Cierpiot v. Faurecia Interior Systems Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

LUCAS CIERPIOT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:22-cv-00090-RK

)

FAURECIA INTERIOR SYSTEMS INC., )

SPENCER WHITE, RENITA HIGGINS, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This civil lawsuit was removed from state court to federal court on February 11, 2021.

(Doc. 1.) Plaintiff Lucas Cierpiot asserts a claim of discrimination under the Missouri Human

Rights Act (“MHRA”) against Defendant Faurecia Interior Systems, Inc. (“FIS”) and a separate

tort claim for conversion against Defendants Spencer White and Renita Higgins. In their notice of

removal, Defendants argue this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 since

Defendants White and Higgins, who the parties appear to agree are otherwise non-diverse

defendants, were fraudulently joined. Specifically, Defendants assert Plaintiff’s tort claim against

Defendants White and Higgins is preempted by the MHRA. On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a

motion to remand, arguing this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the conversion

claim is not preempted by the MHRA and therefore Defendants White and Higgins were not

fraudulently joined. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiff’s motion to remand is fully briefed. (Docs. 13, 15, 19.)

As explained below, the Court does not find Defendants sufficiently meet the high bar to

establish Defendants White and Higgins were fraudulently joined and, as a result, complete

diversity did not exist at the time of removal. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 12) is GRANTED, and the case is remanded to

state court.

I. Background

From February 2019 through June 2020, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant FIS and

worked at Defendant FIS’s plant in Blue Springs, Missouri. (Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges

after he returned from approved medical leave and additional medical leave during which he called

the “absentee reporting line every single day,” he was told he had several “no-call/no-show” days

and was then escorted off the premises by Haley Brown. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 19, 20, 21.) After being

escorted off the premises, Plaintiff alleges Defendants White or Higgins (or both) “directed the

discarding and/or . . . discarded the entire contents of plaintiff’s employee locker No. 102.” (Id.

at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff alleges they “thr[ew] his belongings into the trash” including “original medical

records and documentation relating to the condition at issue in this case, valuable dishes as part of

a Set of Dishware, [and] a recently purchased Carhartt sweatshirt in excess of eighty five dollars.”

(Id. at ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant FIS discriminated against him based on his medical condition

and surgery by failing to provide a requested accommodation and retaliated against him when he

spoke with the Senior Corporate Director of Safety, Spencer White, about his vision condition and

the impact of lasers he was tasked to work with despite his vision condition. Plaintiff specifically

alleges Defendant White gave Plaintiff “a printout from the internet for a benign laser that was

completely different than the lasers in use at the work station plaintiff was assigned to” and refused

to read medical documentation from Plaintiff’s eye surgeon explaining Plaintiff’s vulnerability to

lasers. (Id. ¶¶ 45-47, 50, 51.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts on May 18, 2020, after clocking out

and ending his work day he was “summoned to Senior HR Executive Director Renita Higgins’s .

. . office” where “HR . . . alleged that plaintiff had accumulated four (4) attendance points” but

was not given supporting documentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34.) Plaintiff alleges the meeting and

“notice of four points” were retaliatory and violated Defendant FIS’s own policies. (Id. at ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff also alleges on June 16, 2020, he was “falsely blamed” in an act of retaliation for a mistake

made by a co-worker and was “falsely and retroactively written-up in an act of retaliation by

supervisor Floyd Joy.” (Id. at ¶ 39.)

Finally, on June 28, 2020, “Justin Bond in human resources” informed Plaintiff he was

“terminated for points.” (Id. at ¶ 40.) Plaintiff alleges he never received a certified letter from

Defendant FIS regarding his termination despite being told he would and, in addition, was not paid

for an authorized sick day for June 25, 2020, in retaliation. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41, 42.)

II. Legal Standard

Defendants, who collectively invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, bear the burden of proving

that all prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied. Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 596

(8th Cir. 2002). “A defendant may remove a state law claim to federal court only if the action

originally could have been filed there.” In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 619 (8th

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires an amount in controversy greater

than $75,000 and complete diversity of citizenship among the litigants. “Complete diversity of

citizenship exists where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds

citizenship.” Prempro, 591 F.3d at 620 (citation omitted). Fraudulent joinder – the filing of a

“frivolous or illegitimate claim against a non-diverse defendant solely to prevent removal” – acts

as an exception to the complete diversity rule. Id. Stated differently, “a plaintiff cannot defeat a

defendant’s ‘right of removal’ by fraudulently joining a defendant who has ‘no real connection

with the controversy.’” Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted).

Whether a non-diverse party has been fraudulently joined such that the federal court may

nonetheless obtain subject matter jurisdiction depends on “whether there is arguably a reasonable

basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved.”

Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). The Eighth Circuit has explained that the “reasonableness of the basis underlying the

state claim” is critical to this inquiry. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir.

2003). In Filla, the Eighth Circuit explained the critical difference between circumstances in

which courts should find a non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined and those in which they

should not: “Where applicable state precedent precludes the existence of a cause of action against

a defendant, joinder is fraudulent” but “if there is a ‘colorable’ cause of action – that is, if the state

law might impose liability on the resident defendant under the facts alleged [or, in other words, if

there exists a reasonable basis in fact and law supporting the claim] – then there is no fraudulent

joinder.” Id. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Hayes v. Rad Transport, Inc., No. 10-0787-

CV-W-ODS, 2010 WL 3807052, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 23, 2010) (noting, “[t]he Court’s task is

to determine whether the claim clearly lacks any basis – that is, if it is barred as a matter of law or

if it is based on facts that clearly provide no basis for liability”).

“By requiring the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s claim against the non-diverse

defendant has no reasonable basis in law and fact, [courts] require the defendant to do more than

merely prove that the plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”

Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980. In the fraudulent-joinder analysis, the Court does not focus on the

artfulness of the plaintiff’s pleadings. Id. at 980 (citation omitted). That is because the reasonable

basis standard articulated in Filla is distinct from and less demanding than the Rule 12(b)(6)

plausibility standard. Id.; see also Hayes, 2010 WL 3807052 at *2 (“Where the sufficiency of the

complaint against the non-diverse defendant is questionable, ‘the better practice is for the federal

court not to decide the doubtful question . . . but simply to remand the case and leave the question

for the state courts to decide.’”) (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 810). Any doubts about the propriety

of removal or federal jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. Block v. Toyota Motor

Corp., 665 F.3d 944, 948 (8th Cir. 2011).

III. Discussion

At issue here is Plaintiff’s tort claim for conversion asserted against non-diverse

defendants, White and Higgins. If Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and

Higgins is colorable, the complete-diversity requirement for purposes of federal subject matter

jurisdiction was not satisfied at the time of removal and the case must be remanded to state court.

On the other hand, if – as Defendants argue – Plaintiff’s conversion claim is preempted by the

MHRA, the fraudulent-joinder exception to complete diversity would apply and this Court would

otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding incomplete diversity of parties.

The MHRA makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of an employee’s

disability. § 213.070.1(3); see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1) (setting forth particular “unlawful

employment practice[s]”). In addition, § 213.070.2 states: “This chapter . . . shall provide the

exclusive remedy for any and all claims for injury or damages arising out of an employment

relationship.” In both their notice of removal and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand,

Defendants argue under Missouri law the MHRA provides the “exclusive remedy” for Plaintiff’s

conversion claim against Defendants White and Higgins, pointing to § 213.070.2, RSMo.1 Thus,

1 To the extent the parties address the MHRA’s preemption of common law claims generally, the

Court finds such analysis misplaced here since the specific claim at issue is Plaintiff’s tort claim against a

co-employee rather than the employer itself. See T.F. v. BB St. Louis, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-1526 RLW, 2021

WL 494795, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2021) (recognizing “the Missouri Supreme Court [has] ruled that the

MHRA preempts common law claims against an employer . . . but the Missouri Supreme Court did not hold

that the statute preempts tort claims against a co-employee” and the court was unaware of any “Missouri

case holding tort claims against a co-employee . . . are preempted by the MHRA”); see also State ex rel.

Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. Collins, 543 S.W.3d 22 (Mo. banc 2018) (holding under the general

preemption analysis the MHRA preempts common law claims of negligence and wrongful discharge

asserted against an employer); § 213.010(8)(c) (defining the term “employer” under the MHRA to

specifically exclude “[a]ny individual employed by an employer”). Rather, the critical inquiry is whether

the MHRA’s exclusive-remedy provision, § 213.070.2, applies to Plaintiff’s tort claim against co-

the critical inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and Higgins

“aris[es] out of an employment relationship.”

In their briefing, the parties primarily rely on two fraudulent-joinder cases from other

courts in this district: Van Alst v. Mo. CVS Pharmacy, LLC, No. 4:20-cv-00155-NKL, 2020 WL

2319882 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2020), and Johnson v. Midwest Div.-RHB, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-00728-

BCW, 2021 WL 5541783 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2021). Plaintiff argues this case is like Van Alst and

unlike Johnson, and Defendants argue vice-versa.

In Van Alst, in addition to MHRA claims against her former employer, the plaintiff asserted

a tort claim for trespass to chattels against her former supervisor, a non-diverse defendant. 2020

WL 2319882, at *1. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged her former supervisor “caused the

belongings that [plaintiff] kept while she worked at CVS to be destroyed” and that the supervisor

did so “outside and beyond the scope of her employment with CVS.” Id. In arguing against

plaintiff’s motion to remand, CVS argued the plaintiff’s tort claim necessarily arose from her

employment with CVS for purposes of the exclusivity provision since the tort claim involved items

the plaintiff had kept while working at CVS and that “HR” had unlawfully disposed of those

personal items. Id. at *2.

Ultimately, however, the district court concluded “on the face of the petition, the Court

cannot say as a matter of law that the purported destruction of [plaintiff]’s personal property arose

from an employment relationship.” Id. Specifically, the district court reasoned: (1) “[t]he tort

claim against [plaintiff’s former supervisor] is not based on the facts underlying the MHRA

claims”; and (2) “[t]he petition does not establish that [the former supervisor]’s alleged conduct

was undertaken because of or in furtherance of either her or [plaintiff]’s relationship with CVS.”

Id. In fact, the district court recognized, plaintiff’s petition expressly alleged the former

supervisor’s conduct occurred “outside and beyond the scope of her employment with CVS,” an

allegation the district court concluded was “plausible” since the former supervisor could have

been, for example, motivated by personal animus or an intent to convert. Id. Ultimately, the

district court concluded the “factual issue” of whether the supervisor’s alleged conduct causing the

destruction of plaintiff’s personal property arose from an employment relationship meant

plaintiff’s tort claim was colorable and remand was appropriate since the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. at *3.

employees White and Higgins.

Similarly, in Johnson, the plaintiff asserted a tort claim of conversion against a co-

employee who she alleged “destroyed or otherwise disposed of the personal property [plaintiff]

had left in her . . . office when she went on medical leave.” 2021 WL 5441783, at *4. In her

complaint, however, the plaintiff alleged the co-employee “engaged in the alleged tortious conduct

against [her] in the course and scope of [the co-employee]’s . . . employment.” Id. As a result, the

district court in Johnson distinguished the Van Alst case and held on the face of the complaint that

the Johnson plaintiff’s conversion claim against the non-diverse co-employee “ar[os]e from her

employment relationship . . . such that the MHRA provides the exclusive avenue through which

[plaintiff] may seek redress.” Id. Consequently, the district court found the non-diverse co-worker

was fraudulently joined and denied the plaintiff’s motion for remand. Id.

Although not cited by either party in this context, an earlier decision by another court in

this district further demonstrates the application of the exclusive-remedy provision in the MHRA.

In Huskey v. PetSmart, Inc., No. 18-00813-CV-W-NKL, 2019 WL 122873 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 7,

2019), in addition to MHRA claims brought against her employer, the plaintiff asserted a tort claim

against a non-diverse co-employee for civil conspiracy to violate her rights under the MHRA.

There, the district court found the civil conspiracy claim necessarily “ar[ose] from an ‘employment

relationship’” such that the MHRA’s exclusivity provision applied to the claim since the civil

conspiracy claim “concern[ed] what the statute defines as ‘unlawful employment practice[s].’” Id.

at *2-3.

Here, Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and Higgins is not based on

the same facts that form the basis of his MHRA claim against Defendant FIS, and, unlike the

claims at issue in Huskey, does not on its face otherwise necessarily involve unlawful employment

practices as defined by the MHRA. Defendants’ argument that “on its face, Plaintiff’s conversion

claim alleges that [Defendants] White and Higgins were acting within the course and scope of their

employment” (Doc. 15 at 3) is not persuasive or supported by the record. To be sure, while

Plaintiff’s pro se petition2 does not allege Defendants White and/or Higgins were acting within the

course and scope of their employment when they discarded (or directed the discarding of)

Plaintiff’s personal items from his employee locker, neither does it allege Defendants White and/or

Higgins were acting outside the scope of their employment in doing so. Whether Defendants

2 Although Plaintiff filed the initial petition pro se, he is now represented by counsel.

White and Higgins are fraudulently joined, however, is an entirely different question from the

sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings to state a claim. Knudson, 634 F.3d at 980.

Without a specific allegation that Defendants White and/or Higgins were acting in the

course and scope of their employment when they committed the allegedly tortious act, Defendants

point to the circumstances surrounding this allegation to establish Plaintiff’s conversion claim

necessarily arises out of the employment relationship. For instance, Defendants point to the

closeness in time of the alleged tortious act by Defendants White and/or Higgins as following what

Plaintiff alleges was an act of retaliation by his employer – that is, Plaintiff’s being escorted off

the premises having been accused of having “had several days of no-call/no-show.” Plaintiff does

not allege that either Defendant White or Higgins were involved in that situation, however, and

instead alleges “Haley Brown” accused him of having several no-call/no-show days. Additionally,

it is not clear, for instance, at the time he was escorted off the premises whether he was terminated

in a manner that would or could otherwise require that his employee locker be cleaned out or

emptied. In fact, the petition alleges after he was escorted off the premises, Plaintiff “followed all

the proper channels in order to preserve his job and acquire the necessary medical documentation

to account for all absences” and indicates that Plaintiff subsequently returned to work. In a similar

vein, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s conversion claim

necessarily “arises from an employment relationship” since the items involved in the alleged

conversion were held in an employee locker and some of the items Plaintiff alleges were

unlawfully discarded include medical records and documentation that are relevant to Plaintiff’s

MHRA claim. Without something more, it is not clearly established or alleged that Defendants

White and/or Higgins were acting in the scope of their employment regarding the alleged tortious

behavior as opposed to acting, for instance, with a personal animus or an intent to unlawfully

convert Plaintiff’s possessions.

Accordingly, the Court concludes this case is more like Van Alst than Johnson in that the

petition does not demonstrate on its face Defendants White and/or Higgins were acting within the

scope of an employment relationship and, therefore, the Court cannot conclude Plaintiff’s tort

claim is barred by the MHRA’s exclusive remedy provision. Accordingly, the Court is not

convinced there is no reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based

on the facts involved. Plaintiff’s conversion claim is not based on the facts underlying his MHRA

claim for retaliation and discrimination based on his disability. Where there is any doubt regarding

the sufficiency of the petition and the propriety of removal, “‘the better practice is for the federal

court not to decide the doubtful question . . . but simply to remand the case and leave the question

for the state courts to decide.’” Hayes, 2010 WL 3807052 at *2 (quoting Filla, 336 F.3d at 810).

Because it appears Plaintiff’s conversion claim against Defendants White and/or Higgins is

colorable, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in the instant case because Defendants White

and Higgins are non-diverse parties. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to state court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). Plaintiff’s motion to remand

(Doc. 12) is GRANTED and the case is remanded to state court. 3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATED: April 19, 2022

3 Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s motion to remand, Defendants White and Higgins filed a motion

to dismiss Plaintiff’s conversion claim against them on the same ground – that this claim is preempted by

the MHRA. (Doc. 5.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss is fully briefed. (Docs. 6, 14.) (Defendants did not

file a reply in support of their motion to dismiss.) Because the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction

and must remand the case to state court, however, it does not take up Defendants’ motion to dismiss.