“[B]efore North Carolina substantive law can be applied to plaintiffs action, she must prove that the tortious injury, defendant’s alienation of her husband’s affection, occurred in North Carolina.”
How later courts described this case
- “[B]efore North Carolina substantive law can be applied to plaintiffs action, she must prove that the tortious injury, defendant’s alienation of her husband’s affection, occurred in North Carolina.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
NO. 4:19-CV-46-FL
CHRISTOPHER DOLIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) ORDER
)
JORDAN KINDRED, Officer, Riverside )
Regional Jail Authority, )
)
Defendant. 1 )
This matter is before the court upon defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
and for failure to state a claim (DE 15). Plaintiff responded in opposition, and also has filed a
motion to compel compliance with subpoena for documents (DE 29). In this posture, the issues
raised are ripe for ruling. For the following reasons, defendant’s motion is granted and plaintiff’s
motion is denied as moot.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced this action by motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on April
4, 2019. Upon frivolity review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court allowed plaintiff
to proceed with a claim for alienation of affection and criminal conversation against defendant, an
1 The court constructively has amended the caption of this order to reflect dismissal of formerly-named
defendants.
1
officer at Riverside Regional Jail in Virginia. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, expenses,
and interest.2
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), asserting lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant as well as failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff responded in opposition on August 30,
2019, relying upon an email from plaintiff to defense counsel as well as documents received from
defense counsel. Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel compliance with subpoenas on
September 30, 2019.
STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS
The facts alleged in the complaint may be summarized as follows. Plaintiff is a resident
of Greenville, North Carolina. Defendant is an officer at Riverside Regional Jail in North Prince
George, Virginia (hereinafter, the “jail”). Plaintiff alleges that on January 2, 2018, defendant
began to sexually harass plaintiff’s spouse, Christina Rawls-Dolin (“Rawls-Dolin”), who was
employed as a mental health specialist at the jail. Plaintiff alleges that this harassment developed
into a “dating/sexual relationship.” (Compl. (DE 1-1) at 3).3 On April 28, 2018, defendant’s
“actions towards Rawls-Dolin resulted in plaintiff vacating the shared residence.” (Id.). On
September 1, 2018, “the relationship was ended by Rawls-Dolin.” (Id.). Defendant’s ongoing
harassment towards Rawls-Dolin had effect on plaintiff’s family, “to include having to maintain
2 Plaintiff has two additional cases pending before this court on frivolity review: Dolin v. Kindred, et al.,
5:19-CV-433-FL (E.D.N.C.) and Dolin v. Wellpath, et al., 4:19-CV-88-FL (E.D.N.C.). The court will address those
actions by separate order.
3 Page numbers in citations to documents in the record specify the page number designated by the court’s
electronic case filing (ECF) system, and not the page number, if any, showing on the face of the underlying
document.
2
separate households.” (Id.). According to the complaint, defendant continues to sexually harass
Rawls-Dolin through touching, verbal communications, and stalking.
Plaintiff alleges that he has incurred damages in the amount of $75,001 for mental anguish,
emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life. He has incurred $20,196 for expenses in
maintaining separate houses. Plaintiff alleges that jail officers have allowed defendant to remain
under their employ with allegations of physical and verbal abuse towards staff, contractors and
inmates.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(2) allows for dismissal of a claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. “When a
district court considers a question of personal jurisdiction based on the contents of a complaint and
supporting affidavits, the plaintiff has the burden of making a prima facie showing in support of
its assertion of jurisdiction.” Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 558 (4th
Cir. 2014). At this stage, the court “must construe all relevant pleading allegations in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, assume credibility, and draw the most favorable inferences for the existence
of jurisdiction.” Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989); see Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he district court must draw all reasonable inferences
arising from the proof, and resolve all factual disputes, in the plaintiff’s favor.”).
“To survive a motion to dismiss,” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
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relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating whether a claim is
stated, the “court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff,” but does not consider “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action,
. . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
B. Analysis
1. Personal Jurisdiction
“A lawful assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant requires satisfying the
standards of the forum state’s long-arm statute and respecting the safeguards enshrined in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Tire Eng’g & Distribution, LLC v. Shandong
Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 2012). Where, as here, “North Carolina’s long-
arm statute is construed to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full extent
permitted by the Due Process Clause, . . . the dual jurisdictional requirements collapse into a single
inquiry” into whether personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Christian Sci. Bd. of
Directors of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 2001).
The due process inquiry “can be undertaken through two different approaches – by finding
specific jurisdiction . . . or by finding general jurisdiction.” ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consul.,
Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 2002).
A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant’s
“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant]
essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
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U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. &
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.” Id. at 924.
“To decide whether specific jurisdiction exists, we examine (1) the extent to which the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2)
whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” Mitrano v. Hawes, 377
F.3d 402, 407 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 474–76 (1985). “The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014) (quotations omitted). “For a State to
exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create
a substantial connection with the forum State.” Id. at 284.
In this case, plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over
defendant. Plaintiff alleges that defendant is a resident of Virginia, and plaintiff alleges no
contacts by defendant with North Carolina. The allegations in the complaint concern defendant’s
conduct in sexually harassing plaintiff’s spouse at their place of employment, at the jail in Virginia.
(See Compl. (DE 1-1) at 3). Plaintiff has not alleged defendant has a domicile in North Carolina,
nor such “continuous and systematic” contacts to render defendant “at home” in the state.
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Accordingly, plaintiff has not established general jurisdiction. In
addition, plaintiff has not alleged defendant “purposefully availed” himself of activities in the state
5
nor any claim “arising out of” such activities. Mitrano, 377 F.3d at 407. Thus, plaintiff fails to
establish personal jurisdiction over defendant.
Plaintiff asserts three grounds for personal jurisdiction in opposition to defendant’s motion,
each of which are unavailing. First, plaintiff asserts that defendant regularly travels between
Tennessee and Virginia, crossing through North Carolina. Such travel, however, is insufficient
to establish that defendant is “at home” in the state. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. Second, plaintiff
asserts that “[h]ad the defendant no committed his acts towards the Plaintiff’s spouse, then the
Plaintiff would not have had to move to North Carolina.” (DE 21 at 1). This assertion speaks to
plaintiff’s activities in North Carolina, but does not establish that defendant purposefully availed
himself of activities in North Carolina. Finally, plaintiff points out that defendant has counsel in
North Carolina. Such counsel, however, does not establish defendant’s domicile in North
Carolina, nor has plaintiff asserted any claim “arising out of” such relationship between defendant
and his counsel. Mitrano, 377 F.3d at 407.
In sum, plaintiff’s asserted grounds for jurisdiction are unavailing. Where this court lacks
personal jurisdiction over defendant, claims against defendant must be dismissed as a matter of
law.
2. Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In determining the
law applicable to plaintiff’s alienation of affection and criminal conversation claims, the court
applies North Carolina choice of law rules. “For actions sounding in tort, the state where the
injury occurred is considered the situs of the claim.” Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 335,
(1988). “Thus, under North Carolina law, when the injury giving rise to a negligence or strict
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liability claim occurs in another state, the law of that state governs resolution of the substantive
issues in the controversy.” Id.; see, e.g., Darnell v. Rupplin, 91 N.C. App. 349, 351 (1988)
(“[B]efore North Carolina substantive law can be applied to plaintiffs action, she must prove that
the tortious injury, defendant’s alienation of her husband’s affection, occurred in North Carolina.”)
Here, where defendant is alleged to have committed acts of harassment and sexual
relationship with plaintiffs spouse in Virginia, and where there is no allegation of any criminal
conversation or alienation of affection taking place in North Carolina, the law of Virginia governs
plaintiff's claims. See id. Under Virginia law, “no civil action shall lie or be maintained . . . for
alienation of affection ... or criminal conversation.” Va. Code § 8.01-220.
Therefore, plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed on this additional
basis.
3. Motion to Compel
Where plaintiffs claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state
a claim, plaintiff's motion to compel compliance with subpoenas necessarily is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss, (DE 15), and
DENIES plaintiff's motion to compel (DE 29). Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this the 9th day of October, 2019.
United States District Judge