finding agency relationship based in part upon “allegations of interlocking financial, managerial, and business relationships” between the parent and subsidiary
How later courts described this case
- finding agency relationship based in part upon “allegations of interlocking financial, managerial, and business relationships” between the parent and subsidiary
- “[I]t is accepted practice to pursue both [breach of contract and unjust enrichment] theories at the pleading stage.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
MARK LEVESQUE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) 2:19-cv-00389-JDL
)
IBERDROLA, S.A., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs Mark Levesque, Christie Decker, Michael Platt, Sylvia Krainin, and
Sally Trussell (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed their Third Amended Complaint—a
putative class action—against Defendants Iberdrola, S.A. (“Iberdrola”); Central
Maine Power Company (“CMP”); Avangrid, Inc. (“Avangrid”); and Douglas Herling
(“Herling”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) on January 31, 2020 (ECF No. 44). The
Third Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants implemented a metering and
billing system that incorrectly measured and charged customers for electricity, and
that they then attempted to cover up problems that resulted from their
implementation of this allegedly defective system.
On August 7, 2020, Iberdrola filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, in the alternative,
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (ECF
No. 84). On February 1, 2021, Avangrid and CMP jointly filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 128). That same day, Herling also filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 129). For the reasons that follow, I
grant the motions in part and deny them in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
CMP is an electric utility headquartered in Augusta, Maine that transmits and
delivers electricity generated by various power suppliers to over 624,000 customers
in central and southern Maine. Herling is CMP’s Chief Executive Officer. CMP is a
subsidiary of Avangrid, a New York corporation headquartered in Connecticut.
Iberdrola is a Spanish corporation that owns the majority of outstanding shares of
Avangrid common stock.
In 2011, to dispense with the need for physical meter readings, CMP
introduced a system of “smart meters” designed to measure CMP customers’ use of
electricity and transmit those measurements remotely. In October 2017, CMP
switched to a new “SmartCare” meter and billing system that was designed to
interface with the smart meters. Beginning the following month, nearly 300,000
CMP customers saw their bills increase, many by 50% or more. These billing
increases allegedly occurred without any actual increased use of electricity by the
customers.
The Third Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants failed to
adequately test the SmartCare system prior to rollout, including conducting “far
fewer weeks of testing than planned and recommended.” ECF No. 44 ¶ 72. CMP
allegedly billed customers despite knowing that the SmartCare system was defective
and inaccurate, and instructed CMP customer service representatives (who were
understaffed following the rollout) to tell customers that the spikes in their electricity
bills were caused by other factors. Following their complaints, some customers faced
issues such as: not receiving bills, not being able to access their online CMP accounts,
receiving disconnect notices, being placed on payment arrangements that they did
not agree to, having money withdrawn from their bank accounts without their
consent, being sent to debt collectors, receiving a high bill after months of no bills,
and simply continuing to pay allegedly erroneously high bills. Customers also
suffered indirect harm, such as paying electricians to investigate their energy usage,
purchasing new appliances, and severely limiting their energy usage.
According to the Third Amended Complaint, this was not the first time an
Iberdrola subsidiary had dealt with issues surrounding its billing system. In 2014,
another Iberdrola subsidiary, Scottish Power, was investigated by the United
Kingdom’s Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (“Ofgem”) after its rollout of a billing
system similar to SmartCare. Scottish Power customers received late or incorrect
bills and experienced bill delays followed by a sudden demand for high bills to be paid,
and Scottish Power call centers were overwhelmed by complaints and failed to
respond to customers’ issues. Ultimately, Ofgem fined Scottish Power.
The Third Amended Complaint also alleges that there was an overlap of key
employees between Iberdrola, Avangrid, and CMP. The SmartCare project was led
by a team that included Iberdrola employees, including employees located in Maine.
Iberdrola exercised significant influence over CMP and Avangrid, and the SmartCare
project was implemented at Iberdrola’s direction. At least one Avangrid employee
was also involved in the Scottish Power billing system rollout.
In response to complaints from CMP customers regarding their receipt of high
electricity bills following the SmartCare rollout, the Maine Public Utilities
Commission (“PUC”) retained the Liberty Consulting Group (“Liberty”) to conduct a
forensic audit of CMP’s metering, billing, and related systems.1 In December of 2018,
Liberty published a report of its audit. Ultimately, Liberty concluded that “CMP’s
meters produce accurate measurements of customer usage.” ECF No. 14-6 at 15.
Liberty found that SmartCare “introduced errors and significant delay into the billing
process,” but that these billing errors were “minimal in number and in dollar value.”
Id. Liberty criticized the “testing and training” surrounding the SmartCare
implementation, along with the personnel shortages that “unduly delayed fixes to the
errors, caused significant customer difficulty in reaching CMP representatives and in
getting answers to questions and concerns, and meant overly long delays in resolving
billing problems.” Id. It noted that “compressed timelines leading up to go-live”
adversely affected the rollout of SmartCare, id. at 77, and that “[l]ack of post go-live
planning and management for defect resolution and staff to manage these defects
created a large backlog, which still remain[ed]” as of the date of the report, id. at 81.
However, Liberty ultimately attributed CMP’s customers’ high bills to extreme cold
weather during the winter of 2017-2018 that coincided with an increase in the price
of electricity.
1 The information in this paragraph stems from the Liberty Consulting Group’s forensic audit of
CMP’s Metering and Billing System, ECF No. 14-6 at 5-111. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1993) (noting that courts considering a motion to dismiss may look to documents that are “central
In January 2019, Herling sent a letter to CMP customers stating that the
Liberty audit concluded that “all systems from meter to bill are working as intended
and bills are accurate,” and that the only shortcoming identified by the Liberty audit
was CMP’s failure to dedicate enough “staff, training[,] or management oversight” to
ensure adequate customer service after the SmartCare rollout. ECF No. 44 ¶¶ 113,
115. The Third Amended Complaint alleges that this statement was false because
the Liberty audit also identified problems with CMP’s implementation of SmartCare,
and not merely its customer service following the rollout. In May 2018, before the
Liberty report was issued, Herling also made statements to the Portland Press
Herald and the Bangor Daily News indicating that CMP had found nothing about the
SmartCare system that would artificially increase customer’s usage. The Third
Amended Complaint alleges that these statements were also false, that Herling knew
or should have known that these statements would instill a false sense of security in
the minds of CMP customers and curtail their desire to challenge their bills, and that
customers relied on both statements to their detriment by making their electric
payments, purchasing new appliances, paying electricians, and travelling to observe
CMP’s meter testings.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2018, Levesque commenced a class action lawsuit against CMP in the
Cumberland County Superior Court, alleging a single claim of unjust enrichment
based on CMP’s alleged cover-up of the SmartCare billing issues. Roughly a month
later, he added a number of additional plaintiffs and added Avangrid as a defendant.
The case was transferred to the Superior Court’s Business and Consumer Docket in
September 2018. In February 2019, the Superior Court stayed all proceedings in the
matter pending the resolution of an investigation into the overbilling claims by the
PUC. On July 30, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, which
added new named plaintiffs, added Iberdrola and Herling as defendants, and added
additional claims. CMP and Avangrid filed a notice of removal to this court on August
23, 2019.
The Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on January 31, 2020. The
Third Amended Complaint presents claims for (1) unjust enrichment; (2) breach of
contract; (3) failure to comply with the laws and regulations concerning the provision
and billing of electrical services pursuant to 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1501 (West 2021); (4)
fraud and intentional misrepresentation by the corporate defendants; (5) fraud and
intentional misrepresentation by Herling; and (6) violation of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968. On
February 26, 2020, the PUC issued the result of its investigation into CMP’s metering
and billing issues. CMP, Avangrid, and Herling then filed a motion to dismiss the
Third Amended Complaint without prejudice or to stay the proceedings pending the
Plaintiffs’ exhaustion of administrative remedies on February 28, 2020. Following a
hearing, I denied the motion on November 25, 2020 (ECF No. 104).
I now address three additional motions to dismiss. Iberdrola has filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a
claim. CMP and Avangrid have also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, as has Herling. I held a consolidated hearing on all three motions on May 20,
2021.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1): Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
“To hear a case, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties, that
is, the power to require the parties to obey its decrees.” Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court’s
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. However, this burden is “not a heavy
one.” In re Lupron Mktg. and Sales Practices Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (D.
Mass. 2003). While “[t]he plaintiff must go beyond the pleadings and make
affirmative proof,” Negrón-Torres v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.
2007) (quoting Boit v. Gar–Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992)), under
the prima facie standard, a court “must accept the plaintiff’s (properly documented)
evidentiary proffers as true,” and construe those facts “in the light most congenial to
the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.” Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Facts put forth by the plaintiff must be accepted as true “irrespective
of whether the defendant disputes them,” and “facts put forward by the defendant
‘become part of the mix only to the extent they are uncontradicted.’” Astro-Med, Inc.
v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Adelson v. Hananel,
510 F.3d 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2007)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim
A court reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must “accept
as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in the pleader’s favor.” Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez,
711 F.3d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 72
(1st Cir. 2011)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 53 (quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44
(1st Cir. 2012)).
Courts apply a two-pronged approach in resolving a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
First, courts must identify and disregard statements in the complaint that merely
offer legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Second, courts “must determine whether the remaining
factual content allows a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.
2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Determining the plausibility of a claim
is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Because Iberdrola raises the threshold issue of personal jurisdiction, I address
this question first. I then address the various parties’ arguments as to whether the
Third Amended Complaint states a claim for unjust enrichment, fraud and
misrepresentation, violation of 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1501, or violation of RICO, as
applicable, beginning with the broad argument that all state law claims against
Avangrid must be dismissed.2
A. Personal Jurisdiction over Iberdrola
The parties have engaged in a lengthy discovery process with respect to
Iberdrola’s motion. Accordingly, their factual submissions are extensive and detailed.
I summarize the facts specific to jurisdiction here, presenting them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, as I must, and giving deference to the plaintiffs where
Iberdrola has presented conflicting factual allegations. I then analyze the parties’
jurisdictional arguments.
1. Factual Allegations
Iberdrola, a corporation organized and headquartered in Spain, owns 81.5% of
the shares of its American brand Avangrid, which in turn owns 100% of the shares of
CMP. Iberdrola does not have any offices, property, or bank accounts in the United
States, is not licensed to do business in the United States, and does not have any
permanent employees in the United States. However, certain Iberdrola officers are
also officers of Avangrid. Ignacio Galán is chairman of both Iberdrola and Avangrid.
Avangrid’s Board of Directors includes Pedro Azagra Blázquez, who is Iberdrola’s
Corporate Development Director; José Sainz Armada, who serves in a senior financial
management role at Iberdrola; and Santiago Martínez Garrido, who serves in a senior
legal role for Iberdrola. Several of these individuals have travelled to Maine multiple
2 No party has challenged the claim for breach of contract alleged in Count Two of the Third Amended
Complaint, except for Avangrid in the context of its argument that all claims against it must fail.
Additionally, the Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1501 and RICO claims
times since 2015 to speak about, promote, conduct, and advocate for Iberdrola’s
business interests in Maine. In a Securities and Exchange Commission filing,
Avangrid explained that “Iberdrola exercises significant influence over [Avangrid],
and its interests may be different than [other shareholders’].” ECF No. 16-21 at 47.
It further stated that Iberdrola “exercise[s] significant influence over [Avangrid’s]
business policies and affairs, including the composition of [its] board of directors.” Id.
A former employee of Avangrid’s treasury department, Valery Harris, states
that, during the implementation of the SmartCare project, at least six Iberdrola
employees were based in Maine at any given time to work on the project, particularly
in the lead up to SmartCare’s go-live in October 2017.3 Avangrid reimbursed
Iberdrola for the payroll and housing costs for each employee’s time spent working at
CMP/Avangrid. Iberdrola had an account in the Netherlands where its subsidiaries
deposited their revenues, and CMP/Avangrid could draw from that account if
Iberdrola found it necessary. Iberdrola selected the technical consultant for the
SmartCare project, and for the similar project in Scotland. Additionally,
CMP/Avangrid were required to complete and submit request forms for the purchase
of, among other things, equipment, software, supplies, software add-ons, and
firmware for Iberdrola’s approval. This included approval for expenditures on the
SmartCare project. The necessity of Iberdrola’s approval led to delays with the
SmartCare project. Additionally, Fernando Lucero, Iberdrola’s Chief Information
3 In a procedural order dated April 28, 2021 (ECF No. 157), Magistrate Judge John C. Nivison ruled
that the sworn declaration of Valery Harris, a 2015 Capital Expenditure Plan, and the pleadings and
order regarding the Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against Iberdrola shall be included in the record
for the Court’s consideration of Iberdrola’s motion to dismiss. No objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
order have been filed. Accordingly, Iberdrola’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Notice of New Developments
Officer, was “deeply involved with Avangrid’s Information Technology assets and
programs including the SmartCare project in Maine.” ECF No. 120-1 ¶ 21.
A 2015 Capital Expenditure Plan, entitled “CMP Customer Relationship
Management & Billing Project,” states that the SmartCare project was “proposed by”
Lucero and Sainz Armada. ECF No. 120-2 at 1. It also states that, following approval
by the PUC, the plan was to “be updated and re-presented to the Iberdrola Operating
Committee for full approval before project launch.” Id. at 9. A SmartCare “Project
Kickoff Meeting” handout states that “[t]he Operating Committee of Iberdrola’s
Group approved in 2015 the implementation” of SmartCare. ECF No. 118-5 at 7.
In addition to its more overarching role, Iberdrola was involved at several
points of the SmartCare rollout. For instance, when SmartCare was delayed in June
2016, an Avangrid executive told another executive that they were “being directed by
global IT to get bids from other vendors” which “would cause at least a month’s delay,
possibly more.” ECF No. 125 at 4. He further explained that concerns about the
project could be “escalated” to “Armando Martinez [of Iberdrola] so it could blow up
at a very senior level. Fernando [Lucero] is very concerned about this.” Id. A few
weeks later, after being informed about a potential delay with SmartCare’s
implementation, Lucero wrote in an email: “We have never talked about any delay
impacting the go-live. I [do] not accept it. Please, provide me this week a plan with
options for infrastructure workstreams in order to recover the delay and keep the
agreed go-live.” Id. at 7. Lucero later informed a CMP project manager that “[w]e
must solve all the issues asap.” Id. at 8.
In April 2017, Ignacio Canales, an Iberdrola employee assigned to the
SmartCare project, informed a CMP executive that Jaime Macias Gonzalez
(Iberdrola’s SmartCare emissary based in Maine and a member of the SmartCare
project lead team) would provide her with key performance indicators that Iberdrola
used in other projects to identify and understand the “potential bottlenecks in the
system after the go-live,” including integration and billing errors. Id. at 32. And in
August 2017, in response to reports of likely delays, Iberdrola executive Armando
Martinez emailed Avangrid Chief Executive Officer Robert Kump the following:
What are the regulatory consequences of any delay? And the economic
impac[t] (which must be transfer[ed] to ITRON)? This project should
have finished last July. Delays [from] September are not acceptable.
The team must work on a[] scenario of September completion, unless
non regulatory, economic or reputational impact.
Id. at 1.
For its part, Iberdrola states that only two of its employees—Macias Gonzalez
and Canales—had a notable connection to the SmartCare project, and states that
their roles were limited to “back office” integration of SmartCare with Iberdrola’s
global platform. ECF No. 84-1 ¶ 16. It states that Macias Gonzalez moved to Maine
for a period of time to assist with the project, but that Macias Gonzalez only reported
to Canales at Iberdrola, and that with respect to SmartCare he reported to superiors
at CMP, rather than CMP employees reporting to him. Iberdrola claims that Macias
Gonzalez was the local resource for CMP to interface with a software development
team located in Spain to ensure that the team was devoting the proper resources to
the SmartCare project.
While Iberdrola acknowledges that Iberdrola employees were on the
SmartCare Steering Committee, it states that the Steering Committee was only
“tasked with monitoring strategic priorities for the [SmartCare] project,
demonstrating project sponsorship, reviewing and accepting project status updates
at regular intervals, and securing appropriate project resources,” and notes that
“[t]he Steering Committee did not exercise decision-making authority and instead
provided a forum for the project team to provide informational status updates to
various stakeholders on the progress of the SmartCare project.” Id. ¶ 21. Canales
was the only Iberdrola employee to participate in a Steering Committee meeting and
he did so remotely from Spain and “infrequently.” Id. ¶ 23. Other Iberdrola
employees served on the committee for only “a couple of months” and did not
participate. Id. ¶ 22. Macias Gonzalez was not on the Steering Committee, but, as a
member of the SmartCare project lead team, he did participate in Steering
Committee meetings “infrequently” in “an information-providing role.” Id. ¶ 29.
Iberdrola claims that the services of Canales and Macias Gonzalez were
consistent with Iberdrola’s “Framework Agreement for the Provision of Corporate
Services for Iberdrola and the Companies of Its Group,” which states that “without
detriment to the autonomous decision-making of all such companies,” Iberdrola may
provide “efficient, flexible corporate services” at the request of any subsidiary
company in order to assist with “the global integration of [Iberdrola’s] businesses.”
Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis omitted). The Agreement expressly provides that all services
“shall be provided by [Iberdrola] . . . without detriment to the effective decision-
making capacity of the Client Companies.” Id.
2. Analysis
The Plaintiffs have essentially set forth two theories of jurisdiction. First, they
argue that this court has personal jurisdiction over Iberdrola as a parent company
because of its “general level of control,” ECF No. 118 at 19, over its subsidiaries CMP
and Avangrid—essentially, an argument that CMP/Avangrid, neither of which have
contested jurisdiction, are the “domestic alter ego” of Iberdrola.4 City of Bangor v.
Citizens Commc'ns Co., No. CIV. 02-183-B-S, 2003 WL 22183205, at *5 n.5 (D. Me.
Sept. 22, 2003), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV. 02-183-B-S, 2003 WL
22913423 (D. Me. Dec. 1, 2003). Next, they argue that Iberdrola itself had the
requisite minimum contacts necessary to establish specific personal jurisdiction.
a. The “Domestic Alter Ego” Theory
For a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a parent company on a
“domestic alter ego” theory, a plaintiff “must produce ‘strong and robust’ evidence of
control by the parent company over the subsidiary, rendering the latter a ‘mere
shell.’” Negrón-Torres, 478 F.3d at 24 (quoting DeCastro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F.3d
282, 283-84 (1st Cir. 1989)).
In City of Bangor, Magistrate Judge Margaret J. Kravchuk explained the
“sometimes overlapping scenarios” where courts will exercise jurisdiction over a
parent based on the forum activities of its subsidiaries:
4 While “[d]ue process requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of either general or specific
jurisdiction,” Negrón-Torres, 478 F.3d at 24, in a “domestic alter ego” inquiry “the general versus
specific jurisdiction issue may be of little significance because [CMP/Avangrid’s] forum contacts are
more than sufficient to support an exercise of either specific or general jurisdiction.” City of Bangor,
(1) the parent exercises pervasive or complete control over the
subsidiary, either in regard to its day-to-day operations or in regard to
the specific, claim-related conduct; (2) the subsidiary is the parent’s in-
state agent, instrumentality or a mere department of the parent; (3) the
parent and subsidiary engage in a common undertaking in a manner
that substantially disregards the separate nature of the corporate
entities or creates serious ambiguity about the same; (4) the parent’s
representatives maintain a near constant presence in the state in order
to deal directly with those entities the subsidiary conducts business with
coupled with other factors reflecting a systematic pattern of in-state
activity comparable to the conduct of a domestic corporation; or (5)
traditional veil-piercing factors, including failure to observe corporate
formalities, inadequate capitalization, commingling of funds,
overlapping ownership, officers, directors and personnel, and so forth.
City of Bangor, 2003 WL 22183205, at *3. In that case, among other factors, the
foreign corporation was a holding company that owned 100% of the stock of a Maine
corporation. See id. at *3-4. The holding company’s four owners were the only
members of the Maine corporation’s board of directors, and an individual who held
himself out to be the Vice President of the Maine corporation was in reality the Vice
President of the foreign corporation. See id. at *4-5. The Maine company failed to
file its annual report in Maine as required by law, and the foreign company had
previously been found to have disregarded corporate formalities in a separate lawsuit.
See id. Finally, the foreign company had “active, repeat participation . . . in brokering
its subsidiary’s Maine real estate transactions.” Id. at *5.
The facts of this case do not rise to the level of the facts in City of Bangor.
While there was some overlap between the Boards of Directors of Iberdrola and
Avangrid, Iberdrola did not constitute the entirety—or even the majority—of the
Avangrid Board of Directors. While the Third Amended Complaint references a
metering system rollout in Scotland with similar failures as the SmartCare rollout,
the Plaintiffs have not alleged that there has been any formal finding that Iberdrola
has disregarded its corporate formalities in the past or that it otherwise exercised
“pervasive or complete control” over Scottish Power. City of Bangor, 2003 WL
22183205, at *3. Although, as I will discuss below, Iberdrola was involved in the
SmartCare rollout, that involvement does not appear to rise to the level of rendering
CMP/Avangrid a “mere shell” of Iberdrola. Accordingly, the argument that Iberdrola
is subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction on a “domestic alter ego” theory is
unpersuasive.
b. The Minimum Contacts Theory
Even if CMP/ Avangrid are not the “domestic alter ego” of Iberdrola, Iberdrola’s
direct contacts with Maine may be sufficient to give rise to specific personal
jurisdiction. “Specific personal jurisdiction may be asserted where the cause of
action arises directly out of, or relates to, the defendant’s forum-based contacts.”
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp. (United Elec.),
960 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 (1st Cir. 1992). “To determine whether [a] plaintiff has
alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction, this
circuit divides the constitutional analysis into three categories: relatedness,
purposeful availment, and reasonableness. Critically, an affirmative finding on each
of the three elements of the test is required to support a finding of specific
jurisdiction.” Negrón-Torres, 478 F.3d at 24–25 (internal citations, quotation marks,
and alterations omitted). I address each element in turn.
i. Relatedness
The First Circuit has explained that “[c]ausation is central” in determining
whether the plaintiff’s claims are related to the defendant’s forum state activities.
Harlow v. Children’s Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir. 2005).5
The relatedness requirement is not an open door; it is closely read, and
it requires a showing of a material connection. [The First Circuit]
steadfastly rejects the exercise of personal jurisdiction whenever the
connection between the cause of action and the defendant’s forum-state
contacts seems attenuated and indirect. . . . A broad ‘but-for’ argument
is generally insufficient. Because ‘but for’ events can be very remote,
due process demands something like a proximate cause nexus.
Id. at 61 (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). In other
words, “[t]here must be more than just an attenuated connection between the contacts
and the claim; ‘the defendant's in-state conduct must form an important, or [at least]
material, element of proof in the plaintiff's case.’” Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530
F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow, 432 F.3d at 61).
Iberdrola focuses primarily on this element, arguing that the “Plaintiffs fail to
establish even ‘but for’ causation,” ECF No. 84 at 17, much less the proximate cause-
like “nexus” needed to meet the relatedness requirement, Harlow, 432 F.3d at 61.
Iberdrola leans heavily on the First Circuit’s decision in Negrón-Torres, 478 F.3d 19.
5 In March of 2021—the month after Iberdrola’s motion to dismiss was fully briefed—the Supreme
Court issued Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021). The Court
explained that the plaintiff’s proposed “causation-only approach finds no support” in the relatedness
inquiry, and that “[n]one of [its] precedents ha[ve] suggested that only a strict causal relationship
between the defendant’s in-state activity and the litigation will do.” Id. at 1026. Accordingly, the
Court noted that “some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Id.
Because the First Circuit has yet to address what Ford Motor Co. means for the test articulated in
Harlow—and because, even applying this stricter relatedness standard, I conclude that this Court has
personal jurisdiction over Iberdrola—I analyze the parties’ arguments under the Harlow standard.
In that case, a plaintiff who had unsuccessfully attempted to dial 9-1-1 during her
husband’s medical crisis filed a wrongful death suit against Verizon Communications
after its subsidiary inadvertently disconnected the 9-1-1 system of Puerto Rico while
attempting to address a customer service complaint. See id. at 22. The plaintiff
argued that Verizon directed the management and policies of its subsidiary, however,
the only evidence the plaintiff put forward was a licensing agreement which
purported to show that Verizon gave its subsidiary advice as to how to maintain its
9-1-1 system. See id. at 25. The court found that Verizon was not actually a party to
this agreement, and noted that the plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations” of control were
not enough to meet the relatedness requirement. Id.
Iberdrola claims that it is similarly situated to Verizon—in other words, that
it is merely “a holding company that did not provide advice or direction related to the
[SmartCare project].” ECF No. 84 at 18. However, the Plaintiffs in this case have
asserted substantially more than conclusory allegations. The Plaintiffs have put
forth “affirmative proof,” Negrón-Torres, 478 F.3d at 23, that multiple Iberdrola
employees were involved with the SmartCare rollout, including employees in Maine;
that Iberdrola sought to integrate SmartCare into its global system, and that a
previous SmartCare project by an Iberdrola subsidiary in Scotland had been saddled
with similar issues as those alleged to have occurred in Maine; and, most crucially,
that Iberdrola employees directed its Maine subsidiaries, CMP and Avangrid, to
avoid any further delays with SmartCare’s go-live. An Iberdrola executive directly
told the SmartCare executive team that “[d]elays . . . are not acceptable,” and that
the team had to work toward a September completion of the project. ECF No. 118-1
at 1. Taking as true the Plaintiffs’ contention that the SmartCare rollout was flawed
and led to erroneously high billing of some of CMP’s customers, there appears to be a
direct line of causation between Iberdrola’s executive oversight of the SmartCare
project and the ultimate harm alleged by the Plaintiffs. While Iberdrola may not
have had as large of a role in SmartCare’s alleged problems as CMP/Avangrid, its
role was at least material to SmartCare’s allegedly rushed rollout.
ii. Purposeful Availment
For a court to have specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must
have “purposefully availed itself of ‘the privilege of conducting activities in the forum
state, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and making
the defendant’s involuntary presence before the state’s courts foreseeable.’” Phillips,
530 F.3d at 28 (quoting Daynard, 290 F.3d at 61).
[P]urposeful availment involves both voluntariness and
foreseeability. Voluntariness requires that the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state proximately result from actions by the
defendant himself. The contacts must be deliberate, and not based on
the unilateral actions of another party. Foreseeability requires that the
contacts also must be of a nature that the defendant could reasonably
anticipate being hailed into court there.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Iberdrola addresses this factor only in a footnote, citing cases from other
circuits where parent companies that did not conduct any business or maintain any
offices in the forums were found not to have purposefully availed themselves of those
forums. See Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1274 (6th Cir. 1998); Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert S.A., 94 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1996).
However, much like the relatedness analysis, this case is different from the
case of a parent company that merely owns a subsidiary in the forum but conducts no
business in that forum. Here, multiple Iberdrola employees worked on the
SmartCare project, including at least one employee that partially relocated to Maine
for the task. It was certainly the voluntary, deliberate act of Iberdrola to send its
employees to Maine to work on the SmartCare project, to incorporate the SmartCare
project in Maine into its global system, and to direct CMP/Avangrid employees as to
the timing of the SmartCare rollout. Accordingly, I conclude that Iberdrola did
purposefully avail itself of this forum.
iii. Reasonableness
Finally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must be
reasonable. The Supreme Court has identified a series of “gestalt factors” that the
court should consider in determining reasonableness:
(1) the defendant’s burden of appearing, (2) the forum state’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the
common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social
policies.
Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 209 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Burger King
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)). “The gestalt factors are not ends in
themselves, but they are, collectively, a means of assisting courts in achieving
substantial justice.” Id.
Iberdrola argues that because it is based in Spain, the burden of defending this
case in Maine would be substantial. It further argues that Maine “has a relatively
weak interest in an adjudication of a foreign company’s potential liability vis-à-vis its
own subsidiaries.” ECF No. 84 at 19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
It states that its inclusion in this case is not necessary for the Plaintiffs to obtain
relief, and that its inclusion “would only create a parallel litigation concerning
Iberdrola’s role that has no ultimate relevance to whether Plaintiffs were harmed and
whether they are entitled to recover.” Id. at 20. As I will explain, these arguments
are not persuasive.
While Iberdrola is located in Spain, it clearly has the resources to have its
representatives travel to Maine, as it is a global energy company that has sent its
executives and employees to Maine on many occasions. As the Plaintiffs note, the
judiciary’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has also demonstrated that many
preliminary stages of civil proceedings can effectively be conducted by video or
telephone when travel is not possible. In addition, this is a case in which Maine has
an exceptional interest in adjudicating this case, as Iberdrola owns and influences
the largest public utility in the state, which is alleged to have harmed thousands of
Maine customers. Maine is where all of the Plaintiffs and CMP are located, and is
clearly the forum best-suited to resolve this dispute.
Ultimately, I conclude that this Court has the authority to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over Iberdrola based on its active, targeted involvement in the
SmartCare rollout in Maine.
B. All State Law Claims Pertaining to Avangrid
Avangrid argue that all state law claims against Avangrid must fail because
the Third Amended Complaint does not allege any wrongdoing by the company. They
note that the Third Amended Complaint makes no allegation that Avangrid had a
contract with the Plaintiffs, made statements to the Plaintiffs, or was enriched by the
Plaintiffs in any way.
The Plaintiffs argue that Avangrid is liable for the actions of CMP on the
theories of both veil-piercing and agency.6 I address both arguments.
1. Veil-Piercing
“[B]efore a court may pierce the corporate veil, a plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the defendant abused the privilege of a separate corporate identity; and (2) an
unjust or inequitable result would occur if the court recognized the separate corporate
existence.” Johnson v. Exclusive Props. Unlimited, 1998 ME 244, ¶ 6, 720 A.2d 568,
571. The Law Court has pointed toward several factors which may indicate that the
corporate form has been abused and should be disregarded:
(1) common ownership; (2) pervasive control; (3) confused intermingling
of business activity, assets, or management; (4) thin capitalization; (5)
nonobservance of corporate formalities; (6) absence of corporate records;
(7) no payment of dividends; (8) insolvency at the time of the litigated
transaction; (9) siphoning away of corporate assets by the dominant
shareholders; (10) nonfunctioning of officers and directors; (11) use of
the corporation for transactions of the dominant shareholders; and (12)
use of the corporation in promoting fraud.
Johnson, 1998 ME 244, ¶ 7, 720 A.2d at 571 (alterations omitted) (quoting George
Hyman Constr. Co. v. Gateman, 16 F. Supp. 2d 129, 149-50 (D. Mass. 1998)).
6 On March 3, 2021, five days before the reply deadline, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to
file a thirty-page reply to CMP/Avangrid’s motion to dismiss, which is ten pages in excess of the
twenty-page limit (ECF No. 144). The Court, by an administrative oversight, did not address the
motion before the reply deadline, and the Plaintiffs ultimately filed a twenty-two page reply (excluding
the signature block and certificate of service). Because the issue is no longer live, I deny the motion
The Third Amended Complaint alleges that “[f]rom the time that Iberdrola
acquired [Avangrid] moving forward, there was a continuous team of people in
[Avangrid’s] New Gloucester, Maine corporate office from Iberdrola’s home office in
Spain.” ECF No. 44 ¶¶ 45. It states that meetings were held in Avangrid’s New
Gloucester, Maine offices with Iberdrola representatives in or around 2008 informing
Avangrid and CMP employees that Avangrid was selling the company to Iberdrola,
but that employees were not to share this information. “All of the regulated assets,
accounting for all investments, vendor payments, payroll, and virtually everything
involving money, was processed through the New Gloucester, Maine corporate office.”
Id. ¶¶ 48-50. According to the Third Amended Complaint, the employees working at
the New Gloucester, Maine office “knew no distinction” between Iberdrola, CMP, and
Avangrid. Id. ¶ 62. CMP implemented SmartCare “at the direction of Iberdrola and
with the full cooperation of Avangrid.” Id. ¶ 69. Avangrid employees—as well as
Iberdrola employees placed in Avangrid’s New Gloucester office—were part of the
team that led the SmartCare rollout.
While the Third Amended Complaint paints a picture of an involved parent
company, it does not allege the abuses of the corporate form that a veil-piercing theory
would require. While Avangrid may have been involved in the SmartCare rollout—
and while it may have at times been difficult for employees to distinguish the various
corporate identities of CMP and its parent companies from one another—the
Plaintiffs have not alleged the lack of corporate formalities, improper record-keeping,
financial distress, or confused intermingling of business activities that would allow
this court to impute CMP’s actions to Avangrid on a veil-piercing theory. Accordingly,
I do not find that Avangrid has abused the privilege of its separate corporate identity
to the extent that it should be held liable for CMP’s actions on a veil-piercing theory.
2. Agency
The Plaintiffs also argue that Avangrid is liable for the acts of CMP on an
agency theory.
The District of Massachusetts has explained that:
Generally, for an agency relationship to exist, there must be an
agreement between two people that one will act on the other’s behalf
and subject to his or her control. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1
(Am. Law Inst. 1958). “Whether such an agency is formed depends on
the actual interaction between the putative principal and agent, not on
any perception a third party may have of the relationship.” Itel
Containers Int'l Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Express Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698,
702 (2d Cir. 1990). Although subsidiaries do not always act as agents of
the parents, in some cases the facts establish an agency
relationship. See In re Am. Bank Note Holographics Sec. Litig., 93 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding agency relationship based
in part upon “allegations of interlocking financial, managerial, and
business relationships” between the parent and subsidiary).
Quaak v. Dexia, S.A., 445 F. Supp. 2d 130, 144 (D. Mass. 2006).7
In Quaak, where the court ultimately found that an agency relationship
existed between a parent and its subsidiary, the parent owned 100% of its
subsidiary’s shares, exercised complete control over its day-to-day operations by
placing a member of the parent’s executive committee as the head of the subsidiary,
required the subsidiary to seek parent approval of any significant actions, and was
located in the same building, used the same branding, and operated under uniform
policies as the subsidiary. See id. The Third Amended Complaint, on the other hand,
7 Maine law applies to this matter. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 291 (Am. Law.
Inst. June 2021 Update). However, the parties have not identified any Maine law regarding agency
does not paint the same picture of heavy-handed control of CMP by Avangrid. While
the Third Amended Complaint alleges that Avangrid wholly owns CMP, processed its
finances, and cooperated in the implementation of SmartCare, it alleges very little
about Avangrid’s level of control over CMP. Ultimately, the Third Amended
Complaint fails to allege such an “interlocking of financial, managerial, and business
relationships” as to render CMP an agent of Avangrid. Quaak, 445 F. Supp. 2d at
144.
Accordingly, I conclude that all state law claims against Avangrid must be
dismissed. Because I reach this conclusion, I do not address the additional arguments
raised regarding the state law claims against Avangrid. I now turn to the other
Defendants’ arguments regarding the Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
C. Unjust Enrichment
The Third Amended Complaint alleges a claim for unjust enrichment
collectively against the “corporate defendants.” ECF No. 44 ¶¶ 281, 283-84.
“To establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must prove (1) that it
conferred a benefit on the other party; (2) that the other party had appreciation or
knowledge of the benefit; and (3) that the acceptance or retention of the benefit was
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.” Howard & Bowie, P.A. v. Collins, 2000 ME 148, ¶ 13, 759 A.2d
707, 710 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Unjust enrichment describes recovery for the value of the benefit
retained when there is no contractual relationship, but when, on the grounds of
fairness and justice, the law compels performance of a legal and moral duty to
pay.” Lynch v. Ouellette, 670 A.2d 948, 950 (Me. 1996) (quoting A.F.A.B., Inc. v. Town
of Old Orchard Beach, 639 A.2d 103, 105 n.3 (Me. 1994) (emphasis added)).
Therefore, “the existence of a contractual relationship precludes recovery on a theory
of unjust enrichment.” Stine v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 2:16-CV-109-GZS, 2016 WL
5135607, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2016) (alterations omitted) (quoting Nadeau v.
Pitman, 731 A.2d 863, 867 (Me. 1999)).
Here, CMP and Iberdrola both argue that the binding terms and conditions
of a contract govern the dispute between the parties and therefore preclude recovery
on an unjust enrichment theory. I first address this argument as to CMP, and then
as to Iberdrola.
1. CMP
The existence of a contractual relationship between CMP and the Plaintiffs is
not in doubt. The Third Amended Complaint states that “CMP enters into a
contractual relationship with its customers when it renders services to customers.”
ECF No. 44 ¶ 287. CMP agrees that “a PUC-approved set of terms and conditions . .
. governs the relationship between CMP and [the] Plaintiffs.” ECF No. 128 at 15.
With respect to the unjust enrichment claim against CMP, the Plaintiffs agree
that they cannot recover on both their breach of contract and their unjust enrichment
claims; rather they argue that they are entitled to plead unjust enrichment in the
alternative to their breach of contract claim. See Lass v. Bank of Am., N.A., 695 F.3d
129, 140 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is accepted practice to pursue both [breach of contract
and unjust enrichment] theories at the pleading stage.”); Workgroup Tech. Partners,
Inc. v. Anthem, Inc., 2:15-cv-00002-JAW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14007, at *65 (D. Me.
Feb. 3, 2016) (“[T]he notion that a plaintiff may not plead both breach of contract and
unjust enrichment in the alternative has no legs.” (quotation marks and citation
omitted)). The Defendants argue that, in light of the undisputed contractual
relationship between CMP and the Plaintiffs, the unjust enrichment count must be
dismissed.
Courts have dismissed unjust enrichment counts in instances where a
contractual relationship between the parties is clearly shown. For instance, in Riley
v. Gilmore, the Maine Superior Court reasoned that where “the pleadings
establish[ed] a contractual relationship between the parties,” it was not proper to
allow a claim for unjust enrichment to stand as an alternative theory of liability. No.
CV-05-180, 2006 WL 521710, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2006). And in In re Wage
Payment Litigation, the Law Court noted that where “a contractual relationship
between [the parties] exists,” plaintiffs are “preclude[d] . . . from maintaining a cause
of action for unjust enrichment.” 2000 ME 162, ¶ 20, 759 A.2d 217, 224.
On the other hand, some courts allow a claim for unjust enrichment to stand
even where a contractual relationship between the parties is undisputed. In Lass,
for example, the First Circuit noted that “the parties agree that there is a valid
contract between them,” but nevertheless allowed an unjust enrichment claim to
move forward. 695 F.3d at 140. The First Circuit explained that “the district court
[would] be in a better position once the record [wa]s more developed to determine
whether the unjust enrichment claim should survive.” Id. at 141.
As to CMP, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs and CMP have a contractual
relationship and that Plaintiffs, if successful in proving a breach of contract, will have
a basis to recover without any need to resort to unjust enrichment. Further, the
Plaintiffs have not put forth any argument as to how the development of the record
may alter this conclusion. Accordingly, because there is no sound reason to permit
the Plaintiffs to also seek remedies based on unjust enrichment the same will be
dismissed as to CMP.
2. Iberdrola
Iberdrola argues that the Plaintiffs’ contractual relationship with CMP bars
the Plaintiffs from maintaining an unjust enrichment action against Iberdrola.8 The
Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address this argument, nor do they point to any case
law—from Maine or any other jurisdiction—addressing the question of whether a
parent company may be held liable on an unjust enrichment theory based on its
subsidiary’s breach of contract. Instead, the Plaintiffs note only that they “did not
have a contract with Iberdrola.” ECF No. 118 at 31.
In general, a plaintiff may not bring an unjust enrichment action against a
parent corporation where the dispute is governed by the plaintiff’s express contract
with that corporation’s subsidiary. See Baroi v. Platinum Condo. Dev., LLC, 2012
WL 2847912, at *9 (D. Nev. July 11, 2012); Regal Ware, Inc. v. Vita Craft Corp., 653
F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1151-52 (D. Kan. 2006); Skidmore, Owings & Merrill v. Canada
8 Iberdrola also argues that the Plaintiffs fail to allege that they conferred a direct benefit on
Iberdrola, which Iberdrola contends is required pursuant to the Law Court’s decision in Platz Assocs.
v. Finley, and the Maine Superior Court’s decision in Rivers v. Amato. 2009 ME 55, ¶ 29, 973 A.2d
743, 751; No. CIV. A. CV-00-131, 2001 WL 1736498, at *4 (Me. Super. Ct. June 22, 2001). Because I
determine that the existence of a contractual relationship between the Plaintiffs and CMP precludes
the Plaintiffs from maintaining their unjust enrichment claim against Iberdrola, I do not decide the
extent to which Maine law requires a plaintiff to prove that a direct benefit was conferred on the
defendant to recover on the basis of unjust enrichment.
Life Assur. Co., 706 F. Supp. 758, 759 (D. Colo. 1989). To allow otherwise would
ignore the veil of corporate separateness that exists between a parent and its
subsidiary, and would result in a parent corporation being potentially liable on an
unjust enrichment theory any time its subsidiary breaches a contract. The general
rule is, however, not controlling where there is an allegation that the corporate veil
has been pierced. See Baroi, 2012 WL 2847912, at *9 (“[A] plaintiff may not pursue
an unjust enrichment claim against a parent corporation where the plaintiff has an
express written contract with a subsidiary absent a showing of alter ego or some other
theory of liability.” (emphasis added)); Regal Ware, 653 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52;
Skidmore, 706 F. Supp. at 759.
Here, the Plaintiffs have made various arguments that Iberdrola used CMP as
its domestic alter ego and/or its agent, albeit not in the context of their unjust
enrichment argument. However, even assuming that CMP was Iberdrola’s alter ego
and/or its agent in the context of the unjust enrichment claim, I still conclude that
the unjust enrichment claim against Iberdrola must be dismissed because the claim
against Iberdrola is entirely derivative of the Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim
against CMP. “To pursue unjust enrichment in equity, the plaintiff must lack an
adequate remedy at law.” Wahlcometroflex, Inc. v. Baldwin, 2010 ME 26, ¶ 22, 991
A.2d 44, 49. Here, the breach of contract claim against CMP provides the Plaintiffs
with an adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, the unjust enrichment claim against
Iberdrola is appropriately dismissed.
D. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Under Maine law, the elements of fraud are “(1) that the defendant made a
false representation, (2) of a material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of whether it is true or false, (4) for the purpose of inducing the
plaintiff to act in reliance upon it, and (5) the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the
representation as true and acted upon it to the plaintiff’s damage.” Rand v. Bath Iron
Works Corp., 2003 ME 122, ¶ 9, 832 A.2d 771, 773. Allegations of fraud are subject
to the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which
requires that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Ultimately, to state a claim for
fraud or misrepresentation, the pleader “must state the who, what, where, and when
of the allegedly misleading representation with particularity.” Ezell v. Lexington Ins.
Co., 926 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation
omitted).
All of the Defendants ask this Court to dismiss at least some of the Plaintiffs’
fraud claims against them. Iberdrola and CMP both contend that the Plaintiffs have
failed to meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud. Herling raises arguments
distinct to the allegations regarding his 2018 statements. I address Iberdrola’s
argument first, followed by the arguments of CMP and Herling.
1. Iberdrola
Iberdrola contends that the Plaintiffs cannot meet the heightened pleading
standard for fraud because the Third Amended Complaint fails to allege that
Iberdrola—as opposed to CMP and/or Herling—made any representations to them,
fraudulent or otherwise. The Plaintiffs do not argue that the Third Amended
Complaint names Iberdrola in particular with respect to its fraudulent
misrepresentation claim—indeed, it does not. Rather, the Plaintiffs argue that their
fraud claim “thoroughly implicates Iberdrola under agency principles,” and that “the
other Defendants’ false claims about the accuracy of CMP billing statements and of
the SmartCare system are fairly attributable to Iberdrola, as they were acting as
Iberdrola’s agents in Maine throughout the SmartCare project.” ECF No. 118 at 34-
35.
As noted above, an agency relationship may exist absent a formal agreement
where there are “allegations of interlocking financial, managerial, and business
relationships” between the parent and subsidiary. Quaak, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 144
(quoting In re Am. Bank Note Holographics Sec. Litig., 93 F.Supp.2d at 443–44).
The Plaintiffs do not allege that an agency agreement between Iberdrola and
CMP existed, but rather that Iberdrola and CMP “have interlocking financial,
managerial, and business relationships.” ECF No. 118 at 35. The Plaintiffs cite
Quaak—discussed above in connection to the state law claims against Avangrid—for
the proposition that these interlocking relationships between Iberdrola and
CMP/Avangrid demonstrate an agency relationship.
This case presents a closer call than Quaak. It does not appear, at least at this
juncture, that Iberdrola ran the “day-to-day” operations of CMP/Avangrid. However,
the Plaintiffs have made allegations that Iberdrola “exercised significant influence”
over CMP/Avangrid, ECF No. 44 ¶ 59, and that SmartCare was implemented by
CMP/Avangrid “at the direction of Iberdrola,” id. ¶ 69. The Third Amended
Complaint alleges that the SmartCare rollout in Maine was led by a team that
consisted of both Iberdrola employees located in Spain and “Iberdrola employees
placed in [Avangrid’s] New Gloucester office.” Id. ¶ 71. It also alleges that there was
an “[o]verlap of [k]ey employees at Iberdrola/Avangrid/CMP.” Id. at 15. The
Plaintiffs allege that Iberdrola had a “boots on the ground” approach with respect to
CMP/Avangrid, that a “continuous team of people” from Iberdrola’s office flowed
through Avangrid’s Maine office, and that “[t]he Iberdrola team instructed corporate
office employees as to how the businesses, including CMP, should be run.” ECF No.
44 ¶¶ 45-46, 48. “[T]he employees working at New Gloucester, Maine knew no
distinction” between Iberdrola and CMP/Avangrid. Id. ¶ 62. Finally, the Third
Amended Complaint alleges that Iberdrola’s approval was required for all monetary
requests.
While whether an individual has acted as an agent is a question of fact which
“may be disproved at a later stage of the proceeding,” Quaak, 445 F. Supp.2d at 145
(quoting Foisy v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 356 F.3d 141, 150 (1st Cir. 2004)),
taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, I conclude that the Third
Amended Complaint adequately pleads a fraud claim against Iberdrola, at least to
the extent that it states a fraud claim against CMP, which I turn to next.
2. CMP
CMP’s argument concerns only Plaintiffs Krainin and Platt.9 They contend
that Krainin and Platt have not pleaded that they made any payment on an incorrect
bill, and that they have therefore failed to plead detrimental reliance on a statement
that they believed to be true.
With respect to Platt, the Third Amended Complaint alleges that “[i]n
December 2017, due to CMP’s misrepresentations in the bills it sent to the Platt
family, Mr. Platt’s wife called CMP to pay part of the incorrect $700 bill ($400) and
to request a payment plan for the remaining balance.” ECF No. 44 ¶ 189. It also
alleges that in late May of 2018, Platt’s wife made a $400 payment to CMP to avoid
disconnection, but that the Platts later stopped the payment, and that a CMP
representative later confirmed that no payment had been made on the family’s
account since December.
With respect to Krainin, the Third Amended Complaint details the electricity
bills that she received beginning in February 2019, which were unexpectedly high. It
states that “[d]espite her misgivings, and in part due to Douglas Herling’s January
2019 letter, Ms. Krainin believed that she needed to pay the bills as presented.” Id.
¶ 214. It also states that “[f]rom September, 2017 to the present, Ms. Krainin and
her family have been overbilled at least $1,600.” Id. ¶ 236. The Third Amended
Complaint alleges that sometime after April 26, 2019, Krainin was advised by a CMP
employee not to pay any portion of her disputed bill. Id. ¶ 234.
The claims of both of the named Plaintiffs satisfy the particularity standard.
As to Platt, the Third Amended Complaint alleges that he and his wife paid $400 to
CMP in December 2017 in reliance on a bill that contained false or misleading
statements. While CMP argues that “[i]t would seem indisputable that []Platt has in
fact underpaid the amounts due,” ECF No. 128 at 17, I cannot reach that conclusion
based on the facts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint alone. As to Krainin, the
Third Amended Complaint alleges that she was overbilled beginning in September
2017, and that she believed she needed to pay the bills. While, with respect to
Krainin, the Third Amended Complaint does not specifically use the phrase, “she paid
the bills,” this can fairly be implied from the allegation that she was overbilled but
believed she needed to pay.10 Therefore, the Third Amended Complaint adequately
pleads a fraud claim by Krainin and Platt against CMP.
3. Herling
Herling makes two separate arguments with respect to the fraud claim alleged
against him. First, he argues that the Plaintiffs fail to plead reliance on his
statements in the newspapers in 2018 because none of the Plaintiffs allege seeing
those statements. Second, he argues that the Plaintiffs cannot base a fraud claim on
the letter sent by Herling to CMP customers in 2019 because the Liberty audit was
publicly available,11 the statements about the audit in the letter were accurate, and
only two of the Plaintiffs allege seeing the letter. The Plaintiffs argue that they
“justifiably relied on any number of the false representations that were a part of” a
scheme to mislead CMP customers, and that they “do not need to tether their reliance
10 The Plaintiffs also submit a supplemental declaration from Krainin indicating that she made
numerous payments in 2018 and 2019. CMP argues that the Court may not consider this document,
but they do not specifically dispute its authenticity. Courts may consider supplemental documents if
the parties do not dispute the authenticity of those documents. Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3. While it
seems likely that CMP could easily discover whether the document is accurate given the fact that the
document reflects payments made to CMP, I do not determine whether the document can be
considered, as I conclude that Krainin’s fraud claim against CMP/Avangrid is sufficient even without
considering the document.
11 Because I determine that the statements in the letter were accurate, I do not address the public
availability argument.
to each of Defendant Herling’s false statements that were also a part of the scheme.”
ECF No. 146 at 4-5.
The fraud claim against Herling cannot stand based on his statements to the
newspaper, which none of the Plaintiffs have alleged that they have read.12 Plaintiffs
Levesque, Decker, Platt also do not allege that they received or relied on the letter
sent by Herling in 2019. Therefore, I conclude that the fraud claims against Herling
by Levesque, Decker, and Platt must be dismissed for these reasons. Plaintiffs
Krainin and Trussell both allege that they received Herling’s 2019 letter, but only
Krainin alleges that she was affected by the letter. I therefore conclude that
Trussell’s fraud claim against Herling must also be dismissed.
As to Krainin, the Third Amended Complaint alleges that she “believed she
was being overcharged” but that, “[d]espite her misgivings, and in part due to Douglas
Herling’s January 2019 letter, [she] believed that she needed to pay the bills.” ECF
No. 44 ¶¶ 213-214. Herling argues that even if Krainin does sufficiently plead that
she relied on his letter, her claim must fail because the statements in the letter are
accurate.
The Plaintiffs take issue with two statements in Herling’s January 2019 letter.
First, Herling’s statement that the Liberty audit “concluded that all systems from
meter to bill are working as intended and bills are accurate,” id. ¶ 331, and second,
Herling’s statement that the Liberty audit concluded that CMP failed to dedicate
enough “staff, training[,] or management oversight,” id. ¶ 340. The Third Amended
12 Herling’s statements to the newspapers—issued before the Liberty audit—focus on CMP’s own
investigation into SmartCare’s billing issues. The Third Amended Complaint makes no allegations
Complaint alleges that the first statement is false, and that the second statement
falsely implies that the Liberty audit found no other shortcomings.
Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ assertions, the first statement—that the Liberty
audit concluded that “all systems from meter to bill are working as intended and bills
are accurate,” id. ¶ 331—is not inaccurate. The Liberty audit found that “CMP’s
meters produce accurate measurements of customer usage. Its meter-related
databases and communications systems accurately, completely, and timely collect
and store usage, and transmit it accurately, completely, and timely to the billing
systems of CMP’s customer information system, SmartCare. The meters, systems,
and databases have done so since November 1, 2017.” ECF No. 14-6 at 15. It further
found that “billing is on the whole accurate and has been since November 1, 2017,”
despite some inexplicable billing amounts and delays. Id. at 18. Herling’s assertion
that the Liberty audit “concluded that all systems from meter to bill are working as
intended and bills are accurate” does not conflict with the language of the Liberty
audit itself. ECF No. 44 ¶ 331. While the Liberty audit—a publicly available
document—goes into greater detail regarding certain inexplicable billing amounts,
Herling’s broad assertion that the Liberty audit concluded that SmartCare is working
as intended and producing accurate bills does not contradict the Liberty audit’s
overall findings.
Herling’s second statement—that the Liberty audit concluded that CMP failed
to dedicate enough “staff, training[,] or management oversight,” id. ¶ 340—is also an
accurate representation of the audit. While the Plaintiffs argue that this statement
implies that the Liberty audit found no other shortcomings with the SmartCare
system, I do not conclude that Herling had an affirmative duty to explain every
finding made by the Liberty audit. This is particularly true where the audit’s overall
conclusion was that the SmartCare system accurately measures energy usage and
that CMP’s bills were accurate on the whole.
For the preceding reasons, the Plaintiffs’ fraud claim against Herling must be
dismissed.13
E. Violation of 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1501
The Plaintiffs allege that CMP violated 35-A M.R.S.A. § 1501, which states
that “[i]f a public utility violates this Title, causes or permits a violation of this Title
or omits to do anything that this Title requires it to do it may be liable in damages to
the person injured as a result. Recovery under this section does not affect a recovery
by the State of the penalty prescribed for the violation.”
In a decision dated December 7, 2020, Justice Michaela Murphy of the Maine
Superior Court’s Business and Consumer Docket determined that section 1501 does
not “provid[e] a freestanding cause of action. It simply confirms that individual
persons are not deprived of pursuing common law causes of action . . . .” Deane v.
Central Maine Power Co., No. BCD-CV-20-20, Order on Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, slip op. at 14 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2020) (ECF No. 128-1). Justice Murphy
drew this conclusion from a statement by the Law Court in Smith v. Central Maine
Power Co., which noted that “[b]y statutes and by common law, violation of a safety
13 The Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the Third Amended Complaint to add one or more CMP
customers as plaintiffs who have expressly reviewed Herling’s statements and made a payment in
reliance on those statements. Because I conclude that Herling’s statements (both to the newspapers
and in the 2019 letter) were not inaccurate—and because, therefore, the proposed amendments would
statute or regulation may be evidence of negligence but does not constitute negligence
per se” and cited section 1501 as an example. 2010 ME 9, ¶ 10 n.3, 988 A.2d 968.
Justice Murphy noted that a reading of section 1501 as creating an individual cause
of action would render the Law Court’s statement in Smith superfluous. Deane at 14.
In “endeavor[ing] to predict how [a state’s highest] court would likely decide
[a] question,” a “federal court should consult the types of sources that the state’s
highest court would be apt to consult, including . . . decisions of lower courts in the
state.” Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 613 (1st Cir. 2013). While Deane is not binding
Law Court precedent, it is a recent, on-point decision from a specialized Maine
business and consumer court. Accordingly, I adopt Justice Murphy’s reasoning, and
conclude that the section 1501 claims against CMP must be dismissed because the
statute does not provide a cause of action.
F. Violation of RICO
CMP, Avangrid, and Herling contend that the RICO claim against them must
be dismissed for a number of reasons.14 First, they argue that a RICO defendant
must be “distinct” from the RICO enterprise. Second, they argue that the Plaintiffs
failed to plead facts from which the Court could find that CMP, Avangrid, or Herling
“conducted” the affairs of their corporate parent “through” racketeering activity.15 I
address each argument in turn.
14 As noted above, the Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed the RICO claim against Iberdrola.
15 The Defendants also argue that “[f]or the same reasons that certain Plaintiffs fail to plead injury
and reliance in connection with their fraud claim, they fail to allege any injury as required for a RICO
claim.” ECF No. 128 at 28. Because I dismiss the RICO claim on other grounds, I do not address this
1. Distinctness
Under section 1962(c) of RICO, it is unlawful for a “person employed by or
associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c). “[I]t is well settled in this circuit that the ‘person’ identified
under § 1962(c) must be distinct from the ‘enterprise.’” Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 448 (1st Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of reh'g (Dec. 15, 2000).
“This circuit has consistently refrained from adopting a bright line rule that a
subsidiary can never be distinct from its parent corporation.” Id. at 449. Instead, a
court must “look to the allegations in the complaint to determine whether the parent’s
activities are sufficiently distinct from those of the subsidiary at the time that the
alleged RICO violations occurred.” Id. “In most cases, a subsidiary that is under the
complete control of the parent company is nothing more than a division of the one
entity. Without further allegations, the mere identification of a subsidiary and a
parent in a RICO claim fails the distinctiveness requirement.” Id. “[A] scheme does
not implicate RICO merely because it originated with someone connected to a
corporation.” Id.
The Plaintiffs argue that in this case, “CMP and Avangrid . . . used the
Iberdrola enterprise to facilitate their overbilling of Maine customers, and their
deceptive campaign to cover it up.” ECF No. 145 at 14. They contend that “Iberdrola
introduced the SmartCare system to CMP/Avangrid,” and “instructed what system to
use and designed and implemented the system,” and that “CMP/Avangrid then
managed the customer interfacing and many on-the-ground details.” Id. Ultimately,
the Plaintiffs argue that CMP/Avangrid and Herling are distinct “persons” who used
the Iberdrola “enterprise” to facilitate their fraudulent conduct.
The Defendants argue that the distinctiveness requirement is not satisfied in
this case because it involves legally separate parent and subsidiary corporate entities
carrying on their regular business. They contend that CMP/Avangrid’s management
of customer interfacing and on-the-ground details is typical of the relationship
between electric utilities and their parent companies. Ultimately, they argue that “a
plaintiff may not circumvent the distinctness requirement by alleging a RICO
enterprise that consists merely of a corporate defendant associated with its own
employees or agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendant—that consists,
in other words, of a corporate defendant corrupting itself.” U1it4less, Inc. v. Fedex
Corp., 871 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
As the Defendants note, the Plaintiffs have failed to make any concrete
allegations that the Iberdrola “enterprise” was distinct from CMP/Avangrid/Herling.
In fact, much of the Third Amended Complaint lumps the actions of all of the
corporate defendants together, and seems designed to show that Iberdrola used CMP/
Avangrid as extensions of itself to implement the SmartCare project. Given the
persistent allegations throughout the Third Amended Complaint and throughout the
pleadings relating to the motions to dismiss that Iberdrola was a parent company
highly involved in the workings of its subsidiary, it is illogical to conclude that
Iberdrola and CMP/Avangrid were separate entities for the purposes of RICO. Thus,
the RICO claim must be dismissed on the grounds that it does not allege a “person”
distinct from the alleged “enterprise.”16
2. “Conducted” Affairs “Through” Racketeering Activity
The Defendants also argue that the RICO claims must fail because the
Plaintiffs do not allege that CMP, Avangrid, or Herling “participate[d] in the
operation or management of the enterprise itself,” which, as the Supreme Court has
explained, is necessary to meet the requirement that a person “conduct[ed] or
participat[ed] . . . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs.” Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)). As the Defendants note, the
Third Amended Complaint does not allege that CMP, Avangrid, or Herling
participated in the operation or management of Iberdrola, but rather that Iberdrola
controlled the affairs of CMP. The Plaintiffs counter that the Supreme Court does
not require “significant control over or within an enterprise,” but they acknowledge
that the Court does require participation in the operation and management of the
enterprise. ECF No. 145 at 15 (quoting Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 n.4).
I conclude that the Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege participation in the
operation or management of the enterprise by CMP, Avangrid, or Herling. The
Plaintiffs are clear that they believe Iberdrola is the alleged enterprise. The Third
Amended Complaint alleges that CMP/Avangrid participated heavily in the
SmartCare program, but that project is not the same as the Iberdrola “enterprise.”
16 While the Plaintiffs contend, in essence, that Iberdrola and CMP/Avangrid/Herling became
separate entities following SmartCare’s go-live when CMP/Avangrid began managing the response to
SmartCare’s alleged issues, this argument is not borne out in the Third Amended Complaint, which
seeks to hold all corporate Defendants—including Iberdrola—liable for the allegedly fraudulent
CMP/Avangrid’s participation in the SmartCare rollout does not mean that
CMP/Avangrid were participating in the operation or management of Iberdrola.
Accordingly, I conclude that the RICO claims against CMP, Avangrid, and
Herling must be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Iberdrola’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction (ECF No. 84) is DENIED. Iberdrola’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim (ECF No. 84) is GRANTED as to Count I, DENIED as to Count IV,
and DENIED AS MOOT as to Counts III and VI, which have been voluntarily
dismissed. CMP and Avangrid’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF
No. 128) is GRANTED as to Count I, GRANTED with respect to Avangrid only as
to Count II, GRANTED as to Count III, GRANTED with respect to Avangrid and
DENIED with respect to CMP as to Count IV, and GRANTED as to Count VI.
Herling’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 129) is GRANTED
as to Counts V and VI. Iberdrola’s Response to Plaintiff’s Notice of New
Developments (ECF No. 126) and the Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
in Excess of the Page Limit (ECF No. 144) are DENIED AS MOOT.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 6, 2021
/s/ JON D. LEVY
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE