The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
NICHOLAS A. GLADU, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:21-cv-00345-JAW
)
MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS )
COMMISSION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER AFFIRMING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION
OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Court affirms over objection a recommended decision from a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, dismissing a pro se inmate’s complaint against
the Maine Human Rights Commission and its Executive Director.
I. Nicholas A. Gladu’s Complaint
On December 6, 2021, Nicholas A. Gladu, an inmate at the Maine State Prison
in Warren, Maine, filed a pro se complaint against the Maine Human Rights
Commission (MHRC) and its Executive Director, Amy Sneirson, asserting equal
protection and due process violations in the MHRC’s handling of his discrimination
claim against the Maine Department of Corrections (MDOC). Compl. (ECF No. 1).
In his Complaint, Mr. Gladu stated that he has been diagnosed with chronic kidney
disease, hyponatremia, and bladder dysfunction, all of which have caused excessive
urination. Id. at 2-3. Mr. Gladu further alleged that he demanded reasonable
accommodation for his medical condition from the MDOC, but the MDOC
discriminated against him when it denied his request. Id. at 2. Mr. Gladu said that
he then filed a complaint with the MHRC on May 7, 2019, but the MHRC “summarily
dismissed” his complaint on June 27, 2019, on the ground that he had failed to allege
a medical diagnosis for his excessive urination condition. Id. Mr. Gladu then alleged
that he asked the MHRC for leave to amend his complaint to include his diagnosed
medical conditions but that the MHRC’s Executive Director failed to respond to his
request “merely because he is/was a prisoner.” Id. Mr. Gladu alleged that the MHRC
and its Executive Director have a history of hostility toward discrimination
complaints filed by inmates. Id.
Mr. Gladu says that on October 25, 2019, he filed a second complaint for
discrimination in public accommodation against the MDOC with the MHRC, again
alleging that the MDOC had discriminated against him by refusing to provide
reasonable accommodation for his excessive urination. Id. Mr. Gladu alleges that on
November 22, 2019, the MHRC “decided to allow Gladu’s successive Complaint to
proceed.”1 Id. Mr. Gladu asserts that at the MHRC hearing, he was able to establish
his medical conditions and that they caused excessive urination. Id. at 2-3.
Nevertheless, Mr. Gladu says that on September 24, 2020, the MHRC and its
Executive Director falsely claimed that he failed to establish a medical condition
related to his excessive urination. Id. at 3.
In his pending federal complaint, Mr. Gladu alleges pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, that the MHRC and its Executive Director violated his rights to due process
and equal protection of the law, and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), that they
1 Curiously, Mr. Gladu complains that the MHRC violated its own regulations against
successive complaints when it allowed his second complaint to proceed. Compl. at 2.
engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional and statutory rights. Id.
at 4. The same day that he filed his federal complaint, Mr. Gladu moved to proceed
in forma pauperis. Appl. to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Aff. (ECF No.
2). On December 20, 2021, after Mr. Gladu filed the necessary account statement
and certificate, the Magistrate Judge granted his second motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. Appl. to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Aff. (ECF No.
3); Order Granting Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 4). On January 28,
2022, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Magistrate Judge screened Mr. Gladu’s pro
se Complaint and issued his recommendation that the Court dismiss the Complaint.
Recommended Decision After Review of Pl.’s Compl. (ECF No. 9) (Recommended
Decision). On February 14, 2022, Mr. Gladu filed his objection. Obj. to Recommended
Order (ECF No. 10) (Pl.’s Obj.).
II. The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision
In his January 28, 2022, Recommended Decision, the Magistrate Judge found
that Mr. Gladu had not established a viable due process claim because “Defendants’
dismissal of [his] administrative complaints . . . did not finally destroy a property
interest [he] might have had under state law” because Mr. Gladu still “has available
remedies under state law.” Recommended Decision at 5. The Magistrate Judge
observed that Mr. Gladu could have filed a civil action against the MDOC under the
Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4621, even when the MHRC dismissed his
complaint. Id.
As to Mr. Gladu’s equal protection claim, the Magistrate Judge noted that
“[p]risoners are not a protected class” and Mr. Gladu had otherwise “include[d] no
facts regarding similar-situated individuals or other prisoners who allegedly received
worse treatment than non-prisoners when Defendants considered their
administrative complaint.” Id. at 7. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Mr.
Gladu’s “conspiracy claim fails not only because his substantive claims are
unsupported by sufficient facts, but also because the ‘bare assertions’ of a conspiracy
to harm prisoners is likewise unsupported.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 681 (2009)).
III. Nicholas A. Gladu’s Objection
In his objection, Mr. Gladu emphasizes that “the Supreme Court continues to
say that a ‘pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards,’” Pl.’s Obj. at 1 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and
be liberally construed. Id. at 2. He says “the Court lacks authority to dismiss [his]
complaint sua sponte” and that “the magistrate’s analysis/screening of the complaint
clearly evinces heightened pleading requirements beyond those prescribed by law.”
Id. Mr. Gladu next asserts that the Magistrate Judge employed a higher standard of
review than permitted under the law in screening his complaint. Id. at 2. He also
submits that the Magistrate Judge “mischaracterized the claims in [his] Complaint
as Defendants merely treating prisoners ‘less favorably’ than others, when the
conduct in question amounts to discrimination and denial of equal protection of the
law.” Id.
IV. Discussion
To his first point, Mr. Gladu is simply incorrect when he claims that the
Magistrate Judge lacked the authority to screen his complaint. On the contrary, the
Magistrate Judge applied the appropriate screening standard, pursuant to the in
forma pauperis statute and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915,
1915A.2
As for his assertion that the Magistrate Judge applied the wrong standard of
review for purposes of screening his complaint, again, Mr. Gladu is simply incorrect.
In his Recommended Decision, the Magistrate Judge took care to describe the
standards under which he screened Mr. Gladu’s complaint. Recommended Decision
at 3-4. In fact, for the proper standard of screening, the Magistrate Judge cited Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), the same case Mr. Gladu cites.
Finally, the Magistrate Judge also correctly observed that Mr. Gladu has not
identified a protected interest so as to implicate federal due process protections or a
suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny review of his equal protection claim,
nor provided sufficient facts, aside from conclusory allegations, to support his
conspiracy claims. Specifically, citing First Circuit caselaw, the Magistrate Judge
2 28 U.S.C. § 1915A reads in pertinent part:
(a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event,
as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint –
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or,
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
concluded that Mr. Gladu had failed to demonstrate that “the person, compared with
others similarly situated, was selectively treated” and if so, that “such selective
treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to
inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent
to injure a person.” Recommended Decision at 6 (quoting Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60
F.3d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Yerardi’s Moody St. Rest. & Lounge, Inc. v. Bd.
of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 1989))). Moreover, as noted earlier, the
Magistrate Judge quoted First Circuit law applicable to a “class of one” such as Mr.
Gladu and observed that such a claim “requires the individual to show that he or she
was ‘intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is
no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Id. at 6-7 (quoting Snyder v.
Gaudet, 756 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Vill of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 564 (2000) (per curiam))). Mr. Gladu’s insistence that the Magistrate Judge
misapplied the law is non-meritorious.
V. Conclusion
The Court reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Decision, together with the entire record; the Court has made a de novo
determination of all matters adjudicated by the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended
Decision; and the Court concurs with the recommendations of the United States
Magistrate Judge in full, for the reasons set forth in his Recommended Decision and
determines that no further proceedings are necessary.
1. The Court AFFIRMS the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate
Judge (ECF No. 9).
2. The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Nicholas A. Gladu’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 25th day of March, 2022