“[T]he interest that prosecutorial immunity is designed to protect—independence in the charging decision—is implicated whether the decision is to initiate a prosecution or decline to do so.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he interest that prosecutorial immunity is designed to protect—independence in the charging decision—is implicated whether the decision is to initiate a prosecution or decline to do so.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
FRANKIE INMAN-ARBO, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) 1:23-cv-00326-JDL
)
STATE OF MAINE, )
)
Defendant )
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed a complaint and an application to proceed without prepayment of fees,
which application the Court granted. (Complaint, ECF No. 1; Application, ECF No. 4;
Order, ECF No. 5.) In accordance with the statute that governs matters filed without
prepayment of fees, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening “before docketing,
if feasible or … as soon as practicable after docketing,” because plaintiff is “a prisoner
seek[ing] redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss the
matter.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff, who is evidently serving a state sentence, alleges he was harmed in a
variety of ways during and as the result of state court criminal proceedings. Plaintiff alleges
the district attorney improperly prosecuted him for crimes he did not commit, that his
pretrial bail was excessive, that the conditions of his confinement and transport have been
substandard, that several attorneys provided ineffective assistance, and that he has received
inadequate care for a medical condition. Plaintiff asks the Court to expunge his criminal
record, to order him released from state custody, and to award him monetary damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts
for those persons unable to pay the costs of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding
pursuant to the statute, however, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “Dismissals [under § 1915]
are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective
defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
In addition to the review contemplated by § 1915, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to
screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because Plaintiff currently is incarcerated
and seeks redress from governmental entities and officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
The § 1915A screening requires courts to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim …; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be
granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the
benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A self-represented
plaintiff is not exempt from this framework, but the court must construe his complaint
‘liberally’ and hold it ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.’” Waterman v. White Interior Sols., No. 2:19-cv-00032-JDL, 2019 WL 5764661,
at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 5, 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This
is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a
claim.” Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980).
DISCUSSION
The sole defendant named by Plaintiff is the State of Maine. Subject to limited
exceptions not applicable in this case, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity
exemplified by the Eleventh Amendment, the State of Maine may not be sued by citizens
in federal court, regardless of the form of relief requested. Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.,
558 F.3d 92, 97 n. 6 (1st Cir. 2009). Dismissal, therefore, is appropriate on that basis.
The Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s substantive claim. The gravamen
of Plaintiff’s complaint is that he was wrongfully prosecuted and convicted of multiple
state court offenses. Federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits which constitute “thinly
veiled and improper attempts to collaterally attack [a] conviction” and “overrule the
judgment of [the criminal court].” Stone v. Holder, 859 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2012).
The proper avenues for collaterally attacking a criminal judgment are a direct appeal or
pursuant to a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See, e.g., Olson v. U.S., Civil
Action No. 0565 (JR), 2006 WL 3377942, at *1 (D.C.C. Nov. 21, 2006) (collateral attacks
on criminal convictions may be resolved only on direct review or through a habeas
petition); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that a state prisoner could not maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages
where he alleged that his arrest, trial, and conviction were unconstitutional because an
award of damages on such a claim would implicitly invalidate the conviction. Because the
plaintiff challenged his conviction, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff must
first obtain relief from the conviction through state or federal habeas proceedings, or
similar proceedings, before seeking a remedy under § 1983. Id. at 487. Accordingly,
because Plaintiff seeks to attack collaterally the criminal convictions that comprise his
criminal record, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims.
Even if some of Plaintiff’s claims are deemed to be distinct from his collateral attack
of his state court convictions, dismissal is appropriate. For instance, his challenge to the
district attorney’s decision to prosecute him is barred by the immunity afforded
prosecutors. A prosecutor is entitled to immunity against civil liability for the decision
whether to initiate a prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from
a civil suit for damages under [§] 1983.”); Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir.
1992) (“[T]he interest that prosecutorial immunity is designed to protect—independence
in the charging decision—is implicated whether the decision is to initiate a prosecution or
decline to do so.”).
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement are also
insufficient to support a constitutional claim. The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel
and usual punishments governs prisoners’ treatment after conviction, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes similar obligations while prisoners are in
pre-trial custody. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243
(1983). “Prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement; prison
officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Giroux
v. Somerset Cnty., 178 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
To establish constitutional liability, a plaintiff must satisfy an objective standard by
showing he or she was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm,” and a plaintiff must satisfy a subjective standard by showing that the defendant
“acted, or failed to act, with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’” Id.
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834). The circumstances described by Plaintiff
are not atypical of a jail setting and did not expose Plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious
harm.
Plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from a serious chronic medical condition.
According to Plaintiff, he has been denied access to certain supplements or specialized care
to manage the condition and has not been provided enough calories to satisfy a special diet.
Prisoners have the right to nutritionally adequate food. Domegan v. Fair, 859 F.2d 1059,
1064 (1st Cir. 1988). However, given that Plaintiff does not allege medical care or a diet
that is “so clearly inadequate” even to a lay person, Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234
(1st Cir. 1991), Plaintiff has not provided enough facts about his medical care and
prescribed dietary needs, including which individuals had sufficient knowledge about his
condition and dietary needs, to satisfy the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment
standard. Plaintiff, therefore, has not alleged an actionable deliberate indifference claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, following a review of Plaintiff’s complaint in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, I recommend the Court dismiss the
complaint.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen
(14) days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right
to de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 11th day of September, 2023.