Opinion

Tarquinio v. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab

Court
District Court, D. Maryland
Filed
Apr 11, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 23.2%

explaining that a trial court may not make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a trial court may not make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

SALLY TARQUINIO *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. RDB-23-0727

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY *

APPLIED PHYSICS LAB

*

Defendant.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case involves claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Amendments

(“ADAAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq., for failure to accommodate, employment

discrimination, and prohibited examination and inquiry. Plaintiff Sally Tarquinio worked as an

engineer at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab (“APL”) beginning in September

2005. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Applied Physics Lab instituted a policy

requiring employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Employees were permitted to

request exemption based upon religious or medical reasons. Tarquinio submitted a request for

a blanket exemption from the vaccination policy as well as an exemption from any COVID-

19 testing. She did not provide any timely necessary medical information, and she refused to

sign a medical release form. Consequently, her exemption request was denied, and in

December of 2021, she was terminated for failing to abide by APL’s vaccination policy.

Tarquinio filed a claim against APL with the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging disability discrimination and violations of the

ADAAA. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 5.) The EEOC declined to proceed with her claim and issued her a

right to sue letter on December 16, 2022 (Id.) On October 10, 2023, Tarquinio filed her

Amended Complaint against Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab. (ECF No. 21.)

In her Complaint, she brings three counts alleging violations of ADAAA for failure to

accommodate, employment discrimination, and prohibited examination and inquiry. APL

moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.) The parties’ submissions have been reviewed,

and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated below, APL’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED, and judgment is entered in its favor.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews the facts and all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 378 (2007); see also Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 433 (4th Cir.

2013).1 Plaintiff Sally Tarquinio was hired as a Systems Engineer at Johns Hopkins University’s

Applied Physics Lab in September of 2005. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 6.) In 2004, and later again in 2012,

she was diagnosed with Lyme Disease, which caused her to suffer from “post-treatment Lyme

disease syndrome.” (Id. ¶ 7.) In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, APL announced a

policy on September 24, 2021, which required all employees to provide proof of at least one

dose of an approved COVID-19 vaccine by October 15, 2021. (ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 13.)

Employees could request an exception from this policy for medical or religious reasons, which

1 A series of “undisputed material facts” presented by the Defendant (ECF No. 25-1) were not challenged by the

Plaintiff in the briefs submitted. If a party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of

the motion.” Bailey v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120047, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2011)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)). Accordingly, the material facts presented by Defendant and not challenged by Plaintiff

will be treated as undisputed.

would need to be approved by APL’s Accommodations Coordinator. (Id. ¶ 5.) Employees

seeking an exception were required to have their request submitted by October 1, 2021. (Id.

¶ 6.) If an employee failed to abide by the vaccination policy or have an approved

accommodation, their employment would be terminated on October 15, 2021. (Id. ¶ 7.)

However, employees who timely submitted exception requests were granted temporary

accommodations while the Accommodations Coordinator evaluated each request. (Id. ¶ 8.) If

an employee’s request was denied after October 15th, 2021, they had one week to submit

proof of a vaccination before their employment would be terminated. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Tarquinio filed a Request for Medical Accommodation with the Accommodations

Coordinator on October 1, 2021, requesting an exemption from the vaccination requirements

as well as COVID testing. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 14.) Tarquinio noted her disability as “immune

dysregulation” and “excessive immune activation from the years of chronic Lyme Disease” on

her request. (Id.) Tarquinio later testified that she requested to be exempt from COVID testing

because see did not think testing was reasonable. (ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 19.) The exemption form

she submitted was signed by her medical provider, Dr. Mark Schwartz. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 14.) At

the time of her request, Tarquinio did not have active Lyme pathogen in her bloodstream. (Id.)

On October 11, 2021, APL’s Deputy Accommodations Coordinator notified

Tarquinio that they had not received the Request for Personal Medical Records form from her

and forwarded the link to her. (ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 33.) They also asked Tarquinio to sign a

medical release form to “enable APL’s medical officer to consult with [Tarquinio’s] medical

provider on any necessary follow up.” (ECF No. 21 ¶ 15.) Tarquinio declined to sign the

medical release form. (Id.) That same day, the Accommodations Coordinator contacted APL’s

Medical Director for Occupational Health Dr. Clarence Lam to review Plaintiff’s

accommodations request. (ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 42.) On October 14, 2021, Dr. Lam notified the

Accommodations Coordinator that he did not have enough information to fully consider her

request and noted that “Lyme disease is not a medical contraindication to receiving the Covid

vaccine. . . . Further explanation as to specifically why her Lyme diagnosis would preclude her

from being vaccinated would need to be submitted.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Tarquinio followed up by

reiterating her request for an exemption and her refusal to sign the release form. (Id. ¶ 44.)

On October 18, 2021, Dr. Lam informed the Accommodations Team that he would

reconsider Tarquinio’s request if she could send more recent documentation of her disability

signed by her provider. (Id. ¶ 45.) That day, the Accommodations Team e-mailed Tarquinio

stating “the medical documentation you have submitted is over nine years old. Can you please

provide current medical documentation from your medical provider as to whether the

previously stated concerns are still ongoing and why the COVID 19 vaccine is contraindicated

with respect to your specific medical condition,” and gave Tarquinio a deadline of November

15, 2021, to submit this information. (Id. ¶ 46.) On November 15, 2021, Tarquinio followed-

up by reiterating again her request for exemption and that she would not be signing the release

form. (Id. ¶ 48.) She included two articles from 2003 and 2005 that she claimed were provided

by Dr. Schwartz on Lyme-induced immune dysregulation. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50.)

On November 22, 2021, a member of the Accommodations Team interviewed

Tarquinio about her request and again told her about their need for medical information that

justifies her exemption from the vaccine policy. (Id. ¶ 57.) On November 29, 2021, Dr. Lam

again reviewed Tarquinio’s request including the two articles submitted, he and found that

there was still not sufficient documentation to justify her exemption. (Id. ¶ 58.) He also

reiterated his willingness to speak with her provider to better understand her request. (Id.

¶¶ 59–60.) On November 30, 2021, Tarquinio’s request was officially declined for failing to

provide medical documentation that would explain why a COVID vaccine is contraindicated

and refusing to sign the medical release form. (Id. ¶ 62.) Tarquinio was informed that she was

required to provide proof of her first dose of vaccination by December 7, 2021, or she would

be terminated. (Id. ¶ 64.)

On December 7, 2021, Tarquinio’s supervisor sent a letter notifying her of her

termination. (Id. ¶ 77.) The letter stated that she was terminated because she was not in

compliance with the vaccination policy. (Id. ¶ 80.) Tarquinio filed a claim against APL with the

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging disability

discrimination and violations of the ADAAA. (ECF No. 21 ¶ 5.) The EEOC declined to

process her claim and issued her a right to sue letter on December 16, 2022 (Id.) On October

10, 2023, Tarquinio filed her Amended Complaint against Johns Hopkins University’s Applied

Physics Lab. (ECF No. 21.) In her Amended Complaint, she brings three counts alleging

violations of ADAAA for failure to accommodate, employment discrimination, and

prohibited examination and inquiry. APL filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all three

counts. (ECF No. 25.) The matter is ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court “shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact

is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Libertarian Party

of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986)). A genuine dispute over a material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge’s function is limited to

determining whether sufficient evidence exists on a claimed factual dispute to warrant

submission of the matter to a jury for resolution at trial. Id. at 249. Trial courts in the Fourth

Circuit have an “affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually unsupported claims and

defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526

(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993)).

In undertaking this inquiry, this Court must consider the facts and all reasonable

inferences “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Libertarian Party of Va., 718

F.3d at 312; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). This Court “must not weigh

evidence or make credibility determinations.” Foster v. Univ. of Md.-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243,

248 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Mercantile Peninsula Bank v. French, 499 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2007));

see also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a

trial court may not make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage). Indeed,

it is the function of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including issues of witness

credibility. See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866–68 (2014).

ANALYSIS

I. Count I – Failure to Accommodate

There is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Defendant’s failure to

accommodate a disability under the meaning of the ADAAA. To successfully state a claim for

Defendant’s failure to accommodate, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) that she had a disability within

the statutory meaning; (2) that the employer knew of her disability; (3) that a reasonable

accommodation would permit her to perform the essential functions of the position; and (4)

that the employer refused to make the accommodation.” Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 999

F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 2021). Under the ADA, an employer must “make reasonable

accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified

applicant or employee with a disability, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.9(a). The employer must “engage [with their employees] in an interactive process to

identify a reasonable accommodation.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 581

(4th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346

(4th Cir. 2013)). This duty arises when an employee communicates that they have a disability

and desire an accommodation. Wilson, 717 F.3d at 346.

However, both the employer and employee have a duty to participate in the interactive

process in good faith; an employer may not be held liable for failing to provide a reasonable

accommodation where the employee refused to engage in or caused the breakdown of the

interactive process. See, e.g., Williams v. Md. Dep’t of Health, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244893, at

*20 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2021); Rowlett v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53911, at

*30 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2023). This Court has held that during the interactive process, “the

employer may require medical documentation that ‘(1) describes the nature, severity, and

duration of the employee’s impairment, the activity or activities that the impairment limits,

and the extent to which the impairment limits the employee’s ability to perform the activity or

activities; and, (2) substantiates why the requested reasonable accommodation is needed.’”

Rowlett, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53911, at *26 (quoting EEOC Enforcement Guidance on

Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees under the Americans

with Disabilities Act. Question No. 10 (July 27, 2000), available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html). Moreover, withholding

information can be considered to obstruct the interactive process and thus cause the

breakdown where the missing information can only be provided by the party who is

withholding it. See Berkner v. Blank, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34320, at *22 (D. Md. Mar. 11,

2013) (citing Beck v. Univ. of Wi. Bd. of Regents, 75 F. 3d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Here, Plaintiff declined to sign the medical release form that would allow Dr. Lam to

make an informed decision about whether her exception should be granted. The

Accommodations Team gave Plaintiff ample opportunities to sign the form or provide

additional documentation detailing why she needed an exception, and she continuously

refused. Defendant attempted in good faith to participate in an interactive process that would

allow for both the employer and employee to identify a reasonable accommodation, but

Plaintiff refused to participate.

Plaintiff’s argument that the only reasonable accommodation possible is a blanket

exemption from the Vaccination Policy is unavailing and is another reason her failure to

accommodate claim fails. Employers are not obligated to provide employee’s their preferred

choice of accommodation so long as the provided accommodation is reasonable. See

Wedderburn v. Bd. of Educ., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29628 at *29 (D. Md. 2022) (citing Reyazuddin

v. Montgomery Cnty., 7 F. Supp. 3d 526, 549 (D. Md. 2014)). The only accommodation Plaintiff

was willing to accept in this case was a blanket exemption from the vaccine policy. She took

it a step further by asking for a blanket exemption from the COVID testing policy as well

simply because she believes testing to be unnecessary. Defendant cannot be held liable for

denying Plaintiff the only accommodation she was willing to accept. This is especially true

considering Plaintiff caused the breakdown in the interactive process. Had Plaintiff filled out

the release form or provided timely medical documentation, Dr. Lam would have been able

to make an informed decision, which may have been the accommodation that Plaintiff was

seeking to begin with. Thus, Defendant cannot be held liable for failure to accommodate, and

judgment is entered in its favor as to Count I.

II. Count II – Employment Discrimination

There is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to employment discrimination

under the ADAAA. Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination “against a

qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a claim for disability discrimination under

the ADA, Plaintiff must prove “(1) that she has a disability, (2) that she is a ‘qualified individual’

for the employment in question, and (3) that [her employer] discharged her (or took other

adverse employment action) because of her disability.” EEOC v. Stowe—Pharr Mills, Inc., 216

F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000). Assuming arguendo Plaintiff meets the first two elements, her

claim still fails because she has not demonstrated that Defendant discriminated against her

because of her disability.

This Court has found that an employee who was terminated for not abiding by their

company’s COVID vaccination policy could not state a plausible claim for disability

discrimination. See Jorgenson v. Conduent Transp. Solutions, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18463, at

*12–13 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2023). In Jorgenson, this Court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to

demonstrate a causal link between their alleged disability and their firing, and ultimately found

the plaintiff was terminated because of his failure to abide by company policy, and not because

of his disability. Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to show that she was fired for her alleged disability.

Instead, Plaintiff was fired because of her failure and refusal to comply with the company

vaccination policy. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim for employment discrimination under the ADAAA, and judgment is entered

in Defendant’s favor as to Count II.

III. Count III – Prohibited Examination and Inquiry

Defendant’s medical inquiry is permissible and not a violation of the ADAAA because

it was “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). The

ADAAA states that “[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not

make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability

or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to

be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Id. Determining whether an inquiry is

“job-related and consistent with business necessity” is an objective inquiry and is met if “the

employer reasonably believes that an employee’s medical condition impairs his ‘ability to

perform the essential functions of the job’ or ‘the employee poses a direct threat to himself or

others.’” Coffey v. Norfolk Southern Railroad Co., 23 F. 4th 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 339 (4th Cir. 2019)).

Here, Defendant’s medical inquiry was clearly job-related as it dealt entirely with

Plaintiff requesting a medical accommodation for APL’s vaccination policy. Defendant was

not making a general inquiry into Plaintiff’s health and was only seeking information that

would allow them to follow up on the Plaintiff’s accommodations request. Had Plaintiff not

filed an accommodation, Defendant would not have made a medical inquiry. Furthermore,

the medical inquiry was made to determine whether Plaintiff should be exempt from the

employer’s COVID vaccination policy—a policy put in place to protect the public safety of

all employees, including Plaintiff. There is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to

prohibited examination and inquiries, and judgment is entered in Defendant’s favor as to

Count III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

25) is GRANTED and judgment is entered in its favor.

A separate Order follows.

Dated: April 11, 2024 ____/_s_/______________________

Richard D. Bennett

United States Senior District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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