The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
BRADLEY FARMER, INDIVIDUALLY, )
AS SURVIVING SPOUSE OF TERRY J. )
FARMER, DECEASED, AND IN HIS )
CAPACITY AS PERSONAL )
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ) Case No. 4:20-00801-CV-RK
TERRY J. FARMER, DECEASED; )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, BOARD OF )
POLICE COMMISSIONERS, SECURUS )
TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, A DELAWARE )
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Securus Technologies, LLC’s (“Securus”) motion for
summary judgment. (Doc. 108.) The motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 109, 115, 119, 120.) For
the reasons below, Securus’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 108) is GRANTED.
I. Facts1
A. Background
The claims in Plaintiff Bradley Farmer’s Amended Complaint all arise from the suicide of
his husband, Terry Farmer, on December 28, 2019. (Doc. 109 at ¶¶ 1-2.) At the time, Terry
Farmer was detained at the Shoal Creek Patrol Division (“Shoal Creek”) in Kansas City, Missouri,
in Detention Cell 2, where he used a telephone cord as a ligature to hang himself. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff Bradley Farmer (hereafter “Plaintiff”) is both the surviving spouse of Terry
Farmer and the Personal Representative of his estate. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Defendant Kansas City,
Missouri, Board of Police Commissioners (“KCPD”) manages and controls the police department
of Kansas City, Missouri, its employees, and its facilities, including Shoal Creek. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
1 Except where otherwise noted these facts are taken from the parties’ statements of uncontroverted
material facts. The Court has omitted some properly controverted facts, assertions that are immaterial to
the resolution of the pending motion, assertions that are not properly supported by admissible evidence,
legal conclusions, and argument presented as an assertion of fact.
Defendants Joseph M. Weidler, James C. Dennis, Dalton W. Clemons, and Shawn E. Davis were
police employees of Defendant KCPD. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Defendant Securus is a telecommunications
company that installs and services telecommunication systems and software in correctional
agencies. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Securus and KCPD were parties to a contract under which Securus provided
KCPD with a telecommunications system and related software, including the installation of
telephones, for communication between detainees and their families, attorneys, and others. (Id. at
¶ 7.) Following installation of the telephones at Shoal Creek in 2012, Securus was available to
provide telecommunications and maintenance services. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Any maintenance services
involving an adjustment to the length of the telephone cord would require prior authorization or
approval from KCPD. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Shoal Creek had four detention cells, three of which contained telephones for detainees to
use, while the fourth cell—referred to as an “isolation cell”—did not contain a telephone. (Id. at
¶ 12.) The isolation cell is generally reserved for detainees who are belligerent or who have been
identified as a suicide risk. (Id. at ¶ 13.) The cell in which KCPD placed Terry Farmer on the
night in question was Detention Cell 2, which contained a telephone. (Id. at ¶ 14.)
At KCPD’s request, Securus serviced the telephone cord in Detention Cell 2 at Shoal Creek
on November 14, 2017, by replacing a 12” cord with an 18” cord. (Id. at ¶ 22, Doc. 115-9 at ¶ 22,
Doc. 109-9 at 15, 17.) Aside from that instance, Securus shortened telephone cords at Shoal Creek
two other times, and each time the Securus technician was accompanied by a KCPD representative.
(Doc. 109 at ¶¶ 22-23.) November 14, 2017, is the closest date prior to Terry Farmer’s suicide
that it is known Securus was at Shoal Creek at KCPD’s request to service the telephone cord in
Detention Cell 2. (Id. at ¶ 24.)
Before Terry Farmer’s suicide, KCPD was aware of at least five instances of detainees
attempting to commit suicide at Shoal Creek since July 21, 2015, of which, at least four instances
involved detainees attempting to hang themselves using the telephone cord in their detention cell
while detained at Shoal Creek. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.) In late July 2015, after one such attempt, KCPD
arranged for Securus to come to Shoal Creek and shorten the telephone cords. (Id. at ¶ 27.) After
another such attempt, on January 31, 2017, KCPD contacted Securus, and in response Securus
stated the telephone cords were already too short to shorten, offering as an alternative to install
“hands free phones” at Shoal Creek. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-9.) The phones were not then replaced. (Id. at
¶ 30.)
B. Terry Farmer’s Suicide
On December 27, 2019, Terry Farmer was involved in a motor vehicle crash, and upon the
arrival of KCPD Officers Gormont and Graham, Terry Farmer appeared to them to be visibly
intoxicated. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-33.) Following Terry Farmer’s refusal to undergo a Standardized Field
Sobriety Test, Officer Graham placed him under arrest for driving under the influence (“DUI”).
(Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff told Officer Gormont he was worried that Terry Farmer was going to hurt
himself and asked Officer Gormont to “keep an eye on him.” (Id. at ¶ 35.) Terry Farmer was then
transported to Shoal Creek for processing. (Id. at ¶ 36.)
At Shoal Creek, DUI Officer Shawn Davis administered a DUI Screening, during which
Terry Farmer submitted to a chemical sample of his breath, which revealed a blood alcohol
concentration of .275. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.) Davis reported that during the screening, Terry Farmer
disclosed that he was taking Xanax and had ingested two milligrams of Xanax on the morning of
his arrest, and he informed Davis that he had mental conditions including bipolar, anxiety, and
mood disorders. (Id. at ¶¶ 39-41.) After Davis finished meeting with Terry Farmer, he released
Terry Farmer to detention personnel and advised Officer Graham to order an ambulance for Terry
Farmer’s transportation to a hospital for medical evaluation due to his high blood alcohol
concentration. (Id. at ¶ 50.) Davis did not request a screening or treatment for Terry Farmer’s
psychological conditions or order any form of suicide watch. (Id. at ¶ 51.)
During his booking at Shoal Creek, Terry Farmer underwent a risk assessment separate
from his DUI screening, which included a suicide screening that indicated Terry Farmer reported
having “mental health problems.” (Id. at ¶¶ 55, 57.) The suicide screening further indicated Terry
Farmer reported being bipolar and having consumed alcohol within 24 hours of undergoing the
screening, but it did not include Plaintiff’s warning to Officer Gormont concerning Terry Farmer’s
risk of self-harm. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-60.)
Terry Farmer was taken to North Kansas City Hospital (“NKCH”) where it was confirmed
that he was intoxicated with alcohol. (Id. at ¶ 52.) Following medical evaluation, NKCH staff
released Terry Farmer to return to Shoal Creek at approximately 12:30 a.m. on December 28, 2019.
(Id. at ¶ 53.) NKCH provided discharge information including a written description of symptoms
associated with moderate alcohol intoxication: “Erratic behavior . . . depression . . . Impaired
judgment.” (Id. at ¶ 54.)
Upon returning to Shoal Creek from NKCH, Desk Sergeant Joseph Weidler, the direct
supervisor of the detention facility officers (“DFOs”), was on duty. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-62.) The DFOs
on duty at the time were Defendants James Dennis and Dalton Clemons. (Id. at ¶ 64.) Dennis
knew Terry Farmer, and based on his prior relationship with Terry Farmer, Dennis did not believe
that Terry Farmer was suicidal. (Id. at ¶ 72.) Thus, Dennis did not place Terry Farmer in the
isolation cell. (Id. at ¶ 72.) Dennis consulted with Clemons, and they decided not to place Terry
Farmer in the isolation cell. (Id. at ¶ 74.) Dennis stated in his deposition that if he had processed
another detainee who presented the same conditions as Terry Farmer, but without having a prior
relationship, then Dennis would have placed that detainee in the isolation cell. (Id. at ¶ 73.)
DFOs are able to monitor detainees from the booking desk, which faces the detention cells,
providing a direct line of sight into the see-through glass doors of Detention Cells 1, 2, and 3. (Id.
at ¶ 77.) DFOs can also view camera feeds to all of the detention cells on a monitor on the booking
desk. (Id. at ¶ 78.) From the desk sergeant’s office, behind the booking desk, there is not a direct
line of sight to the detention cells, but the desk is equipped with a monitor that provides a feed to
the detention cells, in addition to additional camera feeds not provided on the DFO’s monitor. (Id.
at ¶¶ 79-82.)
While detained in Detention Cell 2, and in view of a video surveillance camera, Terry
Farmer placed his neck into the telephone cord, secured the ligature by hanging the receiver on the
telephone’s cradle, and lowered himself until his full weight was hanging on the ligature. (Id. at
¶ 83.) Terry Farmer hanged from the telephone cord for approximately 12 minutes before anyone
from Shoal Creek responded. (Id. at ¶ 84.) Clemons testified in a deposition that, during that time,
he was initially at the booking desk, then went to the Weidler’s desk. (Id. at ¶ 85.) He further
testified he only glanced at the monitors a couple times and thought that Terry Farmer was using
the phone, not hanging himself. (Id. at ¶ 85.) Dennis testified in a deposition that he was also
away from the booking desk, that he was at Weidler’s desk with Clemons, and that he also thought
that Terry Farmer was using the phone on the monitor and not hanging himself. (Id. at ¶ 86.)
After Terry Farmer had been hanging for approximately 12 minutes, Clemons entered
Terry Farmer’s cell, unhooked the phone, began administering CPR, and then called for an
ambulance. (Id. at ¶ 87.) When Terry Farmer remained unresponsive, Weidler attempted,
unsuccessfully, to apply an electrical shock to Terry Farmer’s body using an automated external
defibrillator. (Id. at ¶¶ 88-89.) Kansas City Fire Department Firefighters then arrived at Shoal
Creek and transported Terry Farmer to Liberty Hospital in Liberty, Missouri, where he later died
on December 31, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 90.)
C. After Terry Farmer’s Suicide
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on March 2, 2021, alleging a Missouri statutory
wrongful death claim against the KCPD Board only (Count I); a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against the KCPD Board and the individual KCPD defendants (Count II); a claim for strict
products liability against Securus (Count III); and a claim for negligent products liability against
Securus (Count IV). (Doc. 26 at ¶¶ 42-85.)
Additional relevant facts will be set forth as pertinent to the analysis of Securus’ motion
for summary judgment.
II. Legal Standard
The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Rule 56(a). The Court views the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
giv[es] the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 893 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “If the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment should be granted.” Smith-Bunge v. Wis. Central, Ltd., 946 F.3d 420, 424 (8th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
At the summary judgment stage, the movant must “support” its motion either by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record” or by “‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district
court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986);Rule 56(c)(1).
In resisting summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in its
pleadings, but must, by affidavit and other evidence, set forth specific facts showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Rule 56(c); see also Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir.
2007) (mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond a nonmoving party’s
own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment). An “adverse
party may not rely merely on allegations or denials, but must set out specific facts – by affidavits
or other evidence – showing [a] genuine issue for trial.” Tweeton v. Frandrup, 287 F. App’x 541,
541 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Rule 56(e)). In so doing, the nonmoving party “cannot create sham
issues of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM
Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). To controvert a factual position, the
nonmoving party must “refer specifically to those portions of the record upon which [he] relies.”
Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 461 F.3d 982, 990 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
Defendant Securus contends it is entitled to summary judgment on all claims against it,
which include Plaintiff’s Counts III (products strict liability) and IV (products negligence liability).
(Doc. 108.)
As to both products liability claims, strict liability (Count III) and negligence (Count IV),
Securus asserts Plaintiff cannot establish proximate causation because the intervening act of Terry
Farmer’s suicide constituted a superseding cause under three theories. (Doc. 109 at 20.) First,
Securus argues the suicide was not a reasonable and probable consequence of Securus’ alleged
misconduct. (Id. at 22.) Second, Securus contends its alleged wrongdoing is, at most, a prior and
remote cause. (Id. at 25.) And finally, Securus asserts KCPD and the detention officers’
subsequent conduct constitutes a superseding cause, due to their knowledge of the phone cord.
(Id. at 28.)
For purposes of determining proximate causation, foreseeability is relevant and “refers to
whether a defendant could have anticipated a particular chain of events that resulted in injury or
the scope of the risk that the defendant should have foreseen.” Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co-
op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Mo. 2000). Foreseeability in the context of determining proximate
causation “relies upon hindsight to determine whether the precise manner of a particular injury
was a natural and probable consequence of a negligent act.” Id. Under Missouri law, generally,
“[w]here the injury is death caused by a voluntary suicide, the suicide is considered a new and
independent intervening act which breaks the causal connection between the allegedly negligent
act and the death.” Eidson v. Reprod. Health Srvs., 863 S.W.2d 621, 627 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993);
Neurological Med., Inc. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 921 S.W.2d 64, 66–67 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996);
Beer v. Upjohn Co., 943 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997).
For causation to be submissible to a jury, “a plaintiff must offer evidence that the court
determines would establish that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
decedent’s death.” Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Mo. banc
2011) (citing Alcorn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 50 S.W.3d 226, 239 (Mo. banc 2001); Eidson, 863
S.W.2d at 627). “Proximate cause—which is a question for the court—is established by evidence
that the injury or death suffered was ‘the natural and probable consequence of defendant’s
conduct.’” Id. (quoting Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 865 (Mo. banc
1993)).
In the context of a voluntary suicide, this showing can be made “by presenting evidence
that the decedent’s suicide was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the injury he suffered at
the hands of the defendant . . . which may require expert witness testimony if no direct evidence
is available[.]” Id. If Plaintiff has no such evidence, “the suicide would be an intervening cause
and the claim could not be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 309-10. “If, however, the plaintiff presents
evidence that the suicide resulted from the injury, the claim then can be submitted to the jury to
decide as a question of fact whether the suicide is a direct result of the defendant’s negligence.”
Id. at 310. Kivland has been summarized as follows:
In Kivland, the decedent was paralyzed from the waist down after undergoing spinal
surgery. He suffered intense pain in the paralyzed region and efforts to alleviate
the pain failed. Eight months after he filed a medical malpractice action against the
surgeon, the decedent committed suicide. His family amended his suit to include a
wrongful death claim for the suicide. The Kivland plaintiffs relied on the testimony
of a medical expert that the decedent’s suicide resulted from the pain caused by the
surgery. The decedent’s surgeon moved for partial summary judgment on the
action’s claims for wrongful death and lost chance of survival, asserting that the
decedent’s suicide was an independent intervening act, and that, as a matter of law,
the surgeon could not be responsible for the decedent’s death. As to the wrongful
death claim, the Court rejected the surgeon’s request to make a general exception
to the causation standard when the death is by suicide, and instead held that
plaintiffs can show that a defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
decedent’s suicide by presenting evidence that the suicide was the “natural and
probable consequence” of the injury the decedent suffered at the hands of the
defendant. The Court held that the Kivland plaintiffs had met this burden.
Haynes v. Williams, No. 1:21-CV-160-ACL, 2022 WL 2064613, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 8, 2022)
(citing and quoting Kivland throughout).
In contrast to the direct connection shown in Kivland, “[i]f the facts involve[] an extended
scenario involving multiple persons and events with potential intervening causes, then the
requirement that the damages that result be the natural and probable consequence of defendant’s
conduct comes into play and may cut off liability.” Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 865. And, “‘[i]f a
prior and remote cause does nothing more than give rise to an occasion by which an injury is made
possible, and there intervenes between that cause and the injury a distinct and unrelated cause of
injury, a negligence action does not lie, even though the ‘but-for’ test is satisfied.’” Silva v. Constr.
& Abatement Servs., Inc., 238 S.W.3d 679, 682 (Mo. App. 2007) (quoting Tompkins v. Cervantes,
917 S.W.2d 186, 191 (Mo. App. 1996)).
Here, it cannot be said that Terry Farmer’s suicide was the natural and probable
consequence of Securus replacing a worn or frayed 12-inch cord with an 18-inch phone cord in
Detention Cell 2 at Shoal Creek. To the contrary, this case involves an “extended scenario
involving multiple persons and events with potential intervening causes[.]” Callahan, 863 S.W.2d
at 865. Securus’ replacement of the cord “[did] nothing more than give rise to an occasion by
which an injury [was] made possible, and there intervene[d] between that cause and the injury a
distinct and unrelated cause of injury.” Silva, 238 S.W.3d at 682. Multiple potential intervening
causes followed the replacement of the cord, including actions and omissions by the KCPD
defendants at Shoal Creek and Terry Farmer’s own conduct in using the telephone to hang himself.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot show Securus is liable for products liability negligence as a matter
of law.
As to Plaintiff’s strict liability claim, Missouri law requires a plaintiff to show defendant
transferred a product in the course of his business; the product was used in a manner reasonably
anticipated; and either “[t]he product was then in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such
defective condition as existed when the product was sold;” or “[t]he product was then unreasonably
dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics, and
the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of the product being sold without an adequate warning.”
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.760. “The Missouri Supreme Court first adopted strict tort liability in Keener
v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).” Smith v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Richcreek v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 908 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). “Keener involved a defect in a product’s
manufacturing process and the court adopted the strict liability rule set forth in section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Id. “Strict liability was extended to design defects in Blevins
v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. banc 1977). Id.
There is a manufacturing defect when the product is not in its intended condition due to
something going wrong in the manufacturing process, and under those circumstances, the product
is compared to the standards of the manufacturer and to like products. Id. at 791-92. There is a
design defect when the product, although in the condition intended by the manufacturer, is
unreasonably dangerous by the nature of its design when put to normal use. Id. at 792.
Here, no party argues the phone cord was defective, and the Court finds Terry Farmer was
not without knowledge of the cord’s characteristics when he put it to use as a ligature. The subject
phone cord was in its intended condition and, when put to normal use, was not unreasonably
dangerous by nature of its design. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot show Securus is liable for strict
products liability as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, Securus’ motion for summary judgment (Docs. 108) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: September 2, 2022