Allen v. Kijakazi

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

SEAN M. ALLEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 21-00572-CV-W-BP-SSA

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING

COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS

Pending is Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying

his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”).

For the following reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sean Allen was born in January 1982, and applied for DIB on August 5, 2019, and

SSI on September 17, 2019, alleging that he became disabled on July 23, 2019. (R. at 172, 182.)

Prior to his alleged onset date, Plaintiff had work experience as a certified medication tech. (R. at

19.)

After holding a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff suffers

from degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, hypothyroidism, hypertension, hernias,

depression, and anxiety disorder. (R. at 15.) However, the ALJ found that these problems were

not medically equal in severity to one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404. (R. at 16.)

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). He found that,

due to Plaintiff’s impairments, Plaintiff can perform sedentary work with the following additional

limitations: he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb ramps and

stairs, and balance, stoop, kneel, or crouch; he must avoid frequent exposure to cold, wetness,

machinery, and heights; he can perform only simple and repetitive tasks; and he can only

occasionally interact with others. (R. at 17.)

After formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past

relevant work, but that he could perform a number of jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy, including a document preparer, a circuit board assembler, and a packager. (R.

at 20.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled.

Plaintiff has now appealed the ALJ’s determination, arguing that it was not supported by

substantial evidence. The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s appeal. The Court resolves these

issues below, setting out additional facts as needed.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court has a limited ability to revisit the conclusions of an ALJ. Specifically, “review

of the Secretary’s decision [is limited] to a determination whether the decision is supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Substantial evidence is evidence which reasonable

minds would accept as adequate to support the Secretary’s conclusion.” Mitchell v. Shalala, 25

F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Although the substantial evidence standard is

favorable to the Commissioner, it requires the Court to consider evidence that fairly detracts from

the Commissioner’s decision. E.g., Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2012). But if the

Court finds substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision, it cannot reverse the

decision simply because there is also substantial evidence that might have supported the opposite

outcome. Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2015). With these principles in mind,

the Court turns to Plaintiff’s arguments.

1. The ALJ’s Failure to Address Nurse Hanson’s Opinion

Plaintiff’s first argument is that the ALJ failed to evaluate the persuasiveness of the opinion

of Debra Hanson, ARNP. (Doc. 7, pp. 6–7.) Specifically, Hanson completed a questionnaire in

September 2018, indicating that Plaintiff could no longer perform the job of a certified medical

technician or certified nurse assistant due to his back pain. (R. at 362–65 (Hanson’s

questionnaire).) But despite this opinion, Plaintiff continued to work full-time as a medical

technician—at a level at least equal to medium work—for ten months after Hanson completed her

questionnaire. (R. at 37, 208, 261.)

The regulations require the ALJ to evaluate a claimant’s RFC “based on all of the relevant

medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1)–(3), 416.945(a)(1)–(3) (emphasis

added). Insofar as a medical opinion is relevant, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of that

opinion in light of the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. The ALJ did not evaluate

Hanson’s opinion in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. (R. at 19.)

However, the Court agrees with Defendant that this is not reversible error for two reasons.

(Doc. 10, p. 4.) First, Hanson’s opinion predates Plaintiff’s alleged onset date by ten months, and

despite her opinion that Plaintiff could not continue working, he did continue working at a medium

exertional level or higher until the alleged onset date. Given that Hanson’s opinion significantly

predated Plaintiff’s alleged onset date and appears inconsistent with the work he was able to

perform after she identified his supposedly disabling conditions, it is of questionable relevance.

See, e.g., Van Vickle v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2008) (disregarding medical evidence

predating the alleged onset date). Second, and more importantly, any failure to evaluate the

persuasiveness of Hanson’s opinion is harmless, because the ALJ ultimately concluded that

Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work—which is consistent with Hanson’s opinion that Plaintiff

could no longer work as a medical technician or nurse assistant. Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917

(8th Cir. 2012) (“To show an error was not harmless, [a claimant] must provide some indication

that the ALJ would have decided differently if the error had not occurred.”). Therefore, the ALJ’s

failure to evaluate Hanson’s opinion is not a reason for reversal.

2. Plaintiff’s Mental Limitations

Due to Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety, and alleged poor concentration and memory, the

ALJ limited Plaintiff to performing simple and routine tasks, and to only occasionally interacting

with others. (R. at 17.) In doing so, the ALJ did not fully accept Plaintiff’s account of his mental

limitations. (R. at 18–19.) Plaintiff argues that the mental portion of Plaintiff’s RFC is

unsupported by medical evidence, and that the ALJ should have further developed the record on

Plaintiff’s mental health conditions. (Doc. 7, p. 11.)

The Court disagrees. Initially, “[i]t is the claimant’s burden, and not the Social Security

Commissioner’s burden, to prove the claimant’s RFC.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 556

(8th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s “failure to provide medical evidence with this information should not

be held against the ALJ when there is medical evidence that supports the ALJ’s decision.” Steed

v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008). And “[w]hile an ALJ does have a duty to develop

the record, this duty is not never-ending and an ALJ is not required to disprove every possible

impairment. The ALJ is required to order medical examinations and tests only if the medical

records presented to him do not give sufficient medical evidence to determine whether the claimant

is disabled.” McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 612 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

In light of these principles, the Court finds that the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s

mental limitations is supported by substantial evidence in the Record. In November 2019, Plaintiff

did not report any mental health limitations whatsoever, (R. at 45), and has not received any

significant treatment for a mental disorder. (R. at 26.) A medical examination from November

2019 reveals that Plaintiff’s “memory was normal and [his] concentration was good,” and that

Plaintiff exhibited “clear thought processes” and “appropriate” mood. (R. at 327.) Plaintiff did

not seek any mental health treatment until September 2020, when he began to exhibit suicidal

ideation, (R. at 540), but shortly thereafter, Plaintiff indicated that he was “feeling way better” and

his symptoms of depression had significantly improved. (R. at 542, 551.) Thus, there is little in

the record to suggest that Plaintiff has experienced anything other than an isolated mental health

episode, and nothing to suggest that the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff to simple, routine work with

limited interaction with others is insufficient to account for Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms.

Thus, this is not a reason for reversal.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination of Plaintiff’s RFC. Consequently, the Commissioner’s final decision denying

benefits is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Beth Phillips

BETH PHILLIPS, CHIEF JUDGE

DATE: March 11, 2022 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT