CRAWFORD v. CITY OF WESTBROOK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

ROBB A. CRAWFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 2:23-cv-00123-JDL

)

CITY OF WESTBROOK et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

Robb A. Crawford, a former employee of the City of Westbrook, filed a

Complaint initiating this action on March 9, 2023 (ECF No. 1), in response to the

termination of his employment. The Complaint names as Defendants the City of

Westbrook (the “City”) and three individuals affiliated with the City: Michael Foley,

Jerre Bryant, and Gregory Post (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”). The

Complaint asserts several federal and state claims: breach of contract (Count I); sex

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)

(Count II); sex discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (Count

III); violation of the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (Count IV); violation of the

equal protection guarantees under the Maine and United States Constitutions (Count

V); and violation of the due process guarantees under the Maine and United States

Constitutions (Count VI).

The Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss on July 18, 2023 (ECF No.

10). The motion seeks dismissal of all counts in the Complaint against the Individual

Defendants; and Counts II, III, V, and VI against the City. For the reasons that

follow, I grant the motion and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. As a result, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following well-pleaded, nonconclusory facts are derived from the Plaintiff’s

Complaint, and I accept them as true for the purpose of deciding the Defendants’

Partial Motion to Dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Plaintiff

Robb A. Crawford started working for the City of Westbrook in April 2016, and his

position was eliminated in 2020 because of pandemic-related restructuring. In

keeping with a collective bargaining agreement, an employee with a lower seniority

level was “bumped” from her position as an Office Coordinator so that Crawford could

assume that role. ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 12. The City terminated the former Office

Coordinator’s employment on May 22, 2020, and Crawford took over that role on May

26, 2020. Defendant Gregory Post became Crawford’s direct supervisor.

Crawford’s work with Post “was fraught from the beginning.” ECF No. 1 at 3,

¶ 19. Crawford noticed that Post would print and file emails that he sent to Crawford,

which Post did not do for other employees. Post also entered Crawford’s office while

Crawford was gone, rearranged items on his desk, and then took photos of the space.

Crawford had never been warned or disciplined in the four years before the position

transfer. But Post issued write-ups to Crawford on two occasions when Crawford

attended to the health needs of family members—both times with Post’s permission.

Crawford learned from other City employees that Post had a very close

relationship with the former Office Coordinator and that the two had been upset and

crying when they learned that she would be laid off. Crawford “believes, based on

reports made to him and other information he has obtained and observed,” that Post

and the former employee had been involved in a romantic or sexual relationship with

each other. ECF No. 1 at 3, ¶ 8. Post frequently communicated with the former

employee, and he would attempt to hide his phone from Crawford when he received

text messages from her. Despite Post’s efforts, Crawford saw some of the messages

from the former employee to Post, including one that appeared flirtatious and another

that read: “Well hopefully it will change back soon.” ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 25. Crawford

reasoned that Post and the former employee wanted to revert to their prior

arrangement, where Post supervised the former employee—a woman—instead of

Crawford—a man. Given this context, Crawford believed that “Post was attempting

to manufacture a justification for terminating [Crawford’s] employment so that he

could bring back [the former employee] and resume his romantic or sexual

relationship with her.” ECF No. 1 at 3, ¶ 21.

Crawford received a letter from Defendant Michael Foley on March 9, 2021,

that terminated his employment with the City. The letter provided no explanation

as to the reason or reasons for Crawford’s termination. There was a grievance

hearing about Crawford’s termination that Defendant Foley ended early when

Crawford presented evidence about his positive work performance. Post was also

present at the grievance hearing, which made Crawford feel intimidated and unable

to freely describe the problems he experienced at work. Crawford filed a complaint

with the Maine Human Rights Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission and contends that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. He

subsequently brought this civil action.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To evaluate a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must treat

“[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint” as true and then consider

whether “that factual content, so taken, ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged’” such that “the claim

has facial plausibility.” Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.

2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009)). “Plausible, of course, means something

more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation’s plausibility is a

‘context-specific’ job that compels [a court] ‘to draw on’ [its] ‘judicial experience and

common sense.’” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st

Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Status of Individual Defendants

The Individual Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Counts II, III,

and IV against them because there is no individual liability under Title VII, the

Maine Human Rights Act, or the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The

Individual Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss Count I against them

because they are not parties to the contract implicated in this dispute. Crawford

concedes that Counts I through IV do not apply to the Individual Defendants and

agreed at oral argument that those claims should be dismissed as applied to them.

Accordingly, the claims made in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Complaint are

dismissed as to Defendants Foley, Bryant, and Post.

B. Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection Claims

Count II of the Complaint asserts a claim for sex discrimination under Title

VII; Count III asserts a claim for sex discrimination under the Maine Human Rights

Act; and Count V asserts a claim under the equal protection guarantees of the federal

and Maine constitutions. The crux of Crawford’s argument in each of these counts is

that the City discriminated against him or treated him differently because of his sex.

Title VII makes it unlawful for certain employers “to discharge any individual,

or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e‑2(a)(1) (West 2024). Similarly, the Maine Human Rights Act

makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge an employee or discriminate with

respect to hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions or

privileges of employment or any other matter directly or indirectly related to

employment” because of sex. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4572(1)(A) (West 2024). The Maine

Human Rights Act and Title VII are similar in terms of their “text and purpose,” and

federal and state courts “have looked to federal case law addressing Title VII [when]

evaluating claims arising under the [Maine Human Rights Act].” Briggs v. City of

Portland, No. 2:16-cv-00374-JDL, 2017 WL 1745377, at *11 (D. Me. May 4, 2017) (rec.

dec.), aff’d, 2017 WL 2265059 (D. Me. May 23, 2017).

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection

Clause prohibits a state from treating similarly situated persons differently because

of their classification in a particular group.” Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández,

790 F.3d 99, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2015). Likewise, the Maine Constitution provides that

“[n]o person shall . . . be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Me. Const. art. I,

§ 6‑A; see also Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 28, 895 A.2d 944

(explaining that “Article 1, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution includes similar

requirements” as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

To state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII or the Maine Human

Rights Act, Crawford “must plausibly allege that [he] experienced an adverse

employment action taken on the basis of [his] gender.” Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R.,

676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying Title VII). For example, a plaintiff can

state a plausible disparate treatment claim by pleading facts demonstrating that he

was treated differently than others who were similarly situated, and “that gender

was the reason for that difference.” Rivas Rosado v. Radio Shack, Inc., 312 F.3d 532,

534 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 658 (2020) (“[A]n

employer who intentionally treats a person worse because of sex—such as by firing

the person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in an individual of another sex—

discriminates against that person in violation of Title VII.”). The same is true as to

an equal protection claim: “Generally, for an equal protection claim to survive a

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly demonstrating that

‘compared with others similarly situated, the plaintiff was selectively

treated . . . based on impermissible considerations . . . .’” Mulero-Carrillo, 790 F.3d

at 106 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barrington Cove

Ltd. P’ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001)).

Here, the Complaint squarely asserts that Crawford was terminated because

his direct supervisor “did not want a man working for him because he desired to have

a woman with whom he could have a romantic or sexual relationship in Plaintiff’s

position.” ECF No. 1 at 8-9, ¶¶ 61, 68. For reasons I will explain, this assertion,

when considered in conjunction with other facts pleaded in the Complaint, does not

allege that Crawford’s termination or treatment at work was because of his sex.

The allegations in the Complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to

Crawford, would establish that his supervisor preferred the former employee—a

woman—for Crawford’s position, and that Crawford is a man. But those facts alone

do not state a facially plausible claim that Crawford’s work experience or firing were

because of his gender. “To ward off dismissal, ‘the plaintiff need not demonstrate

that [he] is likely to prevail, but [his] claim must suggest more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Conformis, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 58 F.4th 517,

527-28 (1st Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting García-Catalán v.

United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102‑03 (1st Cir. 2013)).

Here, the Complaint alleges facts which, when viewed in the most favorable

light, could establish that Crawford was treated poorly and eventually terminated

because Post desired to maintain a close, romantic relationship with a particular

former female employee with whom he had a preexisting relationship. However,

those allegations do not expressly establish or support a reasonable inference that

“gender was the reason” that Crawford was treated differently than a similarly

situated woman. Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Post was motivated to fire

Crawford “so that he could bring back [the particular former employee] and resume

his romantic or sexual relationship with her.” ECF No. 1 at 3, ¶ 21 (emphasis added).

Rather than supporting a reasonable inference that Crawford was fired because of

his sex, the Complaint—which I read as a whole, see García-Catalán, 734 F.3d at

103—instead alleges that Post preferred a particular person over Crawford. The

Complaint does not plausibly allege that Post’s preference or the adverse employment

action that flowed from it were “because of” Crawford’s sex. See DeCintio v.

Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Appellees were not

prejudiced because of their status as males; rather, they were discriminated against

because [an administrator] preferred his paramour.”). Accordingly, Crawford’s sex

discrimination and equal protection claims—Counts II, III, and V of the Complaint—

are dismissed.

C. Procedural Due Process Claim

Count VI of the Complaint asserts a violation of Crawford’s right to procedural

due process, due to having been “fired without notice as to the cause and without an

adequate opportunity to be heard.” ECF No. 1 at 12, ¶ 89. The Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Maine Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Me. Const. art. I,

§ 6‑A. “The Maine and United States Constitutions create coextensive due process

rights.” Doe I v. Williams, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 61, 61 A.3d 718.

“To establish a procedural due process violation, the plaintiff ‘must identify a

protected liberty or property interest and allege that the defendants, acting under

color of state law, deprived [him] of that interest without constitutionally adequate

process.’” González-Droz v. González-Colón, 660 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011) (alteration

in original) (quoting Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2006));

accord Doe I, 2013 ME 24, ¶ 61, 61 A.3d 718 (“We review a procedural due process

claim in two steps. First, we determine if the government has deprived a claimant of

life, liberty, or property interests. Second, if such deprivation occurred, we then

determine what process, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, is due . . . .”

(quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Me. Revenue Servs., 2007 ME 62, ¶ 26, 922 A.2d

465)). Crawford contends that the City deprived him of a constitutionally protected

property interest in continued public employment. The City counters that even if

Crawford has pleaded a sufficient property interest, his procedural due process claim

must fail because Maine state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.

“‘[W]hen the challenged state action is a flaw in the official’s conduct rather

than a flaw in the state law itself,’ such conduct is considered ‘random and

unauthorized,’ and the procedural due process claim is ‘limited to the issue of the

adequacy of the post[-]deprivation remedies provided by the state.’” Farris v. Poore,

841 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439-40 (D. Me. 2012) (quoting Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d

11, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2005)). Here, Crawford has not alleged “a flaw in the state law

itself,” Hadfield, 407 F.3d at 20, and the facts in the Complaint instead focus on the

individualized conduct of City officials. Thus, Crawford “cannot succeed on his

procedural due process claim unless he can show that the state failed to provide him

with an adequate post[-]deprivation remedy.” Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d

257, 260 (1st Cir. 1996).

The City argues that Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B provides an adequate

post-deprivation remedy here. Rule 80B provides the applicable procedure “[w]hen

review by the Superior Court, whether by appeal or otherwise, of any action or failure

or refusal to act by a governmental agency, including any department, board,

commission, or officer, is provided by statute or is otherwise available by law.” Me.

R. Civ. P. 80B(a). “Rule 80B is designed ‘to afford prompt, effective, expeditious and

direct judicial review of administrative action.’” Tominsky v. Ogunquit, 2023 ME 30,

¶ 19, 294 A.3d 142 (quoting Colby v. York Cnty. Comm’rs, 442 A.2d 544, 547 (Me.

1982)). Crawford contends, however, that “Rule 80B is either not available to [him]

at all or cannot provide an adequate remedy for the wrongs he has suffered.” ECF

No. 17 at 4. Specifically, Crawford argues that Rule 80B does not provide an adequate

remedy because (1) Rule 80B cannot remedy the fact that Crawford was denied a

hearing before he was discharged; and (2) Crawford cannot seek review under Rule

80B because the City never communicated its reasoning for his termination.

As to the first point, Crawford cites Gorham v. Androscoggin County, 2011 ME

63, 21 A.3d 115, for the proposition that he was deprived of due process “prior to any

final action” and “such deprivations cannot be adequately remedied by the Rule 80B

process.” ECF No. 17 at 4. In Gorham, the plaintiff filed a civil complaint in the

Superior Court after he was discharged from his position as a county corrections

officer. Gorham, 2011 ME 63, ¶¶ 1, 5, 21 A.3d 115. The plaintiff asserted due process

and wrongful termination claims, alleging in part that the County Sheriff suspended

the plaintiff without pay, and that the County Commissioners subsequently

dismissed him. Id. at ¶¶ 4-5. The plaintiff “argue[d] that review of the

Commissioners’ action [could not] redress his independent claim that the Sheriff

deprived him of a property interest without due process by suspending him without

pay before the Commissioners conducted a hearing.” Id. at ¶ 21. The Law Court

reasoned that it could not, on the record before it, “conclude that direct review

pursuant to Rule 80B would provide an adequate remedy” for the plaintiff’s due

process claim. Id. at ¶ 25.

In Gorham, the plaintiff complained about two distinct official acts: (1) the

Sheriff’s decision to suspend him without pay, and (2) the Commissioners’ decision to

dismiss him. The Law Court could not conclude on the record before it whether

review of the Commissioners’ decision pursuant to Rule 80B would also address the

plaintiff’s earlier suspension by the Sheriff. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25. In contrast,

Crawford’s procedural due process claim here centers only on the process he received

in relation to his termination. Crawford alleges that he was not afforded applicable

procedural protections before his dismissal, but his Complaint does not allege a

distinct pre-termination deprivation analogous to that at issue in Gorham. The facts

here do not involve a situation where “an alleged deprivation of civil rights occurs

before, and not as a part of, the action or inaction for which a plaintiff seeks review.”

Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 2016 ME 143, ¶ 16, 148 A.3d 707. Thus, this aspect of

the Gorham decision does not support the conclusion that Rule 80B is a

constitutionally inadequate remedy in Crawford’s case.

As to his second argument, Crawford alleges that he received written notice of

his termination on March 9, 2021, but the notice failed to state the reason or reasons

for his termination. It follows, Crawford argues, that the notice did not provide him

“the information necessary to bring an 80B appeal.”1 ECF No. 17 at 5. Crawford

again cites Gorham in support of his argument.

In Gorham, the Law Court noted that the Maine Freedom of Access Act,

1 M.R.S.A. § 407(2) (West 2024), required the County Commissioners to issue a

written decision explaining the basis for their decision.2 Gorham, 2011 ME 63, ¶ 17,

21 A.3d 115. Based on this, the Law Court concluded “that, for purposes of Rule

80B(b), ‘notice of any action’ involving the dismissal of a county employee . . . occurs

when the employee receives a copy of the written decision of the county

commissioners or personnel board required by [the Maine Freedom of Access Act].”

Id. at ¶ 19 (quoting Me. R. Civ. P. 80B(b)). But the City’s failure to issue written

findings—beyond the bare bones termination letter Crawford received—does not

1 Crawford argues in his Response to the Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17) that the absence of

findings prevents him from bringing a Rule 80B action, but he does not otherwise suggest that Rule

80B is unavailable to him. I note that Crawford’s Complaint “makes no allegation that the state

remedies available to him are constitutionally inadequate.” Lambert v. Fiorentini, 949 F.3d 22, 28 (1st

Cir. 2020). “A procedural due process claim that does not ‘allege the unavailability of constitutionally-

adequate remedies under state law’ fails.” Id. (quoting Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of E.

Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1992)).

2 The Maine Freedom of Access Act provides in relevant part:

Dismissal or refusal to renew contract. Every agency shall make a written record

of every decision involving the dismissal or the refusal to renew the contract of any

public official, employee or appointee. The agency shall, except in case of probationary

employees, set forth in the record the reason or reasons for its decision and make

findings of fact, in writing, sufficient to apprise the individual concerned and any

interested member of the public of the basis for the decision. A written record or a copy

thereof must be kept by the agency and made available to any interested member of

the public who may wish to review it.

1 M.R.S.A. § 407(2).

render Rule 80B a constitutionally inadequate remedy. Indeed, the Law Court has

construed Rule 80B as the proper mechanism to address the failure of a government

agency to issue written findings required by the Maine Freedom of Access Act:

Presumably in the instant case there was no record [as required by the

Maine Freedom of Access Act]. However, had plaintiff availed himself

of the relief provided by Rule 80B, he could have compelled the

preparation of a record, including a new hearing if necessary, as he

might have under the now abolished process of mandamus. Once the

requirement of a record was enforced, Rule 80B would also have

provided the mechanism for judicial review of the decision and the

procedure employed in reaching that decision since it has subsumed the

extraordinary writ of certiorari. The court would then have been

appropriately situated to scrutinize the record for error, and if error

were found the court could reverse, vacate, or modify the decision

accordingly. In short, plaintiff’s entire request for relief could have been

adequately remedied through the process of direct review.

Colby, 442 A.2d at 548 (citation omitted). Further, Rule 80B explicitly contemplates

review of a governmental agency’s “action or failure or refusal to act” when review is

available by law. Me. R. Civ. P. 80B(a) (emphasis added). In addition, for the purpose

of calculating “[t]he time within which review may be sought” absent a statutory time

limit, the Rule differentiates between “notice of any action or refusal to act” (within

thirty days after notice) and “a failure to act” (within six months after the time in

which action should reasonably have occurred).3 Me. R. Civ. P. 80B(b).

Based on the foregoing, I determine that Rule 80B constitutes an adequate

post-deprivation remedy for the injuries Crawford claims to have suffered. Indeed,

this Court has previously concluded that Rule 80B constitutes a constitutionally

3 The parties have not briefed—and I do not address—the correct manner or timeframe for Crawford

to raise his concerns in a Rule 80B action.

adequate remedy in the context of the dismissal of public employees,4 and Crawford

has not plausibly alleged that Maine state law does not afford him a constitutionally

adequate remedy here. Because state law provides an adequate post-deprivation

remedy for the “random and unauthorized” conduct that Crawford alleges, Crawford’s

procedural due process claim fails.

D. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Federal jurisdiction in this case is based on the Complaint’s assertion of federal

claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343 (West 2024). Because I conclude that the

federal claims should be dismissed, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims. A federal district court “may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3) (West 2024). Ordinarily in

circumstances where “the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its

early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the

exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” Borrás-Borrero v.

Corporación del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, 958 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). This is because, “in the

4 See, e.g., Learnard v. Inhabitants of Town of Van Buren, 182 F. Supp. 2d 115, 117, 121, 125-26 (D.

Me. 2002) (concluding that Rule 80B provided adequate post-deprivation remedy where former

municipal employee alleged that town officials violated his procedural due process rights “when they

terminated his employment without first giving him notice of the reasons for his termination and an

opportunity to respond”); Farris, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 438, 441 (concluding that “[t]he Maine Rule 80B

process is an adequate post[-]deprivation remedy in this case” involving former town code enforcement

officer and granting motion to dismiss procedural due process claims); Young v. Town of Bar Harbor,

No. 1:14-cv-00146-GZS, 2015 WL 2337868, at *1, *6 (D. Me. Apr. 23, 2015) (rec. dec.) (concluding that

Rule 80B constituted adequate post-deprivation remedy where former chief of police “complain[ed]

about the execution of the process” that town used to terminate his employment), aff’d, 2015 WL

2337442 (D. Me. May 13, 2015).

usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims.” Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2017)

(quoting Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7). I conclude that these factors “point

toward declining” to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims

here. Thus, the remaining claims in the Complaint are dismissed without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is therefore ORDERED that the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. All Counts are DISMISSED with prejudice as against

Defendants Foley, Bryant, and Post; and Counts II, III, V, and VI are DISMISSED

with prejudice as against the City. Because the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the City, it is

further ORDERED that the remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

As a result, all claims in the Complaint have been dismissed and this action is

TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 24, 2024

/s/ JON D. LEVY

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE