination to
register to vote and the identity of a voter’s voter registration agency, which may be a public
assistance office. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(i)(1); 20506(a)(2). These express exemptions demonstrate
while Congress was concerned with transparency when enacting the NVRA, it was unwilling
completely override individual privacy in areas which may result in either stigma or harassment.
See S. Rep. No. 103-6, 35 (1993); Kenn 208 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1339-40 (N.D. Ga. 2016). Further,
the NCSBOE contends that it has identified potential noncitizen registered voters om two
primary sources: North Carolina driver’s license records, which include a noneitizen Renenaion
7 □
on the driver’s identification card,> and a confidential Department of Homeland Security database.
Other federal statutes, such as the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), and the Drivers Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c), protect from disclosure by the NCSBOE the records sought
by plaintiff which would have been used to identify a potential noncitizen voter.
Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the Fourth Circuit in Long did not address the issue
presented here when it decided the narrow question of whether the NVRA requires disclosure of
completed voter registration applications. Long, 682 F.3d at 340. The request to the board of
elections in Long was for “completed voter registration applications of any individual who timely
submitted an application at any time from January 1, 2008, through October 31, 2008, who was
not. registered to vote in time for the November 4, 2008 general election [and] documents
identifying the reasons the applications were rejected.” Jd. at 333. Unlike the plaintiff in Long,
plaintiff here has not requested voter registration applications made during a period of time and
the documents which identify the reasons applications were rejected. Instead, plaintiff has
requested a broad array of documents concerning all registrants who were identified as potentially
not satisfying the citizenship requirement for registration. Plaintiffs request for documents well-
exceeds the scope of what was requested in Long, especially as it seeks, as its starting point, voter .
registrant information that is uniquely sensitive and vulnerable to abuse.
The Court concludes that the NVRA does not require public disclosure of the voter
registration information sought by plaintiff. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim, and the
claims against defendant Belllare\dismissed: □
3 Information pertaining to a driver’s identification card is a motor vehicle record subject to
protection by the Drivers Privacy Protection Act. Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir.
2009).
.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss [DE 20 & 22] are GRANTED.
The pending motion to dismiss the original complaint [DE 11] is DENIED AS MOOT. The clerk
DIRECTED to close the case.
SO ORDERED, this / fday of October, 2019.
An
TERRENCE W. BOYLE
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRIC DGE