Opinion

REYES v. United States

Court
District Court, D. Maine
Filed
Jul 26, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.3%

holding that claims are frivolous under section 1915 when they are “clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” (cleaned up)

How later courts described this case

  • holding that claims are frivolous under section 1915 when they are “clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” (cleaned up)
  • “It long has been established, of course, that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” (cleaned up)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

JOSE RAPHAL REYES, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) No. 1:22-cv-00213-JAW

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Defendant )

RECOMMENDED DECISION AFTER PRELIMINARY REVIEW

Having granted the Plaintiff Jose Raphal Reyes’s application to proceed in

forma pauperis, see Order (ECF No. 4), his complaint is now before me for preliminary

review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow,

I recommend that the Court dismiss Reyes’s complaint.

I. Legal Standard

The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure

meaningful access to federal courts for persons unable to pay the costs of bringing an

action. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). When a party proceeds

in forma pauperis, however, a court must “dismiss the case at any time if” it

determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious[,] . . . fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dismissals under section 1915

are often made on the court’s own initiative “prior to the issuance of process, so as to

spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering” meritless

complaints. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324.

When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be

granted, the court must accept the truth of all well-pleaded facts and give the plaintiff

the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset,

640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). An unrepresented plaintiff’s

complaint must be read liberally in this regard, see Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87,

94 (1st Cir. 2002), but must still contain “the crucial detail of who, what, when,

where, and how” in order to provide fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds

upon which they rest, Byrne v. Maryland, No. 1:20-cv-00036-GZS, 2020 WL 1317731,

at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 20, 2020) (rec. dec.), aff’d, 2020 WL 2202441 (D. Me. May 6, 2020).

II. Allegations

In a rambling and largely incoherent complaint, Reyes alleges a widespread

conspiracy between and among the Roman Catholic Church, Cuba, the Dominican

Republic, Germany, and the United States of America. See Complaint (ECF No. 1)

at 1. He states that “he was exploited by these governments by explo[i]ting him to

foreign agencies who were part of an occultic order controlled by and from the Roman

Catholic Church.” Id. at 2. He accuses the United States of using “the early breakfast

program and other gover[n]mental programs to administer and gain focal points to

gain control of and administer control over people in this country who [were] not part

of the Roman Catholic Church or other parties that they had control over with the

Pope.” Id. at 5. He also alleges that he (1) was kidnapped, (2) was recruited to a

school program in Massachusetts by several well-known public figures, (3) has

diplomatic immunity, and (4) “was introduced to the crime culture of living” by eating

food that people had used to clean themselves. Id. at 2-6. He brings suit against the

United States under the “Abolishing Act” for “Jim Crow Law and Dutch Slave trade”

exploitation and seeks “300 trillion dollar[s] for all damages to his person.” Id. at 1, 8.

III. Discussion

Even with a liberal reading of Reyes’s complaint, I am unable to discern any

plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. Rather, Reyes’s fantastic and

delusional claims are plainly frivolous and should be dismissed. See Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that claims are frivolous under

section 1915 when they are “clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations

that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” (cleaned up)).

Moreover, even setting issues of frivolity aside, dismissal is warranted because

Reyes has failed to demonstrate that the United States has waived its sovereign

immunity with respect to his claims. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399

(1976) (“It long has been established, of course, that the United States, as sovereign,

is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued and the terms of its consent to be

sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” (cleaned up));

Mullen v. Gen. Hosp., Legazpi Philippines, No. 13-11283-GAO, 2014 WL 575456, at *2

(D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2014) (dismissing a complaint where the plaintiff “failed to

demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to his claim for monetary

damages against the United States”).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court DISMISS the

Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

NOTICE

A party may file objections to those specified portions of a Magistrate

Judge’s report or proposed findings or recommended decisions entered

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for which de novo review by the District

Court is sought, together with a supporting memorandum, within fourteen

(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A responsive memorandum

shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the objection.

Failure to file a timely objection shall constitute a waiver of the right

to de novo review by the District Court and to appeal the District Court’s

order.

Dated: July 26, 2022

/s/ Karen Frink Wolf

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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