Reed v. Board of Education City

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

LESLIE RACHEL REED, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Case No. 4:23-CV-01039-SPM

)

ST. LOUIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS )

BOARD OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,

for More Definite Statement (Doc. 12). The motion has been fully briefed. The parties have

consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 16). For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title

VII claims will be granted, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim will be

denied, and the motion for more definite statement as to Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim

will be granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Ms. Leslie Rachel Reed, who is self-represented, filed her Complaint on August

21, 2023, using the Court’s Employment Discrimination Complaint form.1 Plaintiff alleges

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e, et seq., and discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,

as amended, 42. U.S.C. §§ 120101, et seq. On the part of the complaint form asking what conduct

1 Plaintiff named Defendant as “Board of Education City (SLPS)”; Defendant indicates in its

answer that its name is “St. Louis Public Schools Board of Education.” See Answer, Doc. 11.

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“other conduct” section, she wrote, “aggrevate [sic] sexual abuse while at work and defamation

and false statements while at work from staff.” Complaint, Doc. 1, at 4. She also checked the boxes

indicating that she was discriminated against because of her race and because of her disability. Id.

at 5. When asked to state the essential facts of her claims, she stated, “While at work on August

16 2022 starting Tyler A. Archer and his staff began to harass me with assaulting statements and

false defamation statements calling me out of my name and physically assaulting me with sexual

touches.” Id. She asks for $10,000 in lost wages. Id. at 7.

The parties have attached to the pleadings a copy of the Charge of Discrimination Plaintiff

presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), dated June 30, 2023,2

and a copy of Determination and Notice of Rights letter Plaintiff received from the EEOC, dated

July 11, 2023. In the “DISCRIMINATION BASED ON” box, the EEOC Charge states,

“Disability.” EEOC Charge, Doc. 11-1, at 1. In the box asking Plaintiff to describe the particulars,

the EEOC Charge states:

1. I was hired by the above referenced employer [Board of Education of St. Louis]

in August 2022 as a Special Education Teacher Aide. My rate of pay was

$1,035.00/bi-weekly. I was supervised by Dr. Archery, the Principal. I was

diagnosed with a disability in 1996.

2. August 16, 2022, Dr. Archery walked into the classroom that I was assigned

and stood in the door and called me a dirty motherfucker. I am not sure if Ms.

Ford, Special Education Teacher heard the comment, however, she was in the

classroom. I did not respond. A couple of days later, I was in Ms. Byes Special

Education Teacher class sitting with a student when Dr. Archery entered the

class and told Ms. Bye that I was a dirty motherfucker. Ms. Bye did not respond

2 The footer on the Charge of Discrimination indicates that it consists of three pages. Plaintiff

attached to her Complaint a version that was missing page 2, see Doc. 1-5, and Defendant attached

to its answer a version that was missing page 3, see Doc. 11-1.

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I was forced to resign due to the harassment.

3. I believed that I have been discriminated against due to my disabilities and that

I was harassed and constructively discharged in violation of the Americans with

Disability Act of 1990, as amended.

EEOC Charge, Doc. 11-1, at 1-2.

On October 17, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for More

Definite Statement. Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination

claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII sex

discrimination/sexual harassment claim (to the extent she asserts one) for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim, and to dismiss Plaintiff’s disability

discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as improperly pleaded.

In the alternative, Defendant asks for a more definite statement of the nature of Plaintiff’s cause

of action.

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s motion by the applicable deadline. However, at

the Rule 16 hearing held on December 6, Plaintiff requested and was granted an extension of the

deadline—until December 19, 2023—to file a response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. On

December 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a document titled, “More Definite Statement,” with the second

line being, “Motion for More Definite Statement, states as follows below.” See Doc. 21. In the

document, Plaintiff offers a more detailed recitation of facts of Plaintiff’s race, sex, and disability

discrimination claims; she does not specifically address the issue of exhaustion of administrative

remedies as to her race and sex discrimination claims. The deadline for Plaintiff to file a response

to the motion to dismiss has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed any other documents, so the Court

3 This appears to be a typographical error, given that the EEOC Charge was filed in June 2023; it

appears that the resignation occurred in 2022.

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filed a document titled, “Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for More Definite

Statement,” Doc. 23, apparently construing Plaintiff’s December 6 document as a motion for more

definite statement and asking the Court to deny it as procedurally improper.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may assert by motion

that a pleading “fail[s]to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When ruling on a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations in the

complaint, but it need not accept the legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must

make “all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usenko v. MEMC LLC, 926

F.3d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 2019). Additionally, “Where the allegations show on the face of the

complaint there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.”

Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000,

Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).

A complaint filed by a self-represented plaintiff should be “liberally construed” and “held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

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the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be

considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.

2015) (quotation marks omitted).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court generally must ignore

materials outside the pleadings, but it may consider some materials that are part of the public

record.” Blakley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 648 F.3d 921, 931 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Porous

Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)) (quotation and citation omitted).

The Eighth Circuit has held that “an EEOC charge is a public record which can be considered on

a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. Legal Standard for Motion for a More Definite Statement

Rule 12(e) provides that “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading

to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot

reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “A motion for more definite statement is

proper when a party is unable to determine issues he must meet, or where there is a major

ambiguity or omission in the complaint that renders it unanswerable.” Turner v. Ferriero, No.

4:22-CV-33 RLW, 2022 WL 13689791, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 21, 2022) (quoting Tinder v. Lewis

Cnty. Nursing Home Dist., 207 F. Supp. 2d 951, 959 (E.D. Mo. 2001)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Title VII Claims)

The Court first considers Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims (which,

reading Plaintiff’s Complaint broadly, include race discrimination and sex discrimination/sexual

harassment claims) must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies

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exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the EEOC. See, e.g., Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of

Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 989 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A Title VII plaintiff is “required to exhaust his [or her]

administrative remedies with the EEOC before bringing a formal action.”); Williams v. Spire, No.

4:23-CV-43 RLW, 2023 WL 6477973, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 5, 2023) (“Timely filing a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC or with the State or local agency is a precondition to suit under Title

VII and the ADA.”) (citing Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2012)).

See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The Eighth Circuit has explained that “[t]he reason for

requiring the pursuit of administrative remedies first is to provide the EEOC with an initial

opportunity to investigate allegations of employment discrimination and to work with the parties

toward voluntary compliance and conciliation.” Parisi v. Boeing Co., 400 F.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir.

2005).

To determine what federal claims a plaintiff exhausted, the Court looks to the boxes that

were checked on the EEOC charge and the narrative description of the allegations in the EEOC

charge. See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. of Educ., No. 4:19-CV-198 CAS, 2019 WL 3323028, at

*2 (E.D. Mo. July 24, 2019) (citing Blakley, 648 F.3d at 931, & Tyler, 628 F.3d at 989). “[A]

plaintiff will be deemed to have exhausted administrative remedies if the allegations of the judicial

complaint are like or reasonably related to the administrative charges that were timely brought.”

Wedow v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 672 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

The Court should “liberally construe an administrative charge for exhaustion of remedies

purposes”; however, “there is a difference between liberally reading a claim which lacks

specificity, and inventing, ex nihilo, a claim which simply was not made.” Sellers v. Deere & Co.,

791 F.3d 938, 943 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).

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from the face of the complaint and the EEOC charge, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.

See Richter, 686 F.3d at 851 (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of Title VII discrimination

claims in the complaint that were not alleged in the EEOC charge); Brooks v. Midwest Heart Grp.,

655 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).

A review of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge shows that Plaintiff alleged only disability

discrimination in her administrative proceeding. In the “DISCRIMINATION BASED ON” box,

she stated, “Disability”; she did not mention race or sexual harassment. In the narrative part of the

form, she described the nature of her employment, stated that she was diagnosed with a disability,

described incidents in which she was called “a dirty motherfucker,” and alleged that she was

constructively discharged due to the harassment. She concluded her narrative by stating, “I believe

that I have been discriminated against due to my disabilities in that I was harassed and

constructively discharged in violation of the Americans with Disability [sic] Act of 1990, as

amended.” She did not mention race, sex, or harassment of a sexual nature anywhere in the Charge

of Discrimination. The Court finds that even when Plaintiff’s EEOC charge is liberally construed,

Plaintiff’s race and sex discrimination claims under Title VII claims are not “like or reasonably

related to” the disability claim in the EEOC charge. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies with respect to her Title VII claims, and those claims must be dismissed.

The Court need not address Defendant’s alternative arguments in favor of dismissing those claims.

B. Disability Discrimination Claim

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim should be dismissed

because it was not properly pleaded under Rule 8, which requires “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), or Rule 10(b),

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as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Defendant points out that

Plaintiff’s Complaint uses a single sentence to state the facts that supposedly form the basis for

several different claims, without articulating which facts support which claims. Defendant also

argues that although the Complaint uses words and phrases such as “harass,” “assaulting

statements,” “defamation statements,” and “physically assaulting with sexual touches,” the

Complaint lacks facts regarding the who, what, when, where, and how of the statements and

conduct at issue. Defendant argues that it does not have fair notice of the claims asserted against

it and cannot adequately respond to the Complaint. Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the

Complaint, or in the alternative to require Plaintiff to file a more definite statement of her claims

pursuant to Rule 12(e).

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not comply with Rule

8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b). Her claims are not set forth in numbered paragraphs, as required by Rule

10(b); instead, she uses a single sentence to allege disability, race, and sex discrimination claims.

Her Complaint also does not contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” as required by Rule 8(a)(2). For example, although Plaintiff checked

the box indicating that she is asserting a disability claim, she does not allege that she is disabled,

does not allege that she has any mental or physical impairments, does not allege that Defendant or

Defendant’s employees were aware of her disability, does not allege any failure to provide

accommodations for her disability, and does not allege that any of the harassment or defamatory

statements she alleges occurred were related in any way to her disability. The Court agrees with

Defendant that the Complaint, as written, does not satisfy “the essential function of a complaint,”

which is “to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and

a general indication of the type of litigation involved.” See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,

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ambiguous, and has such significant omissions, that Defendant cannot reasonably prepare a

response to it.

In her response, which Plaintiff entitled “More Definite Statement,” Plaintiff included

some additional facts regarding her claims, including her claim of disability discrimination. It is

well established that a plaintiff may not add factual allegations to his or her Complaint through a

response to a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Turner v. Ferriero, No. 4:22-CV-33 RLW, 2022 WL

13689791, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 21, 2022) (“Plaintiff . . . cannot add factual allegations to her

Complaint with a legal memorandum.”); Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 954,

959 (D. Minn. 2000) (“When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court looks only to the factual

allegations in the complaint. Any allegations made in subsequent legal memoranda cannot correct

inadequacies within a complaint.”). However, in light of Plaintiff’s indication to the Court through

this filing that she may have additional facts she wants to present in support of her disability claim,

the Court finds that the appropriate action at this time is not to dismiss Plaintiff’s disability claim,

but to grant Defendant’s alternative motion for a more definite statement and allow Plaintiff to

amend her complaint.

If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with her claim of disability discrimination in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, she must file an amended complaint using a court-provided form.

See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A) (“All actions brought by self-represented plaintiffs or petitioners should

be filed on Court-provided forms where applicable.”). Because Plaintiff’s Title VII claims for race

discrimination, sex discrimination, and sexual harassment are being dismissed for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, her amended complaint should not include those claims.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint must comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and must contain sufficient allegations, set forth in numbered paragraphs, to give

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advised that the filing of the amended complaint completely replaces her original complaint, so

the amended complaint must include all factual allegations and claims Plaintiff wishes to assert.

See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) (“It is

well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint and renders the

original complaint without legal effect.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for More Definite Statement (Doc. 12), is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART, as follows.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., is GRANTED, and

Plaintiff’s claims for racial discrimination, sex discrimination, and sexual harassment are

DISMISSED.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of disability discrimination in violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42. U.S.C. §§ 120101, et seq., is

DENIED.

Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement on Plaintiff’s claim of disability

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42. U.S.C.

§§ 120101, et seq., is GRANTED. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue this claim, Plaintiff must file an

amended complaint consistent with the requirements set forth above no later than twenty-eight

(28) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order.

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If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on the court-provided form within

twenty-eight (28) days in accordance with the instructions set forth herein, the Court will

dismiss this action without prejudice and without further notice.

/ i J )

SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 16th day of January, 2024.

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