Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LAMONTE JACKSON-GIBSON

and TORIEL DIXON,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 20-cv-12765

v. Honorable Linda V. Parker

REGINALD BEASLEY, JUSTIN

HEARN, and DEREK FIELDS,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

On October 13, 2020, Plaintiffs Toriel Dixon and Lamonte Jackson-Gibson

filed this lawsuit against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment on February 21, 2023, presenting two issues:

1) Is summary judgment in favor of Defendants appropriate as to

Count I of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as the use(s) of force were

objectively reasonable and/or because Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity?

2) Is summary judgment in favor of Defendants[] Justin Hearn and

Derek Fields[] appropriate as to Count II of Plaintiffs’ Complaint as

there was no opportunity or ability to prevent the use(s) of force?

(See ECF No. 33-2 at PageID 174 (capitalization removed).) After full briefing,

this Court issued an opinion and order answering the first issue “no” as to Mr.

Jackson-Gibson but “yes” as to Ms. Dixon, and answering the second issue “yes”

with respect to both Mr. Jackson-Gibson and Ms. Dixon. (ECF No. 39.) Thus, the

Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion.

The matter is presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration. (ECF No. 41.) The Court issued a notice informing the parties

that Plaintiffs could file a response to the motion if they chose to do so. (ECF No.

42.) Plaintiffs chose to do so. (ECF No. 43.) For the reasons that follow, the

Court is denying Defendants’ motion.

Applicable Standard

The Court’s summary judgment decision was a non-final order as it did not

dispose of all parties or claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Kissner v. Orr, No.

22-2076, 2023 WL 5687037, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2023). Under Eastern

District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h), “[m]otions for reconsideration of non-final

orders are disfavored” and may only be granted on three grounds: (1) a mistake of

the court “based on the record and law before the court at the time of its prior

decision” if correcting the mistake would change the outcome of the prior decision;

(2) “[a]n intervening change in controlling law warrants a different outcome”; or

(3) “[n]ew facts warrant a different outcome and the new facts could not have been

discovered with reasonable diligence before the prior decision.” E.D. Mich. LR

7.1(h)(2). Defendants rely on the first ground in their motion.

Analysis

Defendants identify two perceived errors in the Court’s summary judgment

decision: (i) “finding that Defendants were not seeking summary judgment with

respect to any claim of unlawful detention or wrongful arrest Plaintiffs may have

or may continue to assert”; and (ii) “failing to apply the appropriate standard of

review to [Defendant Sergeant Reginald] Beasley’s qualified immunity defense[.]”

(ECF No. 41 at PageID 1517 (capitalization and emphasis removed).)

Plaintiffs’ Unlawful Detention & Wrongful Arrest

Throughout their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege, among other things, that

Sergeant Beasley did not have a lawful reason to arrest or detain Plaintiffs. 1 (See,

1 In these paragraphs, when discussing their alleged unlawful arrest and detention,

Plaintiffs refer only to Sergeant Beasley. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege generally

that Defendant Officers Justin Hearn and Derek Fields “had a duty to intervene

when . . . Sergeant Beasley[] violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth

Amendment” and that they had “the opportunity and means to intervene and

prevent the violation . . ..” (Id. at PageID 18, ¶¶ 77, 79.) However, Plaintiffs only

refer specifically to the officers’ failure to intervene with respect to the excessive

force allegedly used against them. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 80.) Therefore, the Court now

concludes that Plaintiffs’ failure-to-intervene claim against Officers Hearn and

Fields is not premised on the alleged unlawful arrest or detention of Plaintiffs.

This conclusion is bolstered by Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion for

reconsideration. (See ECF No. 43 at PageID 1593-94 (pointing to allegations in

the Complaint that “unambiguously pled that Defendant Sergeant Beasley”

unlawfully arrested and detained Plaintiffs) (emphasis added); id. at PageID 1597

(“The issue in this § 1983 [action], whether Sgt. Beasley arrested [P]laintiff[s] in

bad faith and without probable cause . . . is not ‘identical’ to the issue decided at

Plaintiffs’ preliminary examination”) (emphasis added).) As there therefore are no

remaining claims against Officers Hearns and Fields, the Court is terminating them

from this action.

e.g., ECF No. 1 at PageID 7, 9, 11, ¶¶ 23-24, 38, 40, 46, 51-52.) The two counts

alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint are titled generally: “42 U.S.C. § 1983—Violation

of Plaintiffs[’] 4th Amendment [r]ights[.]” (See id. at PageID 14, 17

(capitalization removed).) However, within Count I, Plaintiffs allege that they had

the right “to be free from excessive force, unlawful detention, and wrongful arrest”

and that those rights were violated by Sergeant Beasley. (See id. at PageID 14-15,

¶¶ 67, 69, 70 (emphasis added).)

As set forth above, when seeking summary judgment, Defendants focused

only on whether Sergeant Beasley used excessive force against Plaintiffs and

whether Officers Hearn and Fields failed to intervene to prevent the use of such

force. Any claim of unlawful arrest or detention was not mentioned in Defendants’

moving papers or Plaintiffs’ response. The Court therefore made this observation

in its decision: “It is unclear to the Court whether Plaintiffs continue to assert

claims based on their alleged unlawful detention and wrongful arrest. Defendants

do not seek summary judgment with respect to those claims, to the extent they

remain pending.” (ECF No. 39 at PageID 1499 n.3.) After granting summary

judgment to Officers Hearn and Fields with respect to Plaintiffs’ excessive force

claim, the Court additionally noted:

If Plaintiffs are alleging the violation of their constitutional rights

based only on the alleged use of excessive force, Officers Fields and

Hearn will be dismissed as parties to this action. The parties should

confer and inform the Court as to whether any claims remain against

these two individuals or whether they should be dismissed as parties

to this action with prejudice.

(Id. at PageID 1514, n.4.)

In their motion for reconsideration, Defendants claim the Court “erred”

when finding that they were not seeking summary judgment with respect to any

claims but those alleging excessive force. (ECF No. 41 at PageID 1520

(capitalization removed).) But no such error occurred, as Defendants never

challenged—either expressly or by implication—any claims but those alleging that

Sergeant Beasley used excessive force against Plaintiffs and that Officers Justin

Hearn and Derrick Fields failed to intervene in Sergeant Beasley’s use of excessive

force. The lawfulness of Plaintiffs’ arrests or detentions was never raised in

Defendants’ summary judgment motion, and they made absolutely no arguments in

their briefs with respect to those issues. Tellingly, Defendants assert in their

motion for reconsideration that, “until the entry of this Honorable Court’s Order on

[their] Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants were unaware that any such

claims were even being pursued.”2 (Id.)

2 Defendants, however, “concede” that Plaintiffs’ Complaint refers to the

lawfulness of their arrest, detention, and seizure. (ECF No. 41 at PageID 1521.)

Defendants nevertheless argue that “these allegations appear in what amount to

generalized boilerplate accusations with scarce appurtenant factual allegations”

and that the blanket title of the counts in the Complaint—referring generally to

violations of “Plaintiffs’ 4th Amendment Rights,” “compound[ed]” Defendants’

Defendants assert arguments in their motion for reconsideration for why any

claim alleging unlawful detention or wrongful detention fails. However, a motion

for reconsideration is not the proper avenue for introducing new legal theories or

arguments which could have been presented before. Exec. Ambulatory Surgical

Ctr., LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 3d 728, 731 (E.D. Mich.

2020) (citing Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ’g, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th

Cir. 2007)).

In short, Defendants fail to demonstrate that the Court made a mistake when

finding that they were not seeking summary judgment with respect to any claim of

unlawful arrest or detention. Defendants, in fact, did not seek summary judgment

with respect to any claim but those related to the alleged excessive force used

against them.

confusion apparently as to what Fourth Amendment violations were being alleged.

(Id.) When a defendant believes the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to

support a claim which they “concede” is referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint, the

expected response is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for

more definite statement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. No such motion was filed by

Defendants. At the very least, one would expect the defendant to seek clarification

from opposing counsel. That does not appear to have happened, either.

Sergeant Beasley’s Qualified Immunity Defense

Defendants assert that this Court made incorrect factual determinations and

misapplied the standard of review when analyzing Mr. Jackson-Gibson’s excessive

force claim against Sergeant Beasley.

Defendants first argue that the Court was incorrect when it “stated that ‘there

is no evidence that Mr. Jackson-Gibson voluntarily resisted [Sergeant] Beasley’s

attempt to arrest him.’” (ECF No. 41 at PageID 1526 (quoting ECF No. 39 at

PageID 1504).) Defendants then provide a narrative of what they claim occurred.

The Court, however, after reviewing the available video footage numerous times,

found and continues to find that a reasonable juror could view the events

differently and find that Mr. Jackson-Gibson did not resist arrest.

Defendants next maintain that “the central deficiency” in the Court’s

qualified immunity analysis was that it asked whether a reasonable jury could

conclude that Mr. Jackson-Gibson was not engaged in active resistance rather than

“whether every reasonable official would have known that the particular conduct

of the Officer at issue was unlawful.” (ECF No. 41 at PageID 1528 (emphasis in

original, quotation marks and citations omitted).) Defendants, however, conflate

the standard applied when assessing the totality of the circumstances confronting

an officer during the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis and the question

asked at the second prong as to whether a reasonable officer would have known

that his or her conduct was unlawful.

It was only when evaluating the circumstances presented that this Court

asked what a reasonable juror might conclude, and this was not a mistake of law.

See Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Godawa v. Byrd,

798 F.3d 457 463 (6th Cir. 2015)) (explaining that when facts, including those

shown in videos, can be interpreted in multiple ways, or if videos do not show all

relevant facts, such facts should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party); see also Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., 25 F.4th 391, 400 (6th Cir. 2022)

(citations omitted) (“[W]hen deciding whether force was excessive or whether our

precedent clearly established that result, we must view genuine factual

disagreements in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. If a reasonable jury

could credit the plaintiff’s version of events and if that version clearly shows the

excessive nature of the defendants’ force, we cannot grant the officers summary

judgment”). The same is true with respect to the embrace between Mr. Jackson-

Gibson and Ms. Dixon.

Defendants characterized this embrace as equivalent to “subjects

interlock[ing] their arms in an act of civil disobedience.” (ECF No. 33-4 at PageID

199 (quoting ECF No. 33-19 at PageID 1127).) In its discussion of this

characterization, the Court simply was opining on whether this was an accurate, or

the only possible, characterization of the circumstances presented, when viewed in

a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. (See ECF No. 39 at PageID 1507-08.) In no

way was the Court “substitut[ing] its own ideas in regard to what is ‘proper police

procedure’” in response to the circumstances presented, as Defendants suggest.

(ECF No. 41 at PageID 1529 (quoting Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 602 (6th

Cir. 2000)).)

Lastly, Defendants contend that the Court failed to adhere to the Supreme

Court’s admonishment “not to define clearly established law at a high level of

generality.” (ECF No. 41 at PageID 1529-30 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).) According to Defendants, the Court had to identify a case

“with near-identical facts”—i.e., one with subjects interlocking their arms in an

act of civil disobedience—putting Sergeant Beasley on notice that his use of a taser

was unreasonable. (Id. at PageID 1529 (emphasis in original) (citing Rivas-

Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2021)).) But Supreme Court and Sixth

Circuit precedent do not require that much.

To be clearly established, there does not need to be a case with “near-

identical facts.” Such a requirement does not appear in Rivas-Villegas. In fact, the

Supreme Court indicated that its “case law does not require a case directly on point

for a right to be clearly established[.]” 595 U.S. at 5; see also White v. Pauly, 580

U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)); Knibbs v.

Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 223 (4th Cir. 2022) (“We recognize that neither the

Supreme Court nor this Circuit has considered a qualified immunity case with a

fact pattern precisely identical to the instant one, but that does not preclude a

finding that the right was clearly established”). Instead, “existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Rivas-

Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5 (quoting White, 580 U.S. at 79). The inquiry “must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition.” Id. at 5-6 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)).

Nevertheless, what is required is a case with factual similarity, not one that is

directly on point. See id. at 5 (quoting White, 580 U.S. at 79).

This Court was not mistaken in its qualified immunity analysis. It applied

the proper standard for assessing clearly established law when deciding Mr.

Jackson-Gibson’s excessive force claim against Sergeant Beasley.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court holds that Defendants have not

shown that a different outcome is warranted with respect to Mr. Jackson-Gibson’s

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Sergeant Beasley. As noted,

however, Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion and this Court’s review of

Plaintiffs’ pleading confirms that neither Mr. Jackson-Gibson nor Ms. Dixon assert

Fourth Amendment claims of unlawful arrest or detention against Officers Hearn

or Fields. The Court, therefore, is dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs’ Complaint

against Officers Hearn and Fields and is terminating them from this action.

SO ORDERED.

s/ Linda V. Parker

LINDA V. PARKER

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 1, 2023