The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
BETTY BAYS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 6:22-cv-03082-MDH
)
MISSOURI EAGLE, LLC., )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 18). The motion is fully briefed
and ripe for review. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s lawsuit brings claims alleging discrimination in employment based on her sex
and retaliation for complaining about alleged discrimination in violation of Title VII and the
Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). Plaintiff states she was Defendant’s employee for over
27 years and had the experience, knowledge, and qualifications to be considered for the position
of general manager. Plaintiff also contends that she had knowledge of, voiced opposition to, and
participated in an investigation of sexual harassment by Mr. Brown against another female
employee of Defendant. Plaintiff also voiced opposition to differential treatment of female
employees by the Defendant. Plaintiff claims she was more qualified than a male employee who
was given the general manager position and that she was denied that opportunity based on her
protected activity. Plaintiff states she was also denied the promotion and opportunity based on her
gender and her participation in the sexual harassment investigation.
Count I is a claim pursuant to Title VII for discrimination and retaliation. Count II is a
claim under the MHRA for discrimination and retaliation. Defendant moves for partial dismissal
of Count I and complete dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Specifically, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations under Title VII, other than the
alleged failure to promote, should be dismissed because those alleged acts do not rise to the level
of adverse employment actions. Defendant seeks complete dismissal of Count II arguing Plaintiff
does not identify any specific acts that would constitute discrimination or retaliation and that any
claims under the MHRA with respect to events that occurred prior to January 28, 2021 are time
barred.
STANDARD
A motion to dismiss is the proper method to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Peck
v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981). Federal Rule 12(b)(6) states that a party may move for
dismissal of all or part of the claims against it if the allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. The Court “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410
F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations
must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and the motion to dismiss
must be granted if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
DISCUSSION
First, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of sex discrimination and retaliation
under Title VII. To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Plaintiff must prove she:
(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was meeting her employer's legitimate job expectations;
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated differently than similarly situated
employees who were not members of her protected class. Norman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606
F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2010). Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot meet the third element, adverse
employment action, which is defined as a tangible change in working conditions that produces a
material employment disadvantage. Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d
800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013). Defendant states minor changes in working conditions with no reduction
in pay or benefits do not constitute adverse employment actions. Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d
705, 713 (8th Cir. 2002).
To state a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must establish the following: (1) she
engaged in protected activity; (2) Defendant took an adverse employment action against her; and
(3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Gilbert
v. Des Moines Area Cmty. Coll., 495 F.3d 906, 917 (8th Cir. 2007).
Defendant cites to numerous cases in support of its motion to dismiss, including cases from
the 7th, 10th, and 11th circuits, in which a court granted summary judgment to defendants in
employment cases. However, the motion pending before this Court is a motion to dismiss, not a
motion for summary judgment, and the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true in determining
whether Plaintiff has alleged enough to proceed on her claims. The Court finds she has. Whether
Plaintiff may ultimately prevail on her claims, including whether she suffered an adverse
employment action, will be determined after evidence has been presented. As a result, the Court
DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss and finds Plaintiff has pled enough to proceed on her
claim.
Defendant also moves to dismiss Count II on the same basis. As a result, the Court
DENIES the motion to dismiss for the same reasons stated above, including that whether Plaintiff
can ultimately provide evidence of an adverse employment action is not the issue before the Court.
Rather, Plaintiff has pled enough to state a claim to survive a motion to dismiss.
In addition, Defendant moves to dismiss any claims in Count II arising out of acts prior to
January 28, 2021 stating they are outside the jurisdiction of the MHRA based upon the date of the
Charge of Discrimination. In Plaintiff’s response she “agrees that all acts prior to January 28, 2021
are outside the jurisdiction of the MHRA.”1 However, Plaintiff states that all acts after January
28, 2021 are actionable. Further, the parties disagree regarding what evidence can be used to
support a claim of discrimination, and/or retaliation, including consideration of conduct that may
represent an ongoing employment practice. As a result, the Court finds Plaintiff’s specific claims
that are time barred can be further resolved after consideration of the evidence and the
determination of what evidence, if any, may be considered as ongoing employment practices
having a cumulative effect or whether such evidence is simply a discrete and separate act that does
not represent discrimination or retaliation. As a result, the Court DENIES making a specific
finding regarding Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, but acknowledges the parties agree certain
claims are time barred based on the date of the Charge of Discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons set forth herein the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 15, 2022
/s/ Douglas Harpool ____
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
1 The promotion to general manager position occurred in October 2020.