Ajenifuja v. Owusu

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

:

KEVIN AJENIFUJA

:

v. : Civil Action No. DKC 23-1598

:

EDWARD OWUSU, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case

brought by a parent against school personnel for prohibiting him

from entering the school is the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants Edward Owusu (“Mr. Owusu”), Shannon Grigsby (“Ms.

Grigsby”), and Montgomery County Public Schools (“MCPS”)

(collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 16). The issues have been

briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed

necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the

motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background1

Plaintiff Kevin Ajenifuja (“Plaintiff”) and his ex-wife Anita

Koepcke (“Ms. Koepcke”) have three minor children, the eldest of

whom attends Clarksburg High School. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9). On or about

July 2020, Ms. Koepcke moved their children from Washington, D.C.

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set

forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff.

to Clarksburg, Maryland without Plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.

(Id.). Plaintiff and Ms. Koepcke are engaged in an ongoing custody

action before the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. (Id.

¶ 9 n.1) (citing case no. 2016-003509-DRB). Ms. Koepcke has denied

Plaintiff all communications and visitation access to their

children in violation of a permanent custody order issued by the

Superior Court on July 2, 2018. (Id. ¶ 9). Because Plaintiff

does not know Ms. Koepcke’s and their children’s home address, he

cannot visit their home to pick his children up for visitation.

(Id.). Since the entry of the custody order on July 2, 2018,

Plaintiff has made repeated attempts to visit and spend time with

his children, but the last time he had visitation access was on

November 16, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11 n.2).

On September 25, 2022, Plaintiff sought the assistance of the

Montgomery County Police Department in enforcing the custody

order. (Id. ¶ 10). The police department referred him to the

Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. (Id.). The Sheriff’s office

informed Plaintiff that it could not enforce the custody order

without a contempt of court order. (Id.).

After being denied all access to their children for so long,

Plaintiff decided to visit his fifteen-year-old daughter, K.A.A.,

at Clarksburg High School, the only place where Plaintiff knew he

could find her. (Id. ¶ 11). On December 9, 2021, Plaintiff

entered the Clarksburg High School administrative office during

lunch hour and asked to talk to K.A.A. (Id.). An administrative

staff member paged K.A.A. and she came to the administrative

office. (Id.). Plaintiff then handed her a Christmas card and

$600 for Christmas presents for her and her two siblings. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s interaction with his daughter at the administrative

office took about five minutes. (Id.).

Later that day, Plaintiff received an email with an attached

letter from Mr. Owusu, the principal of Clarksburg High School.

(Id. ¶ 12). Mr. Owusu copied Ms. Grigsby, the assistant principal,

and other officials including the Area Associate Superintendent of

the Office of School Support and Improvement (“OSSI”), Chief Safety

Officer, Commander of the 5th Police District, and Director of

OSSI on the email. (Id.). The letter states:

As the principal of Clarksburg High School, I

am hereby notifying you that, effective

immediately, you, Kevin Ajenifuja, are

forbidden to enter upon the property or campus

of Clarksburg High School, located at 22500

Wims Road, Clarksburg, MD 20871. This action

is being taken as a result of you entering the

school building on Thursday, December 9, 2021

during the school day in which you entered the

school and requested a meeting with your

child. We have court documentation that

specifically forbids this from occurring.

Your behavior has the effect of disrupting

and/or disturbing the normal educational

functions of this school.

The Montgomery County Public Schools

Regulations COC-RA, Trespassing or Willful

Disturbance on MCPS Property, and the

Annotated Code of Maryland Education Article,

Section 26-102, Trespass on the Grounds of a

Public Institution of Elementary, Secondary or

Higher Education, states that the principal or

designee may deny access to the building and

grounds of the institution to anyone who does

not have lawful business, or who disrupts or

disturbs the normal educational functions.

Failure to comply with this directive will

result in official police notification that

may lead to charges being placed for

trespassing.

If you need to conduct any official business

at the school, you are requested to call me at

240-740-6000 to schedule an appointment to

meet with me.

I regret the necessity of this action;

however, I believe it is in the best interest

of your child and the students and staff at

Clarksburg High School. Your cooperation is

appreciated. Should you have any questions

pertaining to this action, please call me at

240-740-6000.

(ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 12; 1-4, at 2).

In his opposition, Plaintiff states that no court documents

or orders forbid his going to his children’s schools. (ECF No. 18,

at 2). He includes text from the Superior Court permanent custody

order providing his visitation schedule. (Id. at 2-3). In

assessing the plausibility of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), however, the court considers Plaintiff’s complaint, not

his opposition to a motion to dismiss. McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA,

Inc., 219 F.Supp.3d 533, 541 (D.Md. 2016). A party may not amend

a complaint in an opposition to a motion to dismiss. Id. Plaintiff

does not allege in the complaint that Mr. Owusu did not have any

court documentation forbidding his entry. He also does not allege

that he told Mr. Owusu, Ms. Grigsby, or anyone else that no court

documentation prohibiting him from entering the school exists or

that he told them that any documentation that they had was

erroneous.2

On September 9, 2022, Plaintiff went to a volleyball game at

Clarksburg High School after school hours to watch his daughter’s

team. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 13). Within minutes of his arrival, Mr.

Noland, the school’s athletic director, asked Plaintiff to leave

the gymnasium. (Id.). Mr. Noland then called the Montgomery

County Police Department to enforce his instructions. (Id.).

On September 10, 2022, Plaintiff sent a letter to the

Montgomery County Police Department stating that a police officer,

Officer Gallagher, arrived at the volleyball game and informed

Plaintiff that he was banned from Clarksburg High School grounds

for one year. (Id.). Plaintiff also wrote that Officer Gallagher

told him he was free to attend his daughter’s volleyball games

outside Clarksburg High School and that starting March 22, 2023,

Plaintiff was free to attend her sporting events and other

activities at Clarksburg High School. (Id.).

2 Any attempt to amend the complaint to allege that no court

documentation forbids his entry to his children’s schools would be

futile. As will be discussed, Plaintiff cannot state a claim—

regardless of whether the court documentation exists—under the

First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment (or its state analogue,

Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights), or § 26-102 of

the Maryland Education Code.

On June 2, 2023, Plaintiff sent Mr. Owusu an email stating

that he planned to attend his second child’s middle school

graduation ceremony at Clarksburg High School and that he did not

want to create a “confrontation” or “distractions” at the event.

(Id. ¶ 14). On June 6, 2023, Mr. Owusu sent Plaintiff an email

reminding him that he is forbidden to access Clarksburg High School

property and therefore may not attend the middle school ceremony.

(Id. ¶ 15). Mr. Owusu stated that he has notified the acting

principal of Plaintiff’s second child’s middle school as well as

central office safety and security partners. (Id.).

Plaintiff assisted K.A.A. with her English and mathematics

schoolwork when she was in middle school and wishes to continue

doing so, as she struggles academically at Clarksburg High School.

(Id. ¶ 16). Clarksburg High School officials, however, have

refused to provide quarterly report cards to Plaintiff starting

with the 2022-2023 school year. (Id.). On February 22, 2023,

Plaintiff requested a copy of K.A.A.’s latest report card from

Clarksburg High School, but the school ignored the request. (Id.).

Plaintiff filed a complaint on June 14, 2023 naming as

defendants Mr. Owusu in his official and individual capacity, Ms.

Grigsby in her official and individual capacity, and MCPS in its

official capacity. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

violated his rights under the First Amendment, Fourteenth

Amendment,3 Article 24 of the Maryland State Constitution, and

§ 26-102 of the Maryland Education Code. Defendants filed a motion

to dismiss on July 20, 2023. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff filed a

response in opposition on July 31, 2023, (ECF No. 18), and

Defendants filed a reply on August 14, 2023, (ECF No. 19).

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing the complaint in light of a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “the court should accept as

true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in

a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v.

Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only

satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule 8(a)).

The Supreme Court of the United States explained that “a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Nonetheless, the

3 The vehicle for bringing a federal constitutional claim is

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive

a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead, “once a claim has been stated

adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts

consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563.

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader

is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2)).

III. Analysis

A. Montgomery County Public Schools

Defendants contend that all claims against MCPS should be

dismissed because MCPS does not possess the right to sue and be

sued. (ECF No. 16-2, at 6). They add that any attempt to amend

the complaint to name the Board of Education of Montgomery County

would be futile because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under

any count. (Id.). Plaintiff responds that “Defendant MCPS stands

as a proxy for the Superintendent of Montgomery County Public

Schools, Monifa B. McKnight[]” and that a “plaintiff may sue

individual state officials (in their official capacities) for

injunctive relief.” (ECF No. 18, at 4).4

Defendants reply that (1) Plaintiff’s argument regarding the

Superintendent is irrelevant because she has not been named as a

party; (2) as a state official acting in her official capacity,

the Superintendent is not amenable to suit under § 1983; (3) the

court cannot consider any new allegations that the Superintendent

knew of her subordinates’ alleged violations; (4) such allegations

are threadbare and cannot sustain a claim; and (5) Plaintiff cannot

sustain a claim against the Superintendent because he has failed

to state a claim for any violation by any of her subordinates.

(ECF No. 19, at 3-4).

Defendants are correct that “MCPS is not a distinct legal

entity empowered to sue or be sued.” Miller v. Montgomery Cnty.

Pub. Sch., No. 19-cv-3067-TJS, 2020 WL 2097686, at *1 (D.Md. May

1, 2020). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against MCPS will be

dismissed. Id.

Moreover, any attempt to amend the complaint to name as

defendants the Board of Education or the Superintendent, acting in

4 The current Interim Superintendent is Monique Felder, who

recently replaced Monifa McKnight.

her official capacity, would be futile.5 For some claims, those

two would be improper defendants and, for others, inasmuch as

Plaintiff fails to state a claim, adding them would be futile.

B. First Amendment Claim

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to peaceable assembly by

forbidding Plaintiff from entering the Clarksburg High School

property and campus. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 21). Defendants contend that

Count I should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to identify

any protected speech at issue or any action by which Defendants

prevented or restricted such protected speech. (ECF No. 16-2, at

8).

Plaintiff responds that his correspondence with Defendants

establishes that he engaged in a constitutionally protected

activity, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to

engage in the activity, and the protected activity was the

motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct. (ECF No. 18, at 5). He

does not specify the constitutionally protected activity in which

he engaged. In their reply, Defendants reiterate that Plaintiff

failed to identify any protected speech that Defendants restricted

5 An amendment is futile when it is “clearly insufficient or

frivolous on its face.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d

503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986).

or any assembly that Defendants denied due to such speech. (ECF

No. 19, at 4).

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the

right of the people peaceably to assemble[.]” U.S. Const. amend.

I. “The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those

of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.” De

Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). As noted by

Judge Hollander, “[t]he contours of the right to peaceably assemble

are not precisely defined in case law or otherwise.” St. Michael’s

Media, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. 21-cv-2337-

ELH, 2023 WL 2743361, at *22 (D.Md. March 31, 2023). Nevertheless,

it is possible to state some basic principles. The right has been

tied to “‘the broad right of expressive association.’” Id.

(quoting InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of Governors

of Wayne State Univ., 534 F.Supp.3d 785, 826 (E.D.Mich. 2021),

reconsideration denied, 542 F.Supp.3d 621 (E.D.Mich. 2021)). The

First Amendment protects two types of association: “intimate

association” and “expressive association.” Roberts v. U.S.

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). “[I]ntimate association” refers

to the right to “enter into and maintain certain intimate human

relationships” and “expressive association” refers to the “right

to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities

protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for

the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.” Id.

The right to peaceable assembly, therefore, falls under the

umbrella of expressive association. The Supreme Court has held

that to come within the ambit of the First Amendment’s protection

of expressive association, “a group must engage in some form of

expression, whether it be public or private.” Boy Scouts of Am.

v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was part of a group

engaging in any form of expression. Id. Nothing in the complaint

indicates Plaintiff came to Clarksburg High School to express

himself as a member of a group. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that he

entered the school in order to speak with his daughter and give

her a Christmas card and money for gifts. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 11).

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his First Amendment

right to peaceable assembly (Count I) will therefore be dismissed.

C. Due Process Claim

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that by violating his right to

peaceable assembly, Defendants deprived him of due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25, 26). Defendants

assert that Count II should be dismissed because Plaintiff does

not have a protected “liberty” or “property” interest in accessing

school property and was not deprived of any right improperly. (ECF

No. 16-2, at 9). They also argue that Ms. Grigsby should be

dismissed because the complaint does not identify any personal

action she took to ban Plaintiff from school property. (Id. at

13). Plaintiff responds that Defendants engaged in deprivation of

reputation by sending copies of the ban letter to the Montgomery

County Police Department and by removing him from a volleyball

game in front of over 150 parents and spectators, and that such a

deprivation violates his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF

No. 18, at 7). Defendants reply that the complaint does not allege

deprivation of reputation and that reputational injury alone,

without a related constitutional deprivation, does not constitute

a Fourteenth Amendment violation. (ECF No. 19, at 5).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits

states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “Due process

contains both substantive and procedural components. Procedural

due process prevents mistaken or unjust deprivation, while

substantive due process prohibits certain actions regardless of

procedural fairness.” Snider Int’l. Corp. v. Town of Forest

Heights, Md., 739 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Zinermon

v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1990); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.

247, 259 (1978)). “In order to state a claim for a violation of

due process, ‘a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support

a finding that the [plaintiff was] deprived of life, liberty, or

property, by governmental action.’” Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of

Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 79 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Equity in

Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 109 (4th Cir.

2011)).

Plaintiff does not specify the interest of which Defendants

allegedly deprived him. Based on the pleadings, however, Plaintiff

may be contending that he has a right to access his child’s school

premises. While parents have a right to direct their children’s

education without unreasonable restrictions, Herndon by Herndon v.

Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177 (4th Cir.

1996), “parents have no ‘general and unlimited First Amendment

right of access to school property[,]’” Davison v. Rose, 19 F.4th

626, 641 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Perry, 859 F.3d 156,

175 (2d Cir. 2017)); see also Just. v. Farley, No. 5:11-cv-99-BR,

2012 WL 83945, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2012) (“While parents have

a general constitutional right to direct their children’s

education without unreasonable interference by the

states, . . . this right is limited in scope and does not include

the unfettered right to access school premises.”).

Courts have uniformly held that parents do not have a

constitutional right to enter school premises. See, e.g., Lovern

v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655-56 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that

school administrators need not provide a parent with “boundless

access to school property” because “school officials have the

authority to control students and school personnel on school

property, and also have the authority and responsibility for

assuring that parents and third parties conduct themselves

appropriately while on school property”); Davison, 19 F.4th at 641

(“Lovern establishes the constitutionality of no-trespass bans

against parents attempting to enter school grounds.”); Just., 2012

WL 83945, at *3 (holding that a parent “was not deprived of a life,

liberty, or property interest when he was banned from the school

campus[]”);Johnson, 859 F.3d at 175 (“[W]e cannot conclude that a

parent has a general and unlimited First Amendment right of access

to school property.”); Porter v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 406 F.App’x

460, 462 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While parents have a general due process

right to direct their children’s education without unreasonable

interference by the states, . . . [plaintiff] has provided no

legal support for the proposition that this right includes the

right to access school premises.”). Others have found that no

such right is clearly established: Wood v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles

Cnty., No. 16-cv-00239-GJH, 2016 WL 8669913, at *10 (D.Md. Sept.

30, 2016) (“[I]t is far from clearly established that [plaintiff]

had a ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest to enter the grounds of La

Plata High School.”); Jackson v. McCurry, 762 F.App’x 919, 929

(11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he few decisions of our sister circuits

reviewing claims similar to [plaintiff’s] have uniformly concluded

that there is no clearly established right for parents to access

school property to exercise their rights under the First

Amendment.”).

Courts have expressed particular concern when parents and

members of the public threaten the safety of students or staff or

disrupt the educational process. See, e.g., Cole v. Buchanan Cnty.

Sch. Bd., 328 F.App’x 204, 209 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that a

school board “has inherent authority to restrict access to the

property that it controls” and “to remove or bar from entry an

individual who threatens the safety of students or staff, or who

disrupts the orderliness of the educational process”); Carey v.

Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980) (holding that the Constitution

does not leave state officials “powerless” to prevent conduct that

“disturbs the tranquility” of schools). Concerns of disruption

and possibly safety were present here. The letter sent by Mr.

Owusu states that Plaintiff’s entry “ha[d] the effect of disrupting

and/or disturbing the normal functions of this school.” (ECF

No. 1-4, at 2). Although the letter does not specifically cite

safety concerns, if Defendants did possess court documentation

forbidding Plaintiff’s entry, such documentation likely heightened

Defendants’ alarm.

Moreover, courts have found bans prohibiting parents from

accessing school premises even after school hours to be

constitutional. See, e.g., Wood, 2016 WL 8669913, at *2, *10

(finding no due process violation when ban prevented parent from

attending parent teacher school organization meetings, planning

events for his child, and events honoring his child’s academic

achievements); see also Davison, 19 F.4th at 630, 641-42 (holding

that school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and

finding no due process violation where ban prohibited parent’s

presence on school property and attendance at any school-sponsored

activities). Thus, Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Due

Process rights by banning Plaintiff from attending K.A.A.’s

volleyball game or his younger child’s graduation ceremony at

Clarksburg High School, in addition to banning his entry during

school hours.

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants engaged in deprivation

of reputation also fails. Plaintiff did not allege deprivation of

reputation in the complaint, and he may not amend the complaint in

an opposition to a motion to dismiss. McDonald, 219 F.Supp.3d at

541; Osei v. Univ. of Maryland Univ. Coll., No. 15-cv-2502-DKC,

2018 WL 2117927, at *2-3 (D.Md. May 8, 2018). Moreover,

reputational injury alone, without a related constitutional

deprivation, is insufficient to constitute a Fourteenth Amendment

violation. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see also

Pettigrew v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. L-10-cv-652-BEL,

2010 WL 1258182, at *1 (D.Md. Mar. 25, 2010) (“Injury to reputation

alone does not result in a deprivation of a liberty or a property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.”).

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants violated

his Due Process rights by prohibiting him from entering school

premises. Count II will therefore be dismissed.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue in the alternative that Mr. Owusu and Ms.

Grigsby are entitled to qualified immunity for damages as to Counts

I and II. (ECF No. 16-2, at 13). Plaintiff responds that they

are not entitled to qualified immunity because they knew or should

have known that their actions violated Plaintiff’s First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 18, at 10). Defendants

reply that Plaintiff has not alleged that a right was violated,

that the right was clearly established, and that a reasonable

official in the same position would understand that the conduct

was unlawful. (ECF No. 19, at 6).

Because the court will dismiss Counts I and II on other

grounds, it need not reach the question of qualified immunity.

E. Article 24 of the Maryland State Constitution Claim

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his

right to freedom of assembly under Article 24 of the Maryland State

Constitution. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 29).

Defendants correctly argue that because Article 24 is

analyzed in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment, Count III

should be dismissed for the same reason as Count II. (ECF No. 16-

2, at 15). “Article 24 is the State’s constitutional guarantee of

due process and equal protection of the law.” Taylor v. Go-

Getters, Inc, No. 20-cv-3624-ELH, 2021 WL 5840956, at *16 (D.Md.

Dec. 9, 2021) (citing Town of Easton v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,

379 Md. 21, 41 n.11 (2003)). It is well settled that Article 24

is interpreted in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment.

Hawkins v. Leggett, 955 F.Supp.2d 474, 496 (D.Md. 2013), aff’d sub

nom. In re Canarte, 558 F.App’x 327 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rosa

v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cnty., Md., No. 8:11-cv-02873-AW, 2012

WL 3715331, at *6 (D.Md. Aug. 27, 2012) (noting that “Article 24

of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is the state law equivalent

of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “[t]herefore, the analysis under

Article 24 is, for all intents and purposes, duplicative of the

analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment[]”); Littleton v. Swonger,

502 F.App’x 271, 274 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that Article 24 is

construed in pari materia with the Fourteenth Amendment)).

Because Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim will be

dismissed, his Article 24 claim will be dismissed as well.

F. Section 26-102 of the Maryland Education Code Claim

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated § 26-

102(b)(1) of the Maryland Education Code by forbidding him from

entering school property. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31, 32).

Defendants contend that Count IV should be dismissed because

there is no private cause of action for violation of § 26-102 and

Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish how Defendants violated

the provision. (ECF No. 16-2, at 15). Plaintiff does not

substantively respond, instead arguing that “[b]ecause

determination of the motion to dismiss requires a review of the

substantive law applicable to the claims ple[]d, the court must

review the substantive law on which the plaintiff’s claims [are]

based.” (ECF No. 18, at 12). Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s

opposition does not refute their point that there is no private

cause of action § 26-102 and does not identify any part of the

complaint that alleges how Defendants violated § 26-102. (ECF

No. 19, at 7).

Section 26-102 of the Maryland Education Code provides:

(b) The governing board, president,

superintendent, principal, or school resource

officer of any public institution of

elementary, secondary, or higher education, or

a person designated in writing by the board or

any of these persons, may deny access to the

buildings or grounds of the institution to any

other person who:

(1) Is not a bona fide, currently registered

student, or staff or faculty member at the

institution, and who does not have lawful

business to pursue at the institution;

(2) Is a bona fide, currently registered

student at the institution and has been

suspended or expelled from the institution,

for the duration of the suspension or

expulsion; or

(3) Acts in a manner that disrupts or disturbs

the normal educational functions of the

institution.

Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 26-102(b). Plaintiff does not allege how

Defendants violated this provision. To the contrary, § 26-102(b)

authorizes Defendants to restrict Plaintiff’s access to enter

school premises. See Wood, 2016 WL 8669913, at *10 (dismissing

Due Process claim of parent who had been banned from school because

§ 26-102(b) explicitly authorizes the school officials to deny his

access). Moreover, the statute does not create a private cause of

action, either explicitly or by implication. See Fangman v.

Genuine Title, LLC, 447 Md. 681, 693-94 (2016) (quoting Baker v.

Montgomery Cnty., 427 Md. 691, 710 (2012)) (“Courts discern

. . . whether a private cause of action was intended by analyzing

the language of the statute to identify its purpose and intended

beneficiaries, reviewing the statute’s legislative history, and

determining whether the statute provides otherwise an express

remedy.”). Plaintiff is clearly not one of the class for whose

benefit the statute was enacted, there is no indication of

legislative intent to create a remedy for parents in this

situation, and it would not be consistent with the underlying

purposes of the legislation to imply a remedy for parents such as

plaintiff.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim that Defendants

violated § 26-102(b) of the Maryland Education Code. Count IV

will therefore be dismissed.

G. Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Defendants argue that because “Plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for Counts I – IV, Plaintiff’s requested relief, including

Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, must

fail.” (ECF No. 16-2, at 16).

Claims for relief are not separate causes of action. Because

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted in any of the counts, his complaint, including the requests

for injunctive and declaratory relief, will be dismissed pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will

be granted. A separate order will follow.

/s/

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge