Opinion

Shivers v. Young

Court
District Court, E.D. Missouri
Filed
Mar 16, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.2%

stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
  • stating that § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”
  • stating that the essential function of a complaint “is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim”
  • stating that “while ordinarily, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered in determining whether it states a claim, materials attached to the complaint as exhibits may be considered in construing the sufficiency of the complaint”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

LEO RAY SHIVERS, )

Plaintiff,

Vv. No. 4:22-ev-01365-DDN

CHERYL YOUNG, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Leo Ray Shivers for leave to

commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee, (Docket No. 3), Having

reviewed the motion, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire

filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915¢b)(1).

Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will order plaintiff to file an amended

compiaint,

28 U.S.C, § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is

required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her

prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial

partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s

account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month

period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly

payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 - □

U.S.C, § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

ayments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00,

the filing fee is fully paid. dd.

In this case, plaintiff has failed to submit an inmate account statement as required by 28

S.C. § 1915(a)(2), stating that the jail has to request it from the company that is contracted to

n the canteen. (Docket No. 3 at 2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information contained in

motion, the Court will require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See

Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8® Cir, 1997) (explaining that when a prisoner is unable

the court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement, the court should assess

amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s □

If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his □

account statement in support of his claim,

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, To

dismissal, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a

re possibility of misconduct,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

sibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether

states a plausible claim for relief is 4 context-specific task that requires the reviewing

draw upon judicial experience and common sense. /d. at 679, The court must “accept as

facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

Supported by mere conclusory statements,” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 95 8, 964 (8® Cir,

See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 □□ Cir, 2016) (stating

that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true

any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it

the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal

construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should

construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within

the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8™ Cir, 2015). However, even

pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of

law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8" Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d

912, 914-15 (8" Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are

not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger

complaint”), In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not

mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes

by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Washington

County Jail in Potosi, Missouri. He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming

Records Officers Chery] Young and E. Moore as defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 2-3). Both are sued

in their individual capacities only. The complaint contains allegations that plaintiff has been held

in custody beyond the maximum release dates of his sentences, in violation of his constitutional

rights.

In the “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff asserts that on May 1, 2020, he “was released from

the Missouri Department of Corrections on parole,” (Docket No. 1 at 4). For reasons he does not

provide, plaintiff was returned to the Department of Corrections on January 8, 2021. Shortly

thereafter, plaintiff “received a new copy of [his] face sheet.” The calculations on the “new” face

sheet were not the same as on his prior face sheet, dated August 29, 2019. In particular, the

maximum release dates for his three cases were different, and purportediy added time to his

sentences. (Docket No. 1 at 4-5).

The August 29, 2019 face sheet shows that plaintiff’s first case is resisting arrest, for which

he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. (Docket No. 1 at 4). The calculation start date is

May 2, 2016, and the maximum release date May 1, 2020. The second case is leaving the scene of

a motor vehicle accident, for which plaintiff received three years’ imprisonment. (Docket No. 1 at

5). The calculation start date is January 1, 2019, and the maximum release date December 31,

2021. The third case is escape or attempted escape, for which plaintiff received three years’

imprisonment. The calculation start date is December 31, 2020, and the maximum release date

December 31, 2023.

According to plaintiff, at some point between May 1, 2020 and May 5, 2020, “the records

offices for the Missouri Probation and Parole [Board]” and the Missouri Department of Corrections

changed his face sheet, adding “days, weeks, months an[d] years to all 3 of [his] sentences.” These

changes were all reflected on a new face sheet dated May 5, 2020. (Docket No. 1 at 5-6),

On the newer face sheet, the calculation start date for his first case is May 1, 2020, and the

maximum release date is September 1, 2021. (Docket No. 1 at 6). The caiculation date for his

second case is September 1, 2021, while the maximum release date is May 1, 2023. Finally, the

calculation start date for his third case is May 1, 2023, while the maximum release date is April

30, 2026.

After setting out these differences, plaintiff provides further details as to the consequences

of these changes. To begin, he states that he was sent to the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and

Correctional Center on July 14, 2016. (Docket No. 1 at 7). Even before then, he “started the

sentence for” resisting arrest on May 2, 2016, with a maximum release date of May 1, 2020.

Plaintiff asserts that he served two years and eight months on that sentence, before it “was deferred

on January 1, 2019,” at which time he “started his sentence for leaving [the] scene of [a] motor

vehicle accident.” The maximum release date for plaintiff's leaving the scene of an accident

conviction was December 31, 2021. He served one year and four months of this sentence before

_ being released on parole on May 1, 2020. (Docket No. | at 7-8).

As previously noted, plaintiff was returned to the Department of Corrections on January 8,

2021, and received a new copy of his face sheet. (Docket No. | at 8). Upon receiving the new face

sheet, he noticed that it had changed from before.

Regarding plaintiff's sentence for resisting arrest, the start date changed from May 2, 2016

to May 1, 2020, while the maximum release date went from May 1, 2020 to September 1, 2021.

According to plaintiff, this meant that he had been “kept past his maximum release discharge date

by 1 year[,] 4 months[,] an[d] 1 day.” He alleges that this amounts to “over detention” and “false

imprisonment,” and that he should have been discharged on May 1, 2020.

Concerning his sentence for leaving the scene of an accident, plaintiff's start date changed

from January 1, 2019 to September 1, 2021, and his maximum discharge date was moved from

December 31, 2021 to May 1, 2023. (Docket No. 1 at 9). As such, plaintiff asserts that he has been

held eleven months and nineteen days past his maximum discharge date, resulting in “false

imprisonment.” .

With regard to his sentence for escape, plaintiff states that he should already have started

serving his sentence as of December 31, 2020, However, due to the Department of Corrections

and the Board of Probation and Parole, this sentence has not started.

The bottom line, according to plaintiff, is that he has been kept past his maximum discharge

date on his first two sentences, and has not even started serving the third. (Docket No. 1 at 11).

Mote specifically, he alleges that the Department of Corrections and the Board of Probation and

Parole has added one year, four months, and one day to his first sentence, and eleven months and

nineteen days to the second. (Docket No. 1 at 10). The escape sentence has not yet begun, because

“the sentence for leaving [the] scene of [a] motor vehicle accident [is still] active,” even though it

should not be. (Docket No. 1 at 11-12).

Plaintiff pays especially close attention to his sentence for leaving the scene of an accident,

pointing out that the August 29, 2019 face sheet had this particular sentence as “active.” (Docket

No. | at 12). On the May 5, 2020 face sheet, the sentence status had changed to “parole release.”

(Docket No. 1 at 13). The status changed once more on the January 28, 2021 face sheet, which

gave a status of “future.” Plaintiff insists this “can’t be, because [he] had already started it on

January 1, 2019 an{d] did 1 year[,] 4 months...on it, an[d] was paroled out on it.” A subsequent

face sheet dated April 27, 2021 had an “active” sentence status, with a maximum release date of

May 1, 2023, (Docket No. 1 at 14), Plaintiff claims that the maximum release date cannot be on

May 1, 2023, because that would be one year, four months, and one day past the maximum

discharge date indicated on his August 29, 2019 face sheet. He thus concludes that his sentence

for leaving the scene of an accident should have been discharged on December 31, 2021. (Docket

No. 1 at 14-15),

‘These recalculations occurred “some time between” May | and May 5, 2020, when plaintift

“left [the] Mobile Department of Corrections.”! (Docket No. 1 at 16). Plaintiff asserts that he never

received “an update from anyone” while on parole in 2020, and that he did not find out that his

maximum discharge dates had been changed until January 28, 2021. He contends that these

changes were made “at the records office in the Missouri Department of Corrections an[d] the

Missouri Board of Probation and Parole.”

Due to these alleged recalculations, plaintiff states he was falsely imprisoned on his

resisting arrest conviction, because he “was made to do an extra” one year, four months, and one

day on his four-year sentence. (Docket No. 1 at 17). Likewise, he claims false imprisonment with

regard to his leaving the scene of an accident conviction, because he has been made to do four

years, four months, and one day on a three-year sentence. In particular, plaintiff complains that

“this sentence is still active” even though it started on January 1, 2019.

With regard to Officer Young, plaintiff alleges that Young “failed to do their job.” (Docket

No. | at 19). At the very least, he asserts that Officer Young “knew how to pursue the parties or

agencies that could resolve the issues of [his] maximum discharge dates an[d] start dates.” Plaintiff

states that Officer Young “harmed [him] by not contacting the parties or agencies that could have

resolved the issues an[d] discharged [him] on the correct dates.” He also accuses her of over-

calculating his maximum discharge dates, and of failing to “fix what was done wrong or pursue

the parties or agencies that could resolve the issues.”

As to Officer Moore, plaintiff claims that Moore “failed to do the same thing as defendant

Cheryl Young,” and failed “to fix or pursue the parties or agencies that could resolve the issues,”

(Docket No. 1 at 20), Thus, he asserts that both defendants acted with deliberate indifference.

‘Tt appears that plaintiff is referring to the Moberly Correctional Center.

Plaintiff further states that both Officers Young and Moore had knowledge of his circumstances

because of a grievance he filed in February of 2021, and to which they responded on March 5,

2021, According to plaintiff, in their response, Officer Young and Officer Moore told him "that

no change will be made to [the] face sheet.”

Based on these facts, plaintiff states that he has suffered crue] and unusual punishment, that

defendants have been deliberately indifferent, that he has been deprived of due process of law, that

he has been deprived of liberty, and that he has been over-detained. (Docket No. 1 at 21), He

asserts that “defendants failed to [do] their part to timely release [him]...once the legal basis to

incarcerate [him] had expired.” (Docket No. 1 at 22). Plaintiff also contends that both Officer

Young and Officer Moor “were charged with the responsibility of examining prisoner’s records

for the purpose...of determining whether and when the prisoners were entitled to be released.”

(Docket No. 1 at 29).

Plaintiff is also upset that the records office at the Moberly Correctional Center changed

ail of his sentence calculations when he was released on parole, and did not give him notice.

(Docket No, 1 at 22-23). In addition, he believes that he “should have had the opportunity to

administratively challenge [the] determination in the changes of the dates,” but “he was not given

that opportunity.” (Docket No. 1 at 26).

Attached to the complaint are seven separate exhibits. The Court has reviewed these

exhibits and will treat them as part of the pleadings.” The first exhibit is a face sheet dated August

29, 2019. (Docket No, 1-5). The second is a face sheet dated May 5, 2020. (Docket No. 1-6). The

2 See also Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8® Cir. 2011) (stating that “while ordinarily, only the facts alleged

in the complaint are considered in determining whether it states a claim, materials attached to the complaint as exhibits

may be considered in construing the sufficiency of the complaint”); and Pratt v. Corrections Corp. of America, 124

Fed. Appx. 465, 466 (8" Cir. 2005) (explaining that “the district court was required to consider the allegations not

only in [plaintiff's] pro se complaint, but also in his motion to amend, his response to defendants’ motion to dismiss,

and the attachments to those pleadings”).

third is a face sheet dated January 28, 2021. (Docket No. 1-7). The fourth is a face sheet dated

April 27, 2021, (Docket No. 1-8). The fifth is a face sheet dated September 7, 2021, (Docket No.

1-9), The sixth is an interoffice communication from Officers Young and Moote, in which they go

through plaintiff's sentence calculations, and explain to him why his start dates and maximum

discharge dates are correct. (Docket No. 1-10). Finally, the last exhibit is an informal resolution

response in which plaintiff is advised that the records department reviewed his sentence, that it

found and corrected a mistake, and that his maximum discharge dates for his three sentences are

September 1, 2021, May 1, 2023, and April 30, 2026 respectively. (Docket No. 1-11),

As a result of his claimed over detention, plaintiff states that he has suffered a loss of

liberty, as well as emotional distress. (Docket No. 1 at 31). He seeks an injunctive order to force

the “Missouri Department of Corrections Records Office to discharge [him] on the correct

discharge date of December 31, 2021 of the crime of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle

accident.” (Docket No. 1 at 37), Plaintiff also requests compensatory damages. (Docket No. 1 at

37-38).

Discussion

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging that his original sentence calculations were changed upon his return from parole.

Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has reviewed his complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court has determined that

the complaint is subject to dismissal. However, plaintiff will be directed to file an amended

complaint.

A. Deficiencies in Complaint

Plaintiff's complaint is deficient and subject to dismissal because he has not adequately

stated individual capacity claims against defendants Young and Moore. Individual liability in a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8" Cir. 2017). In other

words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” SAL □□

Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8" Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability “requires a causal link to,

and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132

(8"" Cir, 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8" Cir. 1990)). See also Kohj

v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8" Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff's excessive bail claims because

none of the defendants set plaintiffs bail, and therefore, “there can be no causal connection

between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged deprivation” of plaintiff's ri ghts).

To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the challenged action. See

Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8" Cir. 2019).

Here, plaintiff has not presented facts demonstrating the personal responsibility of Officer

Young and Officer Moore for violating his constitutional rights. In the complaint, plaintiff asserts

that both Officers Young and Moore either miscalculated his sentences themselves, or failed to

correct calculations made by others. Regardless of the theory he pursues, he has failed to present

any facts establishing that the recalculation of his start dates and maximum discharge dates was

improper or violative of the constitution.

Most of plaintiffs seventy-two-page complaint is spent repeatedly asserting that his

sentence calculations changed from the time he was released on parole, and then returned to the

Department of Corrections. His facts undoubtedly establish that the dates on his August 29, 2019

face sheet are different from the dates on his May 5, 2020 face sheet. What he has not done,

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however, is present any facts showing this recalculation to be incorrect. To be sure, plaintiff claims

his constitutional rights have been violated, but he advances no factual allegations to support that

conclusion. “While the court must accept allegations of fact as true...the court is free to ignore

legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868,

870 (8" Cir. 2002).

Not only has plaintiff failed to provide facts indicating that the recalculation of his

sentences was wrongful, his own exhibits — which are made part of the pleadings — belie the

contention. The informal resolution response, for instance, states that the “records department [has]

reviewed [his] sentence,” corrected two mistakes, and affirms the maximum discharge dates that

appear on his May 5, 2020 face sheet. (Docket No. 1-11). Further explanation is provided by a

memorandum sent to plaintiff and apparently authored by defendants. (Docket No. 1-10). In that

memorandum, the caiculation of plaintiff's start dates, conditional release dates, and maximum

discharge dates are set forth in detail. From this document, it appears that the recalculation of

plaintiffs sentences occurred due to deferred time being added back to his sentence upon his return

from parole.

In short, plaintiffs facts show that the calculation of his start dates and maximum discharge

dates changed, but fails to support the proposition that these changes violated his constitutional

rights, or were in any way wrongful. Meanwhile, the exhibits plaintiff has attached show that the

recalculations of which he complains are correct. For these reasons, plaintiff has not stated

individual capacity claims against Officer Young and Officer Moore.

au

Rather than dismissing outright, the Court will give plaintiff the opportunity to file an

amended complaint, according to the instructions set forth below. Plaintiff must follow these

instructions.

B. Amendment Instructions

Plaintiff should type or neatly print his amended complaint on the Court’s civil rights form,

which will be provided to him. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A) (“ALL actions brought by self-

represented plaintiffs or petitioners should be filed on Court-provided forms”). If the amended

complaint is handwritten, the writing must be legible.

In the “Caption” section of the Court-provided form, plaintiff should clearly name each

and every party he is intending to sue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a} (“The title of the complaint must

name all the parties’). If there is not enough room in the caption, plaintiff may add additional

sheets of paper. However, all the defendants must be clearly listed.

Plaintiff should put his case number in the appropriate location on the upper right-hand

section of the first page. He should then fill out the complaint form in its entirety, and ensure that

it is signed.

In the “Statement of Claim” section, plaintiff should provide a short and plain statement of

the factual allegations supporting his claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff should put each

claim into a numbered paragraph, and each paragraph should be “limited as far as practicable to a

single set of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ, P. 10(b).

The amended complaint should only include claims that arise out of the same transaction

or occurrence. In other words, plaintiff should only include claims that are related to each other,

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Alternatively, plaintiff may choose a single defendant and set forth

as many claims as he has against that defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).

12

In structuring his amended complaint, plaintiff should begin by writing the defendant’s

name. In separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, plaintiff should write a short and plain

statement of the factual allegations supporting his claim against that specific defendant. If plaintiff

is suing more than one defendant, he should follow the same procedure for cach defendant.

Plaintiff must specify whether he intends to sue each defendant in an official capacity, an

individual capacity, or both. The failure to sue a defendant in his or her individual capacity may

result in the dismissal of that defendant.

If plaintiff is suing a defendant in an individual capacity, he is required to allege facts

demonstrating the personal responsibility of the defendant for harming him, See Madewell v.

Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8" Cir. 1990) (stating that § 1983 liability “requires a causal link

to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights”). Furthermore, the Court emphasizes

that the “Statement of Claim” requires more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action.” See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8 Cir.

2017).

If plaintiff is suing multiple defendants, it is important that he establish the responsibility

of each separate defendant for harming him. That is, for each defendant, plaintiff must allege facts

showing how that particular defendant’s acts or omissions violated his constitutional rights, It is

not enough for plaintiff to make general allegations against all the defendants as a group. Rather,

plaintiff needs to provide the role of each named defendant in this case, in order that each specific

defendant can receive notice of what he or she is accused of doing. See Topchian v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8" Cir. 2014) (stating that the essential function of a

complaint “is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim”).

13

Plaintiff is warned that the filing of an amended complaint completely replaces the

original complaint. This means that claims that are not re-alleged in the amended complaint will

be deemed abandoned. See In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 396 F.3d 922, 928

Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint

and renders the original complaint without legal effect”).

After receiving the amended complaint, the Court will review it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915. Plaintiff's failure to make specific factual allegations against a defendant will result in the

dismissal of that defendant. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on a Court-provided

form within thirty days in accordance with the instructions set forth herein, the Court will dismiss

this action without prejudice and without further notice to plaintiff.

C. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Docket No. 2). In civil cases, a pro

se litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel. Ward v. Smith,

721 F.3d 940, 942 (8" Cir. 2013). Rather, a district court may appoint counsel in a civil case if the

court is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim...and where the

nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the assistance of

counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8 Cir. 2018). When determining whether to

appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors such as the complexity

of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting

testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant to present his or her claim. Phillips v. Jasper Cty.

Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8" Cir. 2006).

After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not

warranted at this time. Plaintiff has demonstrated, at this point, that he can adequately present his

14

claims to the Court. Additionally, the Court has determined that this action is subject to dismissal,

and has directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The Court will entertain future motions

for appointment of counsel as the case progresses, if appropriate.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket

No. 3) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00

within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance

payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an original

proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Docket

No, 2) is DENIED at this time.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send to plaintiffa copy of the

Court’s prisoner civil rights complaint form.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall file an amended complaint on the Court

form within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, in accordance with the instructions set forth

above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint on the

Court form within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, in accordance with the instructions

set for above, this action shall be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice.

15

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of plaintiff's amended complaint, the

Court will review it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

btn

Dated this /G day of , 2023,

kK erice Wren

DAVID D. NOCE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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