Stewart v. Precythe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

CURTIS STEWART, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:18 CV 229 ACL

)

ANN PRECYTHE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Curtis Stewart, currently an inmate at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and

Correctional Center (“ERDC”), brought this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

the violation of his constitutional rights during his incarceration at the Southeast Correctional

Center in Charleston, Missouri (“SECC”). The action was originally filed in the Circuit

Court of Mississippi County, Missouri, and was removed to this Court by Defendants. (Doc.

2.)

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants

Ann Precythe, Trevor Proffer, Micha Wyatt, Charlie Brown, Sergeant Gordon, Hollie

Dysinger, and William Pettus (“MDOC Defendants”) (Doc. 26), and the separate Motion for

Summary Judgment of Defendant Cody Stanley, LPN (“Defendant Stanley”) (Doc. 50).

These matters are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

I. Background

In his Complaint, Stewart seeks monetary and declaratory relief against Defendant

Ann Precythe, in her individual and official capacity as Director of the Missouri Department

of Corrections (“MDOC”); and against the following SECC employees in their individual

capacities: William Pettus, Trevor Proffer, Charlie Brown, Micha Wyatt, Sergeant Gordon,

and Hollie Dysinger. Stewart alleges that the Defendant corrections officers (“CO

Defendants”) used excessive force when securing him during a cell transfer on two different

occasions. He further contends that the CO Defendants and Defendant Stanley were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs during and after the cell transfer

incidents. Stewart alleges that Defendant Precythe established and authorized the MDOC

policy of securing inmates during cell transfers, which is unconstitutional.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court may grant a motion

for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that “there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the

moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273

(8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do

more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita 333Elec. Industrial Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is not the

“mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties.” State Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2004). “Instead, the dispute must be outcome

determinative under prevailing law.” Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11

(8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). A fact is material when it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). Stewart’s status as a pro se prisoner does not excuse him from responding

to Defendants’ Motions “with specific factual support for his claims to avoid summary

judgment,” or from complying with local rules. Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir.

2001).

III. Facts1

The facts of each incident are set forth below.2

At the time of both of the occurrences alleged in the Complaint, Stewart was

incarcerated at SECC. He was housed in the administrative segregation unit for assaulting a

staff member.

May 19, 2017 Transfer

On May 19, 2017, Stewart advised Defendants Brown and Wyatt that he felt

threatened by his cellmate and would like to be placed in a different cell. He declared his

cellmate an enemy, so as not to be celled with him.

Stewart alleges that Brown and Wyatt instructed him to “cuff up,” at which time he

placed his hands out the food port to comply. He states that Defendants twisted his wrist

when placing the cuffs on his wrist, and informed Stewart it was necessary to twist his wrist

because his thumbs needed to be facing upward. Stewart alleges that he notified Defendants

1 The Court notes Stewart did not specifically respond to either of the Defendants’ statements of

uncontroverted material facts as is required by Local Rule 7-4.01(E). The MDOC Defendants

argue in their Reply that their statement should, therefore, be deemed admitted. While it is true

that “pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with relevant rules of the procedural and

substantive law,” Schooley v. Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983), the Court finds

Stewart did, at least, attempt to controvert Defendants’ statement by proffering a sworn

“Declaration in Support of Plaintiff[’s] Motion in Opposition to Defendants[’] Summary

Judgment.” (Doc. 33.) The Court further notes that the MDOC Defendants did not fully comply

with Local Rule 7-4.01(E), in that they did not file their Statement of Uncontroverted Material

Facts as a separate document. Under these circumstances, the Court declines Defendants’

invitation to punitively apply Local Rule 7-4.01(E).

2The Court’s recitation of the facts is taken from Defendants’ Statements of Uncontroverted

Material Facts (Docs. 26, 52) and Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Summary

Judgment (Docs. 32, 33, 56), with any disputes noted.

Brown and Wyatt that the cuffs were too tight, to which they responded that policy required

that the cuffs be placed on “skin-to-skin.” Stewart states that he was then removed from the

cell and handcuffed and shackled to an “opened barred steel bench in a sitting hog-tied stress

position.” Stewart also describes this position as a “four point restraint.” On June 2, 2017,

in his Offender Grievance form (Doc. 32-1), Stewart explained that he was “handcuffed and

shackled to a steel bench.” Defendants admit that they placed Stewart “on a restraint bench”

while they found Stewart another cell.

Stewart alleges that, while on the bench, he immediately started to feel “tension” on

his back, shoulders, arms, wrist, and legs. He stated that his wrist became swollen and his

limbs became numb after approximately an hour. Stewart contends that he then informed

Defendants Brown, Wyatt, and Gordon that he was experiencing pain and that his cuffs were

too tight. He alleges that Defendant Gordon responded, “Deal with it,” and Brown and

Wyatt told him he should not have declared his cellmate an enemy. Stewart claims that he

next notified Defendants that it felt as though his rectum was bleeding and requested a

medical emergency, but his request was ignored. He alleges that he also requested to use the

restroom, but Defendants told him he would get a chance to use the restroom when he was

placed in a cell. As a result, Stewart claims that he was forced to urinate on himself.

Stewart alleges that he notified Defendant Cody Stanley of his medical complaints

when Stanley was passing out medication, but Stanley refused to check his restraints or

examine him. Instead, Stanley stated that Stewart should not have checked out of the cell,

and then left. Stanley is a Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) employed by Corizon, LLC at

ERDCC.

Stewart alleges that, after Defendants Brown and Wyatt removed him from the

restraint bench, they noticed blood on the back of his pants from his rectum bleeding due to

the pressure applied to it by the bench bar. He claims that Brown and Wyatt taunted him by

stating that he “may need a cotex.”

Stewart was on the restraint bench for a total of two hours, until Defendants found a

new cell for him. Stewart remained in the new cell until May 22, 2017.

Defendant Stanley states that he does not recall the incident at issue, but states that if

he did not examine Stewart, it was because Stewart never reported the rectal bleeding to him.

May 22, 2017 Transfer

On May 22, 2017, Stewart’s new roommate declared Stewart an enemy and requested

that he be placed in protective custody. As a result, Stewart was again removed from his cell

and placed on the restraint bench for two hours.

Stewart alleges that, while on the restraint bench, he notified Defendant Gordon that

he had pain and swelling in his wrist, and pain in his buttocks, back, legs, and shoulders. He

alleges that, due to the stress put on his back and lack of back support, his lower back

“popped out of place” making it difficult for him to sit straight without extreme pain. His

rectum also started to bleed again. Stewart states that he reported these issues to Defendant

Gordon, but Gordon did not notify medical staff and instead stated that Stewart was “going

to sit on the bench til [his] ass looked like grilled meat.” Stewart alleges that he was again

denied a restroom break and had to urinate on himself. Stewart alleges that he sustained

injuries to his wrist, resulting in spasms in his hand; injuries to his back and leg that affect

his mobility, cause constant pain in his leg, and numbness of his foot; injury to his shoulder,

resulting in difficulty with rotation; and injury to his anus, causing pain.

On May 23, 2017, Stewart was transferred to the Crossroads Correctional Center

(“CRCC”). Stewart reported no medical complaints at this time.

V. MDOC Defendants’ Motion

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants first argue that summary

judgment is proper as to Defendant Precythe because the doctrine of respondeat superior

cannot form the basis of an individual capacity claim, and sovereign immunity bars suit

against her in her official capacity. They next argue that the CO Defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, because Stewart cannot establish an excessive force or

deliberate indifference claim. Defendants further argue that the CO Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity and official immunity; Stewart failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies regarding his allegations about MDOC policies; and Stewart cannot prove any

damages from his alleged injuries. (Doc. 26.) In support of their Motion, Defendants have

attached excerpts of Stewart’s deposition (Doc. 26-1), and the Affidavit of Defendant Hollie

Dysinger Vandergriff (Doc. 26-2).

1. Excessive Use of Force

Stewart argues that the CO Defendants used excessive force “sadistically and

maliciously without provocation or the need to maintain or restore discipline,” in violation of

the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 2 at 8.) The

essence of Stewart’s claim is that he was subjected to an unconstitutional

use of excessive force when he was placed on the restraint bench for two-hour periods while

waiting for an available cell.

The Eighth Amendment forbids the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”

constituting cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992). See also Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 2014) (“After incarceration,

only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment

forbidden by the Eighth Amendment”). When a prison official is accused of using excessive

physical force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is “whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” or “maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir.

2017). See also Ward v. Smith, 844 F.3d 717, 721 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Because the use of force

is sometimes required in prison settings, guards are liable only if they are completely

unjustified in using force, i.e., they are using it maliciously and sadistically”). The factors to

be considered in determining whether force was used in good faith include “the need for the

application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used,

and the extent of injury inflicted.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).

Here, Stewart claims that the procedure by which Defendants handcuff and shackle

inmates to the restraint bench while waiting for a cell inflicts unnecessary pain and suffering.

The first time this occurred, on May 19, 2017, Stewart alleges that he experienced “pain

throughout his entire body specifically his shoulders, arms, wrist, legs, back and ankles.”

(Doc. 2 at 5.) Stewart claims that he notified Defendants that his cuffs were on too tight, that

he was in pain, and that his rectum felt as if it were bleeding, but Defendants told him he

should not have declared his cellmate an enemy and to “just deal with it” until they found

him a cell. Id. Additionally, Stewart alleges that Defendants denied him a restroom break,

which resulted in him urinating on himself. Id. at 6. Upon being removed from the restraint

bench, Stewart stated that Defendants noticed blood on the back of his pants and taunted him

by stating “you may need a Cotex.” Id. at 6. On the second occasion, May 22, 2017, Stewart

was again placed on the restraint bench after a cellmate reported that he “feared for his

safety.” Id. at 7. When Stewart asked a CO why he was being placed on the restraint bench,

Stewart alleges the CO responded, “you guys want to check out of [your] cell and give us a

hard time so I’m going to give y’all a hard time.” Id. Stewart claims that he notified a CO

that his wrist was swollen, and that his wrist, buttocks, back legs, and shoulders hurt. He

states that his rectum began to bleed after about one hour. Id. Stewart alleges that he was

denied restroom breaks, which resulted in him urinating on himself again. Id. It is

undisputed that Stewart was on the restraint bench for two hours on each occasion.

Stewart could also be understood to claim he was subjected to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement when he was held on the restraint bench for two hours without

restroom breaks. To state a plausible Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim,

plaintiff must demonstrate both an objective and a subjective element. To satisfy the

objective element, he must demonstrate he suffered a deprivation that was sufficiently

serious to deprive him of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities, or create a

substantial risk of serious harm to his health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834 (1994); Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1178 (8th Cir. 2019). The duration of the

exposure to the conditions and the harm suffered are key facts in determining whether this

element has been satisfied. Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir.

1996); Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994). To satisfy the

subjective element, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant actually knew of, but

deliberately disregarded, the risk of harm posed by the deprivation. Davis v. Oregon County,

Mo., 607 F.3d 543, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2010); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir.

2004).

The only testimony Defendants have submitted on their own behalf is the Affidavit of

Defendant Dysinger. Defendant Dysinger stated that she was working at SECC in May 2017

when Stewart was an inmate at SECC. Her testimony regarding the alleged excessive force

incidents consists of the following statement: “When a prisoner wants to transfer cells,

Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) policy dictates that the prisoner be removed

from his cell and restrained until a new cell is found for them. Such transfers are done to

ensure prisoner safety.” (Doc. 26-2 at p. 1.) Despite Defendant Dysinger’s reference to

MDOC policy, Defendants have not submitted the policy. Defendant Dysinger offers no

testimony regarding the specific incidents involving Stewart. None of the other CO

Defendants have offered testimony.

Although Defendants have submitted excerpts of Stewart’s deposition, these excerpts

do not address any of the events that occurred while Stewart was restrained on the restraint

bench. Instead, they cite Stewart’s testimony to support the propositions that he was

“placed…on a restraint bench” on May 19, 2017 and “was placed onto the restraint bench

again” on May 22, 2017, while they found another cell for Stewart. Notably, Stewart

testified that he was restrained in a “sitting hog-tie position.” (Doc. 26-1 at p. 5.)

Defendants, however, did not submit the portion of Stewart’s deposition testimony in which

he provided a more detailed description of this position. Defendants cite to Stewart’s

testimony to support the proposition that he “suffered no injuries when he was taken off the

bench.” (Doc. 26 at 6.) While it is true that Stewart testified the guards did not injure him

when they took him off the restraint bench, he testified that he sustained injuries while on the

restraint bench of which he advised the guards and the guards responded by ridiculing him.

(Doc. 26-1 at 7.)

Moreover, some of Defendants’ alleged uncontroverted material facts are merely

unsupported legal opinions. For example, Defendants state, “The force used by Defendants

Corrections Officers on Plaintiff was to keep MDOC personnel and Plaintiff safe,” and “The

force used on Plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances and the minimum necessary.”

(Doc. 26 at p. 7.) These statements fail to comply with Local Rule 4.01(E), which requires

that the moving party state how each fact “is established by the record, with appropriate

supporting citation(s).”

Defendants, relying on Lockhart v. Reese, No. 1:16CV63 SNLJ, 2018 WL 690989

(E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2018), argue that the Court has previously upheld the use of a restraint

bench “such as one Plaintiff was placed on.” (Doc. 26 at 11.) In Lockhart, the plaintiff

prisoner, who suffered from bipolar disorder, declared to SECC staff that he was homicidal

and suicidal at the same time 11 or 12 other offenders in the same housing unit also declared

they were homicidal. Lockhart was placed on a restraint bench because there were not

enough suicide cells. He claimed that he was left on the restraint bench for 17 hours. The

Court3 held that, “[i]n light of the extreme disruption to the prison that was caused by an en

masse declaration of suicidal ideations, the placement of plaintiff on a restraint bench for an

extended time cannot be considered an extreme deprivation that implicates constitutional

rights.” Id. at *4. The Court explained that, “Plaintiff had indicated an intention to kill

himself; defendants had nowhere safe to house plaintiff and many other similarly situated

prisoners; the restraint bench was an adequate and effective short-term solution.” The Court

3Senior United States District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr.

noted that the “short duration and benign nature of any discomfort that may have occurred

does not rise to a constitutional violation.” Id.

As Defendants acknowledge, the circumstances under which Lockhart was placed on

the restraint bench were much different from this case. Specifically, unlike Lockhart, here

there was no “extreme disruption to the prison that was caused by an en masse declaration of

suicidal ideations.” Additionally, Lockhart did not claim that he was restrained in a “hog tie”

position, or that Defendants ignored his complaints of pain caused by his restraint. As such,

the undersigned disagrees with Defendants’ statement that the “nature of restraint and

justification” in this case are no different than those in Lockhart. (Doc. 26 at 11.)

Stewart’s allegations that Defendants “hog tied” him to a restraint bench for two

hours for the purpose of inflicting unnecessary pain, ignored his complaints of pain while he

was restrained, refused to allow him to use the restroom forcing him to urinate on himself,

and taunted him about his alleged injuries remain unrefuted. Defendants have either failed to

address these factual allegations at all or have responded to them with bare legal conclusions.

As previously set out, the core judicial inquiry when analyzing excessive force cases

is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” or

“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Jackson, 866 F.3d at 974. Because Defendants

failed to address Stewart’s alleged facts regarding the method and circumstances of his

restraint, the Court cannot determine whether the force applied was necessary or was applied

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Thus, Defendants have not discharged their

burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on Stewart’s excessive use

of force claim.

Similarly, Defendants have not demonstrated entitlement to qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless their

conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable official would have known.

Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)). To resolve a government official’s claim of qualified immunity, courts

apply a two-part test, asking whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of a

constitutional right and whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of

the violation. Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Harlow, 457

U.S. at 818). “When an official’s intent is an element of the § 1983 claim, as it is in Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims, and if the official has made a properly supported motion

for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the plaintiff ‘must identify affirmative

evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of

proving the pertinent motive.’” Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998)).

In the absence of any testimony whatsoever from any of the CO Defendants regarding

their conduct and intent, the Court cannot say Defendants have made “a properly supported

motion for summary judgment” and thus have not established that they are entitled to

qualified immunity as a matter of law. See Burns, 752 F.3d at 1139.

Defendants next argue that the doctrine of official immunity applies to any of

Stewart’s claims against the CO Defendants. Official immunity is a Missouri doctrine that

“protects public employees from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the

course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts.” Southers v. City of

Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008). However, official immunity does not apply

to “discretionary acts done in bad faith or with malice.” Id. “A defendant acts with malice

when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be

contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” State ex

rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Mo. banc 1986).

The CO Defendants are not entitled to official immunity. First, official immunity is a

Missouri doctrine and Stewart does not allege any state law claims. Second, official

immunity would not apply because Stewart alleges the CO Defendants acted with malice and

Defendants have not offered any evidence regarding the CO Defendants’ intent.

With regard to Stewart’s MDOC transfer policy claim, Defendants have referred to

such a policy but have not submitted the policy, nor have they otherwise provided any

specific details regarding the policy. For this reason, it cannot be determined whether

Defendant Precythe is liable for authorizing this allegedly unconstitutional MDOC policy.

Defendants also argue that Stewart failed to properly exhaust his claim regarding

MDOC policy in the grievances he filed regarding the incidents at issue, yet Defendants did

not submit the grievances that Stewart filed. The crux of Defendants’ argument is that,

because Stewart admitted in his deposition that he did not specifically refer to “policies” in

his grievances regarding the alleged excessive use of force on the restraint bench, he is

precluded from challenging MDOC policies in the instant action.

The purposes of the exhaustion requirement include “allowing a prison to address

complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, reducing

litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that

does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

219 (2007). The exhaustion requirement is “mandatory.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85

(2006). The excerpt of Stewart’s deposition testimony submitted by Defendants reveals that

Stewart filed grievances regarding the incidents at issue. (Doc. 26-1 at 12-13.) These

grievances gave the MDOC a “fair and full opportunity to adjudicate” Stewart’s claims

related to restraint procedures upon inmate transfer requests. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. See

also Jones v. Engle, No. 4:18 CV 984 RWS, 2020 WL 4732047, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 14,

2020) (finding the plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies despite not specifically

addressing the wrongdoing of the defendant because the grievance gave the MDOC the

opportunity to adjudicate the claims against the defendant). Thus, Defendant Precythe has

not demonstrated her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on Stewart’s claim

regarding MDOC policy.

Accordingly, the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Stewart’s

excessive force claims is denied.

2. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Stewart also claims that the CO Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

serious medical needs. Specifically, he argues that Defendants refused to obtain medical

treatment for him despite his requests due to his rectal bleeding and pain from the tight

handcuffs. Stewart claims that he experienced nerve damage to his wrist, and injuries to his

rectum, back, and shoulder.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the CO Defendants argue that they

did not deny Stewart care, Stewart “was afforded the ability to file a health services request

that would allow him to receive medical treatment,” pursuant to “normal policy within

MDOC facilities.” (Doc. 26 at 13.) They further argue that they are “not qualified to make

any medical determinations as to Plaintiff.” Id. They conclude that there “was no delay or

denial of Plaintiff’s medical services.” Id. The only evidence submitted by Defendants in

support of their arguments is the Affidavit of Defendant Dysinger, in which she simply

describes the general process by which inmates request medical care, and states that the CO

Defendants were not qualified to make medical determinations. (Doc. 26-2 at 1.)

“To establish a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under §

1983, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need

and that [the officials] actually new of but deliberately disregarded the need.” Santiago v.

Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2013). A serious medical need is “one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a

layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quoting

Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995)).

Under the subjective prong, “the evidence must show that the officers recognized that

a substantial risk of harm existed and knew that their conduct was inappropriate in light of

that risk.” Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 567 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original).

Deliberate indifference constitutes more than mere negligence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.

Generally, the actor manifests deliberate indifference by “‘intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with treatment or medication that has been

prescribed.’” Krout, 583 F.3d at 567 (quoting Pietrafeso v. Lawrence Cnty., 452 F.3d 978,

983 (8th Cir. 2006)).

The Court finds that Defendants have failed to establish entitlement to judgment as a

matter of law on Stewart’s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim.

Defendants do not address Stewart’s allegations that he complained to the CO Defendants of

wrist pain due to tight handcuffs or rectal pain and bleeding due to his position on the

restraint bench. Instead, Defendants only argue that Stewart was afforded the ability to file a

health services request pursuant to MDOC policy. Stewart clearly was not capable of

completing a form while his hands were cuffed together behind his back and shackled to the

restraint bench. He instead completed this request sometime after he was removed from the

restraint bench and taken to his cell. Significantly, Defendants do not state, and they present

no evidence that Stewart ever received medical treatment for his alleged injuries while at

SECC.

Medical training was not required for Defendants to determine that an inmate

bleeding from the rectum requires medical attention. See Williams v. Chandler,

4:05CV00661 ERW, 2006 WL 2795382, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 2006) (“this Court finds

that even a lay person would recognize bleeding from the rectum and spitting up blood as

requiring a doctor’s attention”). Because Stewart’s allegations regarding his rectal pain and

bleeding remain unrefuted by Defendants, Stewart has established the presence of a serious

medical need. Stewart’s allegations that the CO Defendants intentionally denied him access

to medical care demonstrates the subjective component of his deliberate indifference claim.

Accordingly, the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

VI. Defendant Stanley’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Stanley argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because

the undisputed evidence shows that Stewart had no objectively serious medical need and that

Stanley was not deliberately indifferent to any medical need of which he was subjectively

aware. Stanley has provided a detailed summary of Stewart’s institutional medical record, in

addition to a copy of the medical records as exhibits. (Doc. 52-2.) He has also attached as

an exhibit his own sworn declaration (Doc. 52-1) and excerpts of Stewart’s deposition (Doc.

52-3).

In his separately filed Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts, Defendant Stanley

states that he does not personally recall the incident that forms the basis of Stewart’s

Complaint. Stanley, however, states that he has never had an inmate on the restraint bench

tell him he was bleeding from the rectum and not further examine him. Stanley states that

the protocol for checking restraints is every two hours when an offender is on the restraint

bench or if requested by security. He states that medical staff does not typically check an

offender’s restraints upon offender request because it is a security risk. If an inmate was

screaming out in pain from his restraints, Stanley indicates he would have checked them to

ensure they were fitting properly if it was safe to do so. Stanley states that, if he did not

check Stewart’s restraints, it was because Stanley was either not aware that Stewart was in

pain, or it was a safety risk to check.

In support of his argument that Stewart had no objectively serious need, Defendant

notes that the record evidence shows that his rectal bleeding was simply due to his long-

standing hemorrhoids, for which he was treated with suppositories before he was placed on

the restraint bench. (Doc. 52-2 at pp. 428.) Defendant states that Stewart complained of

wrist pain and numbness prior to May 19, 2017, possibly from a prior restraint bench

occurrence. (Doc. 52-2 at p. 439.) Similarly, Defendant notes that Stewart’s back pain was

caused by an old basketball injury in 2005, and was treated with ibuprofen and Tylenol. Id.

at pp. 385, 393, 458-62, 499-502, 504-05, 516-18.

In Response, Stewart has filed a Declaration in Opposition to Defendant Stanley’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 56.) In this document, Stewart repeats the allegations

from his Complaint as follows: he was denied medical attention while he was restrained in a

sitting hog tie position for several hours; while Defendant Stanley was making rounds in the

unit, Stewart notified him that his cuffs were cutting off his circulation, that he was

experiencing pain throughout his body, and that his rectum felt as though it was bleeding;

and Defendant Stanley refused to check the restraints or render any medical assistance and

instead stated “you shouldn’t have checked out of the cell...” (Doc. 56 at p. 1.) Defendant

Stanley did not file a Reply.

The Court finds that Defendant Stanley has failed to establish his entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law. Stanley argues that Stewart did not have a medical need either

“diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or “so obvious that even a layperson

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” (Doc. 51 at 10.) The

undersigned disagrees. The medical records submitted by Stanley reveal that Stewart had

previously been diagnosed with hemorrhoids. It is reasonable that Stewart’s restraint on the

bench as he describes would exacerbate this condition and cause bleeding. Additionally, the

Court has already found that bleeding from the rectum is so obvious that even a layperson

would recognize the necessity for medical attention.

As to the subjective component of Stewart’s claim, Stewart alleges that he notified

Defendant Stanley of his pain and bleeding rectum, and Defendant Stanley refused to render

any medical assistance, instead stating that Stewart should not have checked out of his cell.

If Stewart’s account of the event is true, then a reasonable jury could find Defendant Stanley

was deliberately indifferent to Stewart’s serious medical needs when he was told about

Stewart’s rectal bleeding and failed to render medical assistance. Stanley does not

specifically deny Stewart’s allegations but, rather, states that he “does not personally recall

the incident.” (Doc. 52-1 at 2.)

The Court may not “weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record,

decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any factual issue.” Kampouris v. St.

Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). The Court instead “perform[s]

only a gatekeeper function of determining whether there is evidence in

the summary judgment record generating a genuine issue of material fact for trial on each

essential element of a claim.” Id.

The Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether

Defendant Stanley was deliberately indifferent to Stewart’s serious medical needs.

Accordingly, Defendant Stanley’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 26) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant

Cody Stanley (Doc. 50) is denied.

/s/ Abbie Crites-Leoni

ABBIE CRITES-LEONI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated this 4th day of June, 2021.