‘If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.’ (quoting Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004))
How later courts described this case
- ‘If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.’ (quoting Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004))
- RFC assessment occurs at fourth step of process
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
ALAN DELANE PIERCE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:19CV233 HEA
)
ANDREW M. SAUL, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying the application of Plaintiff for denial of
supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.
The Court has reviewed the filings and the administrative record as a whole which
includes the hearing transcript and medical evidence. The decision of the
Commissioner will be affirmed.
Background
Plaintiff protectively filed for Supplemental Security Income on March 24,
2017, alleging disability beginning February 27, 2017. He received an initial denial
and subsequently filed a timely Request for Hearing. He attended a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April 18, 2019. The ALJ rendered an
unfavorable decision dated May 22, 2019. In the decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and
lumbar radiculopathy. While the ALJ found neither of Plaintiff’s impairments met
or equaled a listed impairment, he did find some limitations. Specifically, the ALJ
found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
Light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant should
never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and should no more than
occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can occasionally balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch, and crawl.
Based on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform
work such as hand packer, cleaner, and production worker.
Plaintiff filed a timely Request for Review of Hearing Decision. The
Appeals Council, on November 19, 2019, denied the request. Plaintiff has
exhausted all administrative remedies. Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the
final decision of the Commissioner.
Hearing Testimony
On April 18, 2019, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before the
ALJ. Plaintiff testified that eighth grade was the highest grade he completed; he
did not get a GED. The last time Plaintiff worked was in 2017 operating a forklift.
He was fired from that job because he was taking pain medication while at work.
Plaintiff testified that he has problems with his lower back. Plaintiff testified
that his back pain radiates down his legs. If he performs any work, the pain will be
intensified the next day. He testified that he can only stand for about an hour to an
hour and a half at a time. He will then have to sit down. To cope with the pain,
Plaintiff takes narcotic pain medication and will lie down.
Plaintiff is able to perform his own hygiene and shares housework with his
brother, with whom he resides. He is able to share cooking responsibilities.
A vocational expert also testified at the hearing and provided vocational
interrogatory responses after the hearing.
Legal Standard
To be eligible for DBI under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must prove
that he is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001);
Baker v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992).
The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual will be declared disabled “only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner engages in a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. At Step Two, the ALJ considers
whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments. At
Step Three, the ALJ determines whether the severe impairment(s) meets or
medically equals the severity of a listed impairment; if so, the claimant is
determined to be disabled, and if not, the ALJ's analysis proceeds to Step Four.
At Step Four of the process, the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual functional
capacity (RFC) – that is, the most the claimant is able to do despite her physical
and mental limitations, Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) – and
determine whether the claimant is able to perform any past relevant work. Goff v.
Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (RFC assessment occurs at fourth step
of process).
The claimant bears the burden through Step Four of the analysis. If he meets
this burden and shows that he is unable to perform his past relevant work, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to produce evidence demonstrating
that the claimant has the RFC to perform other jobs in the national economy that
exist in significant numbers and are consistent with his impairments and vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience. Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d
699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012).
The Court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir.
2010). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but enough that a
reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Jones, 619
Additionally, the Court must consider evidence that supports the Commissioner's
decision as well as any evidence that fairly detracts from the decision. Boyd v.
Colvin, 831 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2016). If, after reviewing the entire record, it
is possible to draw two inconsistent positions and the Commissioner has adopted
one of those positions, the Court must affirm the Commissioner's decision; the
Court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial
evidence could also support a contrary outcome. Id; see also Fentress v. Berryhill,
854 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2017).
RFC
A claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) is the most an individual can
do despite the combined effects of all of his or her credible limitations. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545. An ALJ's RFC finding is based on all of the record evidence,
including the claimant's testimony regarding symptoms and limitations, the
claimant's medical treatment records, and the medical opinion evidence. See
Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir.2010); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545; Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96–8p.
Decision of the ALJ
At Step One of the decision from May 22, 2019, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 24, 2017, the alleged
onset date. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments
of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and lumbar radiculopathy. The
ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
listed in or medically equal to one contained in the Listings, 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 1, (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to
perform light work subject to the following limitations: Plaintiff should never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and should no more than occasionally climb
ramps and stairs. He can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform his past relevant
work as a forklift operator. At Step Five, the ALJ found that there are jobs that
exist in significant number in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform,
such as hand packer, cleaner, and production worker. Therefore, the ALJ found
Plaintiff not disabled.
Statement of the Issues
Generally, the issues in a Social Security case are whether the final decision
of the Commissioner is consistent with the Social Security Act, regulations, and
applicable case law, and whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. The issue here is (1) whether the ALJ’s RFC
finding is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Discussion
Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly discredited the opinion of Dr.
McPherson, Plaintiff’s treating physician. In considering Plaintiff’s medical
treatment notes, the ALJ noted that for the first six months of treatment, Plaintiff
ambulated normally for the first six months of primary care treatment. In Dr.
McPherson’s clinic, Plaintiff’s providers describe his ambulation as limited, and
also note his gait was normal. He had normal strength and intact sensation.
Plaintiff’s treatment remained conservative, despite a neurosurgical
recommendation for a lumbar brace, facet blocks, and changes to Plaintiff’s
medication regimen, which consisted primarily of narcotic pain medication.
The ALJ noted inconsistent findings regarding Plaintiff’s straight leg raise
testing. Plaintiff’s straight leg testing was positive while in the supine position, but
negative in the sitting position. The ALJ, however, did not simply rely on these
tests. He considered the February 2017 MRI and CT scans when making his
assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work based on his severe
impairments.
Additionally, the ALJ cited other inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s treatment
notes. The Plaintiff was noted to have limited ambulation and a normal gait. As
the Commissioner rightly argues, Plaintiff cites no authority obligating the ALJ to
contact Dr. McPherson for clarification of these inconsistencies. The agency
regulations provide that the agency will determine whether the claimant is disabled
based on the evidence it has. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(b)(1).
The ALJ also noted the conservative treatment. The ALJ noted the
neurosurgical consultation did not recommend surgery, rather, the consulting
neurosurgeon recommended a lumbar brace, facet blocks and medication changes.
“[C]onservative treatment, management with medication, and lack of required
surgical intervention all support the ALJ's RFC determination. See Wildman v.
Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 2010) (‘If an impairment can be controlled by
treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling.’ (quoting Brown v.
Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2004))).” Buford v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 793,
797 (8th Cir. 2016). Throughout the entire record, Plaintiff’s treatment remained
conservative, continuously being treated with pain medication alone.
Dr. McPherson’s determination that Plaintiff was 100% disabled is not a
proper conclusion for a treating physician, in that the determination is an issue left
to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. 416.927(d). The ALJ properly discredited this
conclusion.
The ALJ considered Dr. McPherson’s treatment notes as well as the opinion
of the state agency medial consultant, Dr. McGraw. In assessing all of the
evidence before him, the ALJ observed Dr. McGraw’s review was consistent with
the medical evidence. This fact, however, did not result in a carte blanche
acceptance of Dr. McGraw’s opinion. The ALJ did not rely entirely on the
conclusions reached by Dr. McGraw. Based on the medical evidence in the record,
the ALJ concluded, contrary to Dr. McGraw, that Plaintiff was not capable of
medium work, but rather he is limited to light work. The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s
impairments and limited Plaintiff to light rather than medium work.
While Plaintiff may have an alternative belief that the evidence supports a
finding of disability, the evidence before the ALJ supports the conclusion that
Plaintiff is capable, with limitations, of performing light work. There is substantial
evidence in the record as a whole to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is
not disabled.
Conclusion
After careful review, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Perkins vy. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 900
(8th Cir. 2011). The ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence in the
record, and therefore is affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
A separate judgment shall be entered incorporating this Memorandum and
Order.
Dated this □□ day of February, 2021.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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