IN RE: SCOTT L. FENSTERMAKER, ESQ.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

In Re: Scott L. Fenstermaker, Esq. )

)

) Civil No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL

)

)

ORDER

On March 17, 2023, a single Justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

(“SJC”) suspended Attorney Scott L. Fenstermaker from the practice of law in Maine

on an interim basis (No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 1-1). Pursuant to Local Rule

83.3(c)(2), I immediately suspended Fenstermaker from the practice of law in this

Court and ordered him to show cause as to why this identical discipline should not be

imposed (No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 1). After a case management conference

and with the leave of the Court, Fenstermaker filed a Memorandum in Opposition to

the suspension (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3), as well as a Motion for Recusal,

which argues that I should recuse myself from presiding over this matter (No. 2:23-

cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4).

For the following reasons, I conclude that Fenstermaker has failed to show that

identical discipline should not be imposed and I deny his Motion for Recusal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. State Court Proceedings

On March 16, 2023, the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar (“the Board”) filed

with the SJC an ex parte petition to immediately suspend Fenstermaker from the

practice of law in Maine on an interim basis. The petition was supported by an

affidavit from Assistant Bar Counsel Suzanne E. Thompson, which described two Bar

Complaints that had been made against Fenstermaker and the factual basis for those

complaints.1

The first Bar Complaint was made by Deputy District Attorney Toff Toffolon,

of the State of Maine’s Prosecutorial District VII. The Toffolon Bar Complaint and

attached documents assert, among other things, that (1) Fenstermaker was charged

by criminal complaint with committing multiple misdemeanor offenses stemming

from his alleged altercation with the owner of a towing business which had possession

of a car owned by one of Fenstermaker’s clients; (2) in court filings, including in his

own criminal case, and communications with government attorneys, Fenstermaker

repeatedly alleged, without factual support, that Maine prosecutorial officers and a

Maine state court judge are engaged in criminal conduct and are part of a conspiracy;

(3) Fenstermaker made improper filings in his former clients’ criminal cases after he

had withdrawn from his representation of the clients; (4) in his former clients’ cases,

Fenstermaker sought relief that would be favorable to himself in the criminal

prosecution against him; (5) Fenstermaker continued to visit the Washington County

Jail to meet with inmates despite the fact that he was no longer representing any

clients in the Jail; (6) Fenstermaker alleged that the appointment of co-counsel in

some of his cases was done to “muzzle” his own advocacy; and (7) at an arraignment

session in Machias, Fenstermaker told the assembled members of the public that they

1 On March 17, 2023, Justice Thomas R. McKeon, sitting as a single Justice of the SJC by designation,

issued an order impounding the Bar Counsel Affidavit and attached exhibits. The Board sought a

protective order that would protect the exhibits to the Bar Counsel Affidavit from public disclosure, a

request that Fenstermaker opposed. On April 13, 2023, Justice McKeon granted in part and denied

in part the Board’s request. Specifically, Justice McKeon ordered that some information in the exhibits

should not trust the District Attorney’s Office, which was engaged in a conspiracy,

and he offered free consultation even though he was not the assigned “lawyer of the

day.”

The second Bar Complaint was made by Assistant District Attorney Mark A.

Rucci, who alleges that Fenstermaker angrily confronted him at the Penobscot

Judicial Center. The confrontation was in response to Rucci having informed the

Dexter Police Department of an allegation made by Fenstermaker that the Police

Department had stolen firearms that were owned by one of Fenstermaker’s clients.

According to Rucci, Fenstermaker screamed and cursed while following Rucci in the

courthouse, causing Rucci to “[w]onder whether Attorney Fenstermaker would hit

[him].” Rucci’s account was supported by written statements from two Judicial

Marshals who had been present during the incident and reported that it seemed as if

Fenstermaker would assault Rucci.

Based upon the Assistant Bar Counsel’s affidavit and attached exhibits,

Justice Thomas R. McKeon, sitting as a single Justice of the SJC by designation,

concluded that Fenstermaker’s conduct violated, at the least, Maine Rules of

Professional Conduct 8.4(a), (b), and (d), and that Fenstermaker’s “misconduct serves

as an imminent threat to clients, the public and to the administration of justice.”

Justice McKeon thus ordered Attorney Fenstermaker “suspended from the practice

of law in Maine, until further Order of th[e] Court.” He also appointed Attorney Barry

Mills to serve as the receiver of Fenstermaker’s law practice.

The Board subsequently filed a Motion to Enforce in response to

Fenstermaker’s alleged failure to provide all of the necessary information and

property to the receiver. Justice McKeon held a hearing and then issued an Order

that granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Enforce. The Order provided

in relevant part that Fenstermaker “has no current intent to file a motion to dissolve

the interim order of suspension.”

B. Proceedings in this Court

In response to the discipline imposed by Justice McKeon, on March 21, 2023, I

issued an Order to Show Cause pursuant to Local Rule 83.3(c)(2), which suspended

Fenstermaker from the practice of law in this Court effective immediately and

required Fenstermaker to show cause as to why such discipline should not be imposed

(No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 1). Fenstermaker filed a response that, among

other things, described a pair of federal cases that he was litigating and argued that

identical discipline should not be imposed based on the factors provided in Local Rule

83.3(c)(6) (No. 2:23-mc-00106-JDL, ECF No. 2). On April 19, 2023, I issued an Order

appointing Audrey Braccio, Assistant Bar Counsel, as special counsel in this matter,

but otherwise took no action on Fenstermaker’s first response (No. 2:23-mc-00106-

JDL, ECF No. 3).2

On May 2, 2023, Fenstermaker, pursuant to my April 19 Order, filed a second

memorandum of law arguing that the suspension previously imposed by this Court

2 I also ordered that the records that this Court received from the SJC be sealed (No. 2:23-mc-00106-

JDL, ECF No. 3). In light of Justice McKeon’s Order granting in part and denying in part the Board’s

request for a protective order, see supra n.1, it is ordered that the records, as ordered redacted by

Justice McKeon, are hereby unsealed. At this juncture, though, the Court’s records contain only the

original versions of Exhibits A and B to the Bar Counsel Affidavit—not versions that incorporate the

redactions ordered by Justice McKeon. Accordingly, the copies of Exhibits A and B to the Bar Counsel

Affidavit currently in this Court’s possession will remain sealed, and Assistant Bar Counsel Braccio is

directed to file on the docket a new version of the SJC records containing the redacted documents.

should be vacated (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3). The Board filed a response

in support of the suspension previously imposed (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 6).

Additionally, Fenstermaker filed a Motion for Recusal seeking my recusal from this

case (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4), which the Board opposes (No. 2:23-cv-

00174-JDL, ECF No. 5).

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Fenstermaker’s Suspension

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Fenstermaker makes several arguments as to why identical discipline should

not be imposed in his case. First, Fenstermaker walks through each of the

attachments to the Toffolon Bar Complaint and explains why, in his view, they do not

support a conclusion that he committed misconduct warranting suspension; and with

respect to the Rucci Bar Complaint, Fenstermaker argues that he did not say

everything alleged by Rucci and that suspension is not the proper discipline for his

alleged conduct. Second, Fenstermaker argues that it would be a grave injustice if

he was suspended from the practice of law because his clients in two civil rights cases

filed in this Court, the Coates matter and the Keenan matter,3 would be deprived of

his representation and that other attorneys would be unlikely to take those cases.

Fenstermaker contends that, among other things, he was targeted and suspended in

state court for bringing these civil rights claims against officers of the State of Maine

and that the timing of his suspension supports this conclusion. Third, Fenstermaker

3 Specifically, these cases are Coates v. Maine Secretary of State, 1:23-cv-00062-JDL, and Keenan v.

argues that the state court proceedings that gave rise to his interim suspension,

which were conducted on an ex parte basis, deprived him of due process. Finally,

Fenstermaker also argues that a number of state criminal defendants are prejudiced

because they can no longer retain him to bring federal actions in which they would

assert that Maine state courts violated the criminal defendants’ right to counsel by

refusing “to acknowledge [Fenstermaker’s] engagement to represent those clients.”

No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3 at 17.

2. Local Rule 83.3(c)

Under Local Rule 83.3(c)(2), when this Court receives a certified copy of a

judgment demonstrating that an attorney admitted to the bar of this Court has been

disbarred or suspended by another United States jurisdiction, this Court may, in its

discretion, enter an order immediately suspending that attorney from practice. If the

Court issues such a suspension, it must issue “an order to show cause directing that

the attorney inform this Court . . . of any claim by the attorney predicated upon the

grounds set forth in Subsection (c)(6) hereof that the imposition of the identical

discipline . . . by the Court would be unwarranted and the reasons therefor.” D. Me.

Loc. R. 83.3(c)(2)(C). The Rule provides that identical discipline shall be imposed

unless “the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or this Court finds, that the record in

the other jurisdiction clearly shows” one of four circumstances. D. Me. Loc. R.

83.3(c)(6). These four circumstances are (1) “that the procedure was so lacking in

notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;” (2)

“that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct . . . as to give

rise to the clear conviction that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, accept

as final the conclusion on that subject;” (3) “that the imposition of the same discipline

or the making of the same finding by this Court would result in grave injustice;” and

(4) “that the conduct at issue is deemed by this Court to warrant substantially

different action.” D. Me. Loc. R. 83.3(c)(6)(A)-(D). If any of these circumstances are

present, the Court “shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate.” D. Me. Loc.

R. 83.3(c)(6).

The respondent-attorney “bears the burden to demonstrate ‘by clear and

convincing evidence . . . that the imposition of substantially similar discipline is

unwarranted.’” In re Burbank, 790 F. App’x 226, 228 (1st Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(alteration in original) (quoting In re Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) (per

curiam)).4 And given the limited nature of the Court’s inquiry, “the norm will be for

this court to impose discipline which is substantially similar to that imposed by the

state court.” Id. (quoting In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (per

curiam)). Therefore, “the state court’s substantive findings ordinarily are entitled to

a high degree of respect when this court is asked to impose reciprocal discipline,” In

re Williams, 398 F.3d at 118, and an attorney faces an “uphill climb” in showing that

reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, see In re Barach, 540 F.3d at 85.

For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Fenstermaker has not shown that

any of the conditions in Local Rule 83.3(c)(6) are met. I address each in turn.

4 Although Burbank, Barach, and most of the other cases discussed in this section arise under the

First Circuit’s analog to Local Rule 83.3(c)(6) rather than the Local Rule itself, the cases are

nonetheless instructive about the principles to be applied in reciprocal discipline cases governed by

(a) Due Process

To the extent that Fenstermaker’s due process argument is properly before

me,5 he has not shown “that the procedure [in the state court] was so lacking in notice

or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process.” D. Me. Loc.

R. 83.3(c)(6)(A). Due process is inherently a flexible concept, see In re Barach, 540

F.3d at 85-86, and in the context of attorney discipline cases, “due process concerns

are limited to ‘want of notice or opportunity to be heard.’” In re Williams, 398 F.3d

at 120 (quoting Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)); see also In re Barach, 540

F.3d at 85 (noting that due process is satisfied “if a state adopts procedures that

collectively ensure the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary proceedings”).

Here, although Fenstermaker was suspended on an interim basis after an ex

parte petition from the Board, the Maine Bar Rules specifically provide an

opportunity for attorneys to be heard in such circumstances by filing a motion for

dissolution of the interim suspension. See Me. Bar R. 24(d). Fenstermaker, though,

chose not to file such a motion or challenge his interim suspension by the SJC. His

decision not to pursue the process available to him under state law precludes him

from showing that the process in the state court was “lacking in notice or opportunity

to be heard.” D. Me. Loc. R. 83.3(c)(6)(A). Moreover, there is nothing in the record to

indicate that the process by which the SJC imposes interim suspensions, which is

governed by Maine Bar Rule 24, violates due process. Thus, Fenstermaker’s due

process argument fails. See In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 120 (“The respondent has

5 Fenstermaker developed this issue only in his Reply Brief (ECF No. 11). See Small v. Colvin, No.

2:14-cv-00042-NT, 2015 WL 860856, at *6 n.6 (D. Me. Feb. 27, 2015) (observing that an issue raised

proffered no credible evidence that the notice actually given was inappropriate or that

the state court did not afford him a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to be heard.

Thus, his due process claim fails.”); In re Burbank, 790 F. App’x at 230 (“Indeed, the

SJC provided sufficient notice to Burbank of the allegations against him, time to

respond, and, ultimately, a testimonial hearing before imposing a suspension from

practice.”).

(b) Infirmity of Proof

Fenstermaker argues that although the state court record is replete with

allegations that he committed misconduct, there is no actual proof of such

misconduct, so there is an “infirmity of proof” under Local Rule 83.3(c)(6)(B). Under

this element, the Court will consider whether, based on the state court record, it is

left with a “clear conviction” that it could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final

the state court’s conclusion on the subject of misconduct. See D. Me. Loc. R.

83.3(c)(6)(B); In re Suárez-Jiménez, 666 F. App’x 2, 5 (1st Cir. 2016) (per curiam).

Here, the information in the SJC record supporting the finding of

Fenstermaker’s professional misconduct is substantial. The Bar Counsel Affidavit,

Toffolon Bar Complaint, Rucci Bar Complaint, and the accompanying exhibits show,

among other things, that (1) Fenstermaker was charged with multiple misdemeanor

offenses arising out of an alleged altercation involving his effort to take possession of

a client’s car; (2) Fenstermaker made, in the words of the Bar Counsel Affidavit,

“meritless allegations that courts, prosecutors, and [the Maine Commission on

Indigent Legal Services] were part of a conspiracy to deprive criminal defendants of

their constitutional right to counsel” and that Maine officials were involved in

criminal activity; (3) Fenstermaker sought to represent former clients after he had

withdrawn from representation and, in some instances, to make his own alleged

criminal conduct an issue in his former clients’ cases in a manner that would

primarily benefit his own interests; and (4) Fenstermaker angrily confronted another

attorney over a disagreement and put both the attorney and surrounding marshals

in fear that he would assault the attorney. Taken as a whole, the information

contained in the record provides solid support for Justice McKeon’s finding that

Fenstermaker violated, at the least, Maine Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a), (b),

and (d).

Although Fenstermaker takes issue with some of the assertions made in the

Bar Complaints and exhibits, Local Rule 83.3(c)(6) does not permit a respondent to

relitigate issues that could have been raised in the underlying disciplinary

proceeding. See Burbank, 790 F. App’x at 229; In re Suárez-Jiménez, 666 F. App’x at

5. Contrary to Fenstermaker’s argument, the record does not evince an infirmity of

proof. And as previously noted, Fenstermaker had the right to be heard on the

interim suspension imposed by the SJC and chose not to avail himself of that

opportunity.

(c) Grave Injustice

Fenstermaker argues that the imposition of the same discipline that the SJC

imposed would result in a “grave injustice” to his former clients, who are actively

litigating the Coates and Keenan civil rights cases in this Court. See D. Me. Loc. R.

83.3(c)(6)(C). According to Fenstermaker, the Coates and Keenan cases “will almost

certainly both be dismissed” because “[n]o attorney is going to touch those matters

after [Fenstermaker’s] treatment,” which he contends was retaliatory. No. 2:23-cv-

00174-JDL, ECF No. 3 at 15. Fenstermaker further argues that permitting

retaliation by “powerful Maine-based political interests in a coordinated effort to

silence [his] advocacy” would be a grave injustice. No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No.

3 at 15. Fenstermaker also notes that it would prejudice a number of potential clients

who want to retain him to file federal habeas petitions on their behalf.

Although Fenstermaker’s suspension may inconvenience his former clients

and cause some degree of hardship to them in the Coates and Keenan cases,

Fenstermaker’s assertion that “[n]o attorney is going to touch those matters after

[Fenstermaker’s] treatment,” No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 3 at 15, is no more

than mere speculation.6 Moreover, the potential prejudice to existing clients from

having an attorney suspended is present in most, if not every, case in which an

attorney is suspended from practice. In the same vein, although criminal defendants

who wish to retain Fenstermaker to challenge the alleged denial of their right to

counsel by the Maine state courts are now compelled to seek alternative

representation, that circumstance does not render the imposition of an identical

suspension on Fenstermaker a grave injustice.

Finally, contrary to Fenstermaker’s argument that this case is unique because

he was intentionally suspended to prevent him from litigating the Keenan and Coates

cases, Fenstermaker has failed to show that the SJC suspension was imposed for that

reason. Fenstermaker asserts that the timing of the Board’s petition requesting his

suspension, which was submitted after the Keenan and Coates cases had been filed

in federal court, gives rise to an inference of retaliation. However, the timeline of

events fully supports the conclusion that the interim suspension was imposed for

reasons unrelated to the Keenan and Coates cases.

The Toffolon Bar Complaint, which details Fenstermaker’s conduct in 2022,

was filed on December 22, 2022—before the Keenan and Coates complaints were filed

in federal court on January 31, 2023, and February 9, 2023, respectively. The Rucci

Bar Complaint was filed afterwards, on February 22, 2023. The petition seeking

Fenstermaker’s suspension and the accompanying Bar Counsel Affidavit—which rely

on both the Toffolon and Rucci Bar Complaints—were filed not long after, during the

week of March 15, 2023. This timeline, which includes Bar Complaints submitted

both prior and subsequent to the filing of the Keenan and Coates complaints,

undercuts Fenstermaker’s argument that the petition seeking his interim suspension

was filed in retaliation for his advocacy in those cases. Moreover, the substantial

factual support submitted in connection with the petition in support of

Fenstermaker’s suspension further belies Fenstermaker’s claim of improper

retaliation.

(d) Other Reasons Not to Impose Identical Discipline

Finally, I am not persuaded by Fenstermaker’s insistence that the particular

circumstances of this case support deviating from the discipline imposed by the SJC.

Despite the conclusory bombast employed by Fenstermaker in his written

submissions with this Court accusing state officials of wrongdoing, those submissions

fail to lay out a credible foundation from which wrongdoing might be found. Rather,

the SJC record shows substantial proof that Fenstermaker was suspended on an

interim basis for his own misconduct, and there is no compelling reason to deviate

from the suspension imposed by the SJC.

For the preceding reasons, Fenstermaker has failed to show that identical

discipline should not be imposed.7 Therefore, my initial suspension of Fenstermaker

will remain in effect.8

B. Motion for Recusal

I am also unpersuaded by Fenstermaker’s argument that I am required to

recuse from this case under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) and (b)(1) (West 2023).

Fenstermaker argues that because he challenges the State of Maine’s allegedly

unlawful practices in the Keenan and Coates cases, my prior service as a Judge in the

Maine state court system—which Fenstermaker characterizes as “fetid and corrupt”,

a “cesspool,” and “implicat[ed]” in the Keenan and Coates matters—creates the

appearance of partiality requiring my recusal.9 No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4-1

7 Fenstermaker also argues that the Court should expand the record to include a number of

documents that were not before the SJC. However, under the terms of Local Rule 83.3(c)(6), my review

is limited to “the record in the other jurisdiction.” See also In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 119 (noting that

in reciprocal discipline cases, the “court will undertake an ‘intrinsic consideration of the state record’”

(quoting Selling, 243 U.S. at 51)). Thus, I decline Fenstermaker’s request to expand the record and

instead limit my review to the materials that were before the SJC. Moreover, as noted above, the

materials currently in the record provide an adequate basis for concluding that Fenstermaker engaged

in misconduct, so there is no need to expand the record in any event.

8 I reject as unpersuasive all of Fenstermaker’s arguments about his suspension that are not

expressly addressed in this Order, and I conclude that those additional arguments do not merit further

discussion.

9 Specifically, Fenstermaker makes the following argument:

The district court judge in this matter rose to his present position because of his ability

to finesse and massage Maine’s fetid and corrupt state judicial system with political

aplomb. The district judge served as a Maine district court judge for approximately

six or seven years and then served on Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court for twelve years.

Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court serves as the ringleader of Maine’s fetid and corrupt

state court system and Chief Judge Levy’s lengthy service on this tribunal makes him

at 2. Fenstermaker also argues that due to my prior state judicial service, I am

“almost certainly personally acquainted with Governor [Janet] Mills and Attorney

General [Aaron] Frey,” whose conduct is also implicated in Fenstermaker’s civil

rights lawsuits. No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.

Section 455(a) of Title 28 provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate

judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The statute further provides that

judges shall disqualify themselves when, among other things, they have “a personal

bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary

facts concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1). “The statute ‘forbids not only the

reality of partiality but its objective appearance as well.’” United States v. Pulido,

566 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 45 (1st

Cir. 2000)); see also Snyder, 235 F.3d at 45 (“As the Supreme Court has pithily

characterized [section 455]: ‘Quite simply and quite universally, recusal [i]s required

whenever “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”’” (second alteration in

original) (quoting Liteky v United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994))).

But the recusal standard is an objective one, and it “does not mean that

required recusal can be based on an ‘unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous

speculation.’” In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting In re

brought to light. He was, in short, neck deep in Maine’s corrupt state court system

and apparently politically flourished in that fetid system, to the point that he was

elevated to the Federal bench. Because Respondent’s state court suspension was

orchestrated to protect Maine’s cesspool of a state court system, and the district court

judge was a successful operator in that very cesspool, the appearance of partiality is

great.

United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981)). Similarly, “section 455 does not

require recusal ‘on the basis of remote, contingent, indirect[,] or speculative

interests.’” United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United

States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2000)). Instead, recusal requires “that

there be no reasonable question, in any informed person’s mind, as to the impartiality

of the judge.” In re United States, 441 F.3d 44, 68 (1st Cir. 2006). Furthermore,

judges are not to lightly recuse themselves under section 455. Snyder, 235 F.3d at

45. This is because unwarranted recusals may be prejudicial and because “the

unnecessary transfer of a case from one judge to another is inherently inefficient and

delays the administration of justice.” Id. at 46. Thus, “[a] trial judge must hear cases

unless [there is] some reasonable factual basis to doubt the impartiality or fairness

of the tribunal.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d

1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1979)).

In this case, recusal is not warranted because no “reasonable question” about

my impartiality is suggested by Fenstermaker’s contentions and the invective he

employs to describe Maine’s state courts. In re United States, 441 F.3d at 68; Snyder,

235 F.3d at 45. Fenstermaker’s assertions about my earlier service as a Maine state

judge are precisely the kind of “unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous

speculation” that does not give rise to a duty to recuse. In re Martinez-Catala, 129

F.3d at 220 (quoting In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694). Leaving aside the fact that

Fenstermaker’s reasoning would apparently require anyone who had served as a

judge in the Maine state court system to recuse from this matter, Fenstermaker has

not alleged any facts that provide a reasonable basis to question my partiality.

Fenstermaker also asserts: “Because of Chief Judge Levy’s lengthy service in

the fetid and corrupt Maine court system, he is almost certainly personally

acquainted with Governor Mills and Attorney General Frey.” No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL,

ECF No. 4-1 at 2. A judge’s social acquaintances and affiliations, including any

affiliations with government leaders, is not, without more, grounds for recusal. See

In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d at 221 (concluding that a judge’s former political

affiliation was not a basis for mandatory recusal); In re United States, 666 F.2d at

696-97 (concluding that a judge was not required to recuse despite the fact that the

defendant in that case had, in his political career, treated an associate of the judge

favorably); United States v. Sampson, 148 F. Supp. 3d 75, 113-14 & nn.33-34 (D.

Mass. 2015) (concluding that a judge’s acquaintance with a witness was not a

sufficient basis for mandatory recusal); see also United States v. Angelus, 258 F. App’x

840, 842 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a professional acquaintance with

government officials was insufficient to warrant mandatory recusal).

Fenstermaker has raised no reason grounded in fact or law to warrant my

recusal in this case. Under these circumstances, his request is frivolous, as is his

request that he be permitted to conduct discovery regarding “any and all

communications between the district court judge and any other individual, including

other members of this Court, after Respondent filed the Keenan Matter on January

31, 2023 regarding Respondent in any manner.” No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No. 4-

1 at 4. See Nickerson-Malpher v. Worley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77, 82 (D. Me. 2008)

(denying a frivolous motion for recusal and warning the moving party against further

frivolous filings); see also In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d at 220 (observing that

although a party seeking the recusal of a judge may seek discovery, “the allowance of

such discovery is within the sound discretion of the court”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Fenstermaker’s suspension

shall remain in effect as set forth in my Order dated March 21, 2023 (No. 2:23-mc-

00106-JDL, ECF No. 1), and his Motion to Recuse (No. 2:23-cv-00174-JDL, ECF No.

4) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2023

/s/ JON D. LEVY

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE