The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
M.P., a minor, by her next friend, )
MARQUITA PETERS, and )
MARQUITA PETERS, individually, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 4:18-CV-0816-DGK
)
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF RAYTOWN )
CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL )
DISTRICT NO. 2, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This lawsuit alleges a 180 day suspension of high school student M.P. for physically
threatening her soccer coach violated M.P.’s constitutional rights. The Defendants are the
members of the school board of education and the district’s superintendent, sued in his official
capacity. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice of
Count I and for the Court to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the State Law Claim in Count
II for a Trial De Novo (Doc. 13).
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, alleging two
counts: violation of M.P.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights for punishing her for
expressing her thoughts and feelings (Count I), and a trial de novo pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 167.161.3 (Count II). After Defendants removed to federal court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs filed the pending motion.
Plaintiffs move to dismiss Count I with prejudice. They argue that after the Court dismisses
Count I, it should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the sole remaining count and
remand the case back to the Jackson County Circuit Court. In support of remand, Plaintiffs argue:
(1) the Court will no longer have original jurisdiction over any claim left in the case; (2) Count II
is not related to Count I; (3) their preferred choice of counsel is not admitted to practice in the
Western District of Missouri, and (4) while there are no novel issues of state law here, it is not an
efficient use of this Court’s resources to conduct a trial de novo in this matter. Finally, Plaintiffs
request that any costs in this case be assessed solely against Defendants.
Defendants do not oppose dismissal of Count I with prejudice, but argue the Court should
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II because doing so would best serve
judicial economy, since sending this case back to state court would essentially re-start the judicial
process. Defendants also ask the Court to allow them to seek costs against Plaintiffs.
The statute governing supplemental jurisdiction states in relevant part,
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III . . .
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367. Even where one of the grounds listed in § 1367(c) is present, the court’s
discretion “should be guided by considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
the litigants.” Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 973 (8th Cir. 1999). A
“substantial investment of judicial time and resources” in a case “justifies the exercise of
jurisdiction over the state claims, even after the federal claim has been dismissed.” North Dakota
v. Merchants Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
The Court will dismiss Count I with prejudice since the parties agree to it. And since the
Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, it will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Count II.
The Court finds that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the
litigants weigh in favor of not exercising supplemental jurisdiction. The Court has invested little
time in this case, so sending it back to state court will not result in wasteful duplication of judicial
efforts. The convenience factor weighs in favor of not exercising jurisdiction, since this will allow
Plaintiffs to be represented by their counsel of choice. And the fairness to litigants factor does not
weigh in favor of either outcome.
Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ sole
remaining claim.
Plaintiffs’ request to preclude Defendants from seeking costs is DENIED. Plaintiffs sued
Defendants for allegedly violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments, so Defendants had a statutory
right to removal. The Court sees no reason why exercising this right should prevent Defendants from
seeking costs against Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED IN PART. Count I is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This
case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: February 21, 2019 /s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT