The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
BRANDON MICAH BLANSIT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 17-01041-CV-W-ODS
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING
COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS
Pending is Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final
decision denying her applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits,
and supplemental security income. For the following reasons, the Commissioner’s
decision is affirmed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination
of whether the decision is “supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but…enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 928
(8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “As long as substantial evidence in the record
supports the Commissioner’s decision, we may not reverse it because substantial
evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or
because we would have decided the case differently.” Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098,
1102 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Though advantageous to the Commissioner, this
standard also requires the Court consider evidence that fairly detracts from the final
decision. Anderson v. Astrue, 696 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence; it is relevant
evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Gragg
v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2010).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born in 1973, and is a high school graduate. R. at 24, 39, 178, 185,
202, 218. She previously worked as a buyer, receptionist, administrative assistant, and
vault teller. R. at 24, 206, 218. In January 2015, Plaintiff applied for a period of
disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income, alleging a
disability onset date of March 20, 2008. R. at 10, 176-93. She later amended her
disability onset date to August 30, 2013. R. at 10, 36-37. Plaintiff’s applications were
denied, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). R.
114-15, 127-28. A hearing was held in May 2016. R. at 31-71. In November 2016, ALJ
Gerald Meyr issued his decision, finding Plaintiff was not disabled. R. at 10-26.
In rendering his decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe
impairments: obesity, anemia, arthralgia and myalgia, fatigue, iron deficiency,
insomnia, bulging lumbar disc with degenerative disk disease, persistent depressive
disorder, panic disorder, anxiety, and bipolar disorder. R. at 13. The ALJ determined
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
[P]erform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and
416.967(a) except she will be allowed to sit or stand alternatively at will
provided she would not be off task more than 10% of the work period.
She can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. She is limited to occasionally stooping, crouching,
kneeling, or crawling. She must avoid all exposure to unshielded moving
mechanical parts and all exposure to unprotected heights. Work allowed
off task 10% of the time in an 8-hour workday, in addition to regularly
scheduled breaks. Work is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks;
in a work environment free of fast paced production requirements, which is
defined as constant activity with work tasks performed sequentially in
rapid cessation; involving only simple work related decisions; with few, if
any, workplace changes. She is to have no interaction with the general
public, and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.
R. at 16. Based on the RFC and the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony at the hearing,
the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could work as a document scanner, circuit board assembler,
and packager. R. at 25. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council,
which denied her appeal. R. at 1-3, 174-75. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the Commissioner’s decision must be reversed because (A) the
RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence, (B) the VE’s testimony was inconsistent
with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), and (C) the ALJ did not properly
assess Plaintiff’s credibility.
A. Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff argues the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence. One’s RFC is
the “most you can still do despite your limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The
ALJ must base the RFC on “all of the relevant evidence, including the medical records,
observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of
his limitations.” McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000). Because
Plaintiff’s RFC is a medical question, “an ALJ’s assessment of it must be supported by
some medical evidence of [Plaintiff’s] ability to function in the workplace.” Hensley v.
Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “However, there is no
requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical opinion.” Id.
Plaintiff argues the RFC “is silent” as to her limited ability to respond and adapt to
a work environment. But the RFC limits Plaintiff to “simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks…in a work environment free of fast paced production requirements…involving
only simple work related decisions…with few, if any, workplace changes.” R. at 16.1
Accordingly, this argument fails.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to explain why Plaintiff was precluded from
interacting with the public but could occasionally interact with coworkers and
supervisors, a limitation the ALJ includes in the RFC. Plaintiff relies upon Dr.
Breckenridge’s opinion, which the ALJ afforded great weight, wherein he found Plaintiff
had moderate difficulties interacting appropriately with the public, supervisors, and
1 Plaintiff also seems to suggest her difficulty in maintaining concentration, persistence
or pace is not properly depicted in the RFC because it only references being off task ten
percent of the time. Plaintiff’s representation is not entirely accurate. The RFC includes
other limitations accounting for these difficulties – e.g., “simple, routine, and repetitive
tasks,” being free from “fast paced production requirements,” “simple work related
decisions,” and “few…workplace changes.” R. at 16. Thus, this argument also fails.
coworkers. R. at 20. The RFC requires no interaction with the public, and only
occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. R. at 16. If anything, the RFC is
more limiting than Breckenridge’s opinion in that the RFC restricts Plaintiff to no contact
with the public. Also, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate how “occasional” interaction with
coworkers and supervisors does not illustrate Breckenridge’s opinion that Plaintiff had
moderate difficulties when interacting with others. For these reasons, this argument
fails.
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ improperly rejected her global assessment
of functioning (“GAF”) scores when formulating the RFC. The ALJ considered the GAF
scores but gave them minimal weight and found them unpersuasive. R. at 23. He
noted the GAF scores “are not standardized,” “were rendered on specific dates,” only
represent Plaintiff’s “mental functioning on…particular dates,” and Defendant has
“declined to endorse the scale for use in the disability determination process.” Id. The
Eighth Circuit has found “GAF scores are of little value.” Nowling v. Colvin, 813 F.3d
1110, 1115 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). And, as is the case here, the ALJ may
discount GAF scores when they are inconsistent with the totality of the medical
evidence and not supported by Plaintiff’s demonstrated level of functioning. Lawson v.
Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2015). The ALJ properly discounted the GAF scores
based upon the totality of the medical evidence.
The substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s RFC, and
does not support additional or more severe mental limitations. Accordingly, the Court
finds the ALJ did not err in failing to include additional or more severe mental limitations.
B. VE’s Testimony
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred because the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with
the DOT descriptions of jobs the VE identified. The ALJ determined Plaintiff was limited
to, among other things, repetitive work. Plaintiff argues the document scanner job
identified by the VE is not limited to repetitive work, and the ALJ failed to resolve the
conflict. Plaintiff does not argue the other jobs identified by the VE – i.e., circuit board
assembler and packager – are inconsistent with the DOT job descriptions.2
One mistaken recommendation by the VE “does not devalue the rest of [the
VE’s] opinion.” Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
“An ALJ may rely on a vocational expert’s testimony as long as some of the identified
jobs satisfy the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Id. Here, the VE answered
hypotheticals containing Plaintiff’s limitations, and identified three jobs Plaintiff could
perform. The other two jobs identified by the VE are unchallenged by Plaintiff. Thus,
the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s testimony.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the DOT is misplaced because “DOT definitions are simply
generic job descriptions” offering “approximate maximum requirements for each
position, rather than their range.” Wheeler v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 891, 897 (8th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). Even the DOT cautions “its descriptions may not coincide in every
respect with the content of jobs as performed in particular establishments or at certain
localities,” and “not all jobs… have requirements identical to or as rigorous as those
listed in the DOT.” Id. (citation omitted). While the DOT indicates the document
scanner job includes a variety of duties, the VE, based upon her experience and with
the limitations set forth by the ALJ, testified that Plaintiff could perform that job.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s testimony.
C. Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating her credibility. In assessing Plaintiff’s
credibility, the critical issue is not whether Plaintiff has functional limitations, but the
extent of the functional limitations. House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1994).
The familiar standard for analyzing a claimant’s subjective complaints is set forth in
Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ “need not explicitly discuss
each Polaski factor...[t]he ALJ need only acknowledge and consider those factors
2 In her reply, Plaintiff argues, for the first time, the ALJ failed to find these two positions
existed in significant numbers. Even if this argument is properly before this Court, the
ALJ noted both positions existed in greater numbers in the national economy than the
document scanner position. R. at 25. Accordingly, this argument is unavailing.
before discounting a claimant’s subjective complaints.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390
F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Weighing credibility falls on the ALJ,
not this Court. Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2008). The ALJ is in the
best position to determine a claimant’s credibility, and this Court grants the ALJ
deference in that regard. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).
The Court finds substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff is not entirely credible. In making this determination, the ALJ
referenced several factors. First, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were
inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. R. at 21. Second, the ALJ noted
Plaintiff’s reports of being unable to manage feelings of heightened stress were
contradictory with her ability to take a deep breath and be examined during her hearing.
Id. Third, the ALJ observed Plaintiff’s mixed feelings about returning to work versus
leaving her child at home, indicating she may have other motivations for seeking
disability benefits. Id. Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s self-reported daily activities were
outweighed by the inability to objectively verify her limited daily activities with any
reasonable degree of accuracy, and the difficulty in attributing the alleged degree of
limitation to her medical condition, particularly in light of the weak medical evidence. R.
at 21-22. Finally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility due to her ability to drive,
prepare and cook simple meals, laundry, and take care of her disabled son. R. at 22.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s failure to explain why her daily living activities
were not verifiable or attributable to medical conditions, and the ALJ’s overstatement of
her daily activities. Doc. #13, at 22-25. While the ALJ did not identify which daily
activities could not be verified or attributed to medical conditions, the ALJ referred to the
“weak medical evidence,” which did not establish severely limited daily activities. The
ALJ also found Plaintiff’s “reportedly limited daily activities are outweighed by the other
factors” used in analyzing her credibility, which is outlined supra. R. at 22.
Further, substantial evidence in the record does not support Plaintiff’s arguments.
The function reports submitted by Plaintiff and her mother reveal the ALJ did not
overstate Plaintiff’s daily activities. Plaintiff’s mother states her daughter takes care of
her disabled son, takes care of herself with little assistance, does laundry, shops for
groceries, and can walk thirty to forty-five minutes without resting. R. at 238-45.
Likewise, Plaintiff represents she can “do light cleaning,” do laundry daily, walk for thirty
minutes before needing to rest, shop for groceries, help her son get ready for school,
and assist her son with homework. R. at 249-52, 256. Both Plaintiff and her mother
represent Plaintiff’s ability to understand and remember are unaffected by her medical
conditions. R. at 243, 252. Additionally, the medical records (which Plaintiff does not
cite) do not demonstrate Plaintiff’s daily activities were overstated.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes there is substantial evidence in
the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s credibility assessment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
DATE: September 5, 2018 ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT