The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
L. H., ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR )
CHILDREN; D. J., ON BEHALF OF )
THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; B. C., ON )
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; )
AND J. F., ON BEHALF OF THEIR ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00801-RK
MINOR CHILDREN; )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
INDEPENDENCE SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for attorney fees. (Doc. 44.) The motion is fully
briefed. (Docs. 45, 51, 52.) For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiffs are parents and next friends of minor children who are students in the Defendant
Independence School District and filed this case on their minor children’s behalf on December 6,
2022. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs challenged Defendant’s policy of removing material in school libraries
upon receipt of a challenge to such material, pending a formal review process. Plaintiffs claimed
the policy violates the minor children’s First Amendment rights and Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights. Plaintiffs asserted the policy’s automatic application, lack of notice to students
before, during, and at the end of the formal review process, and lack of opportunity for appeal are
unconstitutional.
Defendant Independence School District (“District”) has a regulation, Board Regulation
6310, which, among other things, allows a student, parent, or guardian to make a formal complaint
about library materials he or she finds objectionable on a form obtained from the Superintendent’s
office. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 26; Doc. 1-2 at 3.) Board Regulation 6310 provides that the complaint will be
considered by the Superintendent and librarian, and, “[c]ontingent with their decision, the material
will be returned to the shelf for continued use, or removed from library circulation.” (Doc. 1-2 at
3.) Board Regulation 6310 refers to Policy and Regulation 6241 – Controversial Materials. (Id.)
On December 16, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, consisting of two counts brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I, Plaintiffs claimed that the District’s automatic-removal
policy violates the minor students’ rights under the First Amendment by removing all student
access to all challenged materials, including where removals are made without merit and on the
basis of viewpoint and content. (Id. at ¶ 63.) In Count II, Plaintiffs claimed the automatic-removal
policy violates the minor students’ Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights to notice and an
opportunity to be heard as to the deprivation of their First Amendment rights implicated in Count
I. (Id. at ¶¶ 72-73.)
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing, among other things, that
Plaintiffs lacked standing. The Court granted that motion on the grounds that Plaintiffs lacked
standing, finding they failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact.
Discussion
Defendant argues it is entitled to attorney fees because Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless.
Under the “American Rule” system in the United States, each party is generally required
to cover the cost of their own legal expenses regardless of the outcome of the case. See Fox v.
Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 832 (2011). However, Congress has allowed courts to deviate from this rule
and shift fees from one party to the other under certain circumstances. Id. In the context of a claim
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights, Congress allows courts to
award “the prevailing party” “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In the context
of this fee-shifting statute, the Supreme Court has held the term “prevailing party” means, in
essence, “one who has been awarded some relief by the court”:
In designating those parties eligible for an award of litigation costs,
Congress employed the term “prevailing party,” a legal term of art. Black’s Law
Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999) defines “prevailing party” as “[a] party in whose
favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded <In
certain cases, the court will award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.>. – Also
termed successful party.”
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598,
603 (2001). The Supreme Court explained § 1988 has generally applied to court-ordered consent
decrees enforcing settlement agreements and enforceable judgments on the merits on one end of
the spectrum and does not apply, on the other end of the spectrum, to a favorable outcome lacking
a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 605.
While one’s status as a prevailing party does not depend solely on receiving a merits ruling,
see CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419, 431 (2016), some substantive result is
required. In this way, generally, a defendant is not entitled to attorney fees as a prevailing party
under § 1988 where the outcome does not involve “a judicial determination of substantial rights.”
ACORN v. Wallis, 717 F.2d 451, 453 (8th Cir. 1983).
Awarding attorney fees under § 1988(b) is discretionary with the Court. In the Eighth
Circuit “a defendant may recover fees under § 1988 only upon ‘well-supported findings’ that the
lawsuit was ‘frivolous, unfounded, and vexatiously brought and pursued.’” Waters v. City of St.
Peters, No. 4:06CV876SNL, 2007 WL 1880740, at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 29, 2007) (quoting Davis
v. City of Charleston, Mo., 917 F.2d 1502, 1505 (8th Cir. 1990)). Additionally, “[d]efendants can
also recover attorney’s fees when a plaintiff continues to litigate after it becomes clear his claim is
frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.” Hamidi v. City of Kirksville, No. 2:14CV00087 ERW,
2016 WL 6563470, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2016) (citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 423 (1978)).
Here, assuming the Court found Defendant was a “prevailing party,” Defendant does not
demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Not every case
that is ultimately dismissed justifies the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. In this case,
Plaintiffs’ claims were not clearly unreasonable or groundless; rather, they implicated important
Constitutional concerns that have been the subject of many federal cases for decades, the
interpretations of which have shifted over time. The Court finds it would contravene the purposes
of the fee-shifting statute to grant Defendant’s attorney fees here where Plaintiffs brought serious,
thoroughly considered claims that were well-argued, and not without reasonable authority to
support their arguments. The Court finds Defendant is not entitled to attorney fees under
§ 1988(b).
Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to for attorney fees is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: July 31, 2023