Opinion

Watkins v. City of St. Louis, Missouri

Court: District Court, E.D. Missouri
Filed: Sep 28, 2022
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 24.2%

local government may be liable for failure to train or supervise police use of force if the city’s failure to act demonstrated Connick v. Thompson Canton “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact”

How later courts described this case

local government may be liable for failure to train or supervise police use of force if the city’s failure to act demonstrated Connick v. Thompson Canton “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact”
denial of qualified Walker immunity reversed where plaintiff “has not offered a single authority” to show that the defendant violated a clearly established law
noting in a case where the Eighth Amendment violation was “obvious” that there need not be a materially similar case for the right to be clearly essetea bGlrisahheadm
holding that two or three instances a year apart is not a custom

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

SARAH WATKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. 4:21-cv-01344-SEP

)

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al., )

)

Defendants. MEM ORAND U )M AND ORDER

Before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendant City of St. Louis, Doc. 7;

Defendants Metcalf, Thompson, Baker, Colombo, and Morris (collectively, the “Individual

Defendants”), Doc. 11; and Defendants Baker, Colombo, and Morris, Doc. 38. For the reasons

set forth below, the motions filed by the City and the Individual Defendants are granted, and

the motion filed by Baker, ColomboF,A aCnTdS AMNoDr BriAs CiKs GdReOnUieNdD as moot.

Plaintiff Sarah Watkins brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of St.

Louis and St. Louis International Airport Police officers Andrew Metcalf, Bryant Morris,

See

Darryl Baker, Justin Colombo, and Anthony Thompson, for violation of her rights protected

by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Doc. 1 ¶A¶. 2T6h-4e7 D. e cember 24th Incident

At 9:00 PM on December 24, 2016, Plaintiff, a 230-pound, 29-year-old female, was

driving near the St. Louis Lambert International Airport when Officer Metcalf stopped her

vehicle for an alleged traffic violation. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15-16. Metcalf informed the Airport Police

Id.

Department of the stop and Officers Morris, Baker, Colombo, and Thompson arrived soon

after to assist. ¶ 17.

The Complaint also names OffiSceeer Frederick Thompson, but Frederick Thompson was granted

summary judgment because it was uncontested that he was not on duty on the date in question and

was not involved in the incident. Doc. 44.

2 See Neitzke v. Williams

The facts are taken from the Complaint and, for the purposes of these motions to dismiss, are

Due to the order of the allegations and the Complaint’s lack of detail about each

Id.

party’s alleged actions, the chronology of events is not clear. At some point, Metcalf ordered

id.

Plaintiff to exit her vehicle and then handcuffed her at the rear of her vehicle. ¶¶ 19-20.

Id.

Apparently believing that Plaintiff was resisting arrest, ¶ 23, Metcalf “yelled” at Plaintiff

her his own Id.

and “forced her into the front of her vehicle.” ¶ 20. At some point after forcing Plaintiff

into vehicle, Metcalf attempted to force Plaintiff into vehicle. ¶ 20. As that

Id.

happened, “Defendant Officers sprayed her with pepper spray and repeatedly hit her on the

Id.

leg with a baton.” ¶ 20. “Defendant Officers continued to pepper spray and hit [her] while

she was restrained and pinned in the front seat of Officer Metcalf’s car . . . .” ¶ 21.

Apparently at some later point, one, several, or all of the officers “pepper sprayed and hit

Id.

[Plaintiff] while she was on the ground,” and while one, several, or all of the officers “were

present and available to maneuver and otherwise secure [her] cooperation.” ¶ 22. No

allegation imputes any specific action to any Individual Defendant other than Officer Metcalf.

No allegation describes Plaintiff’s demeanor or conduct during the incident.

At some point, having “secured [Plaintiff’s] cooperation,” the officers transported

Id.

Plaintiff to the Airport police station and offered to transport her to the “emergency room”

for treatment. ¶ 24. Plaintiff apparently declined their offer and was instead treated at

Id.

“urgent care” for “lacerations and bruising to her leg,” as well as “pain and injuries caused to

her faceB a. nTdh beo Cdoy.m” pla ¶in 2t5 .

Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth two counts. In Count I, Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages against the Individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on allegations that they unlawfully seized, assaulted, and brutalized

her in violation of her rights secured by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution. In Count II, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the City

of St. Louis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on the basis that the City had a policy or custom, or it

failed to train or supervise its officers, which caused Plaintiff to be deprived of her

constitutional rights by the Individual Defendants as described above.

C. Procedural Background

On January 25, 2022, the City filed a motion to dismiss Count II pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Doc. 7. That motion is fully

briefed.

On February 16, 2022, all six Individual Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss

Count I pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and (6) for insufficient service of process and failure to

state a claim, respectively. Doc. 11. On March 18 , Plaintiff filed her memorandum in

opposition to that motion, which effectively conceded the Individual Defendants’ ineffective

service of process argument but argued that the Court should grant her an extension of time

to effectuate service. Doc. 22 at 4-7. The Court informed Plaintiff that any request for an

extension of time must be made in its own motion, and on May 23 , Plaintiff filed a consent

motion for extension of time to effectuate service of process. Doc. 28. The Court granted

that motion on May 24 and gave Plaintiff additional time to properly serve the Individual

Defendants. Doc. 29.

On June 28 , Defendants Morris, Baker, and Colombo filed a second motion to

dismiss. Doc. 38. That second motion raises a new Rule 12(b)(5) argument, but neither

See

party made any alterations to the Rule 12(b)(6) arguments made in the briefing of the first

motion to dismiss. Docs. 39, 41. Accordingly, as to the June 28 Morris, Baker, and

Colombo motion to dismiss, the Court addresses only the argument for dismissal under Rule

12(b)(5). LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is

Neitzke

to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

assumes the factual allegations of a complaint are true, ,490 U.S. at 326-27, and draws

all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, , 588 F.3d

585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Bell

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a

Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly,

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In

the Supreme Court explained that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that

accord Ashcroft v.

a complaint contain ”more than labels and conclusions,” and that “a formulaic recitation of

Iqbal, Ashcroft v. Iqbal

556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In , the Supreme Court reiterated that

Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

Twombly

accusation,” and that “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not

suffice. 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting , 550 at 557) (quotation marks omitted).

Id.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

Twombly,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” at 678 (quoting

550 U.S. at 570). The issue in considering such a motion is not whether the plaintiff

See Twombly

has proven the claim or whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff

is entitled to engage in the discovery necessary to support the claim. , 550 U.S.

at 556. DISCUSSION

I. The Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11)

The Individual Defendants move to dismiss Count I under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Doc. 11.

Count I brings § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual and official

capacities for violating Plaintiff’s rights secured by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 26-35. As set forth below, all

claims iAn. CPoulanitn It iwffi’lsl boef fdicisimali-scsaepda. city claims against the Individual Defendants are

redundant of her claim against the City.

Banks v. Slay

“A core tenet of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence is that an official-capacity suit against

an individual is really a suit against that official’s government entity.” , 875 F.3d

Stockley v. Joyce

876, 878 (8th Cir. 2017). “Thus, the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is not the

Hafer v. Melo

named official, but the government entity.” , 2019 WL 630049, at *26 (E.D.

Mo. Feb. 14, 2019) (citing , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). “It is proper for a court to

dismiss a claim against a government officer in his official capacity as duplicative or

redundant if the claims are also asserted against the officer’s governmental employer.”

Defendants Morris, Baker, and Colombo brought a separate motioSne eto dismiss Plaintiff’s official-

capacity claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) on the grounds

that Plaintiff has not properly served them in their official capacity. Doc. 3 9 at 2-3. Because the

official-capacity claims against the Individual Defendants are dismissed as redundant, Morris, Baker,

Caruso v. City of St. Louis Veatch v.

Bartels Lutheran Home

, 2016 WL 6563472, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 4, 2016) (citing

, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010)). Because Plaintiff has asserted

a claim based on the same occurrence against both the Individual Defendants and their

governmental employer, the City of St. Louis, her redundant official-capacity claims against

the IndBiv.i dPulaali Dnetiffefns’d ianndtsiv airdeu saul-bcjaecpta tcoi tdyi scmlaiismsasl .a lso fail.

see

The Individual Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed because Plaintiff

see id.

fails to state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Doc. 12 at 12-13; Plaintiff fails

to state a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, at 11-12; and the

see

Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity against Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment cl1a.i mP, lain Dtioffc .d 1o2e sa tn 7o-t1 p1l.e aTdh ea C colauirmt c foonrs cidoenrssp eiraachcy a urgnudmere n4t2 i nU .tSu.Crn. . 1985.

The Complaint states that the Individual Defendants are being sued “under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1985, and 1988,” and that Plaintiff’s “actions arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,

and 1988.” Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) does allow Plaintiff to sue state actors for

conspiracy to deprive her of her federally protected civil rights. Although the Complaint does

not expressly set forth a claim against the Individual Defendants for conspiracy under

§ 1985, Plaintiff does allege that “officers of the Airport Police Department and Public Safety

Department conspire with one another to cover for and protect one another from criminal

and/or civil sanctions that might arise from the violation of constitutional rights of a citizen

through weak oversight of officer use of force.” Doc. 1 ¶ 38(b).

The Individual Defendants argue that, “to the extent that it attempts to plead a claim

of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,” the Complaint “fails to state a cause of action upon

which relief can be granted.” Doc. 12 at 12. According to Plaintiff, however, “[she] never

raised a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim”; the allegations regarding a conspiracy among the City’s

officers relate only to the claims against the City in Count II. Doc. 22 at 11. Because Plaintiff

has expressly disclaimed a § 1985 claim, to the extent that the Complaint could be construed

as alleging one, that claim is dismissed.

2. Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth

Amendments.

Count I is titled “Violation of Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Doc. 1 at 7. Plaintiff alleges that the

Id.

Individual Defendants used excessive force, assaulted, brutalized, and unreasonably seized

her in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ¶¶ 27, 28. Plaintiff does not

connect any specific allegation to the Eighth Amendment; she simply asserts that she was

deprived of her rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive use of force, and

Id.

to have her serious medical needs addressed, “in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments.” ¶ 33. Plaintiff also alleges that the Individual Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to her constitutional rights because they failed to exercise proper

crisis management; used pepper spray and a baton after she had been restrained in order to

obtain “pain compliance”; “[kept] her on the ground before, during, and after using pepper

Id.

spray and a baton”; and failed to take reasonable measures to abate the “aforementioned

risks and the conda i. t ioT nh se [ PE li ag ih nt th i fA f]m se un ffd em ree dn t fr d oo mes .” n ot a ¶p 2p 9ly . t o Plaintiff’s claims because she

was not convicted of a crime or incarcerated at the time of the incident.

The Eighth Amendment provides that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend.

VIII. “The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of

Wilson v. Seiter

the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on

those convicted of crimes.” , 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991) (internal quotations

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

marks and citation omitted). It also “requires the State to provide adequate medical care to

incarcerated persons.” , 489 U.S. 189 (1989)

(citation omitted). But the Eighth Amendment itself does not apply until “after the State has

complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal

prosecutions, [because] the State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eight

Id. Ingraham v. Wright

Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in

accordance with due process of law.” at 199, n. 6 (quoting , 430 U.S.

651, 671-72 n. 40 (1977) (cleaned up)). Because Plaintiff does not allege that she was

convicted of a crime or incarcerated at the time of the incident, her claims do not arise under

the Eighth Amendb m. enT th . e Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims because

they must be brought under the Fourth Amendment.

Where “a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such

as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard

County of Sacramento v. Lewis United States v. Lanier

appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”

A ll

, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998) (quoting , 520

U.S. 259, 272, n.7 (1997)). “[ ] claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive

force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a

Graham v. Connor

free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’

standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.” , 490

see

U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants are based on

allegations that they “used excessive force” when they “unreasonably seized” her, Doc. 1

See Lewis

¶¶ 27, 28, and are thus covered by the Fourth Amendment. For that reason, she cannot bring

Graham

a substantive due process claim predicated on the same facts. , 523 U.S. at 843;

, 490 U3.S. . aPtl a3i9n5t.i f f ’s Fourth Amendment claims are barred by qualified immunity.

The Individual Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless their

Burnikel v. Fong Harlow v. Fitzgerald

conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable official would have known.”

, 886 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing , 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). “To defeat qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to prove: ‘(1) the

facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a

Wilson v. Lamp Howard v. Kansas City Police

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the

Dep’t

deprivation.” , 901 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir. 2018) (

Morgan v. Robinson

, 570 F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009)). “Unless both of these questions are answered

Nord v. Walsh City

affirmatively, [a defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.” , 920 F.3d

521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting , 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir.

2014)). “The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to

Hemminghaus v. Missouri Pearson v. Callahan

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”

, 756 F.3d 1100, 1110 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting ,

555 U.S. 223, 236 a (2. 0P 0l 9a )i )n .t i ff has not successfully alleged a violation of her Fourth

Amendment rights.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable seizures,” U.S.

See Torres v. Madrid

Const. amend IV, and the use of excessive force during an arrest constitutes an unreasonable

seizure. , 141 S. Ct. 989, 1003 (2021). “In a § 1983 case, an official is

Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail

only liable for his own misconduct,” and is not liable for the misconduct of others, even if

Iqbal

they are his agents. , 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting

, 556 U.S. at 677-78) (cleaned up). The Court must therefore “examine each Individual

Leonard v. St. Charles Cnty. appeal filed

Defendants’ own actions to determine whether he . . . violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

Pitts v. City of Cuba

rights.” , 570 F. Supp. 3d 707, 718 (E.D. Mo. 2021), ,

No. 21-3755 (8th Cir. Dec. 2, 2021) (citing , 913 F. Supp. 2d 688, 708 (E.D.

Mo. 2012)).

The only Individual Defendant to whom specific allegations are directed is Officer

id.

Metcalf. Plaintiff alleges that Metcalf stopped her vehicle “for an alleged traffic violation,”

id. id.

Doc. 1 ¶ 16; called in the traffic stop, ¶ 17; asked Plaintiff to step to the rear of the vehicle,

id.

¶ 19; handcuffed her, yelled at her, and “forced her into the front of her vehicle”; ¶ 20;

and then “forc[ed] [her] into [his own] vehicle,” ¶ 20. Plaintiff does not dispute that she

committed the traffic violation, which would have provided probable cause for the stop, nor

United States v. Frasher

does she claim that the traffic stop was made without “reasonable, articulable suspicion [of]

United States v. Jones

criminal activity”—the minimum requirement for a traffic stop. , 632

F.3d 450, 453 (2011) (quoting , 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Therefore, Plaintiff has provided no basis for a reasonable factfinder to infer that Metcalf’s

traffic stop constituted an unreasonable seizure.

All other material allegations in the Complaint refer only to “Officer Defendants” and

do not specify which Defendant did what. Setting aside Plaintiff’s failure to allege each

Individual Defendant’s conduct with specificity, she still does not allege facts that, viewed in

the light most favorable to her, demonstrate an unreasonable seizure.

Plaintiff alleges that after Metcalf stopped her vehicle, ordered her to the rear of the

vehicle, handcuffed her, and “forc[ed] her into the front of her vehicle,” “Defendant Officers

sprayed her with pepper spray and repeatedly hit her on the leg with a baton.” Doc. 1 ¶¶ 19-

20. Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendant Officers pepper sprayed and hit [her] while she was

id.

on the ground and when Defendant Officers were present and available to maneuver and

otherwise secure [her] cooperation,” ¶ 22; and “Defendant Officers continued to pepper

id.

spray and hit [her] while she was restrained and pinned in the front seat of Officer Metcalf’s

id.

car,” ¶ 21. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Officers used pepper spray and a baton

“without provocation,” ¶ 20, but also that Defendant Officers did so because they believed

id.

she was “resist[ing] arrest,” . ¶ 23, and that it was necessary to “secure [her] cooperation,”

¶ 22.

“It is well-established that ‘the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop

Chambers v. Pennycook Graham

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof

to effect it.” , 641 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 490

Id.

U.S. at 396). Because Officer Metcalf had the right to make an investigatory stop, “some

degree of physical coercion or threat thereof” was reasonable to effectuate the stop.

“An officer’s use of force violates the Fourth Amendment when it is objectively

unreasonable, given the facts and circumstances of the particular case, as ‘judged from the

Id. Graham

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.’” at 905-06 (quoting , 490 U.S. at 396-97). “[T]he calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

Kisela v.

make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

Hughes Graham

evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (quoting , 490 U.S. at 396-97). “Not every push

Taylor v. Holtmeyer

or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates

Peterson v. Kopp Graham

the Fourth Amendment.” , 183 F. Supp. 3d 962, 970 (D. Neb. 2016) (citing

, 754 F.3d 594, 600 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting , 490 U.S. at 396))).

When determining whether an officer’s use of force was unreasonable, courts look “to the

specific circumstances, such as the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is actively

Taylor

Peterson

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” , 183 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (citing

, 754 F.3d at 600).

McManemy v. Tierney

The Complaint provides no basis for the Court to infer that the Individual Defendants’

Rokusek v. Jansen

actions were not “proportionate to the situation.” , 2018 WL 5269819,

Carpenter v. Gage

at *7 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 23, 2018) (comparing , 899 F.3d 544, 547-48 (8th Cir.

2018), with , 686 F.3d 644, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2012)). The Complaint does

not allege, for example, that Plaintiff was nonviolent, that the offense for which she was

initially stopped was minor, that she posed no threat to the officers or others, or that she was

not resisting arrest or trying to flee. Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate, at best, a tense

situation where some level of force was necessary, but precisely how much cannot be

determined with any degree of certainty.

For example, Plaintiff alleges that Metcalf “forc[ed]” her into his vehicle, Doc. 1 ¶ 20,

but she neglects to allege any facts about her own conduct at that time. Without knowing

what Plaintiff’s conduct was, it is impossible to plausibly infer that Metcalf’s force was

unreasonable in response thereto. She also alleges that “Defendant Officers sprayed her with

pepper spray and repeatedly hit her on the leg with a baton,” including when “she was on

the ground,” but again does not provide any facts about her own conduct at that time.

Plaintiff does assert that the Individual Defendants sprayed her with pepper spray and hit

Twombly

her with a baton “without provocation,” Doc. 1 ¶ 20, but that is a “wholly conclusory

statement” with no factual support, , 550 U.S. at 561. Whether there was sufficient

provocation to justify the Individual Defendants’ use of force is the very question of law that

the objective reasonableness test is meant to address. Plaintiff has alleged no facts from

which the Court could infer a lack of provocation. Aside from an implicit admission that

Individual Defendants had to “secure [her] cooperation,” Plaintiff is silent as to her own

conduct.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Officers continued to pepper spray and hit

[her] while she was restrained and pinned in the front seat of Officer Metcalf’s car . . . .” .

¶ 21. She does not explain in what manner she was “restrained” or why she was “pinned,”

however. And she again neglects to describe her own conduct at the time. Considering

Plaintiff’s affirmative allegations—including that it was necessary for the officers to “secure

allegations relating to her own conduct, it is impossible to evaluate whether the Individual

Defendants’ use of force was unreasonable in response thereto.

Assuming all of Plaintiff’s allegations to be true and giving her the benefit of every

reasonable inference, she provides no basis for a reasonable factfinder to find that the

See Chambers

Individual Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by using an objectively

unreasonable amob u. ntP ola fi fn ot rif cf e h ua ns dfa ei rl e td h eto c im rce ue mt h se tar nb cu er sd . e n to show that , t 6h 4e 1 I n Fd .3i dvi d atu a 9l 0

Defendants violated a clearly established right.

White v. Pauly

Qualified immunity exists to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” , 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (citation omitted).

“[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law in [2016] gave [the Individual

Hope v. Pelzer

Defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [Plaintiff] was unconstitutional.”

the plaintiff bears the burden

, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).

Graham v.

Importantly, to show that the defendant’s conduct

Barnette accord Walker v. Wallace

violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Sparr v. Ward

, 5 F.4th 872, 887 (2021); , 881 F.3d 1056, 1060 (8th Cir.

2018); , 306 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2002). “To demonstrate the law is ‘clearly

Sparr Anderson v. Creighton

established,’ the plaintiff must show a ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is

accord Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna

doing violate[s] plaintiff’s rights.’” , 306 F.3d at 593 (quoting ,

Mullenix v. Luna

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); , 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) (per

curiam) (quoting , 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). Although case law

Rivas-

directly on point is not necessary to demonstrate that the law is clearly established, “existing

Villegas White

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”

Id.

, 142 S. Ct. at 8 (quoting , 137 S. Ct. at 551). “This inquiry ‘must be undertaken

Brosseau v. Haugen

in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” (quoting

, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). “Specificity is especially important in the

Fourth Amendment context, where it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how

Id. Mullenix

the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer

confronts.” (quoting , 577 U.S. at 12).

As the Eighth Circuit and this Court have routinely held, to satisfy the second prong

Graham Boudoin v. Harsson

involves sufficiently similar facts to squarely govern the officers’ conduct in the specific

circumstances at issue,” , 5 F.4th at 887 (quoting , 962 F.3d 1034,

id. De

1040 (8th Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up), “or, in the absence of binding precedent, . . . present a

La Rosa v. White See also District of

robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority constituting settled law,” (quoting

Columbia v. Wesby 4

, 852 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up).

, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018) (defendant officers entitled to qualified

immunity where “[t]ellingly, neither the panel majority nor the [plaintiffs] have identified a

single precedent—much less a controlling case or robust consensus of cases—finding a

Lewis v. City of St. Louis

Fourth Amendment violation under similar circumstances”) (quotation marks and citation

omitted); , 932 F.3d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 2019) (denial of qualified

Walker

immunity reversed where plaintiff “has not offered a single authority” to show that the

defendant violated a clearly established law); , 881 F.3d at 1061-62 (where single

case presented by plaintiffs is factually distinguishable, “plaintiffs have not carried their

burden to show that the unconstitutional nature of [the defendant officer’s] conduct was

clearly established”).

Here, Plaintiff has categorically failed to carry her burden to show that the Individual

Defendants violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Not only has she failed to identify a case on point; she has identified no case at all. Moreover,

qualified immunity federal law

although the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss specifically raised the defense of

—which immunizes state actors from certain claims under —

official immunity

Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition argues that the Individual Defendants are not entitled

state law See Rhea v. Sapp

to —a Missouri common-law doctrine that immunizes state actors from

certain claims under . Doc. 22 at 12-13 (citing , 463 S.W.3d 370,

4 Brosseau Hope

The unlawfulness of conduct can also be deemed clearly established in “an obvious case, . . . even

without a body of relevant case law.” , 543 U.S. at 199 (citing , 536 U.S. at 738 (noting

in a case where the Eighth Amendment violation was “obvious” that there need not be a materially

similar case for the right to be clearly essetea bGlrisahheadm)). When confronted with “extreme circumstances”

and “particularly egregious facts,” “aT gaeynloerr va.l Rcioonjasstitutional rule”—such as the Fourth Amendment’s

oHbojpeective unreasonableness standard, , 490 U.S. at 388—“may apply with obvious clarity

to the specific conduct in question.” , 141 S. Ct. 52, 53-54 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting

, 536o bUv.iSo. uastl y741). But this is Sneoet saunp r“ao bvious case,” because Plaintiff has not alleged facts from

which a reasonable factfinder could find that the Individual Defendants’ conduct was unreasonable,

State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf

Mauzy v. Mexico Sch. Dist. No. 59

375-76 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015); , 706 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc

1986); , 878 F. Supp. 153, 156 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (applying

Harlow

Missouri’s doctrine of official immunity to state-law claims)). Plaintiff’s Opposition does not

acknowledge the well-known two-factor test, nor does she attempt to satisfy the

second prong of that test by arguing that the Individual Defendants’ conduct violated a

clearly established law. Plaintiff has failed to undertake even a minimal effort to carry her

burden.

Because Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to show that the Individual

Defendants violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation,

the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in

CIIo. unt IT mhues Ct itthye oref fSotr.e L boeu idsi’ssm Misosteido.n to Dismiss (Doc. 7)

In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against the City based on

the Individual Defendants’ alleged violations of her constitutionally protected rights.

id.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the City had an unconstitutional policy or custom, Doc. 1

id.

¶ 37; failed to implement proper policies, ¶ 38(f); and failed to instruct, train, supervise

id.

or discipline its officers, ¶ 38(e), (g); and that the City’s failure caused the Individual

Defendants to use excessive force and injure Plaintiff, ¶ 46. The City argues that Count II

should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for

municipal liability under § 1983.

To establish § 1983 liability against a municipality, “a plaintiff must show that a

Moyle v. Anderson Monell v. Dep’t

constitutional violation was committed pursuant to an official custom, policy, or practice of

of Soc. Servs. of City of New York

the government entity.” , 571 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009);

, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[I]t is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or

acts may fairly be said to rep resent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as

5 see

Puzzlingly, although the Individual Defendants thoroughly outlined Plaintiff’s errors in their

Memorandum in Reply, Doc. 24 at 5-7, Plaintiff did not seek leave to correct them. Moreover,

months later, after Defendants Morris, Baker, and Colombo filed their second motion to dismiss—

which included the exact same qualified immunity arguments as their first motion—Plaintiff re-filed

the same deficient arguments in response. Doc. 41 at 8-9. Plaintiff thus had two bites at the apple

See City of Canton v. Harris

an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). A municipality may also be liable for its failure to

act. , 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (local government may be liable

for failure to train or supervise police use of force if the city’s failure to act demonstrated

Connick v. Thompson Canton

“deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact”);

Brady

, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (applied to prosecutors, but held that a

Brady

single violation was insufficient to show deliberate indifference or conscious

disregard for defendants’ rights). Thus, to establish § 1983 liability against a

municipality, the “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation resulted from (1) an

Aldridge v. City of St. Louis

official policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or

Mick v. Raines

supervise.” , 2019 WL 1695982, at * 9 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2019)

Conley

(citing , 883 F.3d 1075, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018)).

Monell

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff appears to have mistakenly relied on certain -

Monell See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of

era cases to support the proposition that she need not allege a factual basis for her

Norfolk Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp.

claim against the City. Doc. 20 at 5 (citing