ISMAIL v. ROBINSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

AHMED ISMAIL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:22-cv-00150-JAW

)

PHILIP ROBINSON, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON DEFENDANT NICHOLAS WRIGLEY’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

An arrestee brings suit against two of his arresting officers, arguing that the

officers violated his constitutional rights by conducting an unlawful stop, by forcefully

removing him from the stopped car, and by conducting an unlawful public strip

search. Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by one of the defendant

officers. Because the Court concludes that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),

bars the plaintiff’s challenges to the stop and that dashcam footage of the arrest

contradicts the plaintiff’s other claims, the Court grants the defendant’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2021, Ahmed Ismail filed a civil action in the Cumberland

County Superior Court in the state of Maine against Maine Drug Enforcement

Agency (MDEA) Special Agent Philip Robinson (S/A Robinson) and Westbrook, Maine

Police Officer Nicholas Wrigley (Officer Wrigley). State Ct. R., Attach. 1, Attested

Docket R. (ECF No. 5). Mr. Ismail alleged the Defendants violated his constitutional

rights during a May 2021 traffic stop by making the initial stop without reasonable

suspicion, prolonging the stop to allow S/A Robinson to arrive on scene, forcefully

pulling him out of the stopped car, and conducting a public strip search. Id., Attach.

2, Compl.

On May 19, 2022, Officer Wrigley removed the case to federal court based on

federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1). On

May 25, 2022, Officer Wrigley answered the complaint and requested a jury trial.

Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Jury Trial Demand (Defendant Officer Wrigley)

(ECF No. 8). On May 26, 2022, S/A Robinson answered the complaint. Answer and

Affirmative Defenses of Def. Philip Robinson (ECF No. 9). On June 6, 2022, Mr. Ismail

responded to Officer Wrigley’s answer. Resp. to Answer (ECF No. 11).

On May 27, 2022, the Magistrate Judge entered a Scheduling Order.

Scheduling Order (ECF No. 10). On June 16, 2022, S/A Robinson objected to the

Scheduling Order, explaining that criminal proceedings arising out of the traffic stop

at issue in this case were underway in Maine state court and asking the Court to stay

this case pending the resolution of the criminal matter. Def. Robinson’s Obj. to

Scheduling Order & Mot. to Stay Case Pending Resolution of Criminal Proceeding

(ECF No. 12). On August 1, 2022, the Magistrate Judge granted S/A Robinson’s

motion and stayed the case until further order. Order on Obj. to Scheduling Order

and Mot. to Stay (ECF No. 16). On December 19, 2022, Mr. Ismail filed a Status

Report to inform the Court that the criminal proceedings had concluded and to

request that this case be set for trial as soon as possible. Pl.’s Status Report (ECF

No. 20). On January 9, 2023, the Magistrate Judge lifted the stay. Order Lifting

Stay and Am. Scheduling Order (ECF No. 23).

On June 30, 2023, Officer Wrigley filed a motion for summary judgment and a

statement of material facts.1 Def. Officer Wrigley’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 34)

(Def.’s Mot.); Def. Officer Wrigley’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Mot. for

Summ. J. (ECF No. 35). Mr. Ismail did not respond to Officer Wrigley’s motion, nor

did he submit his own statement of material facts.2

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Overview

Before reciting the material facts in this case, the Court addresses Mr. Ismail’s

failure to respond to Officer Wrigley’s statement of material facts and to submit his

own statement of material facts. District of Maine Local Rule 56(c) provides that a

“party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a

separate, short, and concise statement of material facts,” which “shall admit, deny or

qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s

statement of material facts.” D. ME. LOC. R. 56(c). This statement “may contain in a

separately titled section additional facts, each set forth in a separately numbered

paragraph and supported by a record citation.” Id. Local Rule 56(f) further provides

that “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if

1 Also on June 30, 2023, S/A Robinson filed a separate motion for summary judgment and

statement of material facts. Def. Robinson’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 36); Statement of Material

Facts (ECF No. 33). The Court addresses S/A Robinson’s motion in a separate order.

2 Beginning June 16, 2023, all court mail to Mr. Ismail at his listed address has been returned

to the Clerk’s Office as undeliverable. Mail (ECF Nos. 32, 38, 39, 41). “A party’s obligation to maintain

a current address with a court does not rest with the court, the opposing party, or a third party. It

rests solely with the party himself, in this case Mr. [Ismail].” Boulier v. Penobscot Cnty. Jail, No. 1:21-

cv-00080-JAW, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39708, at *10 (D. Me. Mar. 7, 2022). “A party, not the district

court, bears the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his mailing address.” Carey v.

King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). Mr. Ismail was advised of this obligation. Notice to Self-

Represented Litigants (ECF No. 6).

supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted

unless properly controverted.” D. ME. LOC. R. 56(f). In other words, if a party

opposing a motion for summary judgment fails to submit a statement of material facts

as required by Local Rule 56(c), any material facts proffered by the party moving for

summary judgment are deemed admitted, as long as they are supported by proper

record citations.

Here, Officer Wrigley’s motion for summary judgment was accompanied by a

statement of material facts as required by District of Maine Local Rule 56(b).3

Notwithstanding Mr. Ismail’s failure to respond, to assure that Officer Wrigley’s

proposed facts are properly before the Court, the Court reviewed each proffered fact

to determine whether it is adequately buttressed by the record. See D. ME. LOC. R.

56(f) (“The court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific

citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment”). Having done

so, the Court finds that each of Officer Wrigley’s proposed facts was properly

supported by a record citation. Therefore, having performed its due diligence review

of the summary judgment record, the Court admits all material facts.

3 District of Maine Local Rule 56(b) provides:

A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by a separate, short, and concise

statement of material facts, each set forth in a separately numbered paragraph(s), as

to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be

tried. Each fact asserted in the statement shall be simply and directly stated in

narrative without footnotes or tables and shall be supported by a record citation as

required by subsection (f) of this rule.

D. ME. LOC. R. 56(b).

Further, in support of his separate motion for summary judgment, S/A

Robinson provided dashcam footage from Officer Wrigley’s police cruiser, which

depicts the events at issue in this case.4 Statement of Material Facts, Attach. 3, Ex.

A to Robinson Decl. (ECF No. 33) (Wrigley Cruiser Footage). The Court reviewed the

dashcam footage and determined that the events depicted in it support Officer

Wrigley’s material facts.

B. Nicholas Wrigley’s Material Facts

On May 19, 2021, Westbrook Police Officer Nicholas Wrigley was on duty in

full uniform and in a fully marked police cruiser. DSMF ¶ 1. While parked near the

intersection of Central Street and William Clarke Drive at around 11:30 p.m., Officer

Wrigley observed a silver Ford Focus approach the intersection. Id. ¶ 2. As the car

approached the intersection, the driver did not signal an intention to make a turn.

Id. ¶ 3. At the intersection, the driver stopped the vehicle past the stop line. Id. ¶ 4.

The driver also did not signal when making a turn at the intersection from Central

Street onto William Clarke Drive. Id. ¶ 5.

After the driver completed the turn onto William Clarke Drive, Officer Wrigley

activated his emergency lights and siren and stopped the Ford Focus. Id. ¶ 6. Based

on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Wrigley believed he had a reasonable

articulable suspicion that the operator of the Ford Focus had violated 29-A M.R.S. §

4 Although Officer Wrigley did not cite the dashcam footage in his motion for summary judgment

or statement of material facts, the Court is allowed to consider the video in resolving the motion under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the

cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record”); FabriClear, LLC v. Harvest Direct,

LLC, No. 20-10580-TSH, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41298, at *3 n.1 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2023) (“While the

Court has no obligation to consider evidence that is not cited in the papers, the Court may consider

admissible evidence in the record even if a party did not cite to the evidence”).

2071(2)(B), which requires a motorist to signal before turning at an intersection.5 Id.

¶ 7. Officer Wrigley approached the vehicle and obtained the driver’s license,

registration, and proof of insurance of the driver, Dawn Ricci. Id. ¶ 8.

Shortly thereafter, Westbrook Police Officer Jason Kopp and S/A Robinson

arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 9. Officer Wrigley understood that earlier that evening

S/A Robinson had been surveilling a known drug house in Westbrook where cocaine

base is commonly used and sold. Id. ¶ 10. Officer Wrigley further understood that a

few minutes before he stopped the Ford Focus, S/A Robinson had observed the car at

the house he was surveilling and he saw two persons, a male and a female, leave the

house, enter the vehicle, and drive away. Id. ¶ 11.

Officer Wrigley observed Ms. Ricci speaking with S/A Robinson about an

investigation he was conducting into potential criminal conduct at the house he had

been surveilling. Id. ¶ 12. Based on Ms. Ricci’s apparent cooperation with S/A

Robinson and his investigation, Officer Wrigley decided not to issue her a summons

for violating 29-A M.R.S. § 2071(2)(B). Id. ¶ 13.

Ms. Ricci asked S/A Robinson to assist her in removing the male passenger in

the front seat of the Ford Focus from the car. Id. ¶ 14. Based on that request, S/A

Robinson ordered the male passenger to exit the car. Id. ¶ 15. S/A Robinson stated

that he saw a cellophane baggy hanging out of the front of the male passenger’s pants

5 DSMF ¶ 7 states: “Based on the totality of the circumstances Wrigley had witnessed that

evening, Wrigley had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the operator of the Vehicle had violated

29-A M.R.S. § 2071(2)(B), which requires a motorist to signal before turning at an intersection.” As

originally written, DSMF ¶ 7 contains a legal conclusion. The Court modified the language of DSMF

¶ 7 to indicate that it reflects Officer Wrigley’s belief.

as the male was exiting the vehicle. Id. ¶ 16. Based on his education, training, and

experience, S/A Robinson believed the cellophane baggy was indicative of drug

packaging. Id. ¶ 17. Based on Officer Wrigley’s training and experience as a law

enforcement officer, he believed that the type of cellophane baggy observed by S/A

Robinson is commonly used in the sale of drugs.6 Id. ¶ 18. S/A Robinson took

possession of the cellophane baggy, which contained a rock-like substance. Id. ¶ 19.

In light of the totality of the circumstances—including the male passenger’s presence

at a known drug house a few minutes before the traffic stop and his possession of a

cellophane baggy containing a rock-like substance that appeared to be crack

cocaine—the officers believed there was reasonable suspicion that the male passenger

was engaged in criminal activity.7 Id. ¶ 20.

At that point, Officers Kopp and Wrigley detained the male passenger for

suspicion of unlawful possession of a controlled substance so that he could be

questioned further. Id. ¶ 21. With Ms. Ricci’s consent, S/A Robinson and Officer

Wrigley searched the Ford Focus and found baggies used by drug dealers and a

hypodermic needle cap. Id. ¶ 22.

6 DSMF ¶ 18 reads: “Based on Wrigley’s training and experience as a law enforcement officer,

the type of cellophane baggie Robinson had observed hanging out of the front of the male passenger’s

pants is typically used in the sale of drugs.” The Court modified DSMF ¶ 18 to indicate that it reflects

Officer Wrigley’s belief.

7 DSMF ¶ 20 reads: “In light of the totality of the circumstances—including the male passenger’s

presence at a known drug house a few minutes before the traffic stop and his possession of a cellophane

baggie that contained a rock-like substance that appeared to be crack cocaine—the officers had at least

reasonable articulable suspicion to believe the male passenger was engaged in criminal activity.”

Because DSMF ¶ 20 as originally written contains a legal conclusion, the Court modified it to indicate

that it reflects the officers’ beliefs.

The male passenger identified himself as Ahmed Ismail, and he provided his

date of birth. Id. ¶ 23. Mr. Ismail admitted that he was on probation, and he provided

the name of his probation officer, David Redmond. Id. ¶ 24. Officer Wrigley spoke

by telephone with Probation Officer Redmond and explained the circumstances of the

traffic stop. Id. ¶ 25. Probation Officer Redmond stated that the conditions of Mr.

Ismail’s probation provided that Probation Officer Redmond could lawfully authorize

a search of Mr. Ismail’s person at any time. Id. ¶ 26. Probation Officer Redmond

then authorized Officer Wrigley and the other officers present to search Mr. Ismail

pursuant to the conditions of his probation. Id. ¶ 27.

S/A Robinson and Officer Kopp searched Mr. Ismail and found a large amount

of cash in denominations from one dollar to one hundred dollars and a rock-like

substance that appeared to be crack cocaine, which tested positive for cocaine. Id. ¶¶

28-29. S/A Robinson suspected Mr. Ismail may have been in possession of additional

drugs and wished to conduct a better search of his person. Id. ¶ 30. In particular,

S/A Robinson wanted to ensure that Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants were not equipped with

inside pockets or drawstrings, which could have been used to tie off a bag of drugs.

Id. ¶ 31.

For these reasons, S/A Robinson removed Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants to search

their contents more thoroughly after confirming that Mr. Ismail was wearing shorts

underneath. Id. ¶ 32. Based on Officer Wrigley’s training and experience as a law

enforcement officer, it is standard procedure for officers to thoroughly search

garments like pants for drugs and weapons when drug crimes are being investigated.

Id. ¶ 33. Moreover, based on Officer Wrigley’s training and experience as a law

enforcement officer, it is common to remove such garments, particularly when a

suspect is wearing multiple layers of clothing. Id. ¶ 34.

At some point during the interactions between Mr. Ismail and the officers, Mr.

Ismail reached down into the back of his pants, removed a bag containing a substance,

and flung it behind him into the grass. Id. ¶ 35. Shortly thereafter, S/A Robinson

found the bag on the ground a few feet from Mr. Ismail and discovered that the bag

contained a large quantity of what appeared to be crack cocaine. Id. ¶ 36. The

substance in the bag tested positive for cocaine. Id. ¶ 37.

Based on the totality of the circumstances—including the substance that

appeared to be crack cocaine that was found on his person, the bag found near him

that contained a large quantity of what appeared to be crack cocaine, and the large

quantity of cash found on his person—Officer Wrigley believed there was probable

cause that Mr. Ismail had engaged in unlawful conduct, including Trafficking in

Schedule W drugs, unlawful possession of Schedule W drugs, and Falsifying Physical

Evidence.8 Id. ¶ 38. Mr. Ismail was charged with Trafficking in Schedule W drugs,

unlawful possession of Schedule W drugs, and Falsifying Physical Evidence based on

these circumstances. Id. ¶ 39.

8 DSMF ¶ 38 reads: “Based on the totality of the circumstances—including the substance that

appeared to be crack cocaine that was found on his person, the bag found near him that contained a

large quantity of what appeared to be crack cocaine, and the large quantity of cash found on his

person—Wrigley had probable cause to believe that Ismail had engaged in unlawful conduct, including

Trafficking in Schedule W drugs, unlawful possession of Schedule W drugs, and Falsifying Physical

Evidence.” Because DSMF ¶ 38 as originally written contains a legal conclusion, the Court modified

it to indicate that it reflects Officer Wrigley’s belief.

Mr. Ismail pleaded guilty to charges arising out of the May 19, 2021 traffic

stop, including unlawful possession of cocaine base and falsifying physical evidence.

Id. ¶ 40.9 At no point during or after the removal of Mr. Ismail’s pants was the bare

skin on the lower half of Mr. Ismail’s body exposed other than the portion of his legs

visible between his shoes and his shorts. Id. ¶ 42.

III. NICHOLAS WRIGLEY’S ARGUMENTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Officer Wrigley makes four arguments in support of his motion for summary

judgment: 1) all claims in Mr. Ismail’s complaint are barred under Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994); 2) the stop of the Ford Focus and search of Mr. Ismail’s person

did not violate the Fourth Amendment; 3) the officers did not use excessive force; and

4) Mr. Ismail’s claims are barred by qualified immunity. Def.’s Mot. at 1-17.

Leading with his first argument, Officer Wrigley asserts that Mr. Ismail’s

claims “are barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule.” Id. at 8. Officer Wrigley

observes that this is so because “the criminal charges to which [Mr. Ismail] pleaded

guilty all stemmed from the traffic stop of Ricci’s Vehicle and the observations made

and information gathered by the officers at the scene of the traffic stop,” meaning

that “[f]or Ismail to succeed with his Section 1983 claims in this case, he would have

to demonstrate unlawful conduct by the officers that would render his convictions

invalid.” Id. He concludes that “[s]ince there are neither allegations nor evidence in

this case that any of the convictions have been reversed on direct appeal, expunged

9 DSMF ¶ 41 reads: “At no time during Wrigley’s interactions with Ismail on May 19, 2021 and

May 20, 2021 did he use more force than was reasonably necessary to secure Ismail, nor did he observe

any other officer use more force than was reasonably necessary to secure Ismail that evening.” The

Court struck DMSF ¶ 41 because it asserts a legal conclusion.

by executive order, declared invalid by a court authorized to make such

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus, [Mr. Ismail’s] claims in this case are not cognizable as a matter of law.” Id.

Turning to his second argument, Officer Wrigley remarks that “[e]ven if

Ismail’s claims against Wrigley are not barred by Heck, he is nonetheless entitled to

summary judgment because the record does not support any constitutional violations

as a matter of law.” Id. Officer Wrigley maintains that the initiation of the traffic

stop was lawful because he “had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the operator

of the Vehicle had violated 29-A M.R.S. § 2071(2)(B) by failing to give a turn signal

continuously—or, in fact, at all—during at least the last 100 feet traveled before

turning.” Id. at 9.

Further, although Officer Wrigley avers that Mr. Ismail “does not appear to

assert any claim against Wrigley arising out of searches conducted after Wrigley

stopped Ricci’s Vehicle,” he maintains that the searches conducted during the traffic

stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 12. According to Officer Wrigley,

“the search of Ricci’s Vehicle was consistent with the Fourth Amendment” because

“Ricci gave the officers permission to search her vehicle.” Id. at 10. Likewise, Officer

Wrigley contends that the search of Mr. Ismail’s person was proper because “the

officers had sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that Ismail may be

engaged in criminal activity” and Probation Officer Redmond authorized the search

pursuant to the terms of Mr. Ismail’s probation. Id. at 11. In addition, Officer

Wrigley declares that “every aspect of the search of Ismail’s person was reasonable

in scope” because of “the evidence-based suspicion that Ismail may have drugs

secreted in his pants and the limited intrusion incurred by Ismail in removing that

garment while Ismail was wearing shorts underneath.” Id. at 11-12. Therefore,

Officer Wrigley concludes, “even if Ismail had intended to assert a claim against

Wrigley based on the searches that occurred after he stopped the Vehicle, that claim

would fail as a matter of law.” Id. at 12.

Shifting to his third argument—that no excessive force was used during the

traffic stop—Officer Wrigley first suggests that “[s]ince the Complaint does not allege

that Wrigley used excessive force in his interactions with Ismail, it is likely

unnecessary for Wrigley or the Court to address that issue.” Id. Even so, Officer

Wrigley continues, “[t]he record reflects that none of the officers interacting with

Ismail on the evening of his arrest used more force than was reasonably necessary to

detain him and secure his arrest.” Id. at 14.

Finally, Officer Wrigley discusses qualified immunity, initially reiterating that

“the record does not reflect that Wrigley violated Ismail’s constitutional rights as a

matter of law.” Id. at 16. Regardless, Officer Wrigley argues that he is entitled to

qualified immunity because he “did not violate any of Ismail’s clearly established

constitutional rights.” Id.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Genuine issues of fact are those that a factfinder could

resolve in favor of the nonmovant, while material facts are those whose ‘existence or

nonexistence has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.’” Green Mountain

Realty Corp. v. Leonard, 750 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Tropigas de P.R.,

Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 637 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2011)).

When the movant “has made a preliminary showing that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmovant must ‘produce specific facts, in suitable

evidentiary form, to . . . establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.’” McCarthy v.

City of Newburyport, 252 F. App’x 328, 332 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)

(quoting Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)).

The nonmoving party must provide “‘enough competent evidence’ to enable a

factfinder to decide in its favor on the disputed claims.” Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294

F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Goldman v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 985 F.2d

1113, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993)). Then, a “court views the facts and draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” Ophthalmic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Paychex,

Inc., 632 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2011), but disregards “[c]onclusory allegations,

improbable inferences, acrimonious invective, or rank speculation.” Mancini v. City

of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Ahern v.

Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2010)). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c)

mandates entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

V. DISCUSSION

To begin, the Court briefly discusses Mr. Ismail’s claims in more detail. The

allegations in Mr. Ismail’s complaint do not paint a universal picture of clarity. Three

of Mr. Ismail’s claims are clear. Mr. Ismail definitively alleges that: 1) the Ford Focus

was unlawfully stopped; 2) the stop was prolonged to allow S/A Robinson to arrive on

scene; and 3) the officers used excessive force when removing him from the vehicle.

Mr. Ismail’s allegations regarding the strip search, however, are less obvious.

In his complaint, Mr. Ismail writes:

While I was already cuffed up [and] headed to [the] police station for a

more thorough search, he decided to start strip searching me in the

middle of the street, forcefully taking my pants of[f] in [the] middle of

the street and humiliating me unjustfully. He violated my liberty by

strip searching me in public without due process of law.

Compl. at 1. Because Mr. Ismail filed his complaint pro se, it is subject to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Construed liberally, Mr. Ismail’s complaint

could contain three allegations related to the strip search: 1) the officers used

excessive force while removing his pants; 2) the scope of the search was unreasonable

in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 3) the search violated his right to

privacy.10

Ultimately, Mr. Ismail’s specific allegations regarding the strip search need

not occupy the Court because, as explained below, the dashcam video, which is part

of the record in this case, clearly demonstrates that no strip search ever occurred,

10 While Mr. Ismail alleges a due process violation, there can be no due process violation under

the facts alleged.

negating whatever claims Mr. Ismail might have attempted to bring. To be fair to

Mr. Ismail, who is pro se, the Court assumes he intended to bring all three potential

challenges to the strip search. Therefore, the Court reads Mr. Ismail’s complaint as

bringing six specific claims against Officer Wrigley.

A. Heck v. Humphrey Bars Mr. Ismail’s Challenges to the Basis for

and Duration of the Initial Traffic Stop

The Court initially addresses Officer Wrigley’s first argument, that summary

judgment is warranted because Mr. Ismail’s claims are barred under Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Def.’s Mot. at 6-8.

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court considered “whether a state

prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 512 U.S. at 478. In answering this question, the Heck Court

observed that “[w]e have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of

tort liability,” id. at 483, and the Court opined that “[w]e think the hoary principle

that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of

outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily

require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just

as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.” Id. at 486.

The Court then held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff

must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make

such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87.

The Heck Court instructed that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a §

1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. The

Court also cautioned that “if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action,

even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal

judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence

of some other bar to the suit.” Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “to determine

Heck’s applicability, a court must examine ‘the relationship between the § 1983 claim

and the conviction, including asking whether the plaintiff could prevail only by

negat[ing] an element of the offense of which he [was] convicted.’” O’Brien v. Town

of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting

Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2006)).

Because Heck provides a jurisdictional bar, the Court must assess Officer

Wrigley’s Heck argument before proceeding to the merits of Mr. Ismail’s claims. See

id. (“Whether Heck bars § 1983 claims is a jurisdictional question that can be raised

at any time during the pendency of litigation”). The Court concludes that Heck bars

Mr. Ismail’s challenges to the justification for and duration of the initial stop, but Mr.

Ismail’s excessive force claim and challenges to the strip search are not barred by

Heck.

The lynchpin of the Heck analysis is whether success on a § 1983 claim would

necessarily invalidate Mr. Ismail’s convictions for drug possession and falsifying

physical evidence. Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 2003) (“The logical

necessity that the judgment in the § 1983 case imply the invalidity of a criminal

conviction is at the heart of the Heck requirement for dismissal of the § 1938 action”

(emphasis in original)). Were Mr. Ismail to succeed on his challenge to the initial

traffic stop, his state convictions could not stand because all the evidence against him

would be rendered inadmissible. See Seidell v. Huggins, No. 1:22-cv-00192-NT, 2023

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75840, at *11 (D. Me. May 2, 2023) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim

“that he was subject to a search that violated the Fourth Amendment because the

police had insufficient grounds to conduct the stop” as “[s]uccess on this claim would

demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction because it would have made the drugs

that he was charged with possessing inadmissible evidence”). The same holds true

for Mr. Ismail’s claim that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged to allow S/A

Robinson to arrive on scene because no evidence of a crime was uncovered before S/A

Robinson arrived. See United States v. Moustrouphis, 560 F. Supp. 3d 333, 340, 343

(D. Me. 2021) (suppressing all evidence obtained after the traffic stop became

prolonged).

Without any evidence, the state could not have charged or convicted Mr. Ismail

of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty.11 Therefore, the Court concludes that Heck

11 It is well established that Heck “applies when the plaintiff has entered a guilty plea and been

convicted.” Seidell, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *10-11 (citing O’Brien, 943 F.3d at 523; Reeves v. United

States, No. 1:16-cv-00193-NT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58331, at *2 (D. Me. May 3, 2016); and Cabot v.

Lewis, 241 F. Supp. 3d 239, 250 (D. Mass. 2017)).

bars Mr. Ismail’s challenges to the initial stop, and accordingly, the Court grants

summary judgment to Officer Wrigley on these claims.

In contrast, success on an excessive force claim does not necessarily invalidate

a prior conviction. See Thore, 466 F.3d at 180 (“A § 1983 excessive force claim brought

against a police officer that arises out of the officer’s use of force during an arrest does

not necessarily call into question the validity of an underlying state conviction . . ..”).

Instead, courts evaluating whether Heck bars a § 1983 excessive force claim must ask

whether the excessive force claim and the plaintiff’s conviction are “so interrelated

factually as to bar the §1983 claim.” O’Brien, 943 F.3d at 529 (quoting Thore, 466

F.3d at 180).

In Mangual v. City of Worcester, 285 F. Supp. 3d 465 (D. Mass. 2018), the

defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force

claim arising out of a strip search, arguing that the claim was barred by Heck. Id. at

468-70. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts allowed some of the

plaintiff’s claims to proceed, concluding that Heck only barred the plaintiff’s

allegations to the extent they challenged the officers’ use of force to extract drugs

from the plaintiff’s rectum. Id. at 472-73. The court denied summary judgment for

the defendants as to the plaintiff’s challenges to force not directly tied to the discovery

of evidence. Id.

Applying the logic of Mangual to Mr. Ismail’s excessive force claim, the Court

concludes that Mr. Ismail’s claim is not “so interrelated factually” to his conviction

that the Heck bar applies. During the hearing at which Mr. Ismail pleaded guilty to

the criminal charges stemming from the traffic stop at issue in this case, the state

prosecutor listed several pieces of evidence supporting Mr. Ismail’s conviction. These

included: a plastic baggie protruding from Mr. Ismail’s waistband, which S/A

Robinson believed to be indicative of drug packaging; a small white rock suspected to

be crack cocaine residue, which was found in Mr. Ismail’s front left pants pocket

before his sweatpants were removed; and a baggie containing several smaller bags of

cocaine base, which Mr. Ismail had flung into the grass. DSMF, Attach. 1, Rule 11

Hr’g/Sentencing Tr. at 7:2-9:9.

The only evidence discovered while Mr. Ismail was exiting the Ford Focus was

the cellophane baggy protruding from his waistband. Wrigley Cruiser Video at 14:55-

15:58. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the cellophane baggy were

suppressed, there would still be sufficient admissible evidence to convict Mr. Ismail.

This evidence would include the cocaine residue found in Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants and

the large amount of crack cocaine found behind Mr. Ismail. Because suppression of

the cellophane baggie would not necessarily invalidate Mr. Ismail’s convictions, Heck

does not bar Mr. Ismail’s excessive force claim.

The same logic applies to Mr. Ismail’s challenges to the alleged strip search.

No evidence was discovered while the officers were removing and searching Mr.

Ismail’s sweatpants. Wrigley Cruiser Video at 40:15-43:49. Therefore, even if Mr.

Ismail were to succeed on his challenges to the search, the state would be able to

introduce its full complement of evidence. In other words, success on these challenges

would not necessarily invalidate Mr. Ismail’s convictions, so the Heck bar does not

apply. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (“[I]f the district court determines that the plaintiff’s

action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding

criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in

the absence of some other bar to the suit” (emphasis in original)). The Court reviews

Mr. Ismail’s excessive force claims and challenges to the alleged strip search on the

merits.

B. The Officers Did Not Use Excessive Force While Mr. Ismail Was

Exiting the Ford Focus

Mr. Ismail’s brings an excessive force claim challenging the force used by the

officers while he was exiting the Ford Focus.12 “In addressing an excessive force claim

brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right

allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Here, that right is Mr. Ismail’s Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,

774 (2014) (“A claim that law-enforcement officers used excessive force to effect a

seizure is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ standard”).

To prevail on an excessive force claim arising under the Fourth Amendment,

“a plaintiff must show that the defendant employed force that was unreasonable

12 Officer Wrigley argues he is not implicated by this excessive force claim. See Def.’s Mot. at 12

(“Since the Complaint does not allege that Wrigley used excessive force in his interactions with Ismail,

it is likely unnecessary for Wrigley or the Court to address that issue”). True, Mr. Ismail alleges that

only S/A Robinson “forcibly pulled [him] out of [the] car.” Compl. at 1. However, Officer Wrigley’s

dashcam footage clearly establishes that S/A Robinson never touched Mr. Ismail and that Officers

Wrigley and Kopp did. Wrigley Cruiser Video at 14:55-16:20. Because pro se complaints are held “to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21, and

because it would be understandable for Mr. Ismail, who likely had not seen the video at the time he

filed his complaint, to confuse the actions of particular officers, the Court interprets Mr. Ismail’s claim

as challenging the force used by both Defendants.

under all the circumstances.” Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2019)

(quoting Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2009)). “‘Determining whether

a particular use of force is reasonable requires consideration of the totality of the

circumstances,’ including (1) ‘the severity of the crime at issue,’ (2) ‘whether the

suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ and (3)

‘whether [the suspect was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight’ (the ‘Graham factors’).” Lachance v. Town of Charlton, 990 F.3d 14, 20 (1st

Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Gray, 917 F.3d at 8).

Here, it is unnecessary to reach the Graham factors, because Officer Wrigley’s

dashcam footage plainly reveals that Mr. Ismail got out of the vehicle on his own and

none of the officers used any force, much less excessive force. At 14:55, S/A Robinson

approaches the driver’s side of the Ford Focus and begins speaking through the open

window. Wrigley Cruiser Video at 14:55. Roughly twenty-five seconds later, Officer

Kopp opens the passenger door. Id. at 15:20-15:25. Mr. Ismail clearly steps out of

the car under his own power. Id. at 15:22-15:27. Once Mr. Ismail is on his feet,

Officer Kopp grabs his left arm and leads him from the street onto the curb. Id. at

15:27-15:36. Officer Wrigley then grabs Mr. Ismail’s right arm. Id. at 15:36-15:39.

The officers proceed to handcuff Mr. Ismail. Id. at 15:39-16:12. Officer Wrigley then

stands back while Officer Kopp stands near Mr. Ismail. Id. at 16:12-16:20.

Based on Officer Wrigley’s dashcam footage, the Court concludes that the

officers applied no force at all during Mr. Ismail’s exit from the vehicle and no more

force than necessary to place Mr. Ismail in handcuffs during his detention. In

particular, the video refutes Mr. Ismail’s allegation that he was “forcibly” pulled out

of the car, as he can be clearly seen exiting the Ford Focus under his own power.

Although the Court is required to view the record in the light most favorable to Mr.

Ismail as the nonmoving party, the Court must not ignore what is clear from the

dashcam footage. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,

so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of

the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment”).

The Court concludes that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was

no law enforcement force of any kind as Mr. Ismail exited the vehicle and any

subsequent force, which was extremely mild, was reasonable to place Mr. Ismail in

handcuffs. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Officer Wrigley on

Mr. Ismail’s claim that the officers used excessive force when he was exiting the Ford

Focus.

C. Mr. Ismail’s Challenges to the Alleged Strip Search Fail Because

No Strip Search Ever Occurred

Mr. Ismail’s final claim is that he was subjected to an unlawful strip search,

during which S/A Robinson “forcefully [took] my pants of[f] in the middle of [the]

street and humiliate[d] me unjustfully” and “violated my liberty by strip searching

me in public.”13 Compl. at 1. Here again, Mr. Ismail’s claims are at odds with Officer

13 Once again, Mr. Ismail alleges that only S/A Robinson participated in the allegedly

unconstitutional acts at issue in this claim. Compl. at 1. Because Officer Wrigley’s dashcam footage

conclusively disproves Mr. Ismail’s allegations, however, the Court will assume the allegation applies

to both Defendants and will review the merits of Mr. Ismail’s claim.

Wrigley’s dashcam footage. After S/A Robinson and Officer Kopp searched Mr. Ismail

and found a large amount of cash in denominations from one dollar to one hundred

dollars and a rock-like substance that tested positive for cocaine, S/A Robinson

suspected that Mr. Ismail may have been in possession of additional drugs and

wished to conduct a better search of his person. DSMF ¶¶ 28-30. This search begins

at 40:15, when S/A Robinson approaches Mr. Ismail, who is standing on the curb next

to Officer Kopp. Wrigley Cruiser Video at 40:15.

Upon reaching Mr. Ismail, S/A Robinson speaks with him for roughly forty

seconds. Id. at 40:15-40:55. During this time, Mr. Ismail is wearing three layers of

clothing over his lower body: a pair of white sweatpants; a pair of white basketball

shorts; and a pair of dark underwear. Previously, after Mr. Ismail had stepped out

of the vehicle, the top of his sweatpants was near his beltline in the front, but below

his rearend, showing a line of black underwear between his tee-shirt and sweatpants.

Id. at 21:55-35:55. At 36:17, the officers began to search Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants and

look inside his sweatpants pockets. As they did so, the sweatpants slid down,

exposing some of his black underwear14 and his basketball shorts. Id. at 36:17-37:45.

At 40:58, S/A Robinson begins pulling down Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants, which

were already sitting slightly above his knees. Id. at 40:58-41:04. After S/A Robinson

stops tugging on Mr. Ismail’s pants, Mr. Ismail removes his right shoe. Id. at 41:04-

14 Mr. Ismail is some distance from the cruiser’s dashcam, and the Court’s view is not perfect,

but it appears that he was wearing a pair of athletic underpants often worn under gym clothes. The

Court does not want to leave the impression that Mr. Ismail was standing by the roadside with

traditional men’s underpants showing, because from a casual observer, it would appear that he was

almost wearing another pair of shorts under his basketball shorts.

41:08. S/A Robinson subsequently points to an area of the sidewalk, and Mr. Ismail

moves to this area and removes his left shoe. Id. at 41:08-41:17. S/A Robinson

searches Mr. Ismail’s shoes. Id. at 41:17-41:32.

At 41:30, Officer Wrigley approaches, at which point S/A Robinson can be

heard telling Mr. Ismail that he’s going to remove Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants so that he

doesn’t trip and fall. Id. at 41:30-41:43. Mr. Ismail then asks why S/A Robinson is

removing the sweatpants, and S/A Robinson reiterates that the pants are a tripping

hazard. Id. at 41:43-41:48. After Mr. Ismail expresses further confusion about why

S/A Robinson is removing his pants, as opposed to pulling them up, S/A Robinson

states that he wants to conduct a more thorough search of the pants. Id. at 41:48-

41:52.

S/A Robinson then repeatedly tells Mr. Ismail to lift his leg up, and Mr. Ismail

eventually complies, allowing S/A Robinson to remove the right leg of the sweatpants.

Id. at 41:52-42:09. Afterwards, S/A Robinson removes the left leg of Mr. Ismail’s

sweatpants, id. at 42:09-42:21, and searches Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants. Id. at 42:21-

43:13. Underneath Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants are a pair of oversized basketball shorts.

Id. at 42:19-42:22. At this point, Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants are completely off, his

basketball shorts extend from his below his waist down to just above his ankles,

exposing his black underwear from the bottom of his tee-shirt to the top of his

basketball shorts. Id. at 42:19-43:16. At 43:13, S/A Robinson begins searching the

pockets of Mr. Ismail’s shorts without removing them. Id. at 43:13-43:49. At 43:35,

S/A Robinson pulls up Mr. Ismail’s basketball shorts so that his black underwear is

no longer showing.

Based on the Court’s view of the dashcam video, Mr. Ismail’s underpants were

thus exposed for about one minute and a half. At no point were any other articles of

clothing removed besides Mr. Ismail’s sweatpants. Further, no skin on Mr. Ismail’s

lower body was ever exposed, apart from the skin visible between his shorts, which

reached below his knee, and his socks.

Officer Wrigley’s dashcam footage confirms unequivocally that Mr. Ismail’s

allegation that he was strip searched is entirely without merit. Mr. Ismail was

wearing three layers of clothing over his lower body, and even after S/A Robinson

removed his sweatpants, he was wearing basketball shorts and black underwear

under his shorts. Once again, the Court cannot ignore what is obvious from the

dashcam footage. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

No strip searched ever occurred. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1885 (Stuart Berg Flexner & Leonore Crary Hauck, eds., 2d. ed.

1987) (defining strip search as “to search (a suspect who has been required to remove

all clothing), esp. for concealed weapons, contraband, or evidence of drug abuse”);

Morales v. Doe, No. 17-cv-234-SM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167830, at *1 n.1 (D.N.H.

Apr. 13, 2021) (quoting New Hampshire Department of Corrections Policy and

Procedure Directive 5.77, IV(a)(3) as defining a strip search as “removing all clothing

from a person and searching the clothing carefully, after which a detailed visual

inspection of the individual’s naked body, including inside of the mouth, the groin

area and the buttocks”).

D. Officer Wrigley Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Officer Wrigley finally asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because

he “did not violate any of Ismail’s clearly established constitutional rights.” Def.’s

Mot. at 15-16. The Court agrees with Officer Wrigley that qualified immunity poses

an insurmountable hurdle for Mr. Ismail and that Mr. Ismail’s claims fail for this

reason as well. However, the Court declines to engage in a qualified immunity

analysis because it would only buttress a conclusion the Court already arrived at,

namely that Mr. Ismail’s lawsuit must fail because even viewing disputed matters in

the light most favorable to Mr. Ismail, he has not stated a cognizable claim against

Officer Wrigley.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendant Nicholas Wrigley’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 34) and ORDERS that the Clerk enter judgment against Ahmed

Ismail and in favor of Defendant Nicholas Wrigley.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 26th day of February, 2024