explaining that the liberal standard applied to the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the liberal standard applied to the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
ANTHONY LOGAN, )
)
Plaintiff )
v. ) 1:22-cv-00347-JDL
)
WASHINGTON COUNTY JAIL )
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, et al., )
)
Defendants )
RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER REVIEW
OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Maine Correctional Center, alleges Defendants,
who are medical providers at the Washington County Jail, failed to provide adequate care for
his knee condition while he was in custody at the jail. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees (ECF No. 2),
which application the Court granted. (Order, ECF No. 7.) In accordance with the governing
statute, a preliminary review of Plaintiff’s complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to screening “before docketing, if feasible or
… as soon as practicable after docketing,” because he is “a prisoner seek[ing] redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a).
After a review of Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and
1915A, I recommend the Court dismiss the matter.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party is proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “the court shall dismiss the
case at any time if the court determines,” inter alia, that the action is “frivolous or malicious”
or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
“Dismissals [under § 1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as
to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such
complaints.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
In addition to the review contemplated by § 1915, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to
screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because Plaintiff currently is incarcerated
and seeks redress from governmental entities and officers. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c).
The § 1915A screening requires courts to “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim …; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted,
courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st
Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not
plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The relevant question ... in assessing plausibility is
not whether the complaint makes any particular factual allegations but, rather, whether ‘the
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complaint warrant[s] dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to
relief plausible.’” Rodríguez–Reyes v. Molina–Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14).
Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is subject to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the
complaint may not consist entirely of “conclusory allegations that merely parrot the relevant
legal standard,” Young v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 231 (1st Cir. 2013). See also
Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980) (explaining that the liberal standard
applied to the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “is not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not
required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim”).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that he has pain in his knee and was supposed to have surgery, but he
did not receive treatment even though he asked for treatment on several occasions.
DISCUSSION
Whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or serving a sentence, Defendants were
obligated to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care. Sacco v. American Institutional
Medical Group, No. 1:20-cv-447-JL, 2022 WL 2194589, at *7 (D.N.H. June 17, 2022). The
Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and usual punishments, governs prisoners’
medical needs after conviction, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes similar obligations while prisoners are in pre-trial custody. See City of Revere v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243 (1983). Defendants have the “substantive
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obligation” not to treat prisoners in their care in a manner that reflects “deliberate
indifference” toward “a substantial risk of serious harm to health,” Coscia v. Town of
Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011), or “serious medical needs,” Feeney v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 464 F.3d 158, 161 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 –106
(1976)).
To establish constitutional liability, Plaintiff must demonstrate both that he was
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and that
Defendants “acted, or failed to act, with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’”
Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834). In other words, Plaintiff must satisfy
both an objective standard (substantial risk of serious harm) and a subjective standard
(deliberate indifference) to prove a constitutional claim of deliberate indifference. Kosilek v.
Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc).
The objective standard evaluates the seriousness of the risk of harm to health. There
must be “a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to [the inmate’s] future health.’”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). A medical
need is “serious” if it has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so
obvious that even a lay person would recognize a need for medical intervention. Leavitt, 645
F.3d at 497; Gaudreault v. Mun. of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 956 (1991)). The subjective standard concerns the culpability of the defendant. A
plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind
amounting to “deliberate indifference to an inmate’s health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
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834 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal
recklessness, “requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable.” Feeney,
464 F.3d at 162 (quoting Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993)). The focus of
the deliberate indifference analysis “is on what the jailers knew and what they did in
response.” Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002).
Deliberate indifference must be distinguished from negligence. As the First Circuit
explained:
A finding of deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of
negligence. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding that
“[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner”); Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir.
1987). A plaintiff claiming an eighth amendment violation with respect to an
inmate’s serious mental health or safety needs must allege “acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106; see also Cortes-Quinone v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988). Although this court has hesitated to
find deliberate indifference to a serious need “[w]here the dispute concerns not
the absence of help, but the choice of a certain course of treatment,” Sires, 834
F.2d at 13, deliberate indifference may be found where the attention received
is “so clearly inadequate as to amount to a refusal to provide essential care.”
Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a federal claim. Plaintiff’s
allegations must support a finding that the individual, through his or her individual actions,
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009).
Plaintiff has not described the specific conduct in which each defendant engaged.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to assert facts to support a deliberate indifference claim.
For instance, Plaintiff has not asserted any facts from which one could discern the nature of
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the condition, the treatment that should have been, but was not provided, or that the named
defendants were aware of the seriousness of the condition but failed to provide the required
treatment. Plaintiff thus has not alleged facts that would support the objective or subjective
standard of a deliberate indifference claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, after a review of Plaintiff’s complaint in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, unless within the fourteen-day period for objections,
Plaintiff amends his complaint to address the deficiencies identified herein, I recommend the
Court dismiss the matter.
NOTICE
A party may file objections to those specified portions of a magistrate
judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the district
court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen (14)
days of being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the district court and to appeal the district court’s order.
/s/ John C. Nivison
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated this 29th day of November, 2022.
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