Opinion

Carson v. Citadel Federal Solutions, LLC

Court
District Court, W.D. Missouri
Filed
Jan 17, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.3%

“[F]ailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[F]ailure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

ST. JOSEPH DIVISION

AMBER CARSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 5:23-cv-06015-DGK

)

CITADEL FEDERAL SOLUTIONS, LLC )

d/b/a FALCONTEK, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER SETTING AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES

This lawsuit alleges Defendant violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681, by declining to offer Plaintiff employment because of information contained within a credit

report without first giving Plaintiff an opportunity to review the report’s accuracy. Plaintiff filed

this case in Missouri state court as a putative class-action lawsuit. Defendant removed, and after

an unsuccessful mediation, filed an offer of judgment covering Plaintiff’s individual claim only.

The offer of judgment was for $1,000 (the statutory maximum for an individual claim) and a

reasonable award of attorneys’ fees which a prevailing plaintiff is also entitled to under FCRA.

Plaintiff accepted the offer, but the parties could not agree on a reasonable award of fees

and costs. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. ECF No.

28. Plaintiff’s counsels’ revised request1 seeks $43,285 in attorneys’ fees and expenses.

Defendant objects to the amount sought. It requests the Court award only one of the three

costs sought and lower the fee award to a “reasonable” amount by reducing Plaintiff’s counsels’

proposed $550 hourly billing rate and Plaintiff’s counsels’ time spent on the litigation.

1 Initially Plaintiff’s counsel sought attorneys’ fees totaling $45,485, but they reduced their request while briefing was

ongoing to account for emails that were inadvertently double billed, and increased their request to reflect time spent

briefing the motion. Reply Br. at 8 n.4, ECF No. 31.

After carefully reviewing the record, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. The Court

awards $105.39 in costs and $24,480 in attorneys’ fees for a total of $24,585.39.

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks to recover costs consisting of her filing fee, her share of the mediation costs,

and costs for a private process server. Defendant argues, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the

mediation costs and private process server costs are unrecoverable in the present case. Since

Plaintiff does not dispute the arguments, they are waived. See Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine

Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ailure to oppose a basis for summary

judgment constitutes waiver of that argument.”). The Court awards Plaintiff costs of $105.39, the

amount of her filing fee.

With respect to determining a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees, the starting point is the

lodestar calculation, which is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of

hours reasonably expended. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). In making this

calculation, the Court considers “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions [presented in the case]; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary

fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation,

and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Id. at 430 n.3. There

is a strong presumption that the lodestar calculation represents a reasonable fee award. City of

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992).

In the present case, there are disputes over both Plaintiff’s counsels’ proposed rate and

claimed amount of time spent on the matter. With respect to a reasonable hourly rate, the Court

agrees that the requested $550 an hour is too high. The Court notes that two other federal courts

in this region have rejected similar rate requests from Plaintiff’s counsel in recent years. One judge

found Plaintiff’s counsels’ request for $550 an hour was “well above the Kansas City-area average

for all attorneys” and “significantly above the median rate for all consumer attorneys in Missouri.”

Stallsworth v. Mars Petcare US Inc., No. 17-CV-04180-NKL, 2018 WL 2125950, at *4 (W.D.

Mo. May 8, 2018) (awarding attorneys’ fees of $32,900 based on 70.4 hours of attorney work at

an hourly rate of $450, plus compensation for the legal assistant’s time, in a FCRA case with a

$1,000 client recovery). The other judge found “$450 per hour is a reasonable—albeit high—rate

for Mr. Brown and Mr. Watkins,” but that was in a FCRA class action case that settled for

$149,205, which is much larger than the recovery here. Bailes v. Lineage Logistics, LLC, No. 15-

2457-DDC-TJJ, 2017 WL 4758927, at *8 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2017). Based on the twelve factors

above, but particularly the second (novelty and difficulty of the questions presented), eighth (the

amount involved and the results obtained), and twelfth (awards in similar cases), the Court finds

$400 an hour is an appropriate hourly rate here.

With respect to the amount of time spent on the matter, the Court appreciates Defendant’s

observation that of the nearly 200 time entries Plaintiff’s counsel has made, 123 of them are for

0.2 hours (twelve minutes), and only two are 0.1 hours (six minutes). This means Plaintiff’s

counsel is claiming that almost every time an attorney or paralegal touched the file, that person

spent twelve minutes on it, which seems unlikely. Additionally, Defendant notes the time records

show Mr. Brown and Mr. Watkins made duplicative billing entries for many phone calls and

emails. Plaintiff’s counsel concedes in their reply brief this was a mistake, and they adjusted their

request downwards by eight hours to compensate for it. While the Court appreciates Plaintiff’s

counsels’ candor in acknowledging these billing errors, see Reply Br. at 4 n.2, it leaves the Court

(1) wondering whether these time entries were made contemporaneously and (2) generally

doubting their accuracy.

After carefully reviewing the time records and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds the

number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended on this case is 61.2. Multiplying this

amount of time (61.2 hours) by the reasonable hourly rate ($400 an hour) equals $24,480. The

Court awards this amount in attorneys’ fees.

Defendant shall pay Plaintiff’s counsel $24,585.39 ($105.39 plus $24,480) within twenty-

one days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 17, 2024 /s/ Greg Kays

GREG KAYS, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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