Naseer v. Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis Executive Board

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

MUNEERA NASEER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:24-CV-00356 HEA

)

ISLAMIC FOUNDATION of GREATER, )

ST. LOUIS EXECUTIVE BOARD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Self-represented plaintiff Muneera Naseer brings this action for employment

discrimination against her former employer, the Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis Executive

Board, as well as several individual defendants who appear to be board members. The matter is

now before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or without

prepayment of the required filing fees and costs. [ECF No. 2]. Having reviewed the motion and

the financial information submitted in support, the Court will grant the motion and waive the filing

fee in this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel,

however, will be denied at this time. [ECF No. 3]. Based on review of the record, plaintiff will be

directed to file an amended complaint on a court-provided form in compliance with the instructions

provided herein. Plaintiff will have twenty-one (21) days to do so.

The Complaint

Plaintiff filed suit on March 8, 2024, against defendant, the Islamic Foundation of Greater

St. Louis Executive Board, as well as several individual defendants who appear to be board

members. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff filed her complaint on the Court-provided form for filing an

Employment Discrimination action, and she appears to be pursuing a claim under Title VII of the

Although plaintiff has not checked more than one box on page 4 of her complaint-form, in the

body of her “Statement of Claim,” she indicates that she is pursuing claims under Title VII for:

gender discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment (failure to provide her with

adequate pay raises given to male colleagues); a “pattern of adverse actions, abuse, mistreatment

and improper conduct,” which this Court interprets as a hostile work environment/harassment

claim based on her gender; failure to pay her for overtime hours worked; and retaliatory

termination for filing a claim regarding alleged harassment.1 Plaintiff has failed to attach to her

complaint either her charge of discrimination or her notice of right to sue from the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which would indicate her ability to pursue federal

employment claims under Title VII.

Plaintiff states that she was employed as an Office Administrator at the Islamic Foundation

of Greater St. Louis Executive Board (IFGSL). She complains that she requested a pay increase

for her position in 2018, and shortly thereafter she was told that she was awarded the raise.

However, was given various excuses over the years every time she asked why the raise had not

been implemented. During this time, plaintiff alleges that several other male employees were

receiving raises for their jobs. In February of 2022, plaintiff alleges that she met with board chair,

Mohammad Tahir and other board members and again asked for a raise. Plaintiff was allegedly

told she would be getting a raise. However, no vote was initiated by the board on the raise, and she

was terminated five months later.

1Plaintiff has not indicated if she is also pursuing claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA),

but she has attached a right to sue notice from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR). The

right to sue was issued to plaintiff on December 8, 2023. Plaintiff’s right to sue from the MCHR does not

entitle her to bring claims pursuant to Title VII.

sometimes daily, by a male employee in the accounts department. She states that the harassment

was based on her gender, and the harasser admonished her and other female employees about his

inability to work with women in certain roles at IFGSL. When plaintiff reported the harassment

and bullying to IFGSL board members, they failed to intervene to stop the harassment, which

seemed to embolden the alleged harasser. Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the harasser was

allowed to go behind plaintiff’s back to change the work processes over which she was in charge.

Plaintiff further alleges that a former male board chair, as well as other board members,

engaged in pervasive harassment towards women at IFGSL. When plaintiff complained about their

behavior, she was told she would have to work despite the alleged harassment. On another

occasion, plaintiff was screamed at so violently by a member of the Religious Affairs Committee

that he had to be removed from the premises. However, the individual faced no consequences for

his behavior despite plaintiff’s complaints.

Plaintiff next asserts that she was fired from her position the day after she officially filed a

complaint via email with the Treasurer and the Chair claiming that she had been bullied and

subjected to harassment by the Treasurer and Accounts person at IFGSL. Plaintiff claims that she

requested a meeting; however, she learned they took a morning vote to terminate her employment.

Discussion

As the Court noted above, there are several issues with plaintiff’s complaint. First, although

plaintiff has attached to her complaint a notice of right to sue from the MCHR, there is no

indication in plaintiff’s complaint that she is bringing claims against defendant IFGSL under the

Missouri Human Rights Act. If plaintiff wishes to sue her employer under both the Missouri

Human Rights Act and Title VII, she needs to designate such in her amended complaint.

or her right to sue notice from the EEOC. As such, the Court is unable to discern if plaintiff has

properly exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her federal claims. Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual

because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. To initiate a

claim under Title VII, a party must timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and

receive a right to sue letter. Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 2000). The

claims in the complaint must be like or reasonably related to the claims listed in the charge of

discrimination filed with the EEOC. See Duncan v. Delta Consolidated Indus., Inc., 371 F.3d 1020

1024 (8th Cir. 2004). For this reason, the Court will require plaintiff to provide the Court with both

her charge of discrimination and her EEOC notice of right to sue.

Additionally, plaintiff has listed several individuals as defendants in this action. However,

Title VII provides a remedy only against an employer. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has

“squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII.” Bonomolo-

Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Cmty. Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Spencer

v. Ripley Cty. State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1997)); see also Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores

Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1111 (8th Cir. 1998). As a result, the individual defendants named in the

action are subject to dismissal from plaintiff’s complaint.

Moreover, plaintiff’s claims are somewhat difficult to discern in this action. As noted

above, although plaintiff has not checked more than one box on page 4 of her complaint-form, in

the body of her “Statement of Claim,” she indicates that she is also pursuing claims under Title

VII for: gender discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment (failure to provide

her with adequate pay raises given to male colleagues); a “pattern of adverse actions, abuse,

mistreatment and improper conduct,” which this Court interprets as a hostile work

and retaliatory termination for filing a claim regarding alleged harassment. If plaintiff is pursuing

these claims, she should mark the appropriate boxes on page 4 of her complaint form. Additionally,

she must also make sure that her claims in her lawsuit match those in her charge of discrimination

submitted to the EEOC. Furthermore, to allege such claims in her amended complaint, plaintiff

must set forth prima facie elements of each of those claims.

For example, to establish a prima facie case of sex/gender discrimination, plaintiff must

properly allege in her amended complaint that she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was

meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations; (3) suffered an adverse employment action;

and (4) was treated differently than similarly situated employees who were not members of her

protected class. Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir.

2013) (citation omitted). “An adverse employment action is defined as a tangible change in

working conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage, including but not limited

to, termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s future career

prospects, as well as circumstances amounting to a constructive discharge.” Id.

To state a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment by a

supervisor, plaintiff must allege that: (1) she is a member of a protected group, (2) she was

subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the harassment was based on sex, and (4) the

harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. LeGrand v. Area Resources

for Community and Human Services, 394 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005). For an atmosphere of

sexual harassment or hostility to be actionable, “the offending behavior must be sufficiently severe

or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). To be considered sufficiently

severe or pervasive, the conduct complained of must create an environment that a reasonable

Cir. 2002). To be actionable, conduct must be both subjectively and objectively offensive, as well

as “extreme in nature and not merely rude or unpleasant.” Southerland v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 580

F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). To determine whether a work environment is

hostile and abusive, the Court examines the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency

of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or

mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s job

performance. Cross v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 615 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir.

2010).

Last, the Court notes that although Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee

“because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or

because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII],” not every adverse employment action can

be considered retaliation under Title VII. To establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation,

plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered a materially adverse

employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct.

Jackman, 728 F.3d at 804. Plaintiff has not indicated in her complaint that she engaged in protected

conduct prior to being terminated except to say generally that on the day before her employment

was terminated, she sent an email saying she had been subjected to some sort of harassment at

IFGSL. If plaintiff engaged in legally protected conduct, she should include a description of such

conduct in her amended complaint.

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will allow plaintiff to amend her pleading.

See Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing how a court should give a pro se

plaintiff a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies and a chance to amend the complaint). Plaintiff

Complaint form. In amending her complaint, plaintiff should take care to set forth her claims for

relief in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and 10; Local Rule 2.06(A).

Instructions for Filing an Amended Complaint

Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the Court’s Employment Discrimination form.

Plaintiff is warned that the filing of an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and all

supplements, and so it must include all claims plaintiff wishes to bring. E.g., In re Wireless Tele.

Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff should make sure to fully complete the form and provide all required information.

Plaintiff should specify all legal grounds for her employment discrimination lawsuit. Plaintiff

should detail all facts and describe specific conduct that she believes is discriminatory. Plaintiff is

required to set out not only her alleged claims in a simple, concise, and direct manner, but also the

facts supporting her claims.

After the filing of plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court will review the amended

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for frivolousness, maliciousness and/or failure to state a

claim. A claim must survive § 1915 review for plaintiff to proceed in this lawsuit.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Finally, plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. [ECF No. 3]. The

appointment of counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil matter lies within the discretion of the

Court. Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006). There is no constitutional

or statutory right to appointed counsel in civil cases. Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing, 728

F.2d 1003, 1004 (8th Cir. 1984). Once the plaintiff has alleged a prima facie claim, the Court must

determine the plaintiff’s need for counsel to effectively litigate his claim. In re Lane, 801 F.2d

the plaintiff and the Court would benefit from the assistance of counsel. Edgington v. Mo. Dep’t

of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d

986, 989 (8th Cir. 2005). This determination involves the consideration of several relevant criteria,

including “the factual complexity of the issues, the ability of the indigent person to investigate the

facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, the ability of the indigent person to present the claims,

and the complexity of the legal arguments.” Phillips, 437 F.3d at 794 (citing Edgington, 52 F.3d

at 780).

In this matter, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time.

The action appears to involve straightforward questions of fact rather than complex questions of

law. Further, the request for counsel is premature, as defendant has not yet been served, and the

Court has not issued a Case Management Order. The Court concludes that the appointment of

counsel would not be of sufficient benefit to the Court or to plaintiff at this time, and will deny

plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel, without prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[ECF No. 2] is GRANTED and the filing fee is waived. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mail to plaintiff a blank copy

of the Court’s Employment Discrimination Complaint form.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order,

plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the court-provided form and in compliance with the

Court’s instructions.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon submission of the amended complaint, the

Court shall review this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel [ECF

No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with this Order shall result in the dismissal of this

action, without prejudice and without further notice.

Dated this 3% day of April, 2024.

HENRY EDWARD (dep

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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