Barrett v. Robydek

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARRETT, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 23-10755

v.

Hon. George Caram Steeh

REBECCA ROBYDEK, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 10)

Defendants Rebecca Robydek, Kaitlyn Montone, Renee Smith, and

Ryan Makowski seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against them pursuant

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Because the court

finds that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, it will grant

their motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND FACTS

This civil rights case arises out of a child abuse and neglect

proceeding that spanned from 2018 to 2021. Plaintiffs Marcus Barrett and

Wendy Wierzbicki are parents of a minor son, B.B. Barrett is also the father

of an older son, S.B. Defendants Rebecca Robydek, Kaitlyn Montone, and

Ryan Makowski are social workers with Children’s Protective Services

(“CPS”), which is part of the Michigan Department of Health and Human

Services (“DHHS”). Defendant Renee Smith is a CPS supervisor.

Plaintiffs allege that S.B. had a history of making unsubstantiated

abuse allegations against Marcus Barrett. ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 13-14. In one of

the complaints, it was noted that S.B. “makes up stories to get Marcus and

other adults in trouble with police and CPS.” Id. In a meeting regarding

S.B., Robydek allegedly told Barrett that “if you do not sell your house and

move out of the county . . . not only will we take away [S.B.], but we will

take your favorite son [B.B.] as well.” Id. ¶ 17. Barrett reported what

Robydek said to her supervisor.

Approximately one month later, Robydek signed a CPS investigation

report alleging that a preponderance of the evidence was found for one of

S.B.’s complaints of abuse. Id. at ¶ 20. Two more complaints were made

alleging that Barrett had “physically abused, improperly supervised and had

maltreated S.B. In these complaints it is was noted that Marcus is

manipulating law enforcement and S.B. is a troubled and poorly behaved

child.” Id. at ¶ 21.

On October 26, 2018, CPS social worker Sharyn Jeske filed a petition

for the removal of S.B. and B.B., which was approved by Robydek. The

children were placed with Barrett’s parents. Following a preliminary

hearing, in which Barrett and Wierzbicki waived the probable cause

determination, the circuit court placed S.B. in foster care and ordered B.B.

to be released to his mother, Wierzbicki. The court’s order provided for

Barrett to have supervised parenting time. See ECF No. 11 at PageID 264-

67. Plaintiffs contend that “[d]espite the Trial Court’s order, Montone

refused to release B.B. to Wendy [Wierzbicki] for two whole days.” ECF No.

3 at ¶ 26.

The abuse and neglect case continued for over two years and

hundreds of docket entries. Generally, Plaintiffs complain that Barrett did

not receive parenting time with B.B. as ordered by the court. For example,

on December 18, 2018, the court ordered that Barrett have parenting time

with B.B. for a minimum of two times per week, for a minimum of one hour.

ECF No. 3 at ¶¶ 31-32. The order provided that “[t]he supervisor shall have

the discretion to terminate parenting time if Respondents are inappropriate

in any way.” ECF No. 11 at PageID 271. Plaintiffs allege that Montone

refused to allow Barrett parenting time for the week of December 17 to 23,

2018, despite repeated requests, and refused parenting time on Christmas

Eve and Christmas. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.

Based upon Montone’s refusal to provide parenting time, Barrett filed

a motion for contempt on December 24, 2018. Id. at ¶ 39. The motion was

heard on January 4, 2019; and the court continued Barrett’s supervised

parenting time and adjourned the motion for contempt until further notice.

Id. at ¶ 40.

Plaintiffs allege that on January 10, 2019, Montone terminated

Barrett’s parenting time after fifteen minutes. Id. at ¶¶ 43-44. Montone

claimed that she did so on her supervisor’s (Renee Smith’s) direction,

because Barrett was speaking to B.B. about the pending abuse and neglect

case, which Barrett denies. Id.

Thereafter, Ryan Makowski became the CPS caseworker assigned to

the abuse and neglect case. Plaintiffs allege that Makowski refused to

provide parenting time to Barrett for the week of January 27-Februrary 2,

2019, despite repeated requests. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 51.

On February 5, 2019, the court ordered a psychological evaluation for

S.B., and for B.B. to be released to Barrett and Wierzbicki. Plaintiffs allege

that Barrett had “extreme difficulty getting Makowski to comply with the

order and arrange the evaluation.” Id. at ¶ 56.

On February 27, 2019, the court ordered for sibling visits to occur,

facilitated by DHHS. Plaintiffs allege that Makowski arranged for a sibling

visit to occur 130 miles from B.B.’s residence and 55 miles from S.B.’s

residence. Makowski refused to change the location upon request and

“disregarded all communication with Marcus regarding the sibling visit.” Id.

at ¶ 58. Makowski also prohibited Barrett from participating in B.B.’s

extracurricular activities or doctor’s visits. Id. at ¶ 59.

Barrett filed a motion for order of contempt against Makowski, related

to his objections regarding the psychological evaluation, sibling visits,

parenting time, and extracurricular activities and doctor’s visits. ECF No. 3

at ¶ 60. After a hearing on March 25, 2019, the motion was dismissed

without prejudice. ECF No. 11 at PageID 285. Among other rulings, the

court scheduled a jury trial. Id.

On May 7, 2019, Makowski filed a supplemental petition for removal

of both children and to terminate Barrett’s parental rights to S.B., alleging

that Barrett refused to let Makowski speak with B.B. in private. ECF No. 3

at ¶¶ 61-62. Plaintiffs allege that Makowski filed the supplemental petition

in retaliation for the filing of the motion for contempt.

A jury trial was held in the abuse and neglect case on June 18, 2019,

and a finding was made that “there are statutory grounds to exercise

jurisdiction over the child(ren),” including the “failure to provide . . . support,

education, medical, surgical, or other necessary care for health or morals,”

“substantial risk of harm to mental well-being,” and “an unfit home

environment.” ECF No. 11 at PageID 288. S.B. was placed in the care of

DHHS, while B.B. was released to Barrett and Wierzbicki. However, on

September 30, 2019, the court issued an ex parte order again removing

B.B. from the care and custody of his parents. ECF No 3 at ¶ 64.

On October 3, 2019, the court ordered Barrett and Wierzbicki to have

supervised parenting time. Thereafter, the court entered a series of orders

regarding parenting time. On March 5, 2020, the court ordered that

Barrett’s parenting time was to be supervised by Isaac Watts. Plaintiffs

allege that even though Watts was willing to supervise the visits, Makowski

did not allow parenting time between March 14 and March 31, 2020.1

Barrett filed a motion to compel parenting time on March 27, 2020. In

response, the court entered an order providing for electronic parenting

time, due to public health and safety issues. ECF No. 11 at PageID 298.

The court continued its previous parenting time order until November

2020, when Barrett and Wierzbicki moved for unsupervised parenting time.

The court continued Wierzbicki’s parenting time as previously ordered and

provided Barrett with supervised parenting time twice a week, up to ten

hours total. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 79. This order was continued until February 23,

1 This occurred during the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic. On March 23,

2020, Governor Whitmer issued an executive order requiring non-essential workers to

stay home, although the order contained an exception for court-ordered parenting time.

ECF No. 3 at ¶ 75.

2021, when the court entered an order closing the case and returning B.B.

to his parents’ care and custody. Id. at ¶ 80.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case on April 1, 2023, alleging

the following counts: Count I, violation of Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process rights (against Robydek); Count II, seizure of B.B.

from November 5-7, 2018, by Montone in violation of the Fourth

Amendment; Count III, violation of due process related to the November 5-

7 seizure of B.B. (against Montone); Count IV, December 17-23, 2018,

seizure of B.B. in violation of the Fourth Amendment (against Montone);

Count V, violation of procedural due process related to the December 17-

23 seizure of B.B. (against Montone); Count VI, seizure of B.B. on January

10, 2019, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; Count VII, violation of

procedural due process related to January 10 seizure of B.B. (against

Montone); Count VIII, supervisor liability for approving January 10 seizure

of B.B. (against Renee Smith); Count IX, supervisor liability for acquiescing

in the January 10 procedural due process violation (against Smith); Count

X, seizure of B.B. from January 27, 2019, to February 2, 2019, in violation

of the Fourth Amendment (against Makowski); Count XI, violation of

procedural due process related to January 27-February 2 seizure of B.B.

(against Makowski); Count XII, seizure of B.B. from March 14, 2020, to

March 31, 2020, in violation of the Fourth Amendment (against Makowski);

Count XIII, violation of procedural due process related to March 14-31

seizure of B.B. (against Makowski); Count XIV, violation of substantive due

process (against Makowski); and Count XV, violation of substantive due

process against Judge Miriam A. Cavanagh.2 Although the caption of the

amended complaint states that the Defendants are being sued in their

individual and official capacities, the body of the complaint and Plaintiffs’

response brief make clear that Plaintiffs are pursuing individual capacity

claims only. ECF No. 3 at ¶ 1; ECF No. 15 at PageID 389-91.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must

allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see

also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint “must

contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Advocacy

2 Count XV is the subject of a motion brought by Judge Cavanagh and will be

addressed in a separate order.

Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315, 319

(6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may “consider the

Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items

appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's

motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are

central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).

II. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiffs’ claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires (1) the

deprivation of a constitutional right (2) by a person acting under color of

state law. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 595 (6th Cir. 2018).

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, which

“protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted). “Qualified immunity balances

two important interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when

they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.” Id. Ultimately, the “[p]laintiff bears the burden of showing that

defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.” Maben v. Thelen, 887

F.3d 252, 269 (6th Cir. 2018).

In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,

the court inquires as follows: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated

a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(abrogated on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). “[I]f a violation

could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next

. . . step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. . . . The

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201-202. It is

within the court’s discretion to determine which prong of this analysis to

address first, depending upon the circumstances of the case. Pearson, 555

U.S. at 236. However, “[w]hen a qualified immunity defense is asserted at

the pleading stage, we have historically found that the inquiry should be

limited to the ‘clearly established’ prong of the analysis if feasible.” Clark v.

Stone, 998 F.3d 287, 298 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Barber v. Miller, 809 F.3d

840, 844 (6th Cir. 2015)). See also Siefert v. Hamilton Cnty., 951 F.3d 753,

762 (6th Cir. 2020) (qualified immunity appropriate at pleadings stage

“when the complaint establishes the defense”).

To be “clearly established,” a legal principle must be “settled law,”

which means “it is dictated by ‘controlling authority’ or a ‘robust consensus

of cases of persuasive authority.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S.

48, 63-64 (2018) (citations omitted). “The precedent must be clear enough

that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular

rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly

stressed that courts must not define clearly established law at a high level

of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official

acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Id.

(cleaned up). Although a case directly on point is not required, “existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (citation omitted). This

standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Id. (citation omitted).

A. Fourth Amendment Seizure Claims

The numerous counts in Plaintiffs’ complaint may be grouped into

three categories: (1) violations of their Fourth Amendment right against

warrantless seizures, (2) violations of procedural due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) violations of substantive due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court first considers the

Fourth Amendment claim.

Like other state officers, social workers are “governed by the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of

Child. & Fam. Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir. 2013). They must “obtain

consent, have sufficient grounds to believe that exigent circumstances

exist, or qualify under another recognized exception to the warrant

requirement before engaging in warrantless entries and searches of

homes.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that Montone and Makowski “seized” B.B. in violation

of the Fourth Amendment when they did not provide Barrett with court-

ordered parenting time or immediately release him to Wierzbicki in

November 2018. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs cite Kovacic, in which

the court held that it was clearly established under the Fourth Amendment

that “a social worker could not seize children from their home without a

warrant, exigent circumstances, or another recognized exception.” Id. at

698. The general principle set forth in Kovacic does not assist Plaintiffs

here, however, because they are not alleging that Montone and Makowski

removed B.B. from his home without a warrant. Rather, they allege that

Montone and Makowski did not arrange for court-ordered, supervised

parenting time for Barrett with B.B., or immediately release B.B. to

Wierzbicki pursuant to an order, after an abuse and neglect case had

commenced. Each of the alleged seizures occurred after a preliminary

hearing was held and the court became involved. It is not clear how the

social workers’ actions, while B.B. was under the supervision of CPS

pursuant to a court order, resulted in a “seizure” of B.B., such that a

warrant, exigent circumstances, or consent would be required. See ECF

No. 11 at PageID 264-67 (Order after Preliminary Hearing (Child Protective

Proceedings)). Plaintiffs cite no case suggesting that Montone and

Makowski’s conduct, in the particularized circumstances they faced, would

violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless seizures. See

generally Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 686-87

(6th Cir. 2018) (no violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law

when social worker questioned minor in his own home and did not “seize”

him).

B. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claims

Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims are similarly flawed. As a

general matter, it is “clearly established that the Constitution recognizes

both a protectible procedural due process interest in parenting a child and a

substantive fundamental right to raise one’s child.” Bartell v. Lohiser, 215

F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000). In the context of the removal of a child, due

process requires that “parents be given notice prior to the removal of the

child . . . stating the reasons for the removal . . . [and that] [t]he parents be

given a full opportunity at the hearing to present witnesses and evidence on

their behalf.” Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 700.

Plaintiffs cite no precedent demonstrating that they are entitled to a

hearing before a social worker can exercise discretion or refuse to provide

parenting time pursuant to a court order. Plaintiffs received a hearing

before the children were placed under the jurisdiction of CPS. The result of

the hearing was an order governing parenting time. Plaintiffs cite no

authority suggesting that the social workers’ administration or refusal of

parenting time pursuant to that order triggers additional due process

protections.

Moreover, parenting time and B.B.’s placement was administered

under the supervision of the state court. To the extent Plaintiffs claim that

Montone and Makowski did not comply with court orders, such issues were

for the state court to address, which it did, in response to motions filed by

Plaintiffs. The record reflects that Plaintiffs had an opportunity to be heard

on these issues.

The court finds that there is no clearly established precedent that

would alert Montone or Makowski that their actions violated either the

Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, and that they are entitled to qualified

immunity with respect to Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, X, XI, XII, and XIII. It

follows that Smith is entitled to qualified immunity for the supervisor liability

claims against her as well (Counts VIII and IX). See McQueen v. Beecher

Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] prerequisite of

supervisory liability under § 1983 is unconstitutional conduct by a

subordinate of the supervisor.”); Bambach v. Moegle, __ F.4th __, 2024 WL

489356, at *10 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024) (holding that “a necessary predicate”

to supervisor liability “is the existence of clearly established law indicating

the subordinate’s actions were unconstitutional”).

C. Substantive Due Process Claims

The remaining counts are Counts I and XIV, which allege substantive

due process claims against Robydek and Makowski. “[S]ubstantive due

process provides that, irrespective of the constitutional sufficiency of the

processes afforded, government may not deprive individuals of

fundamental rights unless the action is necessary and animated by a

compelling purpose.” Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 557-58 (6th Cir.

2000). “[T]he right to family integrity and association without interference

from the state . . . is the paradigmatic example of a substantive due

process guarantee.” Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 540 (6th Cir.

2020). However, “the right to family integrity, while critically important, is

neither absolute nor unqualified. The right is limited by an equaling

compelling governmental interest in the protection of children, particularly

where the children need to be protected from their own parents.” Kottmyer

v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 690 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

The law in the Sixth Circuit regarding the standard for substantive

due process claims is somewhat muddled. In Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty.

Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., the court stated that “[s]ubstantive due

process claims may be loosely divided into two categories: (1) deprivations

of a particular constitutional guarantee; and (2) actions that ‘shock the

conscience.’” 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). But in

other cases, “the court has suggested both prongs are required.” Siefert v.

Hamilton Cnty., 951 F.3d 753, 765-66 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

“Most recently, however, we have held that when we review a substantive

due process claim, we first ask whether the plaintiff has shown ‘a

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest’ and then ask

whether ‘the government’s discretionary conduct that deprived that interest

was constitutionally repugnant.’ . . . ‘Thus, a plaintiff must show as a

predicate the deprivation of a liberty or property interest,’ as well as

‘conscience-shocking conduct.’” Id. (citations omitted). Although

“conscience shocking” is not well-defined, “‘abuse of power’ serves as the

North Star in the analysis.” Id.

With regard to their substantive due process claims against Robydek

and Makowski, Plaintiffs assert that it is clearly established that

“substantive due process protect[s] against seizures by a social worker

where there was no justification for the seizure.” ECF No. 15 at PageID

395-96 (citing Vinson v. Campbell Cty. Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194 (6th Cir.

1987)). This general proposition does not control here, because Plaintiffs

do not allege that Robydek or Makowski engaged in conduct that could be

viewed as a seizure or other deprivation of a constitutionally protected

liberty interest.

As for Robydek, Plaintiffs claim that she threatened to remove B.B.

from Barrett’s custody in retaliation for problems caused by S.B. Although

such a threat could arguably be viewed as “conscience shocking,” Robydek

did not actually remove the children from their parents’ custody without a

court order or facilitate such a removal. Plaintiffs have cited no authority for

the proposition that such a threat, standing alone, violates the right to

family integrity or otherwise constitutes a substantive due process violation.

The analysis might be different if Plaintiffs had alleged that the child

abuse and neglect investigation was done with bad faith or an improper

motive, and was unfounded. See Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs., 725

F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] government investigation of child abuse

will not automatically implicate the right to familial association, absent

evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or investigation tactics that ‘shock

the conscience.’”); cf. Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 542 (6th Cir.

2020) (“Defendants were on fair notice that it would be unlawful to deprive

Holly of her liberty interest in the companionship of her children without any

plausible suspicion of child abuse.”). Such an argument is precluded here

by the state court’s determination that the children should be placed in the

care and custody of CPS and a jury verdict substantiating the abuse. Under

the circumstances, it was the court’s actions that caused the removal of the

children, not Robydek’s. See Pittman, 640 F.3d at 729 (“Because the

juvenile court has the ultimate decisionmaking power with respect to

placement and custody, it alone could deprive Pittman of his fundamental

right.”).

Plaintiffs’ claim against Makowski is similarly deficient. In making

decisions regarding psychological evaluations, parenting time, and sibling

visits, Makowski was acting pursuant to discretion bestowed by court order.

The state court had already made the determination that the children

should be under the care and custody of CPS. See Pittman, 640 F.3d at

729 (“[T]o the extent that Pittman suffered a deprivation of his fundamental

right to family integrity, that deprivation was perpetrated by the juvenile

court, not by [the social worker].”). Plaintiffs cite no authority for the

proposition that a social worker who is administering parenting time,

arranging sibling visits, or otherwise attending to a child’s needs under

court supervision may deprive a parent of his fundamental right to family

integrity. See Toliver v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., No. 07-14179, 2009 WL

211034, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2009) (“Plaintiffs fail to cite, and this

Court’s independent search has failed to uncover, any case recognizing a

federally protected right to visitation or services while children are

temporarily housed in foster care pursuant to a valid court order.”); Young

v. Cnty. of Fulton, 999 F. Supp. 282, 286–87 (N.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 160 F.3d

899 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The plaintiff has failed to set forth even one case which

establishes that visitation, as opposed to custody, is a constitutionally

protected liberty interest of a parent who does not have custody.”); see also

Leta v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep't of Job & Fam. Servs., 668 F. Supp.3d 724,

736 (S.D. Ohio 2023), aff'd sub nom. Leta v. TriHealth, Inc., 2024 WL

229563 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (no clearly established “authority holding

that parents who have lost temporary custody of their children retain a

substantive due process right to access and control their children’s medical

decisions”). As in Pittman, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to

family integrity is implicated in this case, any deprivation was the result of

state court action, not the conduct of the social workers. Pittman, 640 F.3d

at 729.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Defendants violated

their clearly established constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court finds

that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF

No. 10) is GRANTED.

Dated: February 29, 2024

s/George Caram Steeh

HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record

on February 29, 2024, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Lashawn Saulsberry

Deputy Clerk