Williams v. Zachary

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

ABERDEEN DIVISION

KAMEKO R. WILLIAMS, as the natural daughter

and next friend of JAMES LEE BROWNLEE, deceased AND

ON BEHALF of all of the heirs-at-law and wrongful

death beneficiaries of JAMES LEE BROWNLEE, deceased PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-128-GHD-DAS

PATROLMAN ADAM ZACHARY, et al. DEFENDANTS

OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Presently before the Court are the Defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment

[111, 115] – one filed by Defendant Patrolman Adam Zachary, and one filed by the remaining

Defendants. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motions should be granted.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 4, 2016, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the Decedent James Brownlee was arrested

by Defendant Highway Patrolman Zachary at a safety checkpoint for DUI, driving with a

suspended license, lack of insurance, possession of alcohol in a dry county, and a seatbelt

violation.1 [Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 60, at p. 5; Booking Report, Doc. 111-

2]. After his arrest and prior to his arrival at the Chickasaw County Regional Correctional Facility,

Brownlee raised two issues with Zachary: first, that Brownlee’s wrists were hurting from the

handcuffs and, subsequently, that his back was hurting [Zachary Dep., Doc. 115-3, at pp. 35-36,

140]. In response to Brownlee’s first complaint, Zachary released the handcuffs from behind

Brownlee’s back and recuffed Brownlee’s hands in the front [Id. at pp. 36, 140]. In response to

1 Brownlee was a 57-year-old African-American male who worked full-time at a furniture factory in Houlka,

Mississippi [K. Williams Dep., Doc. No. 115-1, at p. 7]. He was, by all accounts, in good health and had not indicated

any sort of medical issues during the time period preceding his death [Doc. 115-1, at p. 7; L. Brownlee Dep., Doc.

No. 115-2, at pp. 15-16, 26, 42].

Brownlee’s complaint that his back was hurting, he was permitted to get out of the patrol car to

stretch his legs; upon arrival at the jail, he raised no further complaints regarding back pain [Id. at

pp. 35-6, 96]. At 10:27 p.m. that same night, after a breathalyzer test indicated his breath alcohol

content was 0.15, nearly twice the legal limit, Brownlee was booked into the custody of the

Chickasaw County Regional Correctional Facility by the Defendant Deputy Cody Shankle [Jail

Booking Report, Doc. 111-2]. During Mr. Brownlee’s booking process at the jail, he did not

indicate any pain, discomfort, or underlying medical conditions to Deputy Shankle; Brownlee

further indicated on the jail’s Health & Observation intake form that he had no heart conditions or

hypertension, was not taking any medication, and had no serious medical problems – the sole

medical condition he indicated was arthritis [Doc. 111-2, at 20; Health & Observation Form, Doc.

119-6]. Subsequently during the booking process, Brownlee relayed to Deputy Shankle that his

stomach was hurting and he asked to use the restroom; following the restroom break, Brownlee

did not further indicate to Shankle or any other jail personnel that he was in any pain or having

any medical issues, and he was escorted to a holding cell [Doc. 111-2, at 24; Shankle Dep., Doc.

111-5, at p. 108]. At 1:40 a.m. on the morning of July 5, Deputy Shankle escorted Brownlee from

the holding cell to a single cell; Brownlee did not mention any medical issues during this

movement and did not require any assistance during the movement or appear to be in any medical

distress [Id.].2

Beginning at 2:00 a.m. on July 5, Brownlee was visually observed by jail personnel an

average of every 34 minutes [Inmate Security Check Log, Doc. 111-3]. At 5:40 a.m., Deputy

Shankle came to Brownlee’s cell to give him his breakfast tray [Doc. 111-2, at 24]. When

Brownlee failed to respond, Shankle entered the cell and found Brownlee unresponsive [Id.].

2 Video footage from inside the jail shows Brownlee during the booking process interacting with jail personnel,

including Deputy Shankle, and in the holding cell. [Video Footage, Doc. 131; Doc. 111-5, at pp. 106-23].

Shankle then made a “Code Blue” emergency radio call [Id.] Several officers and medical

personnel responded, a defibrillator was brought in the cell, CPR was initiated, and an ambulance

was paged [Id.]. Paramedics arrived and CPR efforts were continued until shortly after 6:00 a.m.

[Id.] Mr. Brownlee was pronounced dead at 6:28 a.m. with the cause of death listed as

hypertension and arthroscopic vascular disease [Certificate of Death, Doc. No. 111-1].

The Plaintiff subsequently filed this action pursuant to Section 1983, alleging that

Defendants State Trooper Zachary and Deputy Shankle, both sued solely in their individual

capacities, and the Defendant Sheriff Myers, sued solely in his official capacity, the Defendant

Chickasaw County Sheriff’s Department, and the Defendant Chickasaw County violated

Brownlee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care; the Plaintiff further alleges

that the Defendant Zachary violated Brownlee’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful

seizure, arrest, and imprisonment [Doc. 60, at pp. 12-14]. The Defendants then filed the instant

motions pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the Plaintiff’s

claims against them should be dismissed.

B. Standard of Review

1. Summary Judgment

This Court grants summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th

Cir. 2008). The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery

and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the

Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 323. Under Rule 56(a), the burden then

shifts to the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282

(5th Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). When

the parties dispute the facts, the Court must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal

citations omitted). “However, a nonmovant may not overcome the summary judgment standard

with conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of

evidence.” McClure v. Boles, 490 F. App’x 666, 667 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway

v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).

2. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Zachary and Shankle have asserted that they are protected from liability by the

doctrine of qualified immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity serves to shield … government officials

from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the

official’s acts were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law.” Thompson v.

Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001); see Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177

(5th Cir. 2016) (“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a

clearly established constitutional right.”) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, Tex., 333 F.3d 621,

623 (5th Cir. 2003)). Qualified immunity calls for a bifurcated test in which the court must first

determine (1) “whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct and, if so, (2)

whether the defendant [official’s] conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd,

563 U.S. 731 (2011); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1999). “Once a defendant

asserts the qualified immunity defense, ‘[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified

immunity.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010)). “Despite this

burden-shifting, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant plaintiff’s favor.” Id.

(citing Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).

Importantly, a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless

the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes

would have understood that he was violating it. Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. In other words,

“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question” confronted by the

official “beyond debate.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014). The U.S. Supreme

Court has thus stressed that a plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating that defendants violated “clearly

established law” requires not merely a citation to generalized principles of law, but, rather, specific

authority which “placed the statutory or constitutional question” confronted by the official

“beyond debate.” Id. The Fifth Circuit has similarly written that, in the qualified immunity

context, “[w]e do not require that an official demonstrate that he did not violate clearly established

federal rights; our precedent places that burden on plaintiffs.” Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 872

(5th Cir. 1997). Making the plaintiff's burden in this context even more difficult, the Supreme

Court wrote in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015), that, to establish

that any supportive precedent was “clearly established,” the plaintiff must be able to cite either a

decision from that Court or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of

Appeals.” See also Crawford v. Desoto Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:19CV013-MPM-RP, 2020 WL

55611, at *4 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 6, 2020).

3. Municipal Liability

Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) and its progeny, a

municipality may only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating a citizen's constitutional

rights if “the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ [that] person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’

a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).

Governmental entities are “responsible only for [their] own illegal acts” and are “not vicariously

liable under § 1983 for [their] employees' actions.” Id. Thus, there is no respondeat superior

liability under § 1983; rather, the key to municipal liability is demonstrating that a deprivation of

a constitutional right was inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality in

question. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The alleged unconstitutional conduct asserted “must be directly

attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur.” Piotrowski v.

City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).

To establish constitutional liability under Monell, a plaintiff must therefore demonstrate

(1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or

constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or

custom. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247-249 (5th Cir. 2003). A “policy

or custom” can be either (1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially

adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the

lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or (2) a persistent, widespread practice of city

officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated

policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal

policy. McGregory v. City of Jackson, 335 Fed. App'x 446, 448-449 (5th Cir. 2009); Crawford v.

Desoto Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:19CV013-MPM-RP, 2020 WL 55611, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 6,

2020).

A “single incident” exception to the Monell standard exists, and liability may be

appropriate in a narrow range of circumstances, when proof is presented demonstrating that the

need for more or specific systemic training in a particular area is so obvious, and the inadequacy

of the present level of training is so likely to result in a constitutional violation, that the relevant

policymakers may reasonably be deemed to be deliberately indifferent to the need for the training.

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). In order to establish liability under this

exception, the failure to train officers must “amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.

C. Analysis and Discussion

1. Defendant Zachary and Defendant Shankle’s Motions for Qualified Immunity

a. Plaintiff’s Claims for Denial of Medical Care

The Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Zachary and Shankle violated Brownlee’s right under

the Fourteenth Amendment to adequate medical care as a pretrial detainee. Under the Fourteenth

Amendment, “pretrial detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care unless the failure to supply

that care is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Little v. Keirsey, 69 F.3d

536 (5th Cir. 1995).

To state a claim for the unconstitutional denial of medical care in a case such as the one

sub judice, a plaintiff must show that an officer’s actions or omissions were deliberately indifferent

to a substantial risk of serious medical harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);

Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate deliberate

indifference, the Plaintiff must show that the officer “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate safety.” Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 635-36 (5th Cir. 2019).

The Fifth Circuit, in Batiste v. Theriot, 458 Fed. App’x 351 (5th Cir. 2012), addressed a

similar case. In Batiste, the plaintiff died a short time after being shot with a taser in a foot pursuit

with police; his family sued the involved officers, alleging excessive force and the denial of

medical care. The Fifth Circuit held that the on-scene officers were entitled to qualified immunity

and had not acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s clear medical needs because the

officers at the scene never thought that “there was a serious medical emergency” and that the

officers followed departmental policy regarding the procuring of medical care. Batiste, 458 Fed.

App’x at *4-*5. Likewise, a court in this district, in granting the defendant officers’ motion for

qualified immunity in a similar case involving a detainee who died in her sleep in the Lafayette

County jail forty-eight hours after her arrest, noted that officers “are not constitutionally required

to detect hidden physical or psychiatric problems which would generally require the diagnostic

skills of a medical professional” and that absent awareness that “the detainee suffers from some

outwardly apparent and obviously serious medical condition,” qualified immunity is appropriate.

Boston v. Lafayette County, 744 F. Supp. 746, 754 (N.D. Miss. 1990). In granting the officers’

motion for qualified immunity, the Boston court was faced with facts arguably more severe than

those present in this case – the officers in that case failed to complete a medical screening form

during booking, which was accomplished in the case sub judice, and the decedent detainee had

known mental health issues, suffered from diabetes, and appeared physically ill or disoriented to

the officers. Id. at 749. The Boston court noted that while the decedent in that case gave no

indication to officers that she was in pain or wished for medical attention, she suffered from mental

illness, had ingested insulin, and made grunting sounds and was holding her abdomen when she

arrived at the jail. Id. The decedent died in her cell from a blood clot approximately forty-eight

hours after her arrival at the jail. Id. The court ultimately held that qualified immunity was

appropriate. Id.

Here, likewise, there is no evidence that the Defendants Shankle, Zachary, or any other

involved officer acted with deliberate indifference to Brownlee’s medical needs. Indeed, there is

no evidence that it was clear, upon outward observation, that Brownlee required any medical

attention or treatment or that he suffered from an outwardly apparent and obviously serious

medical condition. Brownlee, although obviously intoxicated, was capable of communicating with

officers, and indicated during booking that he had no heart conditions or hypertension, was not

taking any medication, and had no serious medical problems – his sole complaint related to

stomach pain and the need to use the bathroom, which he was allowed to do; after that, he did not

advise anyone of any pain or medical issues, and the record is clear that he did not outwardly

appear to have any obviously serious medical issues [Doc. 111-2]. The Plaintiff’s deposition

testimony likewise reveal that neither Mr. Brownlee’s wife nor his daughter, both of whom were

with Brownlee when he was arrested, heard him complain of any pain to Patrolman Zachary during

the traffic stop or arrest. [Doc. 115-1, at pp. 12-13; Doc. 115-2, at p. 41].

The primary case upon which the Plaintiff seeks to rely, Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374

(5th Cir. 2020), is clearly distinguishable. In Dyer, the Fifth Circuit held that a genuine issue of

material fact existed regarding the defendant officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity when the

decedent detainee had struck his head violently against the interior metal cage and window of a

patrol car over forty times en route to jail during a drug-induced psychosis and had sustained

serious and outwardly obvious head trauma as a result; the detainee died a few hours later from

cranial trauma. Id. at 381-82. The officers in Dyer had witnessed the trauma and had subjective

knowledge of the decedent detainee’s injuries and the cause of those injuries – rather than seek

medical care, however, the officers simply told jail personnel that the decedent detainee had been

medically cleared at the scene. Id.

The facts in the case sub judice are simply nowhere near as stark as those in Dyer, and the

Plaintiff has not shown that Zachary or Shankle’s actions or omissions were deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious medical harm or that either of them knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to Brownlee’s safety or health. As noted above, Brownlee indicated

no serious health issues during his arrest or booking; his sole complaint during booking was that

his stomach hurt and he needed to use the restroom – he subsequently had no complaints and,

although clearly intoxicated, did not appear to be in any serious or obvious medical distress.

Officers later moved him from a holding cell to an individual cell, and then observed him every

half hour throughout the night until his untimely passing. Based on these undisputed facts, the

Plaintiff has not shown that either Zachary or Shankle were deliberately indifferent to Brownlee’s

clear medical needs nor that either of them acted in an objectively unreasonable manner regarding

Brownlee’s medical needs.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established that either Zachary

or Shankle violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right regarding Brownlee’s

right under the Fourteenth Amendment to adequate medical care as a pretrial detainee, or that their

conduct was objectively unreasonable. Zachary and Shankle are therefore entitled to qualified

immunity and their separate motions for summary judgment as to these claims shall be granted.

b. Plaintiff’s Claims for Unlawful Seizure, Arrest, and False Imprisonment

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Zachary violated Brownlee’s rights under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unlawful seizure, arrest, and false

imprisonment [Doc. 60, at pp. 13-14].

First, the Plaintiff avers that the traffic stop that resulted in Brownlee’s arrest was

impermissible. The Court disagrees. Traffic checkpoints are seizures implicating the Fourth

Amendment. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 455 (1990); see also United

States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976) (“It is agreed that checkpoint stops are

‘seizures’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). While roadblock or checkpoint traffic

stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, checkpoints which stop all

oncoming vehicles with the purpose of checking for traffic violations are permissible. City of

Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); United States v. Atkinson, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir.

2001).

When there is an argument that a checkpoint stop amounted to an impermissible search

and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the analysis first set forth by the Supreme Court in

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), is implicated. In Prouse, the Court invalidated a

discretionary, suspicionless stop for a spot check of a single motorist’s license and registration;

however, the Court indicated that “[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops”

to verify driver’s licenses and registrations would be a lawful means of furthering the state’s vital

interest in highway safety. Id.; see also City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 39 (2000) (noting same).

In addition, in Mississippi, roadblocks or checkpoints where all incoming traffic is stopped for a

driver’s license check have been found permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Miller v. State,

373 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss. 1979); Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 538 (5th Cir. 2004). The

Supreme Court, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), further articulated the balancing test used

to determine the reasonableness of warrantless checkpoint stops: “Consideration of the

constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served

by the seizures, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of

the interference with individual liberty.” Id. at 50–51. In other words, the checkpoint will be

subject to a balancing test to determine whether it is constitutionally permissible - weighing the

public interest, if any, advanced by the checkpoint against the Defendant’s protected privacy and

liberty interests. Collins, 382 F.3d at 537–39.

In the case sub judice, Trooper Zachary testified in his deposition that the subject

checkpoint, set up on July 4, 2016, on Highway 389 near the Natchez Trace, stopped all vehicles

that passed and was established in order to check for driver’s licenses, insurance, and to ensure

vehicle safety [Doc. 115-3, at pp. 28-9]. Because the Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to

contradict this testimony, the Court finds that the checkpoint was properly authorized and was

established for a permissible purpose - the checkpoint was properly authorized and established;

was operated in a manner consistent with the public interest in enforcing licensing, insurance, and

motor vehicle laws; and properly limited the on-site officers’ discretion because every vehicle that

approached the checkpoint was stopped. In addition, the Court finds that brief nature of the stop

at the checkpoint for the limited purpose of verifying drivers’ licenses, proof of insurance, and for

safety observation was a reasonable intrusion into the passing motorists’ protected privacy and

liberty interests. Atkinson, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 2001).

Next, the Plaintiff argues that Zachary arrested Brownlee without probable cause. The lack

of probable cause is a necessary component of a false arrest and imprisonment claim. Cuadra v.

Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010); Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,

164 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[i]f there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . .

then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.”)(emphasis

added); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The ‘constitutional torts’ of false

arrest, unreasonable seizure, and false imprisonment . . . require s showing of no probable cause.”).

Probable cause exists “when the totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer’s

knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the

suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 595 (5th

Cir. 2013).

In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that upon approaching the driver’s side of the

Brownlees’ van, Zachary noticed the strong odor of alcohol [Doc. 115-3, at p. 33]. This alone

gave Zachary sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Brownlee for further investigation. Watts

v. State, 78 So. 3d 901, 904 (Miss. 2012). Further, it is undisputed that Brownlee was in possession

of alcohol in the vehicle [Doc. 115-2, at p. 39; Doc. 115-3, at p. 105] and that Chickasaw County

is a “dry” county, rendering possession of alcohol unlawful in that county. Miss. Code Ann. § 67-

3-13; Mississippi Dep’t of Revenue Alcoholic Beverage Control Division map at

https://www.dor.ms.gov/ABC/Pages/WetDryMap-Beer-Wine.aspx; Dantzler v. State, 542 So. 2d

906, 909 (Miss. 1989). In addition, Brownlee admitted to driving the vehicle, failed a field sobriety

test at the scene, and then registered a breath alcohol content nearly twice the legal limit [Doc.

115-3, at p. 34; Doc. 115-4]. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that probable cause

existed for Zachary to arrest Brownlee and transport him to the jail for booking. Deville, 567 F.3d

at 164; Winston v. City of Shreveport, 390 F. App’x 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2010); see Miss. Code Ann.

§ 45-3-21 (Mississippi Highway Patrolmen possess authority to effect warrantless arrest of any

person committing or attempting to commit misdemeanor in presence or view of Patrolman).

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established that Zachary violated

a clearly established statutory or constitutional right regarding Brownlee’s rights under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unlawful seizure, arrest, and false imprisonment, or

that Zachary’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. Zachary is therefore entitled to qualified

immunity and his motion for summary judgment as to these claims shall be granted.

2. Chickasaw County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant Sheriff Myers, sued in his official capacity, the

Defendant Chickasaw County Sheriff’s Department, and the Defendant Chickasaw County

violated Brownlee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care.

Brownlee was transported by Mississippi Highway Patrolman Adam Zachary to the

Chickasaw County Detention Center at approximately 9:30 p.m. on July 4, 2016, after Zachary

arrested Brownlee for, inter alia, DUI and possession of alcohol in a dry county. Once Brownlee

arrived at the jail, he was booked into the facility by Defendant Deputy Cody Shankle.

As noted above, in order to establish the subject Defendants’ liability in this case, the

Plaintiff must normally identify a policy or custom that caused or was the moving force behind the

complained-of constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Isolated incidents are not

sufficient to demonstrate that a policy exists. See Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3

(5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that “[i]solated violations are not the persistent, often repeated,

constant violations that constitute custom and policy”); Estate of Pernell v. City of Columbus, No.

1:08CV40-D-D, 2010 WL 1737638 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 28, 2010). To show that the right to medical

care has been violated, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an official had subjective knowledge of a

substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff, and the subject official(s) responded with deliberate

indifference. Id. (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996).

In this case, however, the Plaintiff has elected to rely solely on the above-noted “single

incident” exception to the Monell standard, which is appropriate only in a narrow range of

circumstances and which requires proof (here, proof that a genuine issue of material fact exists)

demonstrating that a systemic need for more or specific training in a particular area is so obvious,

and the inadequacy of the provided training is so likely to result in a constitutional violation, that

the relevant policymakers may reasonably be deemed to be deliberately indifferent to the need for

the subject training. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Specifically, as noted

above, in order to establish liability under this exception, the failure to train officers in the subject

area must “amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come

into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.

In the case sub judice, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence

to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding this claim. To the contrary,

the evidence shows that Chickasaw County deputies who work at the jail, as well as Defendant

Deputy Shankle himself, are required to receive training regarding inmate medical assessment and

emergencies, and that Deputy Shankle conducted a medical assessment with Brownlee upon

Brownlee’s arrival at the jail [Doc. 119-5, at p. 25; Doc. 119-6; Doc. 119-9]. Shankle and

Brownlee completed the required medical Health & Observation form, and Brownlee signed the

form indicating no serious health conditions or problems, other than noting Brownlee was under

the influence of alcohol and had pre-existing arthritis [Doc. 119-6]. Nothing in the record indicates

a systemic failure to provide officers with training related to inmate medical assessment, and

certainly not to the level required to invoke the single incident exception to Monell.

Given these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the Chickasaw County Defendants did

not fail to train their officers nor respond with deliberate indifference to Brownlee’s constitutional

rights. Accordingly, municipal liability cannot be imposed under Monell or the single incident

exception to the customary Monell test. The Court thus holds that no genuine issue of material

fact remains as to this claim, and the Chickasaw County Defendants are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.

D. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Defendant Zachary is entitled to

qualified immunity as to the Plaintiffs claims pending against him. Accordingly, Zachary’s

motion for summary judgment shall be granted and the Plaintiff's claims against him dismissed.

Likewise, the Court finds that the Defendant Shankle is entitled to qualified immunity as to the

Plaintiffs claim pending against him, and Shankle’s motion for summary judgment shall therefore

be granted and the Plaintiffs claim against him dismissed. The Court further finds that the

Defendant Sheriff Myers, sued in his official capacity, the Defendant Chickasaw County Sheriff's

Department, and the Defendant Chickasaw County are entitled to summary judgment as to the

Plaintiff's pending claims against them. Their motion for summary judgment shall therefore be

granted and the Plaintiff’s claims against them dismissed.?

An order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.

THIS, the _27thday of August, 2021.

da. HN San

° AA Sten,»

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

3 Defendant Deputy Sheriff Diana Westmoreland, sued solely in her individual capacity, was never served

with process. The Court previously dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims against Westmoreland for failure to timely effect

service of process [32]. The Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint [60], again naming Westmoreland

as a Defendant in her individual capacity; the Plaintiff, however, never served Westmoreland with process. The

Plaintiff’s claims against Westmoreland, therefore, are hereby dismissed.

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