C.R.K. v. Springfield R-XII School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHERN DIVISION

C.R.K., an infant, by and through her natural )

Guardian and next friend, A.L.K., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 6:22-cv-06138-MDH

)

SPRINGFIELD R-XII SCHOOL DISTRICT, )

a political subdivision of the State of Missouri )

d/b/a Springfield Public Schools, )

ANDRE ILLIG, in his individual and official )

capacities, and SARAH ODOM, in her )

individual and official capacities, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is defendants Illig and Odom’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III of

Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 14). The motion is ripe for review.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff C.R.K. (“Plaintiff”) was a student at Cherokee Middle School, part of Defendant

Springfield R-XII School District (“SPS”). Defendant Illig was the principal at the middle school

and Odom was the assistant principal. Plaintiff alleges during the 2020-2021 school year she was

subjected to racially discriminatory statements by other students and other actions based on her

race. Plaintiff alleges because of these actions and conduct Plaintiff wanted to be allowed to utilize

virtual learning. Plaintiff claims Defendants denied this request and required Plaintiff to use the

homebound learning program. Plaintiff believes the homebound learning program was inadequate

compared to the instruction other students received in person and through the virtual program.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on September 28, 2021, alleging race

discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act, RSMo. 213.010 et seq.

The Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) composed a Notice of Right to Sue on

April 1, 2022 (“April RTS”) but did not provide it to Plaintiff or her counsel until September 19,

2022. At the request of Plaintiff’s counsel, the MCHR issued a new Notice of Right to Sue on

October 11, 2022 (“October RTS”). Plaintiff filed suit against SPS, Illig, and Odom on December

16, 2022.

Defendants Illig and Odom move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims arguing that the MHRA does

not contemplate individual liability for claims of discrimination in public accommodation or

retaliation, and that even if it does that Plaintiff’s MHRA claims fail because Plaintiff did not

exhaust her administrative remedies with regard to Illig and Odom.

STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face,’ meaning that the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662,678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A pleading that offers

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and

citation omitted).

Under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendant also seeks to dismiss Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failure to appropriately exhaust her administrative remedies. Defendant states,

exhaustion of administrative remedies under the MHRA is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

Citing Green v. City of St. Louis, 870 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Mo. banc 1994); also see Tapp v. St. Louis

University, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (“unlike the exhaustion requirements for

Title VII, the exhaustion requirement for the MHRA is jurisdictional”). In this regard, “[t]he

standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) applies equally to a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction which asserts a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1).” Gist v.

Centene Mgt. Co., LLC, 2021 WL 3487096 (E.D. Mo. 2021).

DISCUSSION

Defendant Illig was the principal at Cherokee Middle School and Odom was the assistant

principal. Defendants first argue that Plaintiff cannot maintain MHRA public accommodation

violation claims against Illig or Odom as they, as individuals, are not places or businesses, or

public facilities owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the State of Missouri or its

agencies or subdivisions.

The MHRA was amended in 2017, with an effective date of August 28, 2017. The MHRA

provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the state of Missouri…shall be entitled to the

full and equal use and enjoyment within this state of any place of public accommodation, as

hereinafter defined, without discrimination or segregation because of race…” RSMo. § 213.065.1.

In this regard, it prohibits discrimination in public accommodations. Specifically, “[i]t is an

unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or

deny any other person…any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges

made available in any place of public accommodation, as defined in section 213.010 and this

section, or to segregate or discriminate…in the use thereof because of race…” RSMo. § 213.065.2.

It is also “an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer, employment agency, labor

organization, or place of public accommodation:…[t]o retaliate…because such person has

opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter…” RSMo. § 213.070.1(2). With reference to these

prohibitions, the MHRA defines “[p]laces of public accommodation” as “all places or businesses

offering or holding out to the general public, goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages or

accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare and safety of the general public or such

public places providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement, including, but not limited

to:…Any public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state or any agency

or subdivision thereof, or any public corporation; and any such facility supported in whole or in

part by public funds…” RSMo. § 213.010(16)(e).

Plaintiff agrees that the 2017 amendments removed a provision stating that “Any person

claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice may make, sign and file with the

commission a verified complaint in writing … which shall state the name and address of the person

alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory practice” and replaced it with

… any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall

make, sign and file with the commission a verified complaint in writing … which

shall state the name and address of the employer, employment agency, labor

organization, or place of public accommodation alleged to have committed the

unlawful discriminatory practice …

Compare RSMo. § 213.075.1 (2016) with RSMo. § 213.075.1 (Supp. 2018) (emphasis provided

in both). Plaintiff argues the 2017 amendments were principally targeted at removing individual

liability in employment discrimination claims. Plaintiff states, for example, the prior version

includes in its definition of an “employer” without any other applicable limitation, “any person

employing six or more persons within the state, and any person directly acting in the interest of an

employer.” The amended version removes the language about a “person directly acting in the

interest of an employer” and adds an exemption from the definition, “An individual employed by

an employer.” Compare RSMo. § 213.010(7) (2016) with RSMo. § 213.010(8)(c) (Supp. 2018).

Plaintiff then states RSMo. § 213.065 (public accommodation claim) was also amended to

change the causation standard from “on the grounds of” to “because of.” The language of §

213.065.2 still states

It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly, to

refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, or to attempt to refuse, withhold

from or deny any other person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,

services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation

…(emphasis provided).

The definition of “person” remained the same. Compare RSMo. § 213.010(14) (2016) with RSMo.

§ 213.010(15) (Supp. 2018).

Defendants rely on R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., in support of

their argument that the MHRA does not count individuals as respondents in public accommodation

discrimination claims. The Missouri Supreme Court in R.M.A. stated:

Section 213.065.2 provides: “It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any

person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person ...

any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made

available in any place of public accommodation ... on the grounds of ... sex.”

[Emphasis added.] The definition of the term “person,” as used in chapter 213, is

set forth in section 213.010(14), which provides a person “includes one or more

individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, organizations, labor

organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint stock companies,

trusts, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, fiduciaries, or other organized

groups of persons.” (emphasis in original).

R.M.A. by Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 429 (Mo. 2019) (finding

the state and its subdivision – including the school district and school board were persons under

the statute). The Court further found Defendants’ argument that section 213.010(14) does not

specifically list “school district,” “school board,” or, more generally, a “subdivision” of the state,

and therefore that neither of them is a “person” as defined in section 213.010(14) and used in

section 213.065.10 was unpersuasive. Id. “This argument fails because the definition of “person”

in section 213.010(14) expressly states that it “includes” the individuals and entities listed therein,

not that it is limited to them.” Id.

Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination against the two administrators

pleads a cause of action to survive a motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth herein,

Defendants’ motion is denied.

In addition, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her claims against them. A

review of Plaintiff’s Complaint of Discrimination reflects on the first page (Doc. 1-2) that Plaintiff

included “Springfield R-XII a.k.a Springfield Public Schools” in the box that states “indicate who

you wish to file your complaint against.” There is one line where the form has a place for “name.”

The form has an additional box that states: “The particulars are (if additional space is needed attach

extra sheet(s)).” Plaintiff typed “See Attached” in this box. Plaintiff’s attachment then states

Plaintiff… “brings this Charge of Discrimination … against Respondents Springfield R-XII a/k/a

Springfield Public Schools, Andre Illig, and Sarah Odom.” (Doc. 1-2). The form further states

Respondents Illig and Odom are agents and employees of Springfield R-XII and refers to the

Respondents Illig and Odom multiple times through the description of the claim.

Defendants argue because Plaintiff did not state Illig or Odom under the “Business/Entity

Name” portion on the first page of her “Intake Questionnaire” she has failed to exhaust her claim.

Defendants argue this “is confirmed” by the fact that on April 1, 2022, the MCHR issued to

Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue solely against Defendant District. However, Plaintiff’s

attachment to her form clearly indicates that allegations were made against, and included,

“respondents” Illig and Odom.1 The Court finds Plaintiff exhausted the claims against Illig and

Odom by including them in her Charge of Discrimination.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 13, 2023

/s/ Douglas Harpool ____

DOUGLAS HARPOOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that it takes a liberal approach to the fulfillment of

procedural requirements under the MHRA. See Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 670 (Mo.

banc 2009) (where the Court noted the importance of “…the availability of complete redress of

legitimate grievances without undue encumbrance by procedural requirements especially when

demanding full and technical compliance would have no relation to the purposes for requiring

those procedures in the first instance.”). Further, “exhaustion requires a claimant to give notice of

all claims of discrimination in the administrative complaint, but administrative complaints are

interpreted liberally in an effort to further the remedial purposes of legislation that prohibits

unlawful employment practices.” Alhalabi v. Missouri Dep't of Nat. Res., 300 S.W.3d 518, 525

(Mo. Ct. App. 2009).