holding estate of individual could be held liable for a note “whether she was the sole owner doing business under a fictitious name, or was a member of a partnership doing business as Maplewood Auto Mart”
How later courts described this case
- holding estate of individual could be held liable for a note “whether she was the sole owner doing business under a fictitious name, or was a member of a partnership doing business as Maplewood Auto Mart”
- “A sole proprietorship cannot be an unincorporated association”
- recognizing that sole proprietors (or individuals) “are not separate and distinct from the business they own”
- recognizing the rule that “[c]ontracts entered into under unregistered fictitious names are enforceable against the individual doing business as the fictitious name”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
PIPELINE PRODUCTIONS, INC., )
MICHAEL EDMONDSON, BRETT )
MOSIMAN, PLT, LLC, MIDWEST )
PRODUCTION SERVICES, LLC, )
) Case No. 4:20-cv-00130-RK
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
S&A PIZZA, INC., JEFFREY "STRETCH" )
RUMANER, CROSSROADS LIVE, LLC, )
MAMMOTH, INC., JEFF FORTIER, JOSH )
HUNT, JACKI BECKER, UP TO )
ELEVEN PRODUCTIONS, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Up to Eleven Productions’ motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. 246.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 246-1, 247, 272, 278.) After careful consideration
and for the reasons explained below, the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I. Background
Defendant Up to Eleven Productions is not a separate legal business entity. Rather, Up to
Eleven Productions is a fictitious name under which Defendant Jacki Becker transacts business; in
other words, the relationship is as follows: Jacki Becker d/b/a (i.e., “doing business as”) Up to
Eleven Productions. (Doc. 272 at 2.)1 Plaintiffs assert nine claims against Defendant Up to Eleven
Productions (alongside Defendant Becker and others), including: tortious interference with
contract and with business expectancies (Counts VI & VII), defamation (Count VIII), civil
conspiracy (Count IX), violation of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act (Count X), false
association and false advertising under the Lanham Act (Counts XI & XII), unfair competition
(Count XIII), and violation of the Missouri Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Count XIV). Up to Eleven
1 These facts are undisputed. Indeed, Plaintiffs expressly concede that they “do not have evidence
to refute [Defendant Up to Eleven Productions’] contention that it is not a legal entity that is registered to
do business in [Missouri] or any other state.” (Doc. 272 at 1.)
Productions argues it is entitled to summary judgment because it is not a legal entity capable of
being sued.
II. Discussion
“Summary judgment is required if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Generally, federal courts look to state law to determine a party’s capacity
to sue or to be sued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). For individuals, the relevant state law is the law
of their domicile; for corporations, the relevant state law is the law under which it was organized;
and for “all other parties,” the relevant state law is
the law of the state where the court is located, except that . . . a partnership or other
unincorporated association with no such capacity under that state’s law may sue or
be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United
States Constitution or laws[.]
Rule 17(b)(1)-(3).
There is no dispute that Defendant Up to Eleven Productions is not a separate legal entity
under state law. See also Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Serv., 551 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Mo. banc 1977)
(recognizing that sole proprietors (or individuals) “are not separate and distinct from the business
they own”); Steemler v. Goffstein, 397 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing the rule
that “[c]ontracts entered into under unregistered fictitious names are enforceable against the
individual doing business as the fictitious name”) (citation omitted); Deichmann v. Aronoff, 296
S.W.2d 171, 178-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (holding estate of individual could be held liable for a
note “whether she was the sole owner doing business under a fictitious name, or was a member of
a partnership doing business as Maplewood Auto Mart”). Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that
Defendant Up to Eleven Productions is not a separate legal entity.
At most, Plaintiffs argue that even if Defendant Up to Eleven Productions is not a separate
legal entity capable of being sued generally, Rule 17(b)(3) provides an exception that allows
Plaintiffs to sue Up to Eleven Productions under the Lanham Act. As set out above, Rule 17(b)(3)
provides, in relevant part, that an “unincorporated association with no such capacity [to sue or be
sued] under that state’s law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right
existing under the United States Constitution or laws[.]” The question, then, is whether Defendant
Up to Eleven Productions is an “unincorporated association” as referenced in Rule 17(b)(3). The
Court finds it is not.
Rule 17(b)(3) does not define the phrase “unincorporated association.” As generally
understood by federal courts, however, “an ‘unincorporated association’ is a voluntary group of
persons, without a charter, formed by mutual consent for the purpose of promoting a common
objective.” S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 927 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation
marks omitted); Goldenberg v. Indel, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 618, 628 (D.N.J. 2010) (same); see
also Hunter Innovations Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 605 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173 (D.D.C.
2009) (“A sole proprietorship cannot be an unincorporated association”); In re T.W. Koeger
Trucking Co., 105 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989) (recognizing “[t]he word ‘association
denotes a ‘body of persons united without a charter,’” and that because “an association is a group
of individuals joined together for a common purpose,” a sole proprietorship could not be classified
as an “unincorporated association” under the Bankruptcy Code) (quoting Hecht v. Malley, 265
U.S. 144, 157 (1924)). As the Eighth Circuit has recognized, “[a] labor union, for example, is an
unincorporated association that can be sued under federal law.” Brown v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Drug
Task Force, 255 F.3d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1921)). In Brown, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the phrase
“‘[u]nincorporated association’ is a term of art – every group that is not a corporation or partnership
is not automatically an unincorporated association.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs have provided no legal authority to support their conclusory argument that
Defendant Up to Eleven Productions is an “unincorporated association” as that phrase is used in
Rule 17(b). Whatever the precise meaning of the phrase, Defendant Up to Eleven Productions –
which Plaintiffs concede is not even a separate legal entity itself but is instead a d/b/a or “doing
business as” of Defendant Becker – does not fall within the meaning of unincorporated
associations as understood by federal courts. Because Defendant Up to Eleven Productions is not
a separate entity capable of being sued and is not otherwise an “unincorporated association” under
Rule 17(b)(3), the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 246) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: October 28, 2022