Bell v. Scroggins

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES WALLACE BELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:21-cv-00162 SEP

)

UNKNOWN SCROGGINS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Charles Wallace Bell’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis. Doc. 2. Having reviewed the Motion and the financial information submitted

in support, the Court will grant the Motion and waive the initial partial filing fee in this matter.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Upon review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court will

dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis

must pay the full amount of the filing fee. If he has insufficient funds in his prison account to

pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee

of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2)

the average monthly balance in the account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the

initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the

preceding month’s income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having

custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the

amount in his account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Cape Girardeau County Jail. Doc. 1 at 2. He filed a

handwritten ‘Motion and Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed as a Poor Person,’

indicating that he has no income or assets. Doc. 2. In a November 18, 2021, letter, Plaintiff

stated that he has been unable to obtain a six-month inmate account statement from the Cape

Girardeau County Jail, despite requesting one. Doc. 3. Based on the information provided, the

Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When

reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court

accepts well-pled facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and liberally

construes the complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That means that, if the

essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court construes the plaintiff’s complaint in a

way that permits the claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v.

Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). But even self-represented plaintiffs must allege facts

that, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286

(8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply

additional facts or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).

A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although a

plaintiff need not allege facts in painstaking detail, the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. That standard “demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at

679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pled facts but need not accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

THE COMPLAINT1

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Cape Girardeau County Jail, brings this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights against three correctional officers:

(1) Unknown Scroggins; (2) Unknown Baliva; and (3) C. Brown, in their individual and official

capacities. Doc. 1 at 2-3.

1 For the purpose of this Motion, the Court assumes that the factual allegations in the Third Amended

Complaint are true. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989).

him with violence when he filed a grievance about it. Id. at 3. Plaintiff complains about three

specific incidents. Id. at 5. He attached handwritten exhibits to his Complaint that purport to be

copies of grievance correspondence with the Jail concerning the actions of Defendants.2 Id. at

13-18. The Court will treat these attachments as part of the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).

First, on October 12, 2021, Defendant Scroggins “opened and printed” Plaintiff’s

confidential legal mail without Plaintiff being present. Plaintiff claims that Scroggins “opened

and printed” his mail before Plaintiff confirmed that “all the documents were removed from the

original packaging, printed correctly and that CO Scroggins did not read or potentially sabotage

this mail.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff admits that Scroggins did ask him if everything was copied

correctly and Plaintiff replied that they were “printed clearly and [were] readable,” but he notes

that he did not confirm that they were copied correctly. Id.

Second, two days later, on October 14, 2021, Defendant Brown destroyed Plaintiff’s legal

mail before Plaintiff could examine it. Id. at 5. Per Plaintiff’s grievance, Brown destroyed a

document “before [Plaintiff] was able to examine the copied one for defects.” Id. at 14.

Finally, on an unspecified date in October 2021, Defendant Baliva threatened Plaintiff

with physical violence because Plaintiff had filed a grievance over his legal mail being

destroyed. A fellow inmate witnessed the threat. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants acts have caused him “mental distress, financial

difficulties, and ha[ve] jeopardized [his] future and freedom.” Id. For relief, Plaintiff seeks

money damages from Defendants so that Plaintiff can “pay an attorney to fix [Defendant’s]

mistakes” and pay for “counseling for mental distress.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Based on a careful review and liberal construction of the allegations of the Complaint, the

Court finds that this case is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s speculative claims against Defendants

Scroggins and Baliva of disruption to his legal mail, fail to state a First Amendment violation.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Brown threatened him once with violence in

2 Plaintiff filed a letter in December 2021, which he requested be added as an exhibit to his complaint.

See Doc. 5 at 2. The letter is addressed to the Cape Girardeau County Jail Administrator, whom it warns

that Jail inmates should not have access to local news coverage on Jail televisions. Id. at 1. The Court

has reviewed that exhibit, but it is irrelevant to the allegations of the Complaint.

liberty interest. As such, this case will be dismissed.

I. First Amendment Claims against Defendants Scroggins and Baliva

Plaintiff’s claims arise under the First Amendment, which guarantees inmates the right to

send and receive mail. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d

1047, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998). Taking Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, they establish only that

Scroggins and Baliva opened Plaintiff’s mail before giving it to him. Plaintiff claims Scroggins

could have sabotaged his mail or provided incorrect copies; he does not allege that those things

actually happened. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Baliva destroyed a document before Plaintiff

examined the copies for defects. In other words, Plaintiff alleges that that something might have

been missing from copies he received because he did not examine all originals to confirm that

the copies were not defective. Such allegations are entirely speculative and do not nudge

Plaintiff’s claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims could be construed as alleging a denial of access to

the courts because his “legal” mail was disrupted, the allegations still fail to state a valid claim

for relief. Under the First Amendment, the freedom to petition the government for redress of

grievances includes the right of access to courts. BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516,

524-25 (2002). To state a claim premised upon denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that he suffered an “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1996).

The Eighth Circuit has recognized that, when bringing an access-to-courts claim, it is insufficient

to merely allege a denial of access to a specific resource, even if the denial is systemic. Sabers v.

Delano, 100 F.3d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.4). Instead, a plaintiff

must plead (and ultimately prove) that the lack of the resource deprived him of some specific

opportunity to defend himself, or to advance a viable legal claim, in a criminal appeal,

postconviction matter, or civil rights action. Id. Speculation that injuries might occur or could

have occurred is insufficient. Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Absent

an articulation of how the alleged wrongful conduct actually blocked [the prisoner’s] access to

filing a complaint, or caused a filed complaint to be deficient, [the prisoner’s] alleged injuries are

merely speculative.”). Here, Plaintiff only speculates that an injury could have occurred. His

allegations do not establish that he suffered an “actual injury” as required to state a plausible

claim premised upon his right of access to the courts.

under the First Amendment.

II. Threat-of-Violence Claim against Defendant Brown

The Constitution does not guard against all intrusions on one’s peace of mind. King v.

Olmsted Cnty., 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997). “Generally, mere verbal threats made by a

state-actor do not constitute a § 1983 claim.” Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th

Cir. 1992); see also McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Verbal threats and

name calling usually are not actionable under § 1983.”). In other words, fear or emotional injury

resulting “solely from verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not sufficient to constitute an

invasion of an identified liberty interest.” King, 117 F.3d at 1067 (citations omitted). To

determine whether a constitutional line has been crossed by a verbal threat, making it redressable

under § 1983, a court looks to whether it “caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to

the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather than merely

careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the

conscience.” Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485, 492 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hopson, 961 F.2d at

1378 (quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brown threatened him once with physical violence

because Plaintiff had filed a grievance complaining that other correctional officers had disrupted

his receipt of mail. There is no allegation that the threat caused severe injury to Plaintiff or was

inspired by malice. There is likewise no indication that any violence ever actually occurred.

Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations against Brown are insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See

Turner, 784 F.3d at 492 (finding a one-time, one-sentence threat did not amount to a

constitutional violation where the isolated threat resulted in no injury).

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed because it fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is clear about the claims he wishes to

bring, and it is apparent that the problems with the Complaint would not be cured by permitting

Plaintiff to file an amended pleading. Plaintiff’s Complaint will therefore be dismissed, without

prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Jn Forma

Pauperis (Doc. [2]) is GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4), the initial partial filing

fee is waived.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to

issue upon the Complaint. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are DISMISSED without

prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in

good faith.

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2022.

SARAH E. PITLYK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE