Brown v. Bailey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

NORTHERN DIVISION

COREY BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-CV-23 JSD

)

ANDREW BAILEY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on self-represented plaintiff Corey Brown’s Application to

Proceed in the District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (ECF No. 2). Having reviewed the

motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion and

assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will dismiss the

Complaint for the reasons discussed below.

Initial Partial Filing Fee

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis must

pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison

account to pay the entire fee, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee equal to the greater

of either: (1) 20 percent of the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account for the six

months immediately preceding the filing of the lawsuit, or (2) 20 percent of the average monthly

balance in the prisoner’s account over the same six-month period. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). After

payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner must make monthly payments of 20 percent

of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The

agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court

each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, until the prisoner has paid the fee in

full. Id.

Plaintiff has not submitted an inmate account statement as required by 28 U.S.C.

§1915(a)(2). Even so, the Court finds that an initial partial filing fee of $1.00 is appropriate. See

Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a prisoner is unable

to provide the court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement, the court should assess

an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s

finances”). If Plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his

inmate account statement to support that assertion.

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis

if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a

complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-

pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and liberally construes the

complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district

court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the claim to be considered within the

proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). Even so, self-

represented plaintiffs must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law.

Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912,

914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts or to construct a legal theory for the

self-represented plaintiff).

To sufficiently state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal

conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by

mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must

demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.”

Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at

679.

The Complaint

Plaintiff is an inmate at the Moberly Correctional Center in Moberly, Missouri. He brings

this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Missouri Attorney General, the Director of the

Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), the Warden of Moberly Correctional Center

(“MCC”), and Correctional Officer Hunt. Plaintiff sues all defendants in their individual capacities

only.

Plaintiff states that he was performing his duties as dorm porter on August 18, 2023, when

he noticed that his cell door was open. Officer Hunt told him not to go into the cell and then

subjected Plaintiff to a pat search. Plaintiff reports that something “stabbed” him in the shoulder

during the search. When he turned around, Plaintiff noticed that Hunt was holding a tattoo gun in

her hand. Plaintiff informed Hunt that she had “just stabbed [him] in the shoulder with that tattoo

gun.” Hunt then called for assistance. Officer Neimer and Sergeant Saine responded to Hunt’s

request. Saine then ordered Neimer to take Plaintiff to the medical unit.

In support of his Complaint, Plaintiff has attached copies of two Informal Resolution

Requests (“IRRs”) he filed with MCC on August 21, 2023. In the first IRR, Plaintiff alleged that

the medical unit did not follow proper medical procedures “such as taking [his] blood for testing

for Hepatitis C or HIV [that he] may have contracted from this tattoo gun taken from another

inmate[.]” In response to the IRR, the Director of Nursing explained that the treating nurse did not

see any marks on Plaintiff’s skin on August 18th but that a red mark was evident when Plaintiff

returned on August 22nd. According to the Response, “exposure labs for HIV and Hepatitis C

were drawn on August 22, 2023.”1 In the second IRR, Plaintiff alleged that Officer Hunt

apologized after “stabbing” him and stated: “I didn’t mean to do that.” Plaintiff requested monetary

relief for “failure to protect” and failure to properly train new officers. MCC declined.

Plaintiff alleges that the incident caused permanent injury but he does not describe the

nature of the alleged injury. He seeks $56,675,000 in damages.

Discussion

Liberally construed, Plaintiff appears to assert claims for assault, battery, negligence, and

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. For the reasons below, the Court will dismiss

this action without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

1. Personal Involvement

Plaintiff sues the Defendants in their individual capacities only. To succeed on an

individual-capacity claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating each defendant’s personal

responsibility for the alleged harm. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)

(stating that § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation

1The Court may consider Plaintiff’s attachments to the Complaint on its initial review. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is part of the

pleading for all purposes.”).

of rights”). Put another way, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how a particular defendant’s acts

or omissions violated his constitutional rights. See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760

F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014). Conclusory allegations about a defendant’s supervisory role are

insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and

§ 1983 suits . . . the plaintiff in a suit such as the present one must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through his own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Marsh v.

Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d 745, 754 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Vicarious liability is inapplicable in 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 suits.”).

The Complaint contains no allegations that the Missouri Attorney General, the Director of

MDOC, or the Warden of MCC were personally involved in the August 18, 2023 incident or any

of the treatment decisions that followed. Plaintiff instead invokes the supervisory roles of these

defendants. For example, Plaintiff sues the Attorney General “for the total disregard of an Officer

that was employed by the Department of Corrections, a department that the Attorney General’s

Office is the Head Administrator of.” He contends the Warden is liable “for the disregard of the

actions of one of the Employees of the Moberly Correctional Center Facility.” As to the Director

of MDOC, Plaintiff asserts liability on the basis that the Director “disregard[ed] the seriousness of

the actions of one of the employees of the Department of Corrections.” These allegations do not

establish the requisite personal involvement. See Madewell, 909 F.2d at 1208; Keeper v. King, 130

F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] general responsibility for supervising the operations of a

prison is insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support liability.”). For these

reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Missouri Attorney General, the

Director of MDOC, and the Warden of MCC.

2. Deliberate Indifference

Under the Eighth Amendment, the government has an obligation to provide medical care

to those persons it is punishing by incarceration. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). To

demonstrate constitutionally inadequate medical care, an inmate must show that a prison official’s

conduct amounted to deliberate indifference. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1237-38 (8th

Cir. 1997). To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must prove that he suffered from an

objectively serious medical need, and that prison officials actually knew of and disregarded that

need. Roberts v. Kopel, 917 F.3d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir. 2019); Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171,

1177 (8th Cir. 2019).

As to Officer Hunt, the Complaint focuses entirely on her conduct on August 18, 2023.

Plaintiff makes no allegations that Hunt disregarded his medical needs. In fact, Plaintiff states that

Hunt immediately called for assistance, which resulted in Sergeant Saine taking Plaintiff to the

medical unit. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating Hunt’s personal responsibility for

the alleged deliberate indifference. See Madewell, 909 F.2d at 1208. As for the remaining

defendants, the Court has already explained that their supervisory roles—the only basis for

Plaintiff’s claims against them—are insufficient to establish the requisite personal involvement.

See Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d at 1314. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claim against all defendants.

Even if Plaintiff could establish each defendant’s personal involvement, his deliberate

indifference claim would still fall short. A claim of deliberate indifference “requires both an

objective and a subjective analysis.” Hall v. Ramsey Cnty., 801 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2015).

Under the objective prong, the plaintiff must establish that he suffered from an objectively serious

medical need. Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir. 2014). A serious medical need

is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that

even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija,

114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997). Under the subjective prong, the plaintiff must show that a prison

official actually knew of but disregarded that serious medical need. Jackson, 756 F.3d at 1065. To

satisfy the subjective prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s actions were “so

inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care.”

Redmond v. Kosinski, 999 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir. 2021). This requires “a highly culpable state

of mind approaching actual intent.” Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2017); see also

Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “plaintiff must establish a

mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the arrestee’s health”).

The Response to Plaintiff’s first IRR shows that a nurse examined Plaintiff after the pat

search and tested his blood. While Plaintiff alleges a “permanent injury” in his Complaint, he fails

to explain the nature of the injury beyond “permanent scarring.” Thus, even assuming Plaintiff

could establish an objectively serious need, the allegations in the Complaint do not suggest that

the Defendants actually knew of yet disregarded that serious medical need, much less that they

acted with a highly culpable state of mind approaching actual intent. See Jackson, 756 F.3d at

1065; Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 643. On the contrary, the Complaint—read in conjunction with

Plaintiff’s IRRs—suggests that Plaintiff received an appropriate medical evaluation.

3. State Law Claims

Liberally construed, Plaintiff also appears to assert claims for battery, assault, and

negligence under Missouri state law. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim to relief on his federal claim, it will decline to exercises supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S

715, 726 (1966) (if federal claims are dismissed before trial, remaining state claims should also be

dismissed); Crest Construction II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011) (where all federal

claims have been dismissed, district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state

claims is “purely discretionary”).

Conclusion

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any personal involvement by the

Defendants Missouri Attorney General, the Director of MDOC, or the Warden of MCC, and fails

to state a plausible claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The Court will

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. For these reasons,

the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in the District Court

without Prepaying Fees or Costs is GRANTED. (ECF No. 2)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00

within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff shall make his remittance payable to

“Clerk, United States District Court,” and shall include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) a statement that the remittance is for an original

proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief and

Prohibition Against Retaliation is DENIED. (ECF No. 3)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED as

moot. (ECF No. 6)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate

Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

RONNIE L. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 18th day of June, 2024.