Opinion

BROWN v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER

Court
District Court, D. Maine
Filed
Oct 17, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.3%

remanding where, but for an error in discounting a medical provider’s opinion, the ALJ “could well have reached a different conclusion regarding the” claimant’s RFC

How later courts described this case

  • remanding where, but for an error in discounting a medical provider’s opinion, the ALJ “could well have reached a different conclusion regarding the” claimant’s RFC

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

RUSSELL B., )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-00223-GZS

)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DECISION

The Plaintiff in this Social Security Disability appeal contends that the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by discounting favorable opinion evidence

based on faulty reasons, leaving his residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment

unsupported by substantial evidence. See Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 13). I agree and

recommend that the Court vacate the Commissioner’s decision and remand this

matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. Background

The Plaintiff applied for benefits in January 2019, alleging disability beginning

on September 21, 2016. See Record at 24. After his claim was denied at the initial

and reconsideration levels, the Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. See id.

That hearing took place in January 2021, see id. at 24, 46-73, following which the ALJ

issued a decision finding that, from his alleged onset date to his date last insured

(December 31, 2019), the Plaintiff had the severe impairments of a left knee

impairment, status-post left finger amputation, degenerative disc disease, bilateral

shoulder AC joint osteoarthritis, major depression disorder, anxiety disorder, and

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, see id. at 26. The ALJ went on to find that,

during the relevant period, the Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with several additional limitations, including that he could

only occasionally push and pull with his upper extremities; occasionally climb stairs,

ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; should

avoid overhead reaching bilaterally; and could frequently finger with his left hand.

See id. at 29. The ALJ ultimately concluded that the Plaintiff could not have returned

to his past relevant work with such an RFC but could have performed other work

existing in significant numbers in the national economy and therefore had not been

disabled through his date last insured. See id. at 36-38. The Appeals Council denied

the Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, see id. at 1-4, making that decision

the final determination of the Commissioner, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

II. Standard of Review

A final decision of the Commissioner is subject to judicial review to determine

whether it is based on the correct legal standards and supported by substantial

evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001).

Substantial evidence in this context means evidence in the administrative record that

a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support an ALJ’s findings. See Biestek

v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). If an ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence, they are conclusive even if the record could arguably support a

different result. See Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 955 F.2d 765,

769 (1st Cir. 1991). But an ALJ’s findings “are not conclusive when derived by

ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts.”

Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).

III. Discussion

The Plaintiff argues, among other things, that the ALJ erred in discounting

the evaluations of his treating orthopedic specialist Thomas Murray, M.D., that he

could not engage in repetitive activities with his shoulders. See Plaintiff’s Brief at 7,

12.

The ALJ found “little persuasive value” in Dr. Murray’s evaluations, noting

that Dr. Murray assessed only the Plaintiff’s shoulders and that his evaluations were

not well explained because he checked boxes on prefilled forms, did not cite “objective

imaging studies” or “clinical findings on physical examinations,” and failed to put his

evaluations in “vocational[ly] appropriate terms.” Record at 35.

The Plaintiff points out, see Plaintiff’s Brief at 7-8, that Dr. Murray did cite

physical examinations and imaging studies in support of his evaluations that the

Plaintiff could not engage in repetitive activities with his shoulders, see Record at 658

(citing an exam and listing a diagnosis of bilateral shoulder pain); id. at 660 (citing

an exam and noting that the Plaintiff had been referred for an MRI to investigate

whether he had re-torn his left rotator cuff); id. at 662 (citing an exam and an MRI

and noting that the Plaintiff suffered from “bilateral rotator cuff tear”). The Plaintiff

also points out, see Plaintiff’s Brief at 8, that Dr. Murray’s form evaluations were

accompanied by contemporaneous treatment notes from early 2018 describing pain

and tenderness in the Plaintiff’s shoulders on physical examination and recording

Dr. Murray’s impression—based on x-rays and MRIs—that the Plaintiff had re-torn

both of his rotator cuffs after prior surgical repairs, see Record at 656-62. Finally, the

Plaintiff highlights that the vocational expert testified that a person who could not

engage in repetitive work with his upper extremities could not perform the jobs relied

upon by the ALJ at Step 5. See Plaintiff’s Brief at 12.

The Commissioner responds that the ALJ appropriately discounted

Dr. Murray’s evaluations because Dr. Murray failed to explain the connection

between his findings and the limitations he assessed. See Commissioner’s Brief

(ECF No. 16) at 10. She asserts that “[s]upportability is about more than the

existence of evidence in the record, it is about the ‘supporting explanations presented

by a medical source.’” See id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(c)(1)). She further argues that the ALJ was “not required to afford

persuasive value to a pre-printed form that provides no justification, no analysis, and

no indication of the most a claimant can do in spite of his impairments and

limitations.” Id. at 11.

Although I agree that Dr. Murray’s evaluations were not exactly the height of

clarity, the Commissioner’s attempt to pass them off as totally unexplained form

opinions falls flat. Dr. Murray was the Plaintiff’s treating orthopedic specialist; he

examined the Plaintiff, reviewed x-rays and MRIs of the Plaintiff’s shoulders, and

ultimately determined that the Plaintiff suffered from bilateral rotator cuff tears. See

Record at 656-62. Contemporaneously with his treatment of the Plaintiff, Dr. Murray

filled out workers compensation evaluation forms on which he cited his examinations

and some of the imaging studies. See id. at 658, 660, 662. Most significantly, on his

final evaluation, Dr. Murray cited an exam and MRI, noted that the Plaintiff suffered

from bilateral rotator cuff tears, and reiterated his opinion that the Plaintiff could

never perform repetitive activities with his shoulders—the connection between the

assessed impairment and the opined limitation is fairly obvious. See id. at 662. These

things contradict the ALJ’s findings that Dr. Murray failed to explain his opinion or

cite imaging studies and objective findings based on examination, see id. at 35, which,

in turn, indicates that the ALJ improperly ignored this supporting explanation and

evidence when discounting Dr. Murray’s opinion, see Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 35.

Additionally, the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Murray’s evaluations were not

expressed in “vocationally appropriate terms,” Record at 35, is undermined by the

vocational expert’s testimony. When asked by the Plaintiff’s counsel about a person

who could not engage in repetitive activities with his upper extremities, the

vocational expert was able to quantify the vocational implications of such a

limitation—namely, that the limitation would eliminate the jobs relied upon by the

ALJ at Step 5.1 See id. at 37, 72.

1 I recognize that the phrase upper extremity encompasses more than just a person’s shoulder, which

means that the Plaintiff’s counsel asked about a broader limitation than the one opined by Dr. Murray.

Nevertheless, the vocational expert’s testimony underscores the potential vocational significance of a

limitation that precludes repetitive arm activities and suggests that Dr. Murray’s opinion on this point

was set forth in such a way that it could be understood by a vocational expert.

That the ALJ offered additional reasons for discounting Dr. Murray’s

evaluations—including that the evaluations did not describe the most that the

Plaintiff could do and that Dr. Murray left some boxes on the forms unchecked—does

not render his errors harmless because it cannot be said with any degree of certainty

that his weighing of Dr. Murray’s opinion would have been the same had he not

ignored Dr. Murray’s supporting explanation and evidence, which were significant to

the supportability and consistency of Dr. Murray’s opinion. In other words, but for

his errors, the ALJ might have given greater weight to Dr. Murray’s opinion and

assessed a more limiting RFC; thus, remanding for the ALJ to address these errors

would not be an empty exercise. See Ward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 211 F.3d 652, 656

(1st Cir. 2000); cf. Sutton v. Berryhill, 358 F. Supp. 3d 162, 170 (D. Mass. 2019)

(remanding where, but for an error in discounting a medical provider’s opinion, the

ALJ “could well have reached a different conclusion regarding the” claimant’s RFC).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be

VACATED and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this

decision.

NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate

Judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District

Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen

(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum

shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right

to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s

order.

Dated: October 17, 2023

/s/ Karen Frink Wolf

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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